

The 'Semi-presidential' model and its subtypes: Party presidentialization and the selection and de-selection of prime ministers

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Abstract: Nearly 30 years after Duverger introduced the "new political system model" of semi-presidential government, a plurality of the world's democracies fit that type. Yet political science still knows relatively little about the actual performance of these regimes, and in particular how important a role the president plays—one of the key questions posed by Duverger. We consider the impact of semi-presidential subtypes—premier-presidential and president-parliamentary—on patterns of selection and de-selection of prime ministers. We show that the subtypes can be clearly differentiated on their degree of “presidentialization” and that semi-presidential systems tend to empower presidents over parties, as intended by their original founders, but that the premier-presidential subtype tempers that power through the president’s requirement to maintain a parliamentary majority or else face cohabitation—an opposition-led cabinet.

In his widely cited 1980 article, “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government,” Maurice Duverger identified a set of constitutional features that defined semi-presidentialism as distinct from the better known “pure” types of presidential and parliamentary governance. The defining feature of a semi-presidential system is the presence of both a popularly elected and powerful president and a parliamentary-dependent prime minister. Duverger (1980: 117) states his main ambition in the article as explaining the value of semi-presidential system as an “analytical model” despite the fact that “relatively homogenous constitutions are applied in radically different ways.”

We share Duverger’s ambition, which could be described as being at the very heart of the sub-field of political science that is best described as comparative institutional analysis. We also share Duverger’s definition of semi-presidentialism, with one significant amendment: we identify subtypes that allow for a more precise identification of how “powerful” the presidency is in terms of a critical constitutional authority: whether the president has the formal power to dismiss a prime minister independent of the parliamentary majority. After defining this distinction, we develop a theory of how presidential power is mediated through the organization of political parties, a factor that Duverger mostly left out of his analysis (perhaps surprisingly). We are able to identify conditions under which parties would be more or less “presidentialized” (Samuels and Shugart, forthcoming). Then we subject our theory to analysis of career patterns and tenure of prime ministers in semi-presidential democracies, compared to their counterparts in parliamentary systems. The approach we take in our comparative research on semi-presidential systems and political parties allows us to explore the interaction of two of the topics in which Duverger made some of his most profound impacts on political science: in elucidating the “organization and activity” of political parties (1954) and in identifying the “new political system model” of semi-presidentialism (1980).

Semi-presidentialism and the constitutional chain of delegation

A useful way to conceptualize the constitutional structure of a democratic regime is by assessing the “chain of delegation” that connects the top decision-makers with voters. The scholarly agenda of tracing authority structures in this way has been branded the “neo-Madisonian” approach (Carrol and Shugart 2007, Samuels and Shugart forthcoming), because it derives from James Madison’s fundamental insight that representative government necessarily entails delegation of power from voters to a small number of politicians.

Of course, the neo-Madisonian approach is explicitly “institutional” in that it looks first to “formal” differences in the constitutional and legal structure through which politics is played out. It is also Duvergerian, for in his 1980 article on the semi-presidential model, Duverger himself noted (p. 166):

It is not usual for political scientists to construct analytical models defined initially by constitutions. However, no-one would dream of watching a game of football or of bridge without taking into account the rules of the game.

Obviously we agree with this point, and in the intervening three decades it has become rather more common for political scientists to base their models on constitutional provisions. Nonetheless, we also agree with Duverger’s further elaboration (p. 167):

In actual fact, the interpretation of a constitution cannot be separated from the interrelationship of political forces to which it is applied. If the interrelationship varies, the structure and functioning of the form of government established by the constitution vary at the same time.

Prominent among the other “political forces” that Duverger referred to is the nature of a country’s political parties, as well as path-dependent features of how the constitution was introduced. We, too, shall employ these understandings of context, but when it comes to parties, our focus will be primarily on the rather more overlooked *intraparty dimension* (cf. Shugart 2005a) rather than the interparty dimension--the number of parties--that Duverger (1980) focused on as a main contributor to the observed patterns of presidential power in semi-presidential systems.

Before we can begin to make sense of factors outside the constitutional structure, we find it useful to situate all of these factors in the fundamental insight of Madison regarding the delegated authority that was the hallmark of “republican” (representative) government. As Madison famously feared—and sought to limit through constitutional design--despite the delegated (and hence conditional) nature of authority in democracies, politicians can turn this delegated power against voters. Likewise parties’ agents-as-executives can, depending on the formal structure of constitutional authority, turn their delegated authority back on their principals--the party that nominated them in the first place. This danger of agency breakdown exists in all delegation relationships, but their form differs fundamentally depending upon the institutional context in which it takes place.

In parliamentary democracies, voters delegate authority to executives only indirectly, because political parties have the power to hire—and, crucially, fire—

prime ministers. Prime ministers, and the cabinets they head, originate from within the parliamentary majority and survive at the pleasure of that majority. In contrast, in presidential governments the head of the executive originates separately from the legislature, as both branches are subject to direct election. The chief executive also survives independently of the legislature, due to the president's fixed term.

The pure types of parliamentary and presidential government are thus defined by the presence of a single "chief" executive official (president or prime minister) and by how the authority of this office relates to the legislature. In the early years of the 20th century several new constitutions were established with both an elected president and a prime minister with constitutional accountability to parliament. It was this "model" that Duverger referred to when arguing that our typologies of democracies required the consideration of a "semi-presidential" type, which he defined as having the following features:

- 1) A popularly-elected president;
- 2) The president has considerable constitutional authority;
- 3) A PM and a cabinet, subject to the confidence of the assembly majority.

The key feature of semi-presidentialism is the juxtaposition of a president who enjoys separate origin with a PM accountable to the assembly majority. However, as other scholars have pointed out, Duverger's definition is vague (Elgie 1999, 13). For example, what is "considerable" authority? More fundamentally, while the definition is clear about the *origin* of the president (through direct election, and thus separate from the assembly), and clear about the *survival* of the PM and cabinet (subject to parliamentary confidence), it is vague about 1) the *survival* of the president; 2) the *origin* of the PM and the cabinet; and 3) the sources of prime ministerial and cabinet *survival*.

In terms of the president's survival, Duverger and others assume that the president's term is fixed, and thus that presidents in semi-presidential regimes enjoy separation of survival as well as origin. This is relatively unproblematic.

However, Duverger's silence on prime ministerial and cabinet origin raises several issues, because presidents in many semi-presidential systems possess either formal constitutional authority or informal partisan authority to appoint the PM and/or the cabinet. Duverger's silence on prime ministerial origin may stem from his assumption, which he shared with the "founding fathers" of semi-presidentialism, that separately-elected presidents would be "above" the parties in the assembly and remain distant from them. Yet the extent to which presidents are "above" or "distant" from *their own political parties* is an open empirical question. To what extent are presidents and prime ministers actually "insiders" or "outsiders" in this regime-type, relative to the pure-type democratic regimes?

