

Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US Authority



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Over the past century, the United States has built and sustained relationships of varying hierarchy over states in Latin America, Western Europe, and Northeast Asia. In recent decades, it also has attempted to expand its authority over other states into Eastern Europe, which has been met with a measure of success, and the Middle East, which has been far more problematic. The authority wielded by the United States over its subordinates, despite occasional abuses, provides security both internally and externally and permits unprecedented prosperity. Americans, in turn, gain from writing the rules of that order. The key foreign policy task today is not to diminish US authority, but to preserve its benefits into the future. To rule legitimately, however, requires tying the suzerain's hands. To secure the international order that has been so beneficial in the past century and to succeed in extending that order to countries that do not yet enjoy its fruits requires a new, more restraining, multilateral solution that binds the hands of the United States far more tightly than in the past. KEYWORDS: authority, hierarchy, multilateralism, new world order, US foreign policy.

THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AN EMPIRE. OVER THE PAST CENTURY, HOWEVER, it has built and sustained informal empires over states on the Caribbean littoral, spheres of exclusive political and economic influence over countries in South America, and after 1945 protectorates over allies in Western Europe and Northeast Asia in which it controls key segments of their foreign policies. In pursuit of a new world order, the United States has in recent decades attempted to expand its authority over other states into Eastern Europe, which has been met with a measure of success, and the Middle East, which has been far more problematic largely because its attempted rule there is not seen as legitimate.¹

Diplomats acknowledge the authority of the United States through deeds, but engage in a conspiracy of silence. Newly empowered leaders in the developing world champion the principles of sovereignty and national self-determination to secure their rule.² To speak publicly of the authority of the United States would gravely weaken their hold on power. Even in established democracies, leaders are loath to challenge the myth of unbridled popular sovereignty or to admit to themselves and their citizens that they are, in part, under the authority of the United States. US leaders have understood that to claim

authority over others would force their counterparts in subordinate states to deny this fact and thus undermine the legitimacy of US rule. As a result, US authority has been cloaked in the euphemisms. Analysts talk of hegemony, soft power, and recently the declining legitimacy of US power.³ Diplomats describe the United States as the leader of the free world that maintains special relationships with strategic partners. Only critics of the United States give voice to its authority in describing it as a neoimperialist or neocolonial power, concepts that are rejected by the mainstream precisely because they threaten to reveal the authority that dares not speak its name.⁴

The authority wielded by the United States over its subordinates, despite occasional abuses, has been enormously beneficial. Much like individuals in Thomas Hobbes' state of nature who give up personal autonomy for the benefits of a civil society, subordinate states give up a measure of sovereignty for a political order created and enforced by the United States.⁵ This order provides security both internally and externally and permits unprecedented prosperity. The United States, in turn, gains from writing the rules of that order and, especially, from turning possible rivals into reliable subordinates that largely comply with its rules.⁶ The so-called Western international order has actually rested on US authority and its accompanying social contracts. It has also produced very real benefits. The key foreign policy task before the United States today is not to diminish its authority, but to safeguard that authority and preserve its benefits into the future.

Unipolarity and the excesses of the George W. Bush administration that it permitted have finally brought the authority of the United States into public discourse—and into question. The “American empire” discussed in the mainstream media for the first time since at least the Vietnam War is an exaggeration, but the new use of the term reveals the increasingly problematic status of US rule.⁷ The Barack Obama administration is moving quickly to reverse the assertive unilateralism of its predecessor, a change in strategy that, it appears, played a major role in winning the new and untested president the Nobel Peace Prize.⁸ This new strategy will help reinforce the crumbling foundations of US authority. Yet the problem is deeper, more structural, and cannot be solved simply by a change of diplomatic tone or adopting more collaborative policies. To secure the international order that has been so beneficial in the past century and to succeed in extending that order to countries that do not yet enjoy its fruits require a new, more restraining, multilateral solution that binds the hands of the United States far more tightly than in the past. To rule legitimately requires tying the suzerain's hands.

