A. Carl LeVan, Ph.D.
American University
Assistant Professor, School of International Service
Chair, Council on African Studies
Africa Coordinator, Comparative & Regional Studies
4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20016-8071
Office hours fall spring 2009:
Tuesday 3-6, Thursday 2-4
Asbury, room 224B
Dictators, Democrats, and Development in Nigeria
I dispute explanations for government performance in Nigeria based on regime type or fiscal resources. To test my theory that the number of policy actors better predicts performance, I build a veto player model that applies across regimes and to outcomes besides policy stability. Qualitative and quantitative analyses show that my theory better predicts policy outputs. Since Nigeria’s rules of political inclusion impact the number of veto players, my findings pose a dilemma: Increasing the number of political actors improves the representativeness of the policy process. But introducing surplus preferences adds new payments to policy actors and impairs the delivery of public goods. I measure performance using original time-series data on education, fiscal discipline, and the judiciary covering four decades.
Click here for information about the book and the National Security State Seminar at George Washington University.
Working Papers
“Decentralization and Corruption in Nigeria's Education Sector," presentation at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2008. Please email me for a current draft.
"Current and Future Challenges for Nigeria's Electoral Framework," presentation at the Nigerian Peoples Forum, Washington, DC, May 2006.
Carl LeVan / Political Science Department / Last Modified: 1/13/09