Prime ministers in semi-presidential systems may typically owe their appointment to the directly elected president, even if--following Duverger--they owe their survival in office to the confidence of the assembly majority. In fact, as we show below, presidents' appointment powers infuse all semi-presidential regimes with a substantial "presidential tilt" compared to parliamentary systems, because they enhance the relative importance to parties of the direct presidential election, relative to parliamentary elections, for control over the levers of government.

Finally, in terms of prime ministers' survival in office, Duverger's definition missed the fact that many semi-presidential regimes afford presidents not only appointment power but also either formal or informal dismissal power--of the PM, the cabinet, and in some cases the entire assembly. If presidents' "considerable authority" includes dismissal, then--contra the third element in Duverger's definition--the survival of the PM does not depend exclusively on the confidence of the assembly majority. In some cases losing such confidence would be a *sufficient* condition for removing the PM and cabinet, but it would not be a *necessary* condition--because the PM and/or cabinet could also be dismissed if they lost the confidence of *the president*.

Given this vagueness of the role of the presidency, Shugart and Carey (1992) introduced the *premier-presidential* and *president-parliamentary* subtypes of semi-presidentialism. The simplest interpretation of these two subtypes is that premier-presidential regimes have relatively "weaker" presidents. The key distinction between these two subtypes derives from the way that the constitution inserts the president into the survival of the prime minister and cabinet:

- In premier-presidential regimes, the prime minister and cabinet are formally accountable *exclusively* to the assembly majority--and thus *not* to the president;
- In president-parliamentary regimes the prime minister and cabinet are *dually* accountable to the president and the assembly majority.

Whereas there were only seven cases of semi-presidential democracy that Duverger could refer to in 1980 (Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, the newly-democratic Portugal, and the defunct Weimar German system), in the intervening three decades the ranks of this regime type have swelled. In Table 1, we identify the countries considered in this paper and in Samuels and Shugart (forthcoming). The table identifies the years in which these countries were democratic under a semi-presidential format. The criteria for inclusion of a case is that it had at least five years of consecutive democracy in the post-WWII period.¹ The table also indicates some countries which have moved from one sub-type to another. Some other cases have moved between one of the semi-presidential subtypes and either the parliamentary or presidential categories; these will not concern us here (but see Samuels and Shugart, forthcoming). Table 1 shows that there are 31 regime cases, in 27 countries; these include 18 cases of premier-presidentialism and 13 of president-parliamentarism. Countries with some form of semi-presidentialism now represent a plurality of the world's democracies. This explosion in the number of semi-presidential systems now affords scholars the opportunity to reassess the question of whether constitutional variations within the semi-presidential type are associated with systematic variation in political performance.

Table 1 about here

In this paper we focus on the relationship between presidents and their parties in the two subtypes of semi-presidential democracy. In president-parliamentary systems presidents possess tremendous power over their party because they possess *formal, constitutional authority* to dismiss the premier and/or

¹ "Democratic" is here operationalized as a POLITY score of 5 or greater.

the cabinet. In contrast, in premier-presidential systems presidents typically possess *informal, partisan authority* to fire the prime minister. Below we reveal that presidents use both their formal and informal powers to meddle with prime ministers' careers—something that a purely formal analysis of the institutional rules of premier-presidential systems would not expect.

When one combines the evidence of both formal and informal presidential influence over prime ministerial origin and survival, one gains an appreciation for the importance of intra-party politics for the dynamics of power in semi-presidential regimes. Indeed, one cannot understand such dynamics merely by “reading” presidents' formal powers off of the constitution. Thus the two subtypes help illuminate the sources of party “presidentialization” as well as the sources of presidential power more generally considered within semi-presidential systems.

Before turning to our empirical analysis, we focus our attention on the core concept of party “presidentialization”—a situation of presidents being “above” their own parties, in the key sense of authority relations rather than as a typological/sociological distinction.

Presidentialization, or on the organization and activity of parties in the modern *presidential state*

Political scientists increasingly see the party organizations as solutions to the collective action and delegation problems politicians incessantly confront. However, scholars have rarely entertained the notion that the core institutional distinctions between presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential democracies may fundamentally alter the nature of intra-party politics. Indeed, most research on political parties, including the formidable body of work by Duverger, has not addressed how regime type affects the organization and activity of political parties. In addition, the now quite vast literature on “presidentialism versus parliamentarism,” or on semi-presidentialism as a distinct regime type, focuses not on how parties operate within different democratic regimes, but on how constitutional design supposedly generates distinct political outcomes. The literature has thus largely ignored the systematic differences among types of democratic regimes on the key institution for representing citizens' interests and enacting public policy: political parties.

Our main theoretical claim is the following: *to the extent that constitutional structure separates executive and legislative origin and/or survival, parties will tend to be presidentialized.* By presidentialization we mean that parties delegate considerable discretion to their leaders-as-executives to shape their electoral and governing strategies, *and* they lose the ability to hold these agents to accounts. Within any political system, parties can delegate more or less willingly; the question is the extent to which a country's executive–legislative structure imposes higher or lower hurdles on parties' ability to hold their leaders to accounts. The fact of the matter is that when executive authority is lodged in a directly elected presidency, parties face fundamental dilemmas in how they select and (attempt to) hold their leaders accountable. Elsewhere (Samuels and Shugart, forthcoming), we develop several empirical implications of the notion of presidentialization, and analyze the impact of all three main democratic regime-types on party organization and

behavior. Here, we focus on one key aspect of presidentialization, exploring just how “presidentialized” is the process of prime ministerial selection and de-selection in semi-presidential democracies.

The dual nature of the executive in semi-presidential systems suggests a division of power. Yet the reality of that shared executive authority remains an open question. Does the PM enjoy political legitimacy separate from the president—and does the PM perhaps even have the capacity to act as a check on the directly-elected president? Or is the PM merely the president’s subordinate, carrying out his or her will? The answers to such questions are important because if the two executive officials represent competing principals--the voters in the case of the president and the legislative majority in the case of the PM--then the dual executive (Blondel 1984) may institutionalize power-sharing at the highest levels of government. Yet if PMs are simply subordinates of the president, the regime arguably embodies just as much concentration of authority in a single political agent as a pure presidential system—or even *more* concentration, given that some presidents can “fire” the PM and the cabinet, and some--in a further feature that does not exist in pure presidential systems--can even dissolve the entire assembly.

President-party relationships under semi-presidentialism

Semi-presidential systems merit scrutiny because their complexity leaves room for ambiguity as to whether they should be classified as sitting midway on a hypothetical continuum between the two pure types--with the two executives “keeping each other in their proper places”²--or whether the separate presidency implies parties will tend towards presidentialization, even in premier-presidential systems in which presidents have weaker formal authority. In what follows we provide theoretical reasons to expect that intra-party relations will lead to greater presidentialization—relatively powerful yet unaccountable presidents--across *all* semi-presidential systems. We also provide reasons why such presidentialization should be attenuated under premier-presidentialism and under cohabitation.

