Research

Statistical Discrimination in the U.S. Apartment Rental Market (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: We test for statistical discrimination in the apartment rental market using an email-based correspondence study. Emails containing randomly assigned white or black sounding names are sent to over 14,000 vacancy listings posted on Craigslist.org across 35 U.S. cities. By manipulating the level of positive or negative information included in inquiry emails sent to these postings we are able to evaluate the effect of information on racial discrimination. We apply the model of statistical discrimination proposed by Aigner and Cain (1977) to our experimental methodology to form several testable hypotheses. This model is robust in predicting many, but not all, of our results. We find evidence of preferential treatment of whites in terms of the likelihood of receiving a response (as well as the likelihood of receiving a positive response) in a baseline treatment where no additional informaiton is provided. The racial gap in differential treatment is unchanged when positive information is added, though the gap diminishes in the presence of negative information for males.

The Importance of Appearing Earnest: Identifying the Effect of Recognition on Other Regarding Behavior

Abstract: A two treatment experiment is carried out within subjects to determine whether altruistic behavior observed in the laboratory is the result of preferences over certain outcomes, or preferences for being recognized as having created these outcomes. Using a unique design which creates a dichotomy between the way subjects truly behave and the way they are perceived as behaving, we are able to add greater nuance to subject "types" as determined by previous experiments. "Self-interested" subjects will behave selfishly regardless of how their behavior is perceived by others, even when a small sacrifice on their part would result in great gains for their partner. "Appearance-concerned" subjects consistently exploit informational asymmetries in both treatments to obtain self-biased earnings distributions while maintaining a socially favorable appearance. "True-egaliatrains" divide earnings equally, and often in the most efficient manner possible, even when doing so causes them to appear selfish in the eyes of their partner.