Power, Authority, and International Politics

There are two primary forms of power in international politics. Through coercion, one state gets a second state to do something it would otherwise not do by

threatening some costly action and, in the event of noncompliance, actually imposing the threatened costs on the recalcitrant state.⁹ Like a mugger who exerts coercion by demanding “your money or your life,” the United States imposed sanctions on Iraq during the 1990s, and Israel today controls trade in and out of Gaza in an attempt to influence the behavior of the Hamas government.

Through authority, one state gets another to do something it would otherwise not do because its command is regarded as legitimate. More specifically, in an authority relationship, subordinates recognize that a dominant state has the right to issue certain limited commands, that they have a duty or obligation to comply if possible, and that the dominant state has a right to enforce its commands if they choose to violate them.¹⁰ The right of enforcement entails the use of force or violence often associated with coercion, but the context is quite different; unlike in coercion where force is threatened to extract some concession, in authority force is used to gain compliance with a rule that is itself recognized as legitimate.¹¹ Even as we might bemoan the tax and seek loopholes to evade the burden, we accept as authoritative the government’s right to a share of our income and its right to punish us if we cheat.

Despite the widespread assumption that the international system is anarchic, numerous authority relationships exist between states.¹² The United States accepted the brutal dictatorship of General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo y Molina in the Dominican Republic for over thirty years. It was only when he defied its authority and threatened to leave its informal empire that President John F. Kennedy ordered his assassination and, fearing a Communist takeover in the ensuing instability, that President Lyndon Johnson then ordered an invasion of the island.¹³ The legitimacy of this enforcement action was manifested in popular support for the United States in the Dominican Republic, where 64 percent of the respondents in a poll taken immediately after the invasion viewed it favorably, and the subsequent approval of the Organization of American States, which fielded a multinational Inter-American Peace Force.¹⁴ Similarly, Saudi Arabia became a protectorate of the United States during the 1991 Gulf War. Once Saudi Arabia invited the United States to send, initially, 250,000 and, later, over 500,000 troops to defend it against possible encroachments by Saddam Hussein’s military, that country forfeited its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy toward Iraq and Kuwait. Indeed, control over the conflict shifted almost entirely to Washington, which then decided if negotiations with Iraq would occur and on what terms.¹⁵

Authority is never total, of course, but varies by the rights possessed by the ruler and those retained by subordinates. Liberal democratic states, for instance, possess fewer rights to control the behavior of their citizens than totalitarian states, which at least in principle claim a totalizing public sphere in which individuals possess no private rights. The larger the public sphere, or the smaller the set of private rights, the more hierarchical is the relationship between state and society. Similarly, states can legitimately regulate policy in

few or many policy areas in other states. In diplomacy, each state is wholly autonomous or sovereign. But in relations of increasing security hierarchy, a dominant state can legitimately command a subordinate not to ally or cooperate with external powers, commonly known as a *sphere of influence* (e.g., the Monroe Doctrine). Or it can ultimately assume full authority over the latter's defense and foreign policies, traditionally known as a *protectorate* (e.g., Germany, Japan, Afghanistan, and Iraq under their respective occupations). Along this continuum, there are many intermediate steps, such as the more limited US protectorate over Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. Likewise, in an economic zone, a dominant state can legitimately command a subordinate not to grant favorable economic concessions to any third party, as the United States did in demanding that European countries dismantle their systems of imperial preferences after World War II. In a *dependency*, an extremely hierarchical economic relationship, the dominant state can exercise broad authority over the subordinate's commercial, monetary, and even fiscal policies, as frequently happens in countries that "dollarize" their economies (e.g., Panama and Ecuador). Again, there are many intermediate gradations.¹⁶ For the reasons discussed above, the terms for some of these relationships may sound archaic, even politically incorrect. But as the examples suggest, they are still relevant in describing real relationships in the contemporary world.

