

# **COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY PERSONNEL— THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM AND NON-REFORM**

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

What is the impact of the electoral system—and changes in the electoral system—on how political parties recruit candidates and how they assign their successful candidates to party, legislative, and executive posts? To what extent, and in what ways, do electoral systems shape how parties use the processes of recruitment and post assignment to make connections with constituencies? These are important questions for understanding the larger process of democratic representation. The type of people who run for office and the type of posts their parties allow them to occupy will shape how voters will be represented and the type of policies their government will implement. Despite the significance of these questions, the literature does not as yet provide satisfactory answers. While various literatures refer to several related questions, at the broader level and in cross-national theoretical and empirical work, the question remains unanswered. The purpose of this proposal is to systematically investigate these questions with a comparative, multi-country, small-*N* design involving extensive quantitative data collection of the distribution of party personnel before and after elections. Our research design leverages change in electoral systems to help us determine the impact of the electoral system on the ways that parties recruit candidates and assign legislators to posts.

## **II. THEORY AND IMPACT**

Our project proposes to analyze, through a systematic multi-national study, how parties recruit and allocate personnel to scarce and coveted electoral, party, legislative and government positions. Our research design leverages several examples of electoral reform to allow us to analyze how different electoral systems affect the personnel strategies parties employ as they attempt to cater to electoral constituencies, given the constraints and opportunities arising from their institutional context.

### **A. Contributions of Project to Legislative Organization and Candidate Quality Studies**

How electoral systems affect party personnel strategies matters, both theoretically and practically. There are large bodies of literature in political science on aspects of electoral systems and on candidate selection and post distribution. Political scientists have long known that the type of electoral system can influence such important political variables as the number of parties and the type of party system (Duverger 1954, Rae 1967, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1994, Cox 1997). There is also a literature on candidate selection and recruitment, notably that on US congressional parties' efforts to recruit "quality" candidates (Jacobson 1983, Carson, Engstrom and Roberts 2007). The comparative literature on candidate selection is relatively small (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Norris 1997, Katz 2001, Rahat and Hazan 2001, Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005, Rahat 2007, Morgenstern and Siavelis forthcoming).<sup>1</sup> A large number of studies also link electoral incentives to the committee structure in the US Congress and the way in which parties and legislators organize themselves in the legislature (e.g., Mayhew 1974, Fiorina 1977, Katz and Sala 1996). Evidence on the impact of electoral variables on legislative organization from other democracies is exceedingly rare (we find only Pekkanen, Nyblade, Krauss 2006; Mcleay and Vowles 2006; and Stratman

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<sup>1</sup> A note on a prior NSF-supported project by Shugart on candidate quality is appended to this proposal.

and Bauer 2002 in our review). There has yet to be an extensive cross-national study of whether party candidate nomination and distribution of positions to legislators are systematically patterned by the type of electoral system, much less a consideration of what such results would mean for our theoretical understanding.

So despite prior research in electoral studies, we do not know the extent to which and how the strategies of parties, attempting to maximize electoral success under the specific, structured incentives of a given electoral system, affect personnel practices. Especially, we do not know how electoral system incentives affect in a patterned way the types of candidates who run for office, and the legislators who are elected. The answer matters for both political science theory and the quality of representation in democracies. If there is a systematic relationship between electoral systems and the qualities of candidates and types of legislators assigned to specific party, legislative, and government posts, this may have large implications for representation and policymaking. If this relationship exists, then subsequent research can ascertain whether and how such patterns of personnel distribution affects the type of policies parties and legislators adopt, and the level of responsiveness and accountability to voters these policies represent.

With the research design we discuss below, we believe we can provide the first systematic empirical cross-national comparison of how electoral systems affect the ways in which parties allocate scarce posts to individual politicians. Furthermore, we seek to make an additional theoretical contribution by linking previously disparate literatures on candidate quality and legislative organization. A final contribution will be the creation of standardized data bases of electoral and legislative organization variables that will become a major resource to the field.

## **B. Linking Candidate Quality and Legislative Organization Sub-fields**


Although electoral systems have been linked in research to party nominees in election (“candidate quality”) and to the way in which parties and representatives organize themselves in legislatures (“legislative organization”) these two research streams have been studied in isolation. We argue that we should treat them as connected. Empirically, it is easy to see that the two are connected. After all, the legislators who fill committee seats have all been selected previously as candidates and, we suggest, parties distribute both electoral and legislative positions in response to the incentives of the electoral system. What we call “party personnel strategies” are the theoretical fulcrum that link these practices together.

In a business firm, a corporate Human Resources department manages both recruitment and development for employees, and selection and training are ostensibly geared to the market in which the company is operating. Thus comparative studies have shown that personnel recruitment outcomes are strongly affected by the local environment (Tinsley and DiPrete 2001). Similarly, while the analogy is not perfect, parties should recruit and develop their “personnel” (candidates and elected legislators) in a way that the party leadership determines will advance the party’s success in the electoral “marketplace.”<sup>2</sup> How they allocate scarce positions, however, should vary with different types of electoral systems, because the available positions may vary with the electoral system, because the party’s market opportunities and constraints vary with electoral system, and because some electoral systems may privilege local variations in the electoral market whereas others may not. We discuss these various themes further below.

