

## **Dictators, Democrats, and Government Performance**

### **In an African Country**

#### **Chapter 8:**

#### **Conclusion**

It is not too far of a stretch to credit James Madison with the underlying logic of veto player theory. In *The Federalist Papers*, he argues eloquently for dividing power in a republican system. Different branches of the American government would allow “ambition to counter ambition” he says, preventing any single faction from dominating distribution or debate. Hobbes takes a rather different view of sovereign power. He argues that placing the three major authorities of government (levying money, commanding an army, and making laws) in separate bodies would “endangereth the commonwealth” and would encumber lawmaking. “Few perceive, that such government is not government, but division of the commonwealth into three factions.” He concludes “the truth is that it is not one independent commonwealth, but three independent factions, nor one representative person, but three” (Hobbes 1994).

Hobbes saw too many sovereign voices as an invitation to chaos and the fragmentation of policy demands. By contrast, Madison feared that too few sovereign interests in government would pave the road to tyranny. Hundreds of years later we are still debating the virtues of dividing power in order to ensure representation and

accountability. The distributional implications of multiple, sovereign voices in government are still emerging. This project has shown how veto players offer a promising theoretical framework for exploring these issues. The crafting of so many new constitutions over the last two decades, alongside the inability of so many governments to improve the lives of their citizens, remind us of the practical urgency pressing many of these otherwise abstract questions.

In this final chapter I summarize my major findings, discuss their implications, and identify areas for further research. In the first section I outline the empirical puzzle I set out to explain: variation in government performance within one complex country over time. I restate the rationale for the operationalizations of my dependent variable and briefly describe the notable trends. I also note why the conventional causal explanations for this variation, such as regime type and ethnic diversity, do not withstand scrutiny.

In the second section, I restate the basic argument about why veto players have causal effect on government performance (Tsebelis 2002). This required extending the basic veto player model in several ways: I drew on insights from the literatures on bargaining, parliaments, and comparative authoritarianism to extend the model across regimes. I then built upon Cox and McCubbins' work to argue that veto players can explain a range of outcomes, not just policy stability (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63). I also described the logic of informal vetoes, identifying "regional vetoes" as one particular type that often intervenes in Nigeria's policy process. My test results did not show that regimes with more vetoes deliver more pork as I predicted. But they did reveal that these regimes deliver fewer public goods, while they do not improve policy efficiency.

In the third section of this chapter I explore the implications of my findings and point out avenues for future research. One category of implications concerns veto players, since I extended the theory to non-democratic regimes and tested the models on a new range of dependent variables. I found strong support for the claim that additional veto players exacerbate bargaining problems, but weak support for the distributional dilemma tradition's claim that this increases the level of pork. The implications for democracy fit into a second category. My observation that democracies consistently waste more money than dictatorships in some areas of education but not others especially stands out because new democracies often invest heavily in such programs. Finally, my findings on federalism populate another category of implications. By exploring the leverage and logic of Nigeria's federal bargain, I revealed how state creation reinforces the saliency of discrete identities. State creation also serves the interests of the center. Future research in this area might explore the characteristics of successful subnational coordination.

## **A REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE**

### **Public Goods and Pork in Nigeria**

I began this dissertation with a puzzle, demonstrating that Nigeria has experienced variation in government performance over time. Chapter 2 discussed different ways of measuring of government performance, drawing extensively from the public goods literature (Olson 1965). I argued that relying on macroeconomic indicators, as many large-*N* studies do, has important drawbacks. I addressed this by incorporating measures of my dependent variable that resemble pure public goods as well as others that are

comparatively excludable in consumption. I identify education outputs, courts, and budgetary discipline as policies which meet these criteria.

I generated a pair of variables based on commonly used operationalizations for each policy area. I discussed the trends with each variable in detail, utilizing extensive qualitative evidence to elaborate on the statistics and to describe any important policy shifts. This information captures three different aspects of performance: First, I document the delivery of pork by examining the number of primary schools and student/teacher ratios. I find that student/teacher ratios were lowest in the early 1960s. The early 1980s and the mid 1990s were the only other two periods where the ratio reached levels that the government considers good. The worst years occurred in the late 1970s, the late 1980s, and in 1999 – 2000. The number of schools generally increases over time. But I illustrate a steep increase starting in the mid-1970s, a slump in the late 1980s, and the slight downturn after 1999.