In the modern era, the right of one country to rule in whole or part over another derives not from tradition, divine right, or any normative consensus, but from an exchange or social contract.¹⁷ The dominant state produces a political order that protects persons, property, and promises. It secures individuals in a subordinate state from bodily harm at the hands of both fellow citizens and other countries, defends their property from challenges that are constant or without limit at home or abroad, and ensures that promises, once made, will be kept. In return, the subordinates comply with the rules and the extractions necessary to produce that order and accept as legitimate the position of the dominant state. The dominant state gains from writing and enforcing rules that are biased in its favor, subject to the willingness of subordinates to comply with those rules. Subordinates gain from the security provided by the political order and the attendant opportunity to invest, specialize, and prosper. Subordinates escape a Hobbesian state of nature in which life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" and enter an international civil society. In contemporary practice, this means that the United States produces political order within and between subordinate states in return for their compliance with its rules and recognition of its special position in international relations.

The authority exercised by the United States produces a syndrome of unique foreign policy behaviors.¹⁸ Protected in part from external threats, states subordinate to the United States spend substantially less on defense as a share of their gross domestic product (GDP) than nonsubordinate states. Having committed to their defense, in return, the United States is significantly

more likely to come to the aid of its subordinates in international crises. Protected under its security umbrella and following rules set down by the United States for the international economy, subordinate states are more open to trade and especially more likely to trade with countries that are also subordinate to the United States. In implicit acknowledgment of their status, subordinate states join US-led multinational coalitions more often than nonsubordinates, calling into question the notion of a “coalition of the willing.” Finally, exercising its right of enforcement, the United States is more likely to intervene militarily in subordinate states. All of these patterns are hard to explain if relations between states in fact are anarchic and, more important, are consistent with the existence of a social contract.

The social contract, as already noted, has been enormously beneficial for both dominant and subordinate states. Under US rule, Latin America, Western Europe, and Northeast Asia have emerged as zones of peace and prosperity, with some variation. Although Latin American states often rattle their sabers at one another, few crises actually result in military clashes.¹⁹ Western Europe, and the North Atlantic area more generally, is perhaps the only example of what Karl Deutsch originally called a pluralistic security community in which the use of force is ruled out in relations between states.²⁰ Japan’s relations with its neighbors and its foreign policy in general are legendarily pacific. Overall, the regions dominated by the United States look very different politically and economically than, say, Africa or South Asia where Washington possesses relatively little authority.²¹

A New World Order

The foreign policies of Presidents George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and even George W. Bush were united in their attempt to extend the authority of the United States into new regions of the globe. In the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and Eastern Europe, the United States took on new responsibilities for protecting possible subordinates. It guaranteed the territorial integrity of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia against Iraq, an important first step in establishing authority over both states, and fought a war to demonstrate its commitment to their continued protection. In exchange, it received pro-Western policies, restraint on oil prices, support for its policy of dual containment against Iraq and Iran, and a degree of legitimacy for its new, more expansive role in the region.²² In Somalia and Bosnia, it led in attempting to secure ethnically torn and failed states to stabilize both regions and protect the rule of law within and between states.²³ In Eastern Europe, the United States promoted the integration of former Communist states into Western regimes, including such US-led institutions as NATO, in return for compliance with those rules and new US basing rights.²⁴ Desperate for US guarantees of their security, the states of Eastern Europe have quickly become loyal subordinates, accepting missile in-

terceptors on their soil sure to antagonize Russia and participating in the Iraq War in disproportionate numbers.²⁵ In short, taking advantage of the implosion of its Cold War rival and forgoing any possible peace dividend, the United States has sought to extend its authority far beyond its previous limits.

This effort was certain to be controversial. Authority is always negotiated, and problematic at its margins. Early in any new authority relationship, each state will be especially sensitive to issues of precedent and credibility, and disagreements are likely to be frequent. In the decades before the Good Neighbor Policy, which signaled less a change in attitude than the success of the United States in establishing its authority, Washington intervened militarily over twenty times in Latin America.²⁶ The new authority relationships with states in Eastern Europe or the Persian Gulf were likely to be similarly fraught with disagreements and conflict as the contours of US authority were negotiated. A period of tension and new uses of force should have been expected.