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<sup>2</sup> Although many political science theories of political organization (parties, legislatures, etc.) are based ultimately on theories of the firm (as reviewed by Moe 1984), or on the analogy of electoral competition to markets (e.g. Downs 1957, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1994), we are aware of none that have specifically applied human resource and personnel management analogies to parties.

**FIGURE 1: Model of Electoral Systems and Party Personnel Strategies**



Selection to and success in different career posts will depend both on how well the organization recruited new personnel and how well it matches its available positions and personnel. Thus parties may take various actions to structure their personnel strategies in order to successfully appeal to constituencies to gain or stay in power.

Figure 1 presents a diagram of the relationships in our model. It indicates our assertion that party personnel strategies, which are our dependent variable and which contain two components (electoral and post-electoral), are shaped by the electoral system, our independent variable. It further indicates that the impact of the electoral system works through the types of constituency—our intervening variable—that are most favored by the electoral system.

Our dependent variable, party personnel strategies, has two components: electoral (recruitment and nomination of candidates) and post-electoral (appointments to party, legislative and perhaps executive positions). On the *electoral* side, parties may recruit new candidates from eligible pools that might currently be underrepresented within the party ranks. Their incentive to do so is conditioned by the *types of constituencies* that the electoral system privileges, as we will develop below. On the *post-electoral* side, parties “enhance” the quality of their successfully elected candidates by providing them with appointments. The double-headed arrow connecting the electoral and post-electoral components of the party personnel strategies reflects the notion that parties distribute these offices in part to improve the quality of their personnel for the sake of upcoming elections, as well. That is, parties can improve the reelection prospects of incumbent legislators through the posts they give, making them “higher quality” candidates the next time around. The means by which they do so is, in turn, conditioned by the electoral system and the opportunities it gives parties to signal their commitment to constituencies the party is seeking to cultivate. We discuss these inter-relationships further in Section III.

Systematic relationships among these variables have not been extensively investigated. There are many studies linking the type of electoral system to candidate nomination (e.g. Cox and Rosenbluth 1996; Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1999; Browne and Patterson 1999). In the U.S., a literature (referenced above) links electoral constituencies and candidate quality to the organization of the House of Representatives. Several studies have investigated influences on the nomination process itself (Lundell 2004, Gallagher and Marsh 1988), though less so on the characteristics of the candidates themselves. And in European parliamentary systems, there is a literature on the allocation of executive portfolios (e.g. Laver and Shepsle 1990, 1996; Warwick and Druckman 2001). However, there is no literature that we are aware of that ties the

electoral system to party strategies in the allocation of all of these various aspects of recruitment and appointments across a wide range of political systems. This is a major gap we seek to fill.

### **III. RESEARCH DESIGN: Electoral Systems and Party Personnel Strategies**

In this section we further develop our dependent and independent variables, and their relationship. First we define party personnel strategies (the dependent variable) more precisely, and then we turn to variations in electoral systems (the independent variable). Subsequently, we explain in greater detail our concept of constituency types (an intervening variable).

#### ***A. Party Personnel Strategies: Candidate Recruitment and Nomination Quality***

Parties, as we conceptualize them, consist of teams of politicians holding elected office, and candidates nominated for elected office. Each partisan team deploys its personnel—that is, the individuals who are candidates or office-holders under the party label—towards its collective aims (e.g. winning a legislative majority or bargaining for a share of cabinet portfolios or policy concessions). The personnel are assigned specific tasks, under a division of labor that, if the team is managed efficiently, should maximize the alignment of the individual attributes of the personnel with the collective pursuits of the team. While this conceptualization implies a highly centralized, unitary, party, it is not necessary for parties to be centralized in practice for them to act as if they were working to maximize the capacity of the “team” to act collectively. As we develop below, we expect this collective action to be directed towards cultivating constituencies of interest to the party, within the set of constraints and opportunities given by how the electoral system defines victory for the party’s individual candidates.

The electoral component of the party’s personnel strategy consists of the recruitment and nomination of candidates, which may include new personnel from outside the current ranks of the party’s elected members. Besides being critical to representation, candidate selection is also key to parties’ electoral success. In this study, we are interested in how the electoral system structures candidate recruitment, because the candidates collectively are the public “face” of the party’s team, and the subset of candidates who become legislators form the “pool” of personnel from which parties select when allocating posts after an election.

Specifically, we are interested in how parties define and recruit “quality” candidates. We are using the term, “quality,” much as it has been used by Jacobson (1983) on the US case, by Scheiner (2006) for Japan, and by Shugart, et al, (2005), for several European systems: higher quality candidates are those that bring an existing record of experience, whether in politics or other fields, to a legislative campaign. Out of the entire pool of eligible candidates (usually defined as the adult citizenry) only some subset are deemed by the party to have the qualities it seeks in its candidates. As the party seeks to attract new voting constituencies in a competitive electoral marketplace, it may seek to extend its personnel recruitment into new pools of potential officeholders. For instance, a change in issues that the party wishes to emphasize may lead the party to recruit candidates with experience in those issue areas, or a party might recruit more female candidates if gender issues have become more salient among the electorate.