Second, I reviewed the delivery of public goods, which I measure in terms of judicial efficiency and fiscal discipline. Based on case clearance rates, I found that the courts operated efficiently throughout the 1960s while the 1970s were moderately inefficient. Using estimates for years after 1987, my figures showed that courts in the early 1990s clear cases slowly, but not quite as slowly as in the early 1980s. The courts subsequently improved but the rate in the mid-1990s was still quite low.

I operationalized fiscal discipline, my other measure of public goods, in terms of budgetary discipline. Here the data showed that the government ran surpluses in 1971-1974 and 1980. The government also ran comparatively small surpluses in the mid-1990s, although I caution these figures in particular warrant “a grain of salt.” In all other

years the federal government ran deficits. For some years, especially in the 1960s, the deficits were relatively small. The most egregious deficits occurred from 1976 to 1979, in 1981, 1982, 1986, 1991, and 1993.

Third, I measured the efficiency of education spending on teachers and schools. Using federal spending as the principal policy input, I compared predicted educational outputs with the observed ones. My model revealed that the most efficient spending occurred in the 1960s generally, a brief period in the mid-1990s, and to some extent in the early 1980s. The most wasteful spending on education occurred in the late 1970s, and the late 1980s into the early 1990s. Spending was also wasteful between 1999 and 2001. The model based on primary schools showed that schools in the early 1960s were slightly below the predicted number. The figure improved for the remainder of the decade. Levels were low from 1971 to 1973 but from 1973 to 1977 the number was higher than expected. The 1980s were full of seemingly random ups and downs. 1994 to 1998 showed notably higher than predicted number of schools, and this situation reversed in 1999.

### **Possible Explanations for Performance Variation**

After documenting this variation in performance I turn to likely explanations for it. Three of the most common causal explanations for failures in government performance are authoritarianism, ethnic diversity, and an economy dependent on natural resources. Even though Nigeria possesses all of these characteristics, I argued that none of them adequately explain the variation in performance. I built this argument in three different steps.

First, Chapter 3 rejected a hypothesis predicting that regime type explains performance. Regime type should affect policy performance because democracy increases political accountability. Among democracy's advocates, Lake and Baum write that democracy "remains the most effective instrument available for controlling the state and producing public services" (Lake and Baum 2001, 587-621). Others by contrast point out that numerous undemocratic countries around the world enjoy healthy economies and good government performance (Brownlee 2007; Gat 2007, 59-69).

I found no consistent correlation between regime type and government performance. Some authoritarian regimes improved delivery of social services and public goods, while some democracies allowed them to decline. My analysis of government performance under all the regimes between 1960 and 2003 reported that democracy does deliver according to some measures of education performance. For example, democracies maintained lower student/teacher ratios in primary schools. But this record did not hold when we considered policies that meet the stricter definition of public goods. Democracies did not have more efficient courts and they often had some of the worst fiscal discipline. In terms of wastefulness, education spending naira-for-naira yielded far fewer schools under democracy than under dictatorships. Nigeria's record therefore seems to present a challenge to the literature arguing for a causal link between democracy and government performance. Before rejecting the regime type hypothesis outright though, I detailed the performance of each regime. This permitted me to single out *which* regimes performed as expected.

To address the second possible explanation, Nigeria's natural resource-dependent economy, I controlled for oil revenues in all of my tests. Oil income makes fiscal

planning sensitive to exogenous shocks; when the government lacks revenue it can deliver fewer goods to its citizens. My tests throughout the dissertation showed that oil revenues have an effect only on fiscal discipline. But when I presented the final test results of the alternative explanation for performance, oil is actually less significant than veto players across the board.