Equally, in attempting to expand its authority over states in the Persian Gulf, the United States sided with traditional monarchial and secular regimes, much as it supported brutal dictatorships in Latin America in earlier decades.²⁷ These besieged governments were especially interested in developing relationships with the United States, and willing to cede some measure of their sovereignty, precisely because they were weak and under increasing threat at home. These budding international hierarchies brought the United States into direct opposition with the religious fundamentalists who are the primary challengers to these regimes. Incensed at the stationing of US troops on the land of the Prophet, and understanding that Washington would now prop up and bolster regimes they opposed, the Islamists declared war on the United States as well. As the trajectory of Al-Qaida demonstrates, attention gradually shifted from the “near enemy” of apostate regimes in the Gulf to the “far enemy” that now governed in part their fate. With the growth of US authority, Islamists correctly infer that the road to Riyadh now leads through Washington and New York.²⁸ The answer to the question of “why do they hate us?” lies in the authority that is exercised by the United States over its new subordinates.

Untying the Suzerain's Hands

The handmaiden of authority is restraint by the ruler. Within the United States, the Constitution divides power and creates checks and balances such that each branch of government will restrain the others. International authority is no different. Checks and balances are necessary to constrain the authority of the dominant state.²⁹

A state's decision to subordinate itself to another is one of the most profound choices it can make. Not only does it thereby agree to follow the rules of the dominant state, but it opens itself to the possibility of costly punishments if it does not comply with those commands. Equally, once vested, a

dominant state can use its authority to encroach further on the rights of its subordinates over time. To enter and remain in such a relationship requires confidence by subordinates that the authority they grant to dominant states will not be used to violate the social contract by making illegitimate demands or expanding authority further in the future. In domestic politics, this is known as the problem of tying the sovereign's hands.³⁰ In international politics, the problem is how to tie the suzerain's hands.

Throughout the Cold War, the authority of the United States was restrained naturally by the competition with the Soviet Union, which created an alternate pole around which disaffected subordinates, like Cuba, or states that feared US opportunism could rally. The United States was also restrained by its own democratic institutions, which revealed its intentions to other states and made deviations from current policy more difficult. Together, these natural constraints had the paradoxical effect of making US domination far more attractive than it otherwise would have been. So constrained, the United States enjoyed what Gier Lundestad once called an "empire by invitation."³¹

These natural restraints were reinforced by a self-imposed strategy of multilateralism, the hallmark of US foreign policy since 1945.³² Multilateralism gives other states a voice over US policy. It also creates a set of "fire alarms" that can be pulled should the United States transgress the limits to its authority. By its need to hold coalitions together, the United States constrains its ability to abuse those same subordinates. Finally, by its willingness to give other countries a voice and an ability to monitor and sanction its policies, the United States signals its willingness to operate within the bounds of international consensus on its rightful role as leader.³³

In the absence of great-power competition, a dominant state is restrained only by its internal checks and balances and its willingness to restrain itself through multilateralism. This self-restraint depends on virtue, a recognition of limits, and a concern for sustaining its authority over the long term. Yet virtue is a weak fetter. As James Madison, architect of the division of powers in the US Constitution wrote, "the truth is that all men having power ought to be mistrusted."³⁴

President George W. Bush and his advisers were seduced by the condition of unipolarity and the unprecedented coercive power of the United States.³⁵ Frightened by the first significant attack on the United States in fifty years, Americans demanded that the administration "do something." Responding to this pressure, Congress and even the courts failed to exert their normal checks on the executive branch. Fearing that they would be held responsible for any future attacks, the administration eschewed multilateralism and insisted on unrestricted unilateral action in pursuit of the nation's interests. Believing that other states would fall into line once they observed the overwhelming coercive power of the United States, the administration asserted new rights of intervention and regime change in the Persian Gulf that

went far beyond what others were prepared to accept.³⁶ In essence, the Bush administration followed its predecessors in seeking to extend US authority to new regions of the globe, but broke with the practice of embedding that authority in multilateral institutions.