Having recruited a team of candidates for legislative office under the party’s label, the party organization awards some of its candidates with more visible roles in the campaign and, crucially, with nominations that improve chances of actually being elected. Thus variance in nomination quality is the first step in the party’s enhancement of the personnel it has recruited: nominations that are more certain to lead to election are scarce, relative to the pool of recruited candidates. The flexibility parties have in allocating quality nominations is conditioned by the electoral system, in ways that we discuss below, in sub-section C.

## ***B. Party Personnel Strategies: Appointments***

In all democratic legislatures elected representatives must cooperate, organize themselves and create institutions in order to achieve their individual and collective goals. Despite the universal nature of the challenge of legislative organization, the scholarship on the topic has been dominated by studies of the U.S. House (e.g. Polsby 1968, Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Brady and McCubbins 2002; Cox 2005). If electoral incentives affect legislative organization, scholarship that focuses exclusively on the US Congress misses some of the most interesting variation in legislators' electoral incentives. Moreover, most of the US literature starts theoretically from the incentives of the individual legislators and builds upwards to the collective action of parties.<sup>3</sup> This perspective is quite clearly valid for the highly decentralized parties of the US, but it is of less obvious application to the far more centralized parties found in most other democracies.<sup>4</sup> While we will be sensitive in the elaboration of this research to variations in the degree of centralization of parties, our working assumption is that parties in our cases can be characterized as *collective actors that are organized to deploy personnel for collective gain*. It is of less importance for our purposes whether the authority to deploy personnel is delegated from the caucus—from the individual legislators—or from outside in the form of an extra-parliamentary organization. The party organization itself, as noted, may be more or less centralized in ways that affect both candidate-selection processes and post-electoral assignment of posts. Whether or not parties act as if they have a “Human Resources Department” (HR) that develops and promotes personnel for collective electoral benefit, and how this relates to other variations in the organization of parties, is thus an empirical question that we will be investigating. If parties—centralized or otherwise—act as if they have an HR department, we expect to see variation according to the electoral system and the constituencies represented through it that any given party is seeking to cultivate.

Conceptualizing the deployment of personnel in this manner has hardly been done in the comparative literature.<sup>5</sup> Some literature on Germany (a case included in this proposal, as noted in Section IV) points in the general direction we are going with this proposal. The case of Germany is of paramount theoretical significance because legislators are elected in a two-tier system, with some elected in single-seat districts and others by party list. Whereas some scholars have found no significant differences in legislative committee assignments for members elected in the different tiers (Nohlen 1990, Ismayr 1992), others have argued that district representatives are more likely to receive posts that allow them access to particularistic benefits needed for their reelection (Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Stratmann and Baur 2002). In New Zealand, which now has an electoral system similar to Germany's, preliminary interview research conducted by two of this project's principal investigators did not reveal a pattern of different allocations according to tier of election; part of this proposal is to extend research on the New Zealand case. Japan, another of our cases, also has a new electoral system with both a single-seat-district and a list tier. Two of this project's principal investigators have suggested that Japan's Liberal Democratic Party indeed allocates posts differentially according to the tier in which a member was elected (Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006). For instance, among their findings was that “high policy” posts (those that attend to high-profile, national programmatic pursuits) tended to be given to electorally secure senior incumbents, but members who lost in a close district race but won a list seat also were more likely to be given both high policy posts

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<sup>3</sup> Some US theories do not include parties (e.g. Shepsle and Weingast 1987, Weingast and Marshall 1988, Krehbiel 1991); however, debates about the centrality of parties are of limited interest to us, for reasons discussed in this section.

<sup>4</sup> For a similar point, see Gamm and Huber (2002).

<sup>5</sup> A partial exception to this literature would be the portfolio-bargaining literature, which is extensive (and was referenced above), but is more narrowly focused.

and distributive (i.e., “pork barrel”) positions to strengthen their chances of winning in the local district the next time.

As the findings on Japan suggest, parties may promote legislators to leadership roles where they become part of the “face” of the party as a whole and are tasked with enhancing the value of the party’s label in elections. Or they may provide members with access to benefits for their constituencies that will improve their electoral security in the future. The tools that parties have available to them in this area are conditioned by the electoral system. For instance, if an electoral system does not have local districts, there are few opportunities for the party to increase a legislator’s anticipated margin in the next election (e.g. through posts with “pork barrel” opportunities). On the other hand, if the electoral system has party lists ranked by the party itself, the party can enhance the quality of the next nomination by placing the legislator in a visible leadership role and then signaling the importance of this legislator by also giving him or her a higher list position. We now turn to these electoral system variations in more detail.

### **C. Electoral Systems**

The electoral system plays a crucial role in providing parties with opportunities for recruiting and deploying personnel in a way that it expects will benefit the party collectively in the electoral marketplace. Opportunities available to parties in some systems may not be available in others, due to variations in the way in which seats are allocated and the types of constituencies (our intervening variable) that the electoral system privileges.