Ethnic diversity provides the third possible explanation. Nigeria is certainly an extremely diverse society, and scholars attribute low growth (Easterly and Levine 1997, 1203-50), corruption (Alesina et al. 2003, 155-94), and other governance failures to such diversity. Since my study involves only one country over time, this explanation also fails. But social identities are important in Nigeria and my alternative explanation shows how the broader social cleavages can wield great leverage over the policy process.

## **VETO PLAYERS AS A CAUSAL EXPLANATION**

My alternative explanation is rooted in veto player theory, which I outlined in several stages. Chapter 4 reviewed the literature and the logic of veto player theory. I argued that veto players better capture the structure of the policy process. Institutional vetoes can be individual, collective, or “partisan,” in which case they express a stable set of preferences generated by the institutions (Tsebelis 2002; Haggard and McCubbins 2001). Because the existing literature only shows how vetoes account for policy stability, and virtually all of it focuses on developed democracies, I extended the theory in two ways. As a first step I showed how the theory already accommodates the possibility of non-democratic regimes. Referring to crucial case studies, I described how authoritarian regimes share risk, recruit expertise, and seek to protect themselves from charges of

illegitimacy. When it incorporates transaction costs in bargaining existing veto player theory allows for a variety of unconventional collective actors with political leverage.

As a second step, I linked veto players to other outcomes besides policy stability. Drawing upon Cox and McCubbins, I pointed out how regimes with more veto players are also more prone to bargaining problems. This has distributional consequences (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63). Based on these considerations, I hypothesized that more vetoes should lead to more pork. This is an important hypothesis because the “commitment” tradition in this literature expects veto players to enhance policy stability without generating bargaining problems. I contrasted this with Cox and McCubbins as representatives of the “distributional dilemma” tradition. These scholars show how additional veto players can generate negative externalities. Each policy actor is in a position to demand pork; a bargaining process with too many actors is both expensive and threatens to undermine the delivery of public goods.

I also described informal veto players as policy actors not specified by formal institutions but who possess political leverage just the same. Military factions, such as those that emerge in non-democratic regimes, form one such type of informal veto. According to Tsebelis, the practical task of identifying preferences and vetoes in authoritarian regimes involves careful scrutiny of each regime (Tsebelis 2002, 78). By looking to the bureaucracy, military factions, and other cohesive political interests I identified numerous vetoes that exist outside of formal constitutional structures. To exercise a veto, informal policy actors must possess both cause and capability. The other type of informal veto, rooted in regional preferences, must satisfy a third condition. “Regional vetoes” emerge only when existing institutional veto players fail to cut across

Nigeria's broadest cleavage, between north and south. This is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condition.

In Chapter 5 I outlined the logic of regional vetoes, linking social and historical contexts to representative institutions that create incentives for politicizing identity. I summarized the historical basis of Nigeria's subnational politics and described the incentives for sustaining at least three cleavages. As far back as the 1950's, politicians utilized ethno-regional quotas to guarantee equitable representation at the federal level. This practice continues today as the federal character tradition. I developed an identity matrix as an analytical tool for capturing variation in Nigeria's three most basic geopolitical units. States are the most discrete sources of identity engaged in national politics. State creation began almost immediately after independence, first as an effort to dilute opposition voices and later to divide up the spoils of federally controlled revenue. "Zones," the next largest unit, exist nowhere in the constitution. Yet the National Assembly divides leadership offices on this basis, political parties use them to allocate positions, and grievances often coalesce around these seemingly artificial boundaries. Zones have their origins in colonial administrative strategies, when the British used divide-and-rule tactics. Regions express the country's broadest cleavage, between north and south. Brought together with the birth of Nigeria in 1914, the country is now held together by a precarious federal bargain predicated on the cultural and political equality of these two areas. Zones and states may attempt to exercise leverage, but only regions – when organized and united – can impose a veto on the policy process.