The idea that semi-presidentialism impacts political parties by altering their relationship to government formation is hardly new, even if party scholars have tended to overlook it. Semi-presidentialism originates with the 1919 Finnish and German constitutions. The hybrid nature of the Weimar constitution, for example, owes much to the advice of several eminent social scientists.³ Max Weber ([1917] 1978) urged that the Weimar constitution empower an agent of the entire electorate, in order to check and balance the electorate’s partisan agents who held sway in the legislature, while jurist Hugo Preuss justified Weimar’s hybrid regime by stating that the constitution would provide the president and parliament with “autonomous sources of legitimacy” (Stirk 2002, 514).

These notions represent a 20th-century continental European echo of Madison’s call for ambition to counteract ambition, allowing separately legitimated institutions to keep each other in their “proper places.” Yet differently from the

² The quoted phrase is from James Madison (Federalist #51), describing the relations between the separate institutions of the then-proposed US constitution.

³ See e.g. Mommsen (1984), Meyerson (1999), Stirk (2002), Skach (2005) or Shugart (2005b).

context of the *Federalist Papers*, these “founding fathers” of semi-presidentialism wrote in an era in which mass parties already existed. That is, unlike Madison, these scholars articulated and advocated their model of government *precisely under the assumption that an elected presidency would alter parties’ role*, relative to their role under parliamentarism. Weber ([1917] 1978, 1452–3), for example, mistrusted parties’ capacity to govern and assumed that a “plebiscitary” presidential election would force parties “to submit more or less unconditionally to leaders who held the confidence of the masses.”

The subsequent collapse of Weimar democracy with Hitler’s rise to power could have completely discredited this model of democracy. Yet the appeal of a system that combines a popularly-elected, powerful president with a cabinet responsible to parliamentary parties continues to resonate powerfully. We owe the spread of semi-presidentialism around the world not to Weimar’s disastrous experience, but to France’s rather more successful reinvention of the regime-type a few decades later. In his Bayeux Manifesto of 1946, Charles de Gaulle called for a “chief of state, placed above the parties” (Lijphart 1992, 140–1). France’s 1958 constitution elected the president indirectly, through an electoral college that included the legislature, and thus can be seen as a reform of the 4th Republic’s pure parliamentary model (1946–58) rather than as an entirely new political system. Yet with his 1962 plebiscite de Gaulle gained approval for direct presidential elections, thereby recreating a key element of the Weimar constitution, and establishing what has become the most-emulated semi-presidential system in the world.

These two cases exemplify each semi-presidential subtype: Weimar Germany was president-parliamentary, while France V is premier-presidential. Of course, in contrast to Weimar’s experience, 5th Republic France has grown stable—even though the irony that de Gaulle’s system recreated a key element of the Weimar constitution has gone largely unnoticed. Scholars have also failed to note that the advocates of semi-presidentialism offered fundamentally similar theoretical justifications for their proposed reforms in both countries: *to engineer a system that would simultaneously change the parties and change the relationship between parties and government*. In both countries, reformers understood that altering the chain of delegation between voters and their agents in government would change the organization and behavior of the parties that mediate between voters and government.

We now consider how both subtypes tend to “presidentialize” political parties. Presidentialization is embedded in the very constitutional design of the president-parliamentary subtype, but we also show that parties are likely to be presidentialized under premier-presidentialism, due to the importance parties place on winning the presidency.

Presidentialized Parties in President-Parliamentary Regimes

In a typical president-parliamentary system the presidentialization of parties—and indeed, of the entire political system—presents no puzzle. By definition, presidents in these systems have clear constitutional authority to both appoint and dismiss a premier and/or a cabinet—something lacking in premier-presidential systems. Given this, presidents are both the dominant executive official

as well as the dominant actor in the entire political system. Even when the assembly majority is sharply opposed to the president, the constant threat that the president will dismiss the premier and/or the cabinet or even all new legislative elections gives presidents a powerful source of political leverage (Shugart and Carey 1992, 121–6). This constitutional format makes this hybrid regime closely resemble pure presidentialism—and in some senses gives the president even *greater* authority than presidents in pure presidential systems,⁴ suggesting that the parties in such systems should closely resemble those found in pure presidential systems.

Presidentialized Parties in Premier-Presidential Regimes

In contrast to the situation in president-parliamentary regimes, the presidentialization of parties in premier-presidential systems poses a larger intellectual puzzle, because in such systems the cabinet is formally accountable only to the assembly majority. In theory this constitutional structure should weaken presidential influence in legislative politics, thereby limiting the presidentialization of the parties in the system—and thus limiting presidents’ overall political influence. Nonetheless, presidents’ formal *and* informal influence works to presidentialize the parties in such systems.

In terms of formal institutional influence, Shugart (2005b) noted that presidents in most premier-presidential systems do have the right to *propose* a PM, subject to an investiture vote, and some presidents even have the power to *appoint* the PM unilaterally. Only a few premier-presidential constitutions deny the president a formal role in initiating a premier’s appointment.⁵ To the extent that the president has formal authority to select the premier, then pursuit of the presidency will influence party organization (see Samuels and Shugart, forthcoming, Chapters Five and Six).

We recognize that if presidents’ formal authority to appoint the PM were their only source of political influence, party presidentialization would remain limited, given that once appointed, cabinets in premier-presidential systems become independent of the president. Unless presidents possess other sources of political influence, parties might downplay the presidency and concentrate on capturing the assembly majority and, through it, control of the cabinet. This is quite clearly what happens in Austria (a case we discuss separately below) and Ireland, for example. However, these systems, which illustrate Duverger’s point about the “radical difference” in political outputs across democratic regimes, are in fact not at all typical of the experience of premier-presidential systems.⁶ Typically, presidents tend to possess important informal political power aside from their constitutional authority--power that comes from the “presidentization” of political parties.

The importance of presidents’ informal partisan authority in premier-presidential systems focuses our attention away from premiers’ origin and towards

⁴ For example, by including the power to dissolve the assembly, and perhaps also by tying the assembly’s hands through prime-ministerial control of the agenda. Some pure presidential systems give the executive control over the legislative agenda, but many do not (Shugart and Carey 1992, Cox and Morgenstern 2002).

⁵ These are Bulgaria, Croatia, Madagascar, Niger, and Ukraine (Shugart 2006, Table 2).

⁶ Duverger also discusses Iceland as such a case; however, Iceland is not in our larger comparative study due to its small population.

their survival. As noted, in premier-presidential systems presidents have no *formal* authority to dismiss the PM or the cabinet. Even newly-elected presidents in premier-presidential systems have no formal authority to dismiss an incumbent PM. These rules should, in principle, limit presidents' power over parliamentary parties and should give premier-parliamentary systems—and the parties that operate within them—a strong parliamentary “lean.”⁷ In our empirical section below, we investigate this question through an analysis of the career paths of executives.

