

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

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DOCTORAL STUDIES:

PhD (In Progress) University of California, San Diego, 2004 to Present
Thesis: Statistical Discrimination in the U.S. Apartment Rental Market: A large sample field study
Expected Completion Date: Spring 2010

THESIS COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES:

Gordon Dahl (Chair) UC San Diego Economics Dept 9500 Gilman Dr. #0508 La Jolla, CA 92093 gdahl@ucsd.edu (858) 822-0644	Vincent Crawford (co-chair) UC San Diego Economics Dept 9500 Gilman Dr. #0508 La Jolla, CA 92093 vcrawfor@dss.ucsd.edu (858) 534-3452	Kate Antonovics UC San Diego Economics Dept 9500 Gilman Dr. #0508 La Jolla, CA 92093 kantonov@ucsd.edu (858) 534-2973
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UNDERGRADUATE STUDIES:

Bachelor of Arts, Economics, University of California, Berkeley, with honors, 2004

Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 2004

DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Fields: Applied Microeconomics

Secondary Fields: Experimental/Behavioral Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

Austin Community College - Instructor
Microeconomics - Summer 2009

Park University - Instructor
Statistics for Business and Economics - Summer 2009

Rady School of Management at University of California, San Diego - Teaching Assistant
Strategy – 2007-2008

University of California, San Diego - Teaching Assistant

Microeconomics, Intro/Intermediate/Advanced Econometrics, Game Theory, Choice Under Uncertainty, Financial Economics, Labor Economics, Economics of Industrialization, Economic History of the United States, Environmental Economics - Fall 2004 - Spring 2007, Fall 2008 - Present

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

M. Davis and Company Inc. – Economic Consultant

January 2010 - Present

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIPS:

Russell Sage Foundation - Small Grant for Behavioral Economics

Awarded Fall 2008

Institute for Applied Economics – Research Grant

Awarded Fall 2008

University of California, San Diego – Department of Economics Teach Assistant Excellence Award

Awarded Fall 2009

University of California, San Diego - Department of Economics Heller Prize – Outstanding 3rd Year Paper

Awarded Spring 2007

B.P. Foundation Scholarship

Awarded 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009

RESEARCH PAPERS:

Statistical Discrimination in the U.S. Apartment Rental Market: Evidence from an internet field study (co-authored with Michael Ewens and Choon Wang)

We test for statistical discrimination in the apartment rental market using an email-based correspondence study. Emails containing randomly assigned white or black sounding names are sent to over 14,000 vacancy listings posted on Craigslist.org across 35 U.S. cities. By manipulating the level of positive or negative information included in inquiry emails sent to these postings we are able to evaluate the effect of information on racial discrimination. We apply the model of statistical discrimination proposed by Aigner and Cain (1977) to our experimental methodology to form several testable hypotheses. This model is robust in predicting many, but not all, of our results. We find evidence of preferential treatment of whites in terms of the likelihood of receiving a response (as well as the likelihood of receiving a positive response) in a baseline treatment where no additional information is provided. The racial gap in differential treatment is unchanged when positive information is added, though the gap diminishes in the presence of negative information.

The Importance of Appearing Earnest: The Effect of Recognition on Other Regarding Behavior

A two treatment experiment is carried out within subjects to determine whether altruistic behavior observed in the laboratory is the result of preferences over certain outcomes, or preferences for being recognized as having created these outcomes. Using a unique design which creates a dichotomy between the way subjects truly behave and the way they are perceived as behaving, we are able to add greater nuance to the subject “types” determined by previous experiments. “Self-interested” subjects will behave selfishly regardless of how their behavior is perceived by others, even when a small sacrifice on their part would result in great gains for their partner. “Appearance-concerned” subjects consistently exploit informational asymmetries to obtain self-biased earnings distributions while maintaining a favorable appearance. “True-egalitarians” divide earnings equally, even when doing so makes them appear selfish in the eyes of their partner.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

Journal referee: American Economic Review