By untying the nation's hands in an attempt to smash and intimidate foreign opponents, President George W. Bush did more to weaken the carefully cultivated authority of the United States over other states than perhaps any other leader in our nation's history. Confronted with the country's unfettered coercive power and the administration's assertion of bold new rights, other states—including many long-term subordinates who would normally legitimate US actions—reacted predictably by opposing the Iraq War, refusing to participate in the peacemaking, and denying all claims to new authority by the United States. By breaking the restraints that had previously limited the international authority of the United States, the administration caused many to question whether it could be trusted to abide by its existing social contracts.³⁷ Americans reacted with new calls to restore the legitimacy of their country and elected a new president who promised to take foreign policy in a new direction.

How to Bind a Giant

How then can US authority be made safe for the world? Once broken, can a country retie its own fetters? To the extent that the international authority of the United States is important for the maintenance and possible expansion of international order, to simply allow its authority to wither would have serious consequences not only for the United States, but for other states as well. But now that its hands are free, it is hard to mask its power simply by slipping the old ropes back on. Knowing that coercion can still be used, other countries will be far less likely to grant the United States authority over their affairs. With less authority, the United States will be more tempted to resort to coercion to achieve its ends. The authority of the United States, and the political orders it supports, threaten to unravel in a vicious circle.

President Obama and his administration appear to recognize the need to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the United States in the world. But virtue alone cannot provide credible guarantees against future US opportunism. Unipolarity is an enabling condition that persists. The problem of credibility is structural, and not one that a new administration can solve simply by a new style or approach to foreign policy. Ironically, to safeguard its authority requires that the United States embed its coercive capabilities even deeper into multilateral institutions that can provide real checks on potential opportunism.

Whether and how the United States should bind itself internationally is an old and recurring debate. The struggle over the League of Nations is often mis-

construed.³⁸ President Woodrow Wilson envisioned the League precisely as a vehicle that would allow the United States to create order and earn authority over other states, and accepted that multilateral constraints on Washington were a price worth paying. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, his principal antagonist, was not an isolationist as is sometimes averred. He instead was a unilateralist who supported the effort to extend international order, but opposed the League because it would unduly constrain rights possessed by the United States “which ought not to be infringed.”³⁹ Similarly, Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman sought to extend and secure US authority in the postwar period by embedding it in multilateral institutions, including the Bretton Woods organizations, the United Nations, and later NATO.⁴⁰ Opponents, led by Senator Robert Taft, again supported a new, more active role for the United States in international affairs, but opposed multilateralism because it threatened to put US foreign policy “at the mercy” of other states.⁴¹ While losing the first of these debates, the multilateralists decisively made the case after 1945 for extending the authority of the United States and embedding it in multilateral institutions, ushering in a half-century of constancy in US policy.

In Western Europe, NATO succeeded as both a vehicle for and a check on US authority because the members were deeply interdependent not only economically, but also militarily. Although not formed in any single vision, NATO was, in retrospect, a brilliantly designed institution.⁴² The United States provided the vast bulk of the organization’s military capabilities. Even as it decried the free riding of its allies, this critical role allowed the United States to set the policy agenda of NATO and, through that power, the policy agendas of member nations.⁴³ Dependent on the United States for their defense, in turn, West Europeans ceded control over many dimensions of their foreign and defense policies to Washington. At an extreme, with its military forces locked up in NATO, West Germany lost its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy, especially its ability to use or even threaten to use its military capabilities against its neighbors—a right of otherwise sovereign states.

Nonetheless, the United States was constrained within NATO by its dependence on the Europeans. The United States never had enough troops or materiel in place to deter an attack on the continent or to defend it single-handedly. Contributions from the Europeans themselves were essential to the credibility of conventional deterrence. The United States was also dependent on forward bases on the continent. Even as the United States clearly led the alliance, any significant use of force within Europe required the cooperation and, thus, the consent of the Europeans.⁴⁴ The United States could, of course, always choose to act outside the alliance, but at a substantially greater cost to itself. In effect, these mutual dependencies rendered the authority of the United States not only acceptable, but desirable for Europe.