Two conditions facilitate presidential political influence in premier-presidential systems: (1) when the president and the assembly majority come from the same side of an ideological divide and (2) when the president is the *de facto* head of his or her party. The first condition holds about 80% of the time. As for the second condition, presidents in premier-presidential systems are frequently the *de facto* leader of their party even if they are not their party's formal leader. When presidents are *de facto* party leaders, the importance of parliamentary confidence—the third element of Duverger's definition of semi-presidentialism—vanishes, *because the premier is the president's political subordinate*. If presidents have this sort of *intraparty* power, then parties will become presidentialized regardless of the president's constitutional powers. This means that premier-presidential constitutions do not provide necessary conditions for presidentialized parties, only sufficient conditions. In such regimes the extent of presidential influence is a function of the way parties resolve their own internal problems of delegation and coordination.

Of course, in a premier-presidential system there is no guarantee that elections and intra-legislative bargaining produce a legislative majority compatible with the president. When the president and the assembly majority are from opposing sides of an ideological divide, we might expect that it becomes especially important just how strong are the powers of the presidency over the cabinet. The expectation would thus be that in premier-presidential systems, if there is alternation to a legislative majority opposed to the president, the latter would be deprived of influence over the cabinet, which in the subtype depends on the exclusive confidence of the opposing majority. If the cabinet is headed by the president's opposition, then the president is deprived of intra-party sources of influence over legislative politics. Given this fact, any analysis of presidentialization must take account of the tendency for cohabitation, which we will do below.

Selection and deselection of prime ministers

We now turn our attention to some observable implications of presidentialization of parties, and expectations about how semi-presidential systems, and their subtypes, compare to the pure types.⁸ We are interested in the relation between president and PM, and in particular in their partisan ties. By partisan ties, we mean not only what party they are affiliated with, but also, in the

⁷ Except, perhaps, after an assembly election or the break-up of an assembly majority coalition, in which case the president has influence over the nomination of the next PM and cabinet.

⁸ The theoretical perspective of this section is developed much more fully in Samuels and Shugart (forthcoming), especially Chapters Two and Three.

case of the PM, evidence of their connections to their party's organization: are they "insiders" or "outsiders"? The greater the control of party organizations over the executive, the more we expect those who ascend to the top executive position to have demonstrated a commitment to the party through prior service in the legislature or cabinet. Such party "insiders" have had a chance to develop a reputation among their party colleagues for their reliability as party stalwarts. Clearly, the type of institutional structure in which party organizations have the most influence over who ascends to the executive are parliamentary systems, where both origin and survival of the executive are fused with the legislative majority.

When the party does not control the path to the head of the government—such as when an elected president appoints the premier—we expect relatively less career experience within the legislature and cabinet. Parties tend to select presidential candidates for their "outsider" appeal—their ability to garner support beyond what their party's legislative candidates can. Such appeal is often necessary if the party hopes to win a presidential election.

Thus when parties control the path to the head of government, premiers should exhibit more "insider" profiles. In contrast, the more that PMs are agents of the president, the more they should exhibit "outsider" profiles. Insider profiles means career paths in the legislature and cabinet as well as affiliation with a party that, alone or with coalition partners, heads the legislative majority; outsider profiles simply imply less experience in the legislative party and cabinet, as well as possibly lacking affiliation with the current legislative majority.

Ultimately, the question of the power of the presidency in a semi-presidential system comes down to the actual authority lines that run between the president and the premier, and between the latter and the assembly. The idea that semi-presidentialism provides for a dual executive (Blondel 1984) rests implicitly on the assumption that the president and the prime minister each possess an independent source of authority. However, only if these authorities stem from distinct sources can the dual executive be said meaningfully to be dualistic. Otherwise, one executive is an agent of the other—and it is perhaps obvious that in semi-presidential systems the premier will likely become the political agent of the president, and not vice-versa.

As Duverger (1980) stressed, the *de facto* distribution of authority in these systems does not always appear to match what the constitution prescribes. The reason for this mismatch lies in intra-party politics, a point not emphasized by Duverger. When one traces the political jobs that PMs held prior to ascending to the top post, as we do in this section, one finds that premiers are often subordinates of the president. This suggests that party "presidentialization"—and thus of the entire political system—derives from presidents' informal influence, and not primarily from their constitutional powers. Thus when a president's party controls the assembly majority, presidents can in most situations subordinate the premier to their own authority. They are only unable to do so consistently when the opposition controls the assembly—the condition known as cohabitation—situations that for all practical purposes only occur under premier-presidentialism. This means that presidentialization of the political parties is nearly complete under president-parliamentary systems.

Parliamentary systems serve as our reference point for comparison. In a parliamentary system, the PM is the only chief executive, whereas in semi-presidential systems, either the president or the PM could be the chief, or there could be a diarchy (understood as co-equal “chiefs.”). We expect increasing presidentialization, and thus increasing “outsider-ness” as we move from parliamentary, through premier-presidential, to president-parliamentary systems.

In order to compare the careers of prime ministers in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, we explored the biographies of all prime ministers in the countries included in Table 1, with the exception of Austria (for reasons explained below). Our data base includes 626 prime ministers, surely the largest ever of its kind.⁹ Prime ministers have a more insider profile to the extent that they come directly from the institution to which they will be accountable in the new post, and the length of their service there. Likewise, given the important role that parties are understood to play in pure parliamentary systems, prime ministers can be expected to have built their careers within their parties, likely including prior leadership positions, to a greater extent in parliamentary systems than in the more presidentialized regime types.

Table 2 about here

We see in Table 2 that in both parliamentary and premier-presidential democracies about half of prime ministers were serving in the national legislature upon appointment to head the cabinet. On the other hand, only about a third of prime ministers in president-parliamentary systems come directly out of the legislature. Virtually all parliamentary prime ministers have served in the national legislature at some point in their careers, whereas smaller shares have done so in each of the semi-presidential subtypes, as expected. The number of years of such service likewise follows the expected pattern. Turning to party leadership positions, there is little difference in rates of immediately prior service, but quite stark differences in both the tendency of prime ministers ever to have had a party leadership role and in the number of years in such roles.

The data shown in Table 2 support our contention that both forms of semi-presidentialism are relatively presidentialized compared to parliamentary systems. This implies that party “outsiders” are more often likely to head the party’s parliamentary delegation in semi-presidential systems—and in reality, these outsiders are likely to be direct agents of the president, rather than of the parliamentary party. The comparison of the subtypes likewise is consistent with an expectation of greater presidentialization in the president-parliamentary subtype than under premier-presidentialism.