There are many ways in which the diversity of the world’s electoral systems may be simplified and classified. For our purposes, a critical distinction is that between *nominal* systems and *list* systems. A secondary variable of interest—secondary, in part, because it is closely correlated with nominal or list—is the districting structure. Under nominal systems, legislators are elected solely on votes cast for them as individuals, typically in small (often single-seat) districts. The vote accrues only to the candidate for whom it was cast and can’t be “pooled” to any other candidates of the same or other party. Under a list system, on the other hand, votes are counted first for the set of candidates running as a team in a given multi-seat district (perhaps nationwide). Only after the counting of votes and allocation of seats to these partisan teams is a determination made as to which candidates within a list have been elected.

The most common example of a nominal system is the single-seat district (SSD) plurality system (also known as first-past-the-post, or FPTP). Perhaps the next best known nominal system is the single nontransferable vote (SNTV), formerly used in Japan, in which a party may have two or more candidates competing in any given *multi-seat* district. List systems of interest to us will be systems of proportional representation (PR), with closed or predominantly closed lists.<sup>6</sup> PR systems in which the party (or alliance) ranks candidates on the list ahead of the election stand in the starkest contrast to nominal systems, by effectively allowing voters a vote for the full *team* only, whereas all the nominal systems we will investigate allow a vote only for one individual. Some systems are hybrids of both types, sometimes connecting nominal and PR portions and sometimes not.. We discuss the impact of variation in electoral systems further in sub-section E, but first we discuss our intervening variable, constituency type.

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
<sup>6</sup> That is, we are not interested here in open lists, in which votes cast for individual candidates determine the order of election from the list. We are interested in systems in which parties rank candidates and, even if there are candidate-preference votes, it is the party rank that normally prevails in determining the order in which candidates are elected from the list. (The issues raised in this footnote are central to Shugart’s current NSF-supported research, as addressed at the end of this proposal.)

#### **D. Intervening Variable: Constituency types**

Our overarching framework is one that takes personnel strategies to be means by which parties seek to attract given electoral constituencies, recruit sufficiently “quality” candidates to communicate their interest in those constituencies, and then enhance those qualities further through the allocation of party, legislative, and executive posts. Broadly speaking, what are the types of constituencies that are of interest? They may be conceived of as lying in a two-dimensional space, as depicted in Figure 2.

The horizontal dimension represents the degree to which a constituency of interest is located primarily in given geographic sub-regions of the country (concentrated) or is found as a small minority throughout the territory (dispersed). The vertical dimension represents the degree to which the constituency is organized to articulate its interests. Some constituencies are demographic groups or “communities of interest” such as consumers that lack structured organizational lobbies of the sort typical of producer groups. In the next sub-section we discuss the implications of electoral systems for parties’ interest in articulating constituencies of various types, and the further implication for parties’ personnel strategies.

**FIGURE 2: Constituency Types**



#### **E. The Argument: Towards a theory of party personnel strategies**

Party personnel strategies are shaped by the type of electoral system, but, as we depicted in Figure 1 above, their impact is felt through the type of constituencies, as defined above in sub-section D, that the electoral system makes available to the party, as we explain in this sub-section.

The type of electoral system has an impact on the types of constituencies that are available for parties to court through the recruitment of candidates or the assignment of legislators to committees that attend to policies of interest to various constituencies (i.e. through the party’s personnel strategy). Thus if parties are conceptualized as teams of individual politicians that deploy their personnel in a manner that they collectively determine will allow them to win votes and seats, then the way in which the electoral system structures vote- and seat-winning opportunities will condition the types of constituencies that are electorally valuable.

If the electoral system is nominal, a party needs a personnel strategy that will win votes for its individual candidates, because, by definition, under such systems votes are cast and counted solely for the candidates. On the other hand, if the electoral system is list, parties may assemble teams of candidates that appeal to diverse constituencies that make up the party electorate,

perhaps including candidates of dispersed or unorganized interests that could not hope to elect candidates of their own under a nominal system. The degree of diversity represented depends on the degree of diversity of the electorate, which in turn is shaped by the districting as well as the underlying features of the society and economy. Thus, in coding the variable, constituency type, in this project, we will have to be cognizant of demographic and economic characteristics of the district, however “district” may be defined under the electoral system in use.

Nominal systems in single-seat districts (FPTP rules) require each party to present before each constituency of potential voters only one candidate, because the system divides the national territory into geographically delimited districts. The single candidate nominated in any district must be able to appeal to a wide swath of the party’s potential voting constituency in that geographically delimited region. Many districts may be uncompetitive and thus “safe” for one party. These are, from the candidate’s and party’s perspective, the highest quality nominations, because they are the nominations that virtually guarantee that the candidate will be elected or reelected. However, it is in marginal districts where candidate recruitment matters most for the party’s collective success, for in a competitive district the candidate must not only gain the votes of committed partisans but also appeal to some segment of uncommitted or cross-party (“swing”) voters. Thus it is in the marginal seats that we would expect the most attention to “matching” the candidate with characteristics of the constituency being courted, and also the strongest (in terms of appeal to that constituency) candidates to be run.

Nominal systems in multi-seat districts (i.e. the single nontransferable vote) likewise entail a party’s dependence on the qualities of its individual candidates; however, parties—at least the larger ones—may be nominating more than one candidate per district, rather than having a single standard bearer. While this distinction in the number of candidates running for a party is clearly consequential for personnel strategies, the more important distinction for our purposes is that any type of nominal system stands starkly apart from a list system in that nominal systems do not permit voters to accept the party’s “team,” only (one of) its candidates.

