“…so contriving the interior structure of government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.”—James Madison Executive-legislative structure; interactions between executive form and electoral systems Books
David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart, Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. (Click here to see replication data sets.)
Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, editors, Executive Decree Authority. New York: Cambridge University Press 1998. Includes the following chapters by Shugart:
- John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Calling out the Tanks or Filling out the Forms?”
- John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Institutional Design and Exeuctive Decree”
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, editors, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Includes the following chapters by Shugart: - Matthew Soberg Shugart and Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate”
- Ron Archer and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia”
- Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System”
Chapters in other volumes Erika Moreno, Brian F. Crisp, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “The Accountability Deficit in Latin America,” in Democratic Accountability in Latin America, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003
Matthew S. Shugart, “Sistemas de Gobierno En América Latina: Frenos y Contrapesos en una Era de Globalización,” in Fernando Carillo, ed., Democracia en Déficit: Gobernabilidad y Desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe. Washington: Interamerican Development Bank, 2001. Matthew Soberg Shugart and Stephan Haggard, “Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems,” in Presidents, Parliaments and Policy , ed. by Mathew D. McCubbins and Stephan Haggard. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Stephan Haggard, Robert Kaufman, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Politics, Institutions, and Macroeconomic Adjustment: Hungarian Fiscal Policy-Making in Comparative Perspective,” in Reforming the State: Fiscal Welfare Reform in Post-Socialist Countries, ed. by Stephan Haggard, Robert Kaufman, and Janos Kornai. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Journal articles Matthew Søberg Shugart, Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns." French Politics 3, 3(2005): 323-51. Matthew Soberg Shugart, “The American Process of Selecting a President: A Comparative Perspective.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, 3 (September, 2004): 632–55. David J. Samuels and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Presidentialism, Elections, and Representation.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 15, 1 (January, 2003). Daniel L. Nielson and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Constitutional Change in Colombia: Policy Adjustment through Institutional Change.” Comparative Political Studies 32, 3 (May, 1999): 313–41. Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries,” Constitutional Political Economy, 10,1 (March, 1999): 53–88.
Matthew Soberg Shugart, “The Inverse Relationship Between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians' Constitutional Choices,” British Journal of Political Science 28 (1998): 1–29. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy—A Critical Appraisal ,” with Scott Mainwaring. Comparative Politics 29, 4 (July 1997). Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Executive–Legislative Relations in Post-Communist Europe,” Transition 13 (December 1996): 6–11. Matthew Soberg Shugart, “The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government,” American Political Science Review 89, 2 (June 1995): 327–43. Matthew Soberg Shugart and Rein Taagepera, “Majority Versus Plurality Election of Presidents: A Proposal for a 'Double Complement Rule'.” Comparative Political Studies 27 3 (October, 1994): 323-48. |