The ad hoc multilateralism of the 1990s had many similarities to NATO, but was ultimately less beneficial and restraining. From the invasion of

Panama in 1989 to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, every significant use of force by the United States was vetted and approved by some multilateral organization and, in many cases, joined by others in a US-led military coalition.⁴⁵ Ad hoc multilateralism restrained the United States by negotiating and clarifying the purpose for which force was to be used. It further restrained Washington by including countries in operations who were certain to call any deviations from agreed goals and procedures to the attention of the international community. This was critical to US-Saudi cooperation in the Gulf War, for instance, where the object was to restrain the United States from expanding the war or exerting too much control over other dimensions of the kingdom's foreign policy. The inclusion of Arab states, especially Syria, and France ensured that any sign of US opportunism would quickly cause the coalition to fall apart. Indeed, it was the fear of breaking the coalition that restrained President George H. W. Bush from going to Baghdad and overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein in 1991.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, the checks on the United States in this and other ad hoc multilateral coalitions were relatively weak because the operations lacked the kinds of mutual dependencies that were the hallmark of NATO. As a result, the United States could easily opt out of the multilateral system of checks and balances, as it did in the Iraq War of 2003 by defying the United Nations and forming a coalition of the willing composed of only minor states (Great Britain excepted) which made even more minor contributions.

Retying the Knots

The safeguarding of US authority requires multilateralism that is broader and certainly deeper than in the 1990s—more like NATO than the ad hoc coalitions of the new world order. Indeed, absent the constraints exerted by competition with the Soviet Union, the institutional fetters through which the United States must bind its own hands will have to be even stronger than those in NATO.⁴⁷ The great paradox of contemporary international politics is that the unprecedented international power of the United States requires even more binding constraints on its policy if it is to preserve the authority that it has built over the last half-century and extend it to new areas of the globe.

The advanced military capabilities of the United States will make it a key actor in any such multilateral institution and will allow it to set the collective agenda. Since it is highly unlikely that anything will happen in the absence of US involvement, as in Bosnia where the Europeans dithered until the United States stepped to the fore,⁴⁸ Americans need not be overly concerned about “runaway” organizations or global mission creep. At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, other countries will have to make serious and integral contributions to the collective effort. Both sides to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreci-

ate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute to its success. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. Other countries, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority.

Americans are likely to resist the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact. After six decades, US leadership and its fruits—security, free trade, economic prosperity—have developed a taken-for-granted quality. It is hard for average Americans to tally the myriad benefits they receive from the country's position of authority, but it is relatively easy for them to see multilateral institutions constraining the country's freedom of action. Precisely because unipolarity makes coercion and unilateralism possible, and for some attractive, any constraints on US foreign policy may appear too high a price to bear.⁴⁹

But if the United States is to remain the leader of the free world and possibly beyond, it must make its authority safe for others. To sustain US authority over the long term, it must be embedded in new, more constraining multilateral institutions. Americans trust their government only because of its internal checks and balances. Although there may be disagreements on exactly where the appropriate scope of government authority ends, nearly all Americans agree that limited government is the best form of government. This same principle extends abroad. If the United States is to exercise authority over other states, and enjoy its fruits, that authority must be checked and balanced as well. The height of hubris is not that the United States might govern the world, at least in part. This is a fact of international politics. Rather, hubris arises in the belief that the virtue of its people and leaders will restrain the United States sufficiently such that other peoples will voluntarily cede a measure of their sovereignty to it.⁵⁰ Politicians and peoples may occasionally be saintly, but it would be folly to rely on this quality at home or abroad. Recognizing the universal need to restrain authority, the United States should, in its own self-interest, lead the way to a new new world order. 🌐

Notes

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1. All descriptions of various international hierarchies are from David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). On measures and regional patterns of hierarchy, see chap. 3.