These historical, cultural, and economic complexities have earned Nigeria a reputation as the "graveyard of theory." To preempt any such skepticism, Chapter 6

undertook a rigorous and lengthy process of coding the country's veto players. At one end of the possible range of regimes rests those where policy making and implementation require only the chief executive's consent. The preferences in collective bodies mirror his or her preferences. The veto player literature claims that such regimes are rarer than the popular understanding of authoritarianism suggests (Tsebelis 2002). In fact I coded only one regime, lasting two years, as a single-veto regime. At the other end of the range, removal of the chief executive is a real political possibility and gridlock may emerge from a system of checks and balances among multiple veto players. I identified three regimes with four veto players, spanning a total of 13 years.

After the 1980s, the flurry of publications about Nigeria's military regimes dropped off. Chapter 6 made a convincing case that it is time for scholars to return to this research. Many new sources have come to light since the return of democracy in 1999. Exploiting some of these materials, my coding revealed some unexpected patterns of coalition building by those who held vetoes and those who hoped to hold vetoes. Even authoritarian regimes face political costs if their institutions are too exclusive. So who did they turn to in order to convey an image of inclusion? One type of regime, such as Gowon's, depended on powerful senior bureaucrats while others, such as Buhari's, turned to conservative traditional rulers. In another type of regime, softliners shifted the balance of power as they did under Babangida. Also, state military administrators sometimes collectively conspired against federal policy, as they did under Aguyi-Ironsi. Nigeria's authoritarian regimes deserve revisiting, as rich new details continue to emerge in the press and in the memoirs of former generals.

### **Summary of the Veto Player Test Results**

My basic hypothesis throughout this dissertation states that more veto players lead to more pork. I make three causal claims about how the number of veto players impact policy outputs. I predicted that regimes with more veto players deliver more pork, fewer public goods, and less policy efficiency. Chapter 7 introduced my control variables and performed statistical tests using original data. First, I found that veto players do not have the expected impact on the level of pork. There was no significant impact on the number of primary schools, and student/teacher ratios actually get significantly worse as the number of vetoes increases. This finding runs counter to Cox and McCubbins' intuition that as each veto player demands a payoff, policy becomes burdened by pork (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63). By contrast I found support for their theory in my second test, where my results showed that regimes with more vetoes deliver fewer public goods. Bargaining problems increase with the number of veto players, and this reduces the government's ability to maintain fiscal discipline and judicial efficiency.

My third test revealed that multi-veto regimes do not significantly decrease the efficiency of education spending on school infrastructure as a measure of pork spending. They do, however, have the predicted impact on the policy efficiency of student/teacher ratios. An increase in the number of veto players led to a statistically significant increase in policy inefficiency, even after introducing controls. This challenges one stream of the veto player literature, which suggests that the opportunities for corruption decline with additional veto players (Andrews and Montinola 2004, 55-87). It also conflicts with the commitment tradition's underlying premise, which links the credibility provided by veto players to political accountability more broadly.

The *regime* dummy produced some curious effects, both in tests of the “regime type” hypothesis and as a control variable in my veto player models in Chapter 7. My tests revealed first that regime type has no impact on the delivery of public goods. Neither fiscal discipline nor judicial efficiency improves under democracy. Democracy also fails to improve the level of pork. In fact, democracies build fewer schools. This holds at a statistically significant level; numerous scandals during the Second and Fourth Republics that I described (in Chapter 3) buttress the regressions. Finally, my tests for policy efficiency suggest that democracy improves the policy efficiency measured in terms of teachers. However the coefficients were only significant in the models where *regime* acts as a control. To the extent that democracies have a measurable effect on school construction, the results suggest that democracies are actually waste more money. I concluded from this that democracies improve accountability through more efficient spending on teachers but just the reverse occurs when they build schools. This finding provides a cautionary note for countries such as Nigeria that create new vetoes in order to share power.

## **IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH**

My findings have a variety of empirical and theoretical implications. One category of implications centers on what we have learned about the promise of veto player theory. First, vetoes can be used to explain more than just policy stability. Even though some of my predictions failed, vetoes are highly correlated with student teacher ratios, budgetary discipline, and one type of inefficient education spending. Second, this means that vetoes express the structure of the policy process better than a dichotomous approach to democracy and authoritarianism. By establishing clear criteria and using

qualitative evidence to reveal veto players' "cause and capability," I incorporated factions and regional vetoes as two types of vetoes that arise through extra-constitutional political processes.