If the electoral system is based on lists, parties nominate a slate of candidates. If parties also rank candidates on the list, then the party is able to structure a slate of candidates, which the voters must accept (or reject) as a whole. This feature allows parties to select and prioritize their candidates to balance the set of candidate characteristics and the constituencies to which they appeal. As the prioritized list represents the “party label,” to large strata of voters, it communicates to various constituencies what the party stands for and the values it places on different types of candidates and thus constituencies.

The nominal–list distinction, as well as the districting arrangement, have significant implications for how constituencies are represented. Some of these implications are quite straightforward. For instance, there can be little doubt that constituencies that are geographically concentrated are favored by electoral systems that are nominal, especially if they use single-seat districts: constituencies that can make the difference between winning or losing many of these districts are electorally valuable to competing parties. As a result, we would expect parties to attempt to recruit candidates with local appeal and to provide the winners with post-electoral appointments that could be used to enhance their appeal to such constituencies. On the other hand, if the electoral system is based on lists, and especially if the lists are competing in very large districts (at the limit, nationwide), then geographically concentrated constituencies may be less valuable to parties, other things equal. If that intuition is correct, then we should see fewer candidates with appeal to geographically concentrated constituencies and fewer tendencies to assign legislators to legislative committees or party or government posts that would help the legislator attend to geographically defined constituencies. Even among list systems, the more districts a

country is divided into, the more it should be electoral valuable to target geographically concentrated constituencies. It is critical that list systems *always* have multi-seat districts and often some of them are quite large both in territory and in number of members elected. Thus list systems tend to privilege geographically defined constituencies less than nominal systems, which consist of either single-seat districts or relatively small multi-seat districts.

As for the impact of the electoral system on the other dimension of constituency type—the degree of organization—it is less straightforward what to expect. It is widely recognized that nominal voting in multi-seat districts privileges organized interests (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1994; McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995; Tatebayashi and McKean 2002), because constituency organization helps parties differentiate their candidates. As for the impact of other electoral systems, guidance in the literature is relatively unclear. Some literature suggests that single-seat districts (with, necessarily, nominal voting) should lead parties to prioritize unorganized interests. On the other hand, according to the same logic, a large-district list system may allow parties to place representatives of unpopular sectoral interest organizations in list ranks that are safe but where they may be unnoticed by voters, who, in any event, cannot do anything to affect these specific candidates' electoral chances, due to the list-only vote (Bawn and Thies 2003). Another logic might suggest that lists permit parties to give safe rankings (“high quality nominations,” in our terms) to leaders that they want to attend to “high policy” commitments of the party, which may include candidates with minimal organizational ties but appeal to segments of public opinion.<sup>7</sup> If our theoretical perspective is on the right track, we should see legislators with ties to organized constituencies in list systems receiving appointments of interest to those constituencies, whereas legislators with appeal to unorganized constituencies might be expected to occupy the “high policy” leadership positions with great public visibility. The impact of electoral systems on how parties in list-based electoral systems—the most common family of electoral systems in the world—use their personnel strategies to connect with organized or unorganized interests promises to be one of the main impacts of the proposed research.

#### **IV. CASE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION**

We propose a small-*N* multi-case design that requires intensive data collection and analysis under the direction of the Co-PIs and with the close assistance of country-specialist subcontractors. We will analyze party personnel strategies through data we will collect on candidate selection and legislative organization. We will attempt to ascertain how (if) the incentives of different electoral systems systematically affect these strategies. As we detail below, we have four cases where a fundamental electoral-system change has occurred within the last fifteen years and four “steady state” cases where there has been no such change.

If our theory of personnel strategies being related to cultivating constituencies under different electoral systems is accurate, we should see significant changes in the countries that have undergone major electoral reform. Countries with significant electoral-system change are about as close to “natural experiments” as we can get. The steady-state cases, on the other hand, give us a base-line against which to judge the change cases, and allow us effectively to control for broader cross-national factors that might change the nature of cultivated constituencies even in countries not undergoing electoral reform. Because the world is not static, we also have to consider that exogenous factors such as change in the international economy or international norms, decreased gender disparities, or the rise of new issues such as the environment could also affect the electoral marketplace and thus party personnel practices. A research design that

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<sup>7</sup> There are indications of this in Krauss and Pekkanen's current co-authored article in progress on the distribution of PR ranks and cabinet posts in New Zealand. See also Mcleay and Vowles 2006.

focuses on before and after comparisons of state experiencing electoral change could, if these changes were temporally proximate, risk obscuring these systemic level changes. For example, the increased salience of the environment as a political issue could cause parties to increasingly recruit “environmental specialists” regardless of any change in electoral system. Accordingly, we use steady-state cases to “control” for these kind of changes.

### A. Case Selection

In selecting our cases, we have sought to leverage the theoretical significance of countries’ changing their electoral systems across the categories of nominal and list, or to/from a “mixed-member” (MM) system that has tiers of each type.<sup>8</sup> Our steady-state cases likewise include both pure nominal and list cases, as well as MM systems. Just as is the case with the change cases, including MM systems in our research design allows us to leverage variation in electoral-system type while holding the context of the larger political system constant. We can also test for “contamination” effects of having a hybrid system.