Our argument that premiers are agents of the president and not the party is bolstered by turning our attention towards the sources of prime ministerial termination across parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. One of the most important means of holding a politician accountable is by terminating his or her

⁹ A country enters our sample when it scores 5 or greater on the POLITY IV scale of democracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2008) for five or more years during the period 1945–2004. Data were collected up through 2007. Further details regarding the construction of the data base, and comparisons to elected presidents, may be found in Samuels and Shugart (forthcoming).

tenure in the job. To explore how prime ministers' tenure ends, we draw from the same data base as we used for Table 2.¹⁰

We can think of three general ways in which prime ministers can be “fired” from their jobs: through elections, through inter-party politics, or through intra-party politics. First, premiers may lose their jobs because their party loses electoral support relative to some other party or parties. Yet PMs also frequently leave their jobs *between* legislative elections. An inter-party cause might be, for example, the collapse of a government coalition or loss in a no-confidence vote sponsored by another party. A PM can also lose his or her job due to intra-party conflict, due to dissension within the rank-and-file, for example. The percentages of PMs in parliamentary systems who leave by any of these three methods of parliamentary accountability--parliamentary elections, coalition collapse, or replacement by the PMs own party--will serve as a baseline against which to compare PM termination in semi-presidential systems.

Naturally, the crucial difference between parliamentary and semi-presidential systems emerges when we take into consideration presidential influence over prime ministerial termination. In semi-presidential systems, presidents' influence can be either inter-party or intra-party. An interparty change under presidential influence refers to a situation in which the president and PM are of different parties and conflict between the two leads the PM's resignation or firing. Intra-party conflict simply means that the president terminates the tenure of a PM from his or her own party--with clear evidence that it was the president, rather than the parliamentary party, whose pressure led to the change.

Table 3 about here

Table 3 shows the data on reasons for termination. When we compare parliamentary and semi-presidential systems (ignoring the subtypes for now), we see that each of the paths of parliamentary accountability--the only categories besides “other” that exist in a parliamentary system¹¹--represents roughly equal shares of the reasons for PM termination. In semi-presidential systems, although “assembly” factors still matter a great deal, presidential influence accounts for about 24% of all prime ministerial terminations.

One might expect substantial presidential influence over prime ministers' tenure in the president-parliamentary subtype, given the formal distribution of authority. However, the extent of presidential influence—accounting for almost 17% of all PM terminations--is something of a surprise in premier-presidential systems. After all, in those regimes the PM is formally accountable only to the assembly majority. Understood only within the confines of the constitutional rules, presidents should have no authority to dismiss a prime minister in these systems. The reason presidents possess such influence—as our concept of presidentialized

¹⁰ We uncovered the specific reason each PM left office by exploring published biographies, Lexis-Nexis, the *New York Times* on-line historical archives, and a variety of other sources. This census does not include changes to or from caretaker or interim PMs and does not include incumbent PMs at the time the dataset was constructed (Summer 2007).

¹¹ “Other” reasons include conflict with the non-elected head of state or coups or threats of coups.

parties suggests and as the table implies—is because of their informal, intra-party authority.

The intra-party authority of presidents in semi-presidential systems comes from the sheer importance of the presidency as a political prize. In fact, that is what we mean by presidentialization: parties delegate substantial autonomy to their leaders who become their presidential candidates, and once they are in office, presidents enjoy yet more autonomy as a result of their fixed term. Presidentialization results in substantial “agency loss” (the power of the agent being turned against the original principal), because letting the president have a hand in selecting and/or deselecting the party’s agent in the assembly—someone constitutionally subordinate only to the assembly majority—means relinquishing perhaps the most important source of political power that exists in a premier-presidential system. Yet once inaugurated, it would be surprising to see presidents willingly defer to their parties on something as important as who heads the cabinet. And in fact, what we see in premier-presidential system is considerable presidential influence over prime ministers’ fates. This means that despite the formal constitutional balance of power, parties have permitted a *de facto* reversal of the principal-agent relationship, as presidents use their partisan authority to shape and reshape their party in their own image.¹²

Are the two subtypes equally presidentialized? The last two columns of Table 3 suggest that they are not. In particular, two of the critical paths of assembly accountability—interparty conflict and loss of a parliamentary election—are notably less important causes of termination in president-parliamentary systems than in premier-presidential systems. And, while the margin is small, presidents in president-parliamentary systems appear to be able to intervene within their own parties and dismiss a PM somewhat more often than their counterparts in premier-presidential systems. This is as we expect, given that the president in a president-parliamentary system has, by definition, an unrestricted right to dismiss the prime minister whenever he or she feels like it.

Notwithstanding their lesser overall powers, presidents in premier-presidential systems even exhibit the ability at times to dismiss prime ministers not of their own party, as the cases of “inter-party” influence show in Table 3. Each and every case of inter-party presidential influence clearly violates the notion of “exclusive cabinet responsibility” to the assembly in premier-presidentialism. A president’s authority to dismiss another party’s (supposed) agent is primarily a function of alliance-formation. In multiparty systems, parties frequently form coalitions in which one party gets the presidency while another gets the premiership. When entering such alliances, parties evidently must accept an implicit deal in which the president determines how long the premier and his or her cabinet stays in office. This is precisely what we mean by presidentialization; the fact that presidents influence prime ministerial termination in premier-presidential systems only slightly less frequently than in president-parliamentary systems is a powerful testament to the impact of presidentialization on political parties in hybrid regimes.

¹² Here we have in mind here a distinction between “constitutional” and “partisan” powers that is similar to that developed by Mainwaring and Shugart (1998) for Latin American presidential systems.

The political parties in these regimes can be thought of as operating under an implicit contract under which the candidate is the head of the party and is essentially delegated the right, upon winning the presidency, to change premiers. This reverses the original principal-agent relationship, given that the premier is ostensibly an agent of the assembly majority. And if a president is sufficiently popular to have had extensive coattails in legislative races, or is expected to help the party in an upcoming legislative election, then his or her informal power to dismiss the premier (and other cabinet ministers) is likely to go unchallenged within the party. This informal partisan influence--above and beyond any formal constitutional powers, and without any formal presidential accountability to the party--marks the very essence of a presidentialized party.¹³ Now we turn our attention to the cases in which presidential influence, of any sort, should be most limited: cohabitation.

The Impact of Cohabitation

The definition of semi-presidentialism requires that the premier and cabinet be responsible to the assembly majority. However, the separate election of president and assembly makes possible an “executive divided against itself” (Pierce 2005), when an election results in an assembly majority that is opposed to the president. Duverger (1980: 186–7) concluded his article by referencing what he termed a “brilliant article” by his colleague, Georges Vedel, who had suggested that France would not develop a synthesis of parliamentarism and presidentialism, but rather “an *alternation* between presidential and parliamentary phases, which is quite another thing.”¹⁴ In 1980, such alternation had yet to occur in France (though it could have in 1978, had the outcome of that close assembly election been different), and Duverger did not identify any such cases in his other six semi-presidential countries. Largely, the absence of such clear alternations could be explained by the absence of bipolarity in the party systems of those other countries. Duverger notes that he had predicted the emergence of bipolarization in France and that a goal of a model of semi-presidential systems should be to help understand and predict “alternations.” In this section, we do not specifically endeavor to predict when alternations occur, but rather to develop hypotheses about the implications for prime ministerial selection and deselection, *given an alternation*. If our institutional approach to semi-presidentialism and its subtypes is accurate, there should be clear differences in patterns of intra-party influence by presidents when they face opposition majorities.