My third and probably most important contribution in this category arises from my tests of the two veto player traditions I identified: commitment and distributional dilemmas. While previous studies acknowledge these differences, none actually test these traditions utilizing variables that capture the differences between pork and public goods. I find that commitment not only increases bargaining problems, it does so without improving accountability. In addition, while my tests did not support the distributional dilemma's argument about the level of pork, they did support its claim about how additional veto players impair the delivery public goods. These findings are particularly robust with regard to fiscal discipline. This means that governing arrangements that aim to ensure political inclusion by increasing the number of vetoes put public goods at risk. Future tests for distributional dilemmas should probably incorporate measures of pork that do not contribute to human capital. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, policies which do so acquire some of the properties of public goods by forcing policy makers to make political calculations with a time horizon beyond their immediate self-interest.

Another category of implications arise from observing the policy effects of democracy. For those concerned about the normative implications of my findings of the regime type hypothesis, I think the theory ultimately points to the inadequacy of a dichotomous approach to regimes. I argue that regime type fails to capture the relevant institutional variation impacting policy outputs; democracies perform poorly when the policy process incorporates too many actors with the leverage to extract concessions.

The different effects of regime type on teachers and schools may also be important. They showed that democracies spend money more efficiently than dictatorships on personnel. But the reverse is true when it comes to school construction. Both effects are quite robust. This suggests a practical, cautionary note for new democracies that launch ambitious and often costly education programs. To further explore this effect, I intend to use data I have that distinguishes between capital and recurrent education spending. (It was not possible to exploit this data for all of the years covered by this dissertation.) This would improve my operationalizations by linking the appropriate category of spending to the variable in question.

Finally, our third category of implications concerns the nature of Nigeria's federal bargain. The fact that representation generates particularistic benefits contributes to the persistence of discrete subnational identities. Scholars of federalism widely attribute the creation of new states and local governments to this phenomenon (Suberu 2001; Onwudiwe and Suberu 2005). I argue that regional vetoes do not emerge when existing veto players adequately represent Nigeria's largest cleavage, between north and south. This generates several new insights about Nigerian federalism. By refocusing scholarly attention on regimes, regional veto players reveal how the creation of additional subnational units also serves the interests of political actors bargaining at the center. Dividing up the "national cake" is more than just a local response to centrally-controlled fiscal resources. The localized view oversimplifies state creation as a collective action problem in the sense that the pursuit of rational self-interest by each subnational community generates collectively irrational outcomes. I have instead shown how this process is also part of a political strategy that serves the interests of the center.

The notion that new subnational units serve the interests of the center also means that minimum winning coalitions are inadequate. Even if a government has enough regional support to satisfy a regime's rules for inclusion, it still pays off additional political actors because it hopes to weaken their ability to coordinate a regional veto. Inclusive governance requires some degree of surplus membership. This practice is entrenched in Nigeria's norms of politics and deeply rooted in the colonial era. As we learned from our coding exercise, Nigeria legislated through oversized coalitions in 1965 and 1983. This is a timely finding since many critics of Nigeria's recent 2007 elections endorse a surplus coalition as a gesture to overcome the election's profound flaws (International Crisis Group 2007). Oversized cabinets throughout Africa further suggest that Nigeria would be far from unique by pursuing such solutions.

Future research in this area could address two important aspects of my intuitions about regional veto players. To start, I hope to demonstrate when actors identify with one cleavage rather than another. I also might delve into the dynamics of subnational coordination. This would allow me to identify the characteristics of organizing that are most conducive to the cohesion of informal collective political actors. Next, it is worth demonstrating that only regions can impose a veto. I make this argument in Chapter 5 using an identity matrix and the logic of a transactions costs model. The persistence of north/south differences on shari'a and the broader historical basis of Nigeria's federal unity suggest that this assertion is eminently reasonable. But documenting the failed attempts by the smaller subnational units to impose vetoes would put this proposition on terra firma. This might also allow me to empirically demonstrate the population proportionality principle that I assert in Chapter 5. A result would likely be a valuable

contribution to research which explores how population proportions impact the saliency of ethnic identities (Posner 2004, 529-45).