Ideally, in order to maximize our analytical leverage, we would need some cases that are MM and some that are only nominal or list, some that have changed to MM and some that have abandoned it. We would also need some MM systems where the list tier dominates the seat allocation process (mixed-member proportional or “MMP”) and others where the nominal tier does so (mixed-member majoritarian or “MMM”).<sup>9</sup> We would also want to include systems with some variance in districting. Getting these variations would be difficult with even a dozen or more cases, while so many cases would make the project hopelessly unwieldy and expensive. No case-selection criteria for a small-*N* design can be perfect, with just the right variation on the independent variables (and everything else held constant!). Nonetheless, as we explain here, we have selected our cases to provide maximum leverage on these many variations.

In selecting cases of electoral change, we have chosen countries that experienced the greatest move on the independent variable of interest (nominal or list) in ways that we hypothesize will affect party personnel strategies. We also have chosen cases that moved from electoral systems with a greater incentive to cultivate geographically concentrated votes to systems with less incentive, as well as cases moving the opposite way (of which there are few).

**Table 1: Electoral-system types and country cases**

Electoral System	Steady-state cases	Countries changing from this system	New system for change cases
Nominal (SSD)	UK	New Zealand	MMP
List (PR)	Portugal	Bolivia	MMP
MMM	Lithuania	Ukraine	List (PR)
MMP	Germany	--	--
SNTV	--	Japan	MMM

Table 1 shows our countries, organized by our independent variable, the type of electoral system. It shows that we have a steady-state case for each electoral-system type, except for

<sup>8</sup> No established democracy has moved recently from a pure list to a pure nominal system, or vice versa (not counting a one-election use of lists in France). Either the “to” or “from” system has been mixed.

<sup>9</sup> MMP entails domination by the list tier because the party lists are used to compensate parties for any disproportionality that arises from the use of single-seat districts in the nominal tier. MMM systems also known as “parallel” systems—see Lijphart 1999) are dominated by their nominal tier, in that there is no compensation from the lists. Instead, a party’s list allocation is simply added to the seats it has won in the nominal tier. See Shugart and Wattenberg (2001).

SNTV,<sup>10</sup> and we have cases that have moved away from each type, except for MMP. (We are unaware of any country that has had MMP and then abolished it.) As we see in the table, the UK uses nominal-SSD, which New Zealand switched from, and Portugal has a list-PR system, which is what Bolivia has moved away from. We have one steady-state MMM system, while our change cases include both a country that has abandoned MMM (Ukraine) as well as one that has adopted it (Japan). Additionally, we have one steady-state MMP system (Germany) as well as two countries that moved to this system (Bolivia and New Zealand).

Our set of reform, mixed-member, and steady-state cases further vary not only on the dimension of nominal, list, and mixed, in the ways shown in the tables above, but also in their districting. Obviously, the U.K. has the maximum degree of districting on account of its use of SSDs, as did pre-reform New Zealand. Single-seat districts are also found in all the MM systems. The list tiers of the mixed-member systems vary from the single national districts of New Zealand, Lithuania, and Ukraine, to the numerous districts of varying magnitudes in Japan, Bolivia, and Germany.<sup>11</sup> allowing us to analyze the impact of both short and long lists. Our steady-state list case, Portugal, is also one of widely varying magnitudes.

In addition, our cases vary on other potentially important dimensions, including their type of executive, their level of development, and the age of their democratic regimes. While these variations pose challenges to the research design, we believe we can leverage these further variations in ways that enhance the robustness of any conclusions we are able to draw about the impact of electoral systems on party personnel strategies.

Let us take first the variable of executive type. Six of our eight cases are either parliamentary or semi-presidential systems in which the parliamentary majority has more authority over cabinets and policy than the presidency (Shugart 2005). Among our cases, only Bolivia and Ukraine have powerful presidencies, though neither system is a “pure” presidential system.<sup>12</sup> Presidentialism can be expected to have a significant impact on political parties (Epstein 1967, Shugart and Carey 1992, Shugart 1998); nonetheless, there is no reason to expect that a powerful presidency renders moot the impact of the electoral system on party personnel strategies. While “presidentialized parties” (Samuels 2002, Samuels and Shugart, 2006, N.d) may be less focused on government formation and policy-making than their parliamentary counterparts, a change in the electoral system would be expected to change party personnel strategies in the same direction as we would see under parliamentarism.

A similar argument can be made about newer democracies in less developed countries. While parties in these countries may be of a different character from their counterparts in richer countries with long-established democracies, the direction of the impact of the electoral system is expected to be the same across these sets of countries. Less developed economies require us to be sensitive to the nature of the constituency—the interests of voters being represented and the pool from which candidates can be recruited—because an electoral system that encourages more “diversity” of candidate characteristics (as we have suggested for lists) can do

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<sup>10</sup> There is no appropriate steady-state case of SNTV. While Taiwan has used SNTV, it has also had a small list tier for as long as it has had competitive elections. Moreover, it is already in the process of changing to MMM. Thus it is not really a case of “steady state” SNTV.

