

Timeline

- 1986: Milošević elected chairman of the League of Communists of Serbia; Stambolić elected president of Serbia
- 1987: Protest where Milošević says "You will not be beaten" (April)
- 8th Session of LCS, Milošević defeats Stambolić (Sept)
- 1988: "Yogurt Revolution" in Vojvodina (Oct 5-6)
- Kosovo govt resigns (Nov 17)
- 1989: Montenegrin govt resigns (Jan 11)
- Yugoslav Presidency declares state of emergency in Kosovo due to Albanian protests (Feb 27)
 - New Serbian constitution. Autonomous regions Kosovo & Vojvodina abolished (Mar)
 - Milošević president of Serbia (May)
 - Log Revolution in Knin (Aug)

Timeline

- 1990 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Jan)
- Tudjman elected in new Croatia
- 1991 Jović has Yugo Presidency vote for use of army against Croatia & Slovenia. Tie vote. (March)
- Croatia & Slovenia independence (June 25)
 - 10 day war in Slovenia (June-July)
 - War in Croatia; Seige of Vukovar (Aug – Nov)
-
- 1992 Ceasefire between Croatia and Serbia (fighting is mostly low level until 1995, when it intensifies)
- Serbia & Montenegro form FR of Yugoslavia
 - Bosnian War begins
- 1993-95 NATO Op's: Deny Flight & Deliberate Force
- 1995 Dayton Agreement ends wars
- 1996-99 Kosovo Liberation Army vs. Serbia
ends with NATO bombing, Serbian defeat, and UN administration of Kosovo
- 2008 Kosovo declares independence

Explaining ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia

- Strategic antagonism?
 - Mass or elite driven?
 - Why do people go along? Personal agendas?
 - Overcoming collective action problem?
 - Credible commitment problems?
 - Security dilemma?
-

Strategic antagonism: Was violence provoked for violence's sake or strategically?

- Was Milosevic provoking for personal power?
- Or responding to society-driven antagonism?

Strategic antagonism?

Vladislav:

- Milosevic & Stambolic in routine power struggle
 - “Circular flow of power” in one-party socialist states: leaders are chosen by the members, but they also choose the members
 - Consensus & obedience the norm, but struggles for the top can occur & temporarily divide the party
- Milosevic emerged as leader not because of mass support for Kosovo issue, but for other reasons that were important to the socialist elite
 - Personality, work ethic, control of press. Stambolic was too interested in personal power, too “dictatorial”, too reformist
 - Kosovo issue was a minor policy difference. It was exaggerated, and perhaps meant something with the public, but not decisive in within-party struggle

Strategic antagonism?

Gagnon: Conservative responses to reformists wanting liberalization & democratization:

- Within Serbian Communist Party: conflict provoked to take power from Stambolic
- Within Yugoslavia: reaction to Slovenia & Vojvodina who wanted further devolution
 - “Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution”: ‘74 Constitution gave Serbia no control over provinces & leaders in Vojvodina & Montenegro were labeled by media campaign as power-hungry "armchairers"
- Within Serbia: reaction to nationalists & others who wanted political power
 - E.g., Vuk Draskovic’s Serbian National Renewal
 - Conservatives shift from within-party and within-Yugo battles to within (new) Serbia

In each case, ethnic antagonism was provoked to keep power & prevent reforms

Strategic antagonism?

Gagnon: antagonism is an elite driven strategy

- Add: Public follows because of
 - personal agendas: most rallies were facilitated by political leaders giving workers a day off (i.e., state control of the economy gives levers to help collective action)
 - media manipulation

Vladislavjevic emphasizes routine contests for communist party leadership, little mention of ethnic nationalism, except that it was not decisive within party

- Was ethnic conflict an accidental byproduct to some extent? Or entirely a separate (mass) phenomenon?

Are these views reconcilable? If not, which is better?

Strategic antagonism?

- To what degree is strategic antagonism responsible for ethnic conflict?
 - Other examples: Tudjman “allows” Vukovar seige to get international support... was this also for domestic political support??
 - Neither Milosevic nor Tudjman seemed to provoke violence *only* for the purposes of ethnic war
 - antagonism was to some extent constructed for other ends

Security dilemmas?

- In Croatia:
 - Croatia arms itself for defense both before armed conflict & after ceasefire
 - Leads to growing insecurity and defensive actions by Croatian Serbs, further driving Croatian acquisitions...
 - Yugoslav army (under Serbia) attacks to protect Croatian Serbs (and Yugoslavia from illegal sub-national “militias”)
- Defense was not the only motive:
 - Croatia was motivated about within-republic sovereignty & Serbia was motivated in part by territorial expansion...
 - But would war would have happened without security dilemma?

Credible commitment problems?

Possibilities:

- Kucan believed that Milosevic would not stick to new deal (allowing more autonomy for Slovenia in exchange for allowing local groups to declare independence)
 - Croatian government cannot assure Croatian Serbs them that they are safe
 - Tudjman & Milosevic cant seal deal to divide Yugoslavia
 - Several ceasefires between Croatia & Serbia were not sustained
-

Additional “information problems”?

- Serbia assumes that the West wont intervene (or if they do, they wont have the stomach to stay)

Explaining ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia

One explanation:

- Most important factors
 - Kosovo issue + economic stagnation & inequality + institutional fragmentation of state and Serbs → growing reformism, counter-reformism, & nationalism
 - Antagonism provoked by leaders pursuing their own ends
 - Security dilemmas
- Facilitated by:
 - Milosevic influence over Serbian TV
 - Government control of the economy
 - Political malaise and corruption

-
- Were any of these *sufficient* or *necessary* causes?

NATO in Kosovo

- Kosovo problem persisted because it was not on the table in Dayton, which required Milosevic's approval
 - Serbian commitment to treat Kosovo well was not credible... threat to Kosovo persists
 - Albanians wanted autonomy, Serbians wanted control... non-violent movements got little attention
 - Growing KLA leads to crackdown by Serbs... escalating violence...
 - Security dilemma?
 - Strategic antagonism?
- 1999, NATO intervenes with bombing campaign

NATO in Kosovo

Daadler & O'Hanlon: NATO victory was by no means certain, made serious mistakes:

1. Did not decide what it was prepared to do (militarily), only incrementally & reactively
 2. Committee decision making needs a chairman. US (Clinton administration) should have pushed harder, even in face of Congress and allies
 3. Blindness to difficulty of the task... they expected to win quickly
 4. Desire to avoid casualties at all cost—high flying planes with bombs (pushed by state department) & no ground troops
- Ironically, Milosevic's errors may have lead to his loss: had he been less brutal and more patient, NATO could have lost resolve and chosen to “bomb, declare victory, and forget”

NATO in Kosovo

- But, incrementalism is not always too costly, and rushing in can end up being more costly. In any event, effectiveness can only be determined ex post
- Efficient policies are seldom a political reality, especially when the country is not partisan in the conflict
 - *International countries or groups have no will to intervene unless they are partisan*
 - *End of Cold War not only makes ethnic conflict more likely but also makes super-powers less interested*
- Politics can trump policy for good reasons
 - Cautious political leaders who heed to their constituency's interests are a good thing
- International interventions are seldom timely or designed for best results in conflict areas