### **A Few Reflections on Nigeria's Future**

At the time of this writing, Nigeria is enjoying its longest experiment with democracy ever. The same Obasanjo who stepped down in 1979 to allow a transition to democracy turned over the presidency in 2007 after serving two terms as president. Optimists praised the transfer of power in Sub-Sahara Africa's largest country. They measured success by the absence of military involvement in politics, the relatively limited violence during the elections, and the failure of Obasanjo's stealth attempt to change the constitution to allow himself a third term in office. Even if Nigeria's democracy remains flawed, the ability of the National Assembly and civil society to thwart an illegal extension of power offers an encouraging sign.

On another level, the democratic gains seem more modest. First of all, the elections were so profoundly flawed that even the oil-dependent United States sent a low-level delegation to the inauguration. A coalition of 50,000 domestic election observers reported widespread irregularities and malpractices, concluding that "on the whole, the elections were a charade and did not meet the minimum standards required for democratic elections." They recommended cancellation entirely.<sup>1</sup> The European Union and other observers shared the profound sense of concern.

Second, Obasanjo's record government performance seems mixed at best. Deficits are down but schools, courts, and other organs of government remain in crisis. Improving policy efficiency has become intertwined with the ruling party's hegemonic

---

<sup>1</sup> "An Election Programmed to Fail – Domestic Observers," *Daily Trust*, April 25, 2007.

ambitions. Before the election its presidential candidate claimed he was the only governor who had not been accused of corruption by a federal government commission. And as mentioned in this dissertation's introduction, all of this has both strengthened subnational identities and created an ambivalent popular attitude toward democracy.

Following Buhari's coup in 1983, Obasanjo commented on this ambivalence:

We'll probably have to accept that the military will be a major factor to reckon with in the political life of the country. This is a country that needs to be governed. I believe that we have to look at our society and devise for ourselves a system that has everybody chipping in to participate in one form or another. A system that gives us direction, that gives us decisive and purposeful leadership and galvanizes us together as a nation. I don't believe that the ritual of voting every four years really does that.<sup>2</sup>

The flawed elections of 2007 suggest that he has changed his mind little, and the institution of presidency is now more powerful than ever. However at some level, sovereignty ultimately resides in people and their ability to reconstruct authority. In this dissertation, I have suggested that a recurring dilemma in Nigerian politics requires balancing representation and performance. Hopefully I have provided some insight into the likely consequences of Nigerians' institutional choices.

---

<sup>2</sup> "Obasanjo Okays Coup," *The Punch*, January 19, 1984. See also "Young Elder Statesmen," *West Africa*, January 30, 1984, pp. 197-98.

## Works Cited

- Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2003):155-94.
- Andrews, Josephine T. and Gabriella R. Montinola. 2004. "Veto Players and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (2004):55-87.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 2001. The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes. In *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*. Ed. Haggard, Stephan and Mathew McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Easterly, William and Ross Levine. 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (1997):1203-50.
- Gat, Azar. 2007. "The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers." *Foreign Affairs* 86 (2007):59-69.
- Haggard, Stephan and Mathew D McCubbins. 2001. *Presidents, parliaments, and policy*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobbes, Thomas. 1994. *Leviathan with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668*. Ed. Curley, E. M. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co.
- International Crisis Group. Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State? 2007. Dakar/Brussels, International Crisis Group.
- Lake, David and Matthew Baum. 2001. "The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services." *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (2001):587-621.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Onwudiwe, Ebere and Rotimi T. Suberu. 2005. *Nigerian Federalism in Crisis: Critical Perspectives and Political Options*. Ibadan : Program on Ethnic and Federal Studies.
- Posner, Daniel. 2004. "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review* 98 (2004):529-45.
- Suberu, Rotimi T. 2001. *Federalism and ethnic conflict in Nigeria*. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. New York and Princeton: Russell Sage Foundation with Princeton University Press.