<sup>11</sup> Germany is often thought of as having nationwide allocation of its list seats, but this true only between parties. Within parties, the lists are indeed state-specific and there actually are no national lists.

<sup>12</sup> Ukraine’s cabinet must maintain parliamentary confidence and Bolivia’s president is elected in a “runoff” in congress if no candidate obtains more than half the popular vote. Both presidents may dismiss a cabinet and both have vetoes that may be overridden only by a two-thirds vote of the legislature.

so only relative to the constituency represented. As we noted above, the nature of the constituency being represented is an important variable, regardless of the level of development.

In a very important sense, then, we have set up more difficult tests by selecting countries that have strong presidencies, are relatively poor, and more recently democratized alongside some that are parliamentary, rich, and long-established democracies. If parties in a given country are of a different character in countries that have some combination of presidentialism, less developed economy, and younger democracy, then it is plausible that the impact of the legislative electoral system (or the legislature itself) is minimal. If that is the case, we will not find significant results from changes in the electoral system in countries such as Bolivia and Ukraine, or across the tiers of the mixed-member systems in Lithuania (and formerly Ukraine). If, on the other hand, we do find significant results, we can have more confidence that our electoral-system perspective is robust to different contexts.

### **B. Data collection**

In order to trace the connections among electoral systems, constituencies, and the allocation of appointive posts, we need to collect intensive data of several kinds from each of the eight cases outlined above in sub-section A. In each country we will assemble a comprehensive database on candidates of each party with parliamentary representation, district characteristics, constituency information, and party, legislative, and government posts allocated. We expect these databases to be a continuing resource for future scholars doing research on each country and also comparative research. The specific types of data to be included in the databases are:

- (1) **Biographical background data on candidates.** We will collect data on the occupational and other experience profiles of winning candidates and at least the more significant losing candidates for all parties with legislative representation. Sampling of losers may be necessary where there are many candidates whose nominations made them ex-ante “hopelessly” unlikely to win a seat.<sup>13</sup> Candidate data generally will require original in-country data collection.
- (2) **Nomination quality data.** Not all nominations are created equal: as noted above, in nominal and list systems alike, some nominations practically assure victory, while others are “marginal” or “hopeless.” Drawing primarily on existing electoral data, we will code the relative quality of nominations. We will use a methodology similar to that used by Herron (2002), one of our subcontractors.
- (3) **Constituency information.** In order to determine the underlying constituencies from which parties are seeking votes, we will need to know some basic socio-economic and demographic data on the districts that are defined by the specific electoral system (or tiers in a MM system) in use.
- (4) **Collective goals of parties.** Given that a key purpose of this project is to link the strategies of parties, which are collective actors, with the employment of individual personnel, we will need some independent indicator of what a party is seeking to do. For instance, a manifesto or other campaign communications could indicate that a party has attempted to enter a new issue market. We will need such data in order to test our idea that parties entering a new market would recruit candidates with an appeal to voters who care about this issue. For some cases, we can use existing data sets for this sort of information. For others, we will need to develop new data.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> We will develop systematic criteria for determining which losing candidates to include in consultation with our country subcontractors.

<sup>14</sup> For instance, the Comparative Manifesto Project covers some of our cases. For cases not so covered, we do not anticipate a problem with using other indicators of party priorities, because we will be using

- (5) **Party, Legislative, and Government posts.** We will want to know what party positions, legislative committee assignments, and government (e.g., cabinet and sub-cabinet) posts elected legislators obtain. Such data are essential for testing the notion that parties use the allocation of personnel as part of their constituency-connection strategies.

We expect that the second category—nomination data—will be already available in most of our cases, though clearly it will require new data collection in some newer democracies. The other categories will require new data collection in all cases although we already have partial data for Japan, New Zealand, and Portugal (as addressed below). Further, to make the project more manageable, the four steady-state country cases will be sampled for this data periodically rather than the complete data annually that we will collect for the change cases.

### **C. Collaborative Research, Subcontractors, and End Products**

This project would be undertaken as a collaborative institutional project between the University of California, San Diego (Primary) and the University of Washington. Shugart and Krauss (both at UCSD), and Pekkanen (UW) have contributed equally to the development of this project, but bring different, complementary experience and skills to it. Shugart is one of the world's recognized experts on the theory and analysis of comparative electoral systems, electoral reform, and candidate characteristics (the latter resulting from his prior NSF project, as addressed at the end of this project description). Krauss and Pekkanen, both experts on Japan, have published on the effects of electoral reform in Japan and have some databases partially constructed on Japan and New Zealand.

Subcontractors listed below will supervise data collection for each country case, except Japan, to be handled by Krauss and Pekkanen. For administrative simplicity, Pekkanen's funding will be managed separately by the University of Washington. We are requesting funds for each subcontractor to be able to hire research assistants *in the country in which data needs to be collected* and to undertake travel necessary for the supervision of the collection of this data. We also propose to have two meetings of all of the subcontractors to coordinate the project more effectively, an absolute necessity in a project of this scale and complexity to ensure efficient coordination and that the data collected is inputted in a standardized fashion.