In order to carry out this final stage of our analysis, we need to have a clear definition of periods of alternation to opposition-controlled cabinets. We will define a situation of *cohabitation* as resulting when:

- (1) The president and prime minister are from opposing parties; and
- (2) The president’s party is not represented in the cabinet.

Both conditions must hold for cohabitation to result (see Samuels and Shugart, forthcoming, Chapter Two, for a more detailed discussion). With this definition in mind, to the extent that our Neo-Madisonian framework is useful, then

¹³ In Samuels and Shugart (forthcoming, Chapter Four), we detail several specific cases of such influence.

¹⁴ *Le Monde*, 19–20 February 1978, as cited by Duverger (1980).

we should observe differences in the frequency of cohabitation across the two subtypes. Cohabitation should occur from time to time under premier-presidentialism, because the exclusive accountability of the cabinet to the legislative majority gives parties some degree of influence over the cabinet, independently of the outcome of presidential elections. In contrast, we expect cohabitation to almost never occur under president-parliamentarism. In such systems, by definition presidents have the authority to dismiss the cabinet. This gives presidents far greater influence over legislative parties. Indeed, relative to a pure parliamentary system or a premier-presidential system, we expect parties in president-parliamentary systems to be highly presidentialized, because parties have much stronger incentives to focus on pursuit (and retention of) of the presidency rather than of legislative seats.

First, what is the frequency of cohabitation across the two subtypes of semi-presidentialism? To answer this question, we determined which prime ministers in our database led cohabitation cabinets. Table 4 summarizes our findings,¹⁵ based on analysis of 66 presidents and 209 prime ministers. Across all semi-presidential systems cohabitation occurred about 15% of the time. However, clear differences emerge: cohabitation occurred about 20% of the time under premier-presidentialism, but it occurred less than 2% of the time under president-parliamentarism. Indeed, we found only one case of cohabitation in this latter subtype—a brief period in Sri Lanka.

Table 4 about here

Cohabitation is relatively infrequent to begin with, and almost unknown in president-parliamentary systems. However, for the president and prime minister to be in opposition to one another 15% of the time, and 20% in one subtype, is hardly trivial. It is well worth looking more closely at cohabitation situations. In what follows, we repeat some key elements of what we did for the cross-regime comparison above, only here focused on the cohabitation situations. If our theoretical perspective is correct, there should be clear evidence of sharply lessened presidentialization under cohabitation. That is, when the bargaining situation between the president and the parliamentary majority is such that the latter can insist on a cabinet headed by an opponent of the president, and on no cabinet representation of the latter's party, the president has perforce lost his or her intra-party sources of influence. If so, then cohabitation situations should exhibit a more "parliamentarized" pattern in both the appointment of a prime minister, and in how they end. Specifically, the leader of the opposition should tend to become prime minister, and cohabitation should end principally because of elections or coalition break-up and not, most crucially, because of presidential influence (at least in premier-presidential systems).

Table 5 summarizes our findings, which should be compared against the proportions of party leaders appointed premier under all situations in semi-presidential systems reported in Table 2: 22% in premier-presidential systems and 18% in president-parliamentary systems. Table 5 shows that prime ministers under cohabitation are more than twice as likely to have been the party leader than prime

¹⁵ For a full list of cohabitation cases, see Samuels and Shugart (forthcoming), Chapter 2 appendix.

ministers under unified government.¹⁶ While the total number of cohabitation prime ministers is small (twenty six in premier-presidential systems, one in a president-parliamentary system), this difference is statistically significant. Moreover, the proportion--over 30%--is even higher than the 23% of premiers who had been serving as party leaders in parliamentary systems reported in Table 2.

Table 5 about here

This finding confirms that under semi-presidentialism, an incumbent president whose party (or alliance) loses a legislative election must frequently accept the opposition leader as head of his or her cabinet. Still, 33% means that in two-thirds of all cohabitation situations the main opposition party does *not* install its leader as prime minister. This raises two possibilities: that the opposition *chooses* not to install its leader as PM, or that the president influences *which member* of the opposition takes over the cabinet. The latter possibility implies that presidents can meddle in the affairs of parties that hold the assembly majority even when constitutionally prohibited from doing so.

We are aware of several cases when presidents have influenced the choice of PM even when the opposition controlled the assembly--and even in the premier-presidential subtype, where presidential influence should be especially weak under cohabitation. For example, in Mongolia in 1998–9 there was a prolonged stalemate as the president refused nominees for premier proposed by the majority seven times in a row. While each of these cabinets met our definition of cohabitation, the president's insistence on determining which opposition leaders served in the cabinet severely limited parliamentarization. There was also a case in Romania following the 2004 elections in which the president was able to break up a pre-electoral alliance opposed to his own election. Even as that coalition, which had won a plurality of seats in the assembly, was close to negotiating a majority coalition under its leadership, the president was able to avert cohabitation by appointing a premier from his own party and then enticing one of the partners in the opposition alliance to defect and join the president's coalition. (Details of these and other cases are discussed in Samuels and Shugart, forthcoming, Chapter Three.)

Still, despite some cases of presidential interference within opposition (or proto-opposition) alliances, the broad pattern is clear. When the president's opposition holds an assembly majority in premier-presidential systems, the result is almost always cohabitation,¹⁷ at which point the leader of the party opposed to

¹⁶ The percentage of party leaders becoming prime minister in non-cohabitation periods is slightly lowered by the fact that the president may be leading one of the parties. However, because our definition of "party leader" includes *assembly* leadership positions, nothing would preclude parties promoting their assembly leader to the premiership when another of their leaders (or perhaps one of our "outsiders") has won the presidency. Such occurrences are evidently rare, and thus it is mainly in cohabitation situations—when neither the party itself nor an ally controls the presidency—that the leader is likely to become prime minister.

¹⁷ The alternative outcomes could be either a grand coalition containing members of both the president's party and parties in opposition or a "divided government" in which the cabinet is of the president's party notwithstanding the opposition legislative majority. Our data show one case of a grand coalition in a premier-presidential system (in Mongolia, 2004–06) As for "divided government," our one case occurred, not surprisingly, in a president-parliamentary system: Taiwan, where President Chen Shui-bian had

the president tends to assume the premiership. In contrast, opposition majorities in president-parliamentary systems are extremely rare to begin with, and we were able to find only a single case of cohabitation in countries defined as democratic.¹⁸

If cohabitation is a parliamentarized phase of semi-presidentialism, then cohabitation should be most likely to end through processes that typify parliamentarism. That is, cohabitation should end either due to election results or due to intra- or inter-partisan disputes in parliament—and not due to presidential influence. Table 6 confirms this hypothesis, showing elections are the most common way to end a period of cohabitation. In about 41% of the cases cohabitation ended because the incumbent PM's party lost an assembly election, resulting in a new cabinet that included the sitting president's party. In another 22% of the cases cohabitation ended because of a presidential election, with equal shares of these cases being the PM leaving to run for (and some cases be elected) president or presidential elections being won by another candidate of the PM's party.¹⁹

Table 6 about here

Another 30% of cohabitation periods end through inter-party conflict in parliament. In these cases an opposition-controlled coalition collapses and a new government forms that includes the president's party. However, in none of these cases did the president precipitate the government collapse--in fact, no episode of cohabitation ended due to presidents' public influence. (Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the incumbent president maneuvered behind the scenes.) This finding is striking: presidents in premier-presidential systems can clearly change the prime minister when their allies control the assembly majority, but they cannot do so when they face a majority opposition. This is exactly what we should expect theoretically, if cohabitation represents a "parliamentary" phase in such regimes, as Duverger and his colleague Vedel suggested (and Lijphart 1999, 121–2, later argued).²⁰

Cohabitation periods under premier-presidentialism are important inasmuch as they reveal the conditions under which presidents are politically sidelined in such

cabinets of his own party throughout his eight years as president despite always facing an opposition-controlled legislature.