2. On the importance of juridical sovereignty, see Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

3. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005).

4. Vietnam era critics often described US foreign policy as imperialist. See Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Modern Reader, 1969). One of the first studies to identify the imperialism in contemporary US policy was Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992). During the administration of George W. Bush, critics regularly invoked the imperial metaphor. See Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (New York: Verso, 2003); and William E. Odon and Robert Dujarric, *America's Inadvertent Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

5. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651; reprint, London: Collier, 1962).

6. The benefits of order are described in Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, chaps. 4 and 5. See also Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the 21st Century* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005); and G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

7. On the growth of "empire talk" in major media sources, see Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "American Empire, Not 'If' but 'What Kind,'" *New York Times*, 10 May 2003, p. A19.

8. The Nobel committee specifically cites President Obama's return to multilateralism. The committee's statement is available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html (accessed 1 April 2010).

9. On coercion, see Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 2.

10. On the concept of authority, see John A. Simmons, "Political Obligation and Authority," in R. L. Simon, ed., *Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 17–37; and Richard E. Flathman, *The Practice of Political Authority: Authority and the Authoritative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

11. Thus, it is not the use of violence that distinguishes coercion from authority, but the context in which it is used. On the difference between the concepts, see Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, pp. 21–23.

12. On anarchy, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

13. On President Kennedy's order to assassinate Trujillo, see G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, *The Dominican Republic and the United States: From Imperialism to Transnationalism* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), pp. 119–120; and Russell Crandall, *Gunboat Diplomacy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p. 48. On the US intervention more generally, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

14. Crandall, *Gunboat Democracy*, p. 92.
15. David A. Lake, *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 231–241.
16. On the continua of security and economic hierarchy, see Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, pp. 51–59.
17. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, pp. 28–40.
18. This syndrome of foreign policy behaviors is documented in Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, chaps. 4 and 5.
19. David R. Mares, *Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
20. Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
21. See Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
22. On the Gulf War, see Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). On problems in dual containment, see F. Gregory Gause III, “The Illogic of Dual Containment,” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (1994): 56–66. On the aftermath of the war within the region, see Jon B. Alterman, “The Gulf States and the American Umbrella,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 4, no. 4 (2000): 77–86.
23. On nation building, see James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, *America’s Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan* (London: Vintage, 2003); and Francis Fukuyama, *State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). For a perspective from inside the Clinton administration during these cases, see Nancy Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2005).
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(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). On self-binding hegemony, see G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory*, pp. 40–42.

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34. This common quotation is available at http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quote/james_madison_quote_40a5 (accessed 28 March 2010).

35. See among others, Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

36. On the debate over these rights, which unfolded largely within the UN, see Alexander Thompson, *Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). On the expectation of President Bush and his advisors that others would follow the US lead, see Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, p. 136; and James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 237 and 357.

37. Unusually large shifts in foreign public opinion against the United States occurred after the invasion of Iraq. An unprecedented number of foreign respondents viewed the United States less favorably, held more negative views of US influence in the world, and distrusted the United States to act responsibly in world affairs after the invasion of Iraq than before. Report on the Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Global Unease with Major World Powers," 27 June 2007, available at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2010).

38. Lake, *Entangling Relations*, chap. 4.

39. Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 266. On the relevance of President Wilson and the debate over the League of Nations, see G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith, *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

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41. Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the Policy of Containment* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1968), p. 18.

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45. Atsushi Tago, "Why Do States Join US-led Military Coalitions? The Compulsion of the Coalition's Missions and Legitimacy," *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* 7, no. 2 (2007): 179–202.

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47. On the difficulties of creating such an organization, see Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 5 (2006): 105–113.

48. Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth*, p. 83; John F. Harris, *The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House* (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 191–202.

49. Lake, *Entangling Relations*, pp. 293–298.

50. On beliefs of the George W. Bush administration that others shared its values, see Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, p. 125; and Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, p. 362.

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