**Bolivia.** Miguel Centellas (Ph.D., Western Michigan University, 2007) is Visiting Assistant Professor at Dickinson College (Carlisle, Pennsylvania). He is a specialist on Bolivian politics and its mixed-member electoral system (Centellas 2005a, b).

**Germany.** Thomas Gschwend and Thomas Zittel are Senior Fellows at the Mannheim Center for European Social Science Research (MZES), University of Mannheim. Their professional qualifications for this project include the chapter on legislative behavior (Uslaner and Zittel 2006) in the *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, and published articles and working papers on the German mixed-member system (Gschwend and Zittel, N.d., Gschwend 2007, Wüst, et al, 2006, Gschwend, et al, 2003). Although both Gschwend and Zittel will attend the subcontractors' initial and final meetings, they will share a single subcontractor's allocation for supervisory travel and research assistance.

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such data only within a given country. We are not proposing to compare party priorities across countries. Rather, we need an indicator of a party's declared policy commitments in a given election, so as to explore connections to the type of personnel recruited and the posts allocated to these personnel.

**Lithuania and Ukraine.** Erik Herron is Associate Professor at the University of Kansas, and is one of the leading scholars of the politics of post-communist countries and of mixed-member systems (Herron 2002, Ferrara and Herron 2005, Nishikawa and Herron 2004, Herron 2008).

**New Zealand and U.K.** Jack Vowles is one of the preeminent scholars of New Zealand politics, both before and after the electoral-system change. He is now based in the U.K. as Professor at the University of Exeter, and will retain an adjunct professorship at the University of Auckland. He is the author of several books and articles on New Zealand parties and elections (e.g. Vowles, et al, 2005, McLeay and Vowles 2006). Now that he is based in UK he can apply his knowledge of SSD systems and contacts for managing research in both NZ and UK.

**Portugal.** Ana Espírito Santo is a Ph.D. student at the European University Institute (Florence, Italy) and formerly held visiting research positions at the Complutense University (Madrid) and the Social Science Research Center (Berlin). She is a member of the Portuguese team for Eurobarometer and has authored book chapters and working papers on electoral politics and political parties in Portugal (Espírito Santo 2006, 2007). She was an Independent Contractor for the collection of data on Portuguese candidates in Shugart's prior NSF-funded research (as addressed at the end of this project description). Note that because Espírito Santo is a graduate student at a foreign institution, she will be an Independent Contractor for this project, and her budget will be managed at UCSD.

This project would have several "products" of importance to several fields of political science:

1) A book and various articles co-authored by Krauss, Pekkanen, and Shugart analyzing the data from all eight countries and drawing important comparative conclusions from the findings about the effect of electoral systems on party personnel strategies. We intend a volume authored principally by the three lead investigators with the assistance of the subcontractors, instead of an edited volume. Rather than have chapters on each country authored by a country specialist, we envision a book with chapters organized by theme, with contributions about various country included where relevant, based on materials provided by the subcontractors and drawing on the articles written by or with the subcontractors. This book and these articles should have a major impact in the field because of their linking, for the first time, party strategies in nominations and legislative organization and both of these to electoral system change. Further, this project would be the most comprehensive and systematic cross-national project on the effects of electoral reform ever conducted.

2) Several articles by the subcontractors analyzing the effects of the electoral system and electoral reform (or non-reform) on the politics of their subject country utilizing the data from this project. Because of the manner in which the organization of the project is structured, and the number of countries involved in the comparison, this project should produce a far greater number of professional, peer-reviewed articles than most projects, including (as noted above), articles co-authored by the Co-PIs themselves and with the country subcontractors.

3) A large and standardized data base, available for public use, on candidate qualities, nomination practices, legislative posts, and political-party organization in eight countries. Once public at the completion of our research, the databases will become a unique and significant intellectual resource. We propose that each subcontractor, in addition to the Co-PIs, be given exclusive rights for two years to the databases assembled on each country. After that time, the databases would be accessible to other researchers and the public. Data sets of this sort do not exist for these countries, or exist in very incomplete form. Thus the data collection alone will advance future research, but a major advantage of this project is the interoperability of country data sets. Were these data sets to be collected independently in each country, it is very unlikely that scholars could easily make cross-national comparisons due to missing variables and coding

differences. The principal investigators are familiar with the construction of such data sets and make these statements based on experience. However, it is also unlikely that such a coordinated effort at data collection could be made without significant external funding. This interoperability alone is thus a strong reason why this project merits NSF support.

4) The project will contribute to the professional development of graduate students, who will be employed under the direction of Krauss and Shugart at UCSD.

5) New knowledge with practical impact about the relationship of electoral-system choice and change on the democratic process. We expect that countries, especially newer democracies but also some established democracies, will continue to undertake or consider electoral-system change. At the present, however, electoral reformers have limited knowledge about the actual impact of proposed changes, especially on outcomes such as legislative and party organization, but also on issues such as gender distribution of candidacies and posts. The Co-PIs and their country subcontractors, accordingly, will also seek venues in which to disseminate their findings to a larger non-technical audience (e.g. through opinion pieces in the US and other countries).

Thus, this project bodes well to have multiple important theoretical and empirical products for political science and the broader national and international publics.