¹⁸ We also identified one case in a president-parliamentary system in which an opposition majority won control of the assembly, but the president continued to control the cabinet: Taiwan under the presidency of Chen Shui-bian. The ability of a president to avert cohabitation in such a system is, of course, not surprising, given the leverage that formal constitutional powers to dismiss a prime minister that define the subtype.

¹⁹ The one case where cohabitation ended because the premier sought and lost the presidency was the case of Lionel Jospin in France in 2002. Jospin resigned the premiership immediately upon Jacques Chirac's reelection as president, and his Socialist party also lost the assembly election a month later. (The case is also therefore one of termination resulting from a presidential election in Table 3.)

²⁰ It is also notable how much less frequently intraparty conflict within parliament ends cohabitation relative to its importance overall for ending prime ministers' tenures, whether in premier-presidential or pure parliamentary systems. Intra-party terminations represent about a fifth of all PM terminations under premier-presidentialism and close to a third under parliamentarism. Yet only two of twenty-seven cohabitation premiers ended their terms this way. Parties logically--and quite sensibly--may be more careful to avoid internal conflict that might jeopardize their hold on the cabinet when they face an opposing president--whose influence would likely peak precisely when it came time to bargain over replacing the cabinet.

systems. However, it would be a mistake to assume that cohabitation returns parties to a *fully* “parliamentarized” state. After all, under cohabitation, the party that holds the premiership but not the presidency will understand the need to have a leader capable of winning the next presidential election. Indeed, the sitting premier is likely to be a future presidential candidate—as was the case in two periods of cohabitation in France, for example: Jacques Chirac, premier from 1986 to 1988, ran for the presidency and lost in 1988 but won in 1995; and Lionel Jospin, premier from 1997 to 2002, ran for the presidency and lost in 2002, when Chirac was reelected.

In sum, our analysis of the sources of prime-ministerial deselection reveals that presidentialization of the parties is greater in president-parliamentary systems than in premier-presidential systems, just as the constitutional structure of authority in these subtypes would lead one to suspect. However, prime ministerial de-selection—and thus intra-party politics generally considered—is presidentialized in both subtypes, except under periods of cohabitation. This is because presidents—agents who cannot be fired—employ both formal constitutional and informal partisan powers to shape cabinet composition. For this reason, executive moral hazard is a greater danger under hybrid constitutions than under pure parliamentarism. Regardless of the constitutional configuration of authority, political parties tend to be highly presidentialized under both subtypes of semi-presidentialism.

Austrian exceptionalism?

Austria is a critical case for any consideration of the relationship between constitutional powers in semi-presidential systems, and actually observed powers. The president-parliamentary subtype grants the president so much formal authority over cabinet formation that parliamentarization of parties should be rare. However, rare does not mean never, as we illustrate by briefly exploring the case of Austria, which is the one obviously “parliamentarized” president-parliamentary regime. Austrian presidents have never played such a dominant role, despite the president’s clear constitutional authority to determine the prime minister, to dismiss cabinets that enjoy parliamentary confidence, and to dissolve parliament. In fact, Austria was one of the cases that led Duverger (1980: 167) to be cautious in how much he attributed political behavior to formal constitutional provisions, when he said that presidents’ formal powers “remain secondary in relation to the general physiognomy of the system” and “far less important than the variety of political practices” that one observes in comparative analysis. It is worth recalling, however, that Duverger had at his disposal a mere seven cases, whereas we have been able here to analyze about four times as many, and with almost three decades of additional accumulated experience. Our analysis has shown clearly that the dimension of presidential power on which the subtypes of semi-presidential democracy are differentiated has clear and systematic relationships with patterns of prime-ministerial selection and deselection—except in Austria.

Müller (1999) notes that Austria’s informal “constitutional convention” requires that the president always appoint the leader of the largest party as *formateur*. In fact, the leader of the largest party has always formed the government.

In addition, no postwar Austrian president has dismissed a government or dissolved parliament. Parties also tend not to nominate their most important leaders for president, but rather “elder statesmen.” Campaign laws further inhibit presidentialization, as there is almost no public finance available for presidential candidates to campaign independently of their parties, in contrast to the generous subsidies available for all other elected offices (Müller, 1999: 40). In short, unlike parties in other president-parliamentary regimes, Austria’s parties have gone to considerable lengths to minimize the potential that they would become presidentialized.

Given these informal norms, Austrian politics does not follow the formal configuration of power its constitution outlines. Austrian premiers are strong insiders, in contrast to PMs in all other president-parliamentary systems: eleven of twelve jumped to the premiership from the assembly or the cabinet, a far higher proportion than average for the regime subtype; all had also served at some point in parliament, seven of twelve had served as party leader, and half had served in the cabinet.

Austria is clearly an outlier for our argument because the presidency has limited political relevance. This development is partly an historical accident, and partly a function of Austrian parties’ conscious efforts to control the presidency. At the end of WWII, Austria re-declared its independence from Germany, which had annexed the country in 1938. To restore stability and the country’s autonomy as rapidly as possible, Austrian political leaders decided to sidestep the often lengthy and contentious process of rewriting their constitution. Instead, they agreed to simply revert to the country’s constitution as of 1920, which had been modeled on Weimar Germany’s but which had been amended in 1929 to give the president considerably greater autonomous powers. After the war, the two main parties--the socialist SPÖ and center-right ÖVP--entered into a governing coalition that lasted for two decades. During this time, the parties established an informal norm that the presidency would be largely ceremonial. The constitution has never been amended to formally reduce the presidents’ powers, but presidents have rarely taken advantage of their considerable formal powers.

In no other semi-presidential system in our database²¹ do we see this degree of *de facto* political deviation from the *de jure* constitutional form. However, the Austrian experience suggests ways that parties--and thus the regime itself--may be parliamentarized even under institutions that tend to promote presidentialization. However, we expect such cases to be rare, and they evidently are. After all, the Austrian case illustrates that conscious inter- and intra-party agreement is required to maintain a *de facto* weak president in a *de jure* strongly presidentialized system.

We have also seen that cohabitation tends to “parliamentarize” party politics—but only in premier-presidential regimes. Finally, despite the Austrian

²¹ What we say about “parliamentarization” in Austria could be largely repeated for Iceland, another president-parliamentary system. As Duverger noted, Icelandic presidents exercise few of their formal powers. However, Iceland, due to its very small population, is not included in the data source from which we compiled our list of democracies (POLITY IV) and hence we have ignored it.

case, parties tend to be highly presidentialized in president-parliamentary regimes, as our theoretical framework predicts.

Conclusions

The concept of semi-presidentialism first appeared in the English language literature with Duverger's (1980) article proposing it as a "new political system model." In the intervening three decades, the model has enjoyed widespread influence both in political science and in the world of actual constitutional design. Duverger was concerned principally with the extent to which the model was useful for understanding and predicting the extent of presidential influence in systems with both a powerful elected presidency and a parliamentary-dependent cabinet. Notwithstanding Duverger's considerable contributions to the study of political parties, his 1980 article did not draw the links between party organization and regime type. In fact, no one has done so systematically, to our knowledge, up to now. Yet the presence of an elected presidency with even minimal constitutional powers generally induces parties to orient most of their organization and activity around capturing that office. The result, we have argued, is a "presidentialization" of the party, as the president becomes the most important leader, frequently reversing the principal-agent relationship. That is, whereas presidents are usually nominated by a political party, and hence should be party agents, once in office they become the most important principal over their own party. By comparing the experiences of almost thirty countries, and analyzing the careers of over six hundred parliamentary and semi-presidential prime ministers, we were able to confirm that there is substantial presidentialization in semi-presidential systems. Prime ministers are more likely to be "outsiders" and hence less clearly agents of the parliamentary party when there is an elected presidency. The pattern that holds even more for the president-parliamentary subtype in which presidents have formal power to dismiss the prime minister than in the premier-presidential subtype, in which they lack this power. There is also strong evidence that presidents regularly intervene in the selection and deselection of the prime minister when their own party is in a privileged position in the parliament. However, when they face an opposition majority--a condition that occurs almost exclusively in premier-presidential systems and even there only around 20% of the time--presidents indeed recede to the background and the regime alternates to a relatively more "parliamentarized" phase, as Duverger expected.

By employing a form of institutional analysis that highlights a critical variation in the political system model Duverger identified, and by considering how the structure of the regime shapes intra-party organization and behavior, we have been able to combine two of the major contributions of Duverger to political science. First, we have confirmed that semi-presidentialism is worthy of being considered a distinct regime type from parliamentarism. Second, we have seen that political parties are the key vehicles through which presidents shape their influence over the cabinet, and by extension over the entire democratic process.

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Table 1: Semi-presidential democracies in the post-WWII era, by subtype

Premier-Presidential	President-Parliamentary
Armenia 2 (2005-2007)	Armenia 1 (1998-2005)
Bulgaria (1990-2007)	Austria (1949-2007)
Croatia (2000-2007)	Georgia (2004-07)
Finland (1945-2007)	Madagascar 2 (1993-97)
France (1962-2007)	Mozambique (1994-2007)
Ireland (1952-2007)	Namibia (1990-2007)
Lithuania (1991-2007)	Peru (1980-92, 2000-07)
Macedonia (1991-2007)	Portugal 1 (1978-80)
Madagascar 1 (1991-93)	Russia (1992-2007)
Mali (1992-2007)	Senegal (2000-2007)
Moldova (1991-2001)	Sri Lanka (1978-2007)
Mongolia (1992-2007)	Taiwan (1997-2007)
Poland (1989-2007)	Ukraine 1 (1992-2005)
Portugal 2 (1980-2007)	
Romania (1990-2007)	
Slovak Republic (1998-2007)	
Slovenia (1991-2007)	
Ukraine 2 (2005-07)	

Table 2: Legislative and party-leadership careers of prime ministers by regime type

	Parliamentary (N=403)	Premier- Presidential (N=151)	President- Parliamentary (N=72)
National legislator			
As immediately previous job	55%	50%	32%
At any point in career	94%	80%	70%
# Years Legislator	9.40	6.80	6.10
Party leadership position			
As immediately previous job	23%	22%	18%
At any point in career	76%	51%	19%
# Years Lead Party	4.09	2.61	1.20

Table 3: Reasons for PM termination in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems

Change occurs...	Parliamentary, Number (%)	Semi-presidential, either subtype, Number (%)	Premier- Presidential, Number (%)	President- Parliamentary, Number (%)
As result of losing assembly election	113 (31.9)	51 (25.6)	45 (33.1)	6 (9.5)
Inter-party conflict, assembly	115 (32.5)	36 (18.1)	31 (22.8)	5 (7.9)
Intra-party conflict, assembly	107 (30.2)	43 (21.6)	27 (19.9)	16 (25.4)
Interparty, Presidential Influence	--	17 (8.5)	9 (6.6)	8 (12.7)
Intraparty, Presidential Influence	--	31 (15.6)	14 (10.2)	17 (27.0)
Ran for/Was Elected President	--	15 (7.5)	9 (6.6)	6 (9.5)
Other	19 (5.4)	6 (3.0)	1 (0.7)	5 (7.9)
(N)	354	199	136	63

If PM changed after concurrent presidential and assembly elections, the case is considered to have followed a presidential election.

Table 4. Rate of cohabitation by semi-presidential subtypes

	Duration of cohabitation	Total presidential tenure	Percent of cohabitation
Premier-presidential	69 years, 9.7 months	315 years, 7.3 months	22.1
President-parliamentary	2 years, 4 months	163 years, 6.2 months	1.4
Semi-presidential total	72 years, 1.6 months	479 years, 1.7 months	15.1

Table 5: Previous job of prime ministers in semi-presidential systems, by subtype and cohabitation

	All Semi-presidential PMs		Premier-presidential PMs	
	Cohabitation	Unified Government	Cohabitation	Unified Government
	(N=29)	(N=197)	(N=28)	(N=122)
Party leader	.33	.15	.31	.16
Significance		p=.01		p=.04

Note: Includes only those prime ministers who were newly appointed after a parliamentary election or between elections; that is, excludes three PMs who were already in power and remained in power when an opposing president was elected.

Table 6: Reasons for Termination of Cohabitation in Semi-Presidential Regimes*

	Cohabitation PMs (%)
Ran for/Elected President	11
Electoral: assembly election resulted in unified government	41
Electoral: presidential election resulted in unified government	11
Interparty Conflict, Parliament	30
Intraparty Conflict, Parliament	7
Interparty, Presidential Influence	0
Intraparty, Presidential Influence	0
(N)	27**

* Does not necessarily mean termination of the prime minister, but rather the reason the prime minister ceased to be in a cohabitation situation; this includes the one case of cohabitation under president-parliamentary system, which ended via an assembly election.

** Total number of completed cohabitation periods (this excludes five prime ministers still in office under cohabitation at the end of 2008).