Chapter Two: Political Parties in the Neo-Madisonian Theoretical Framework

Our theoretical approach for thinking about how variation in the structure of executive-legislative relations affects political parties is rooted in the *Federalist Papers*. The *Federalists* advocated on behalf of the proposed US Constitution, and offered a theory of how institutions shape politicians' behavior. Contemporary rational choice and institutionalist political science provide a modern synthesis of key concepts from the Federalists, and result in what we call the *Neo-Madisonian* theoretical perspective (Carroll and Shugart 2007).

This framework starts from the Federalists' core hypothesis: the extent to which government ensures liberty or gives way to tyranny is directly related to the manner in which the institutions of government structure the representation of societal interests and channel political ambition. In *Federalist #10*, James Madison articulated the core problem all democracies face: representative government necessarily entails delegation of power from voters to a small number of politicians, yet politicians can turn this delegated power against voters. Madison feared that tyranny would result if politicians' selfish motivations, which he took for granted, were not held in check. To preserve liberty, Madison favored the establishment of an "extensive republic" in which a diversity of interests would gain representation and be pitted against one another, thereby preventing a single "faction" from dominating the entire political system.

What is often forgotten is that Madison's original constitutional proposal for achieving this goal bore scant resemblance to the theory of government that is most widely associated with him today, separation of powers and institutional checks and balances. He only articulated this latter conception of a republican constitution--in which

the executive originates and survives independently of the legislature--in *Federalist #51*, which informed the final draft of the US Constitution and which forms the basis of what we now call pure presidentialism.

Madison's initial draft constitution, known as the "Virginia Plan," made the House of Representatives the dominant institution and contained no provision for separate origin of the executive. As Kernell (2003) has noted, the theory of *factional* checks and balances Madison articulated in *Federalist #10* logically required that the House--the body most capable of representing the diverse factions of the extensive republic-- dominate government institutions. Only later did Madison develop the conception of *institutional* checks and balances, adding a differently-constituted upper chamber and a powerful, independent executive, both of which were designed to impede the House's political dominance. This model emerged later in the Constitutional Convention partly because smaller states adamantly opposed the principle that state population should determine legislative representation.

Madison's two theoretical constructs--the dominant assembly of *Federalist #10* and the Virginia Plan versus the institutional checks and balances of *Federalist #51* and the Constitution--echo the distinction between pure parliamentarism and pure presidentialism. Yet despite this clear difference, Madison's two models share a key feature that is highly relevant for our purposes: both assume that nothing akin to the modern national political party would emerge. In *Federalist #10* Madison assumed that each member of the assembly would represent his constituency's "local and particular" interests. Legislative majorities would therefore inspire little fear of tyranny--or so Madison believed--because the degree of internal diversity in the legislature would make

oppression of minorities impossible, and because no single faction (whether a minority or majority) would be able to dominate long enough to entrench itself at the expense of other minorities. Madison never considered the possibility that a single majority party could control the legislature for an entire term.

Of course, parties have emerged in democracies of every kind, and these parties do compete to control legislative majorities--either on their own or in coalition with other parties. In particular, when the executive originates from within the legislative majority, competition for control of the executive is a direct function of parties' competition in legislative elections. Madison's Virginia Plan called for the legislature to select the executive—a concept that has emerged as the core feature of parliamentarism. Had the Constitutional Convention adopted the Virginia Plan the US might never have incubated the separation-of-powers model that eventually became modern presidential democracy. Instead, American government might have developed a parliamentary system like those that eventually emerged in the UK, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere in the British Commonwealth. And had this occurred, political parties might have evolved in the US as they have in many parliamentary systems, embodying the "responsible party government" model. Such parties tend to be highly institutionalized, organized nationally, and focused on national policy concerns, in contrast to Madison's expectation that politicians would organize *ad hoc* coalitions along merely "local and particular" interests.

This thought experiment—and the argument of this book--suggests that parties have developed in distinct ways in parliamentary and "non-parliamentary" democracies. As noted in Chapter One, comparativists have paid scant attention to the potential impact

of the separation of powers on party emergence, evolution, and behavior, even though Americanists have long lamented the absence of "responsible" parties in the US. The very notion of a responsible party implies that party organizations dominate all aspects of the democratic process—candidate selection, campaigning and elections, formation of government, and policy-making. The "responsible" party is an ideal-type, one that no party ever completely embodies. Nonetheless, the notion of a "responsible" party erects a normative standard by which scholars judge the quality of collective representation and accountability under democracy. Thus, throughout this book we will ask how the separation of powers systematically changes the ways in which parties engage in each of those key aspects of the democratic process.

At one level, the differences in parties' roles across democratic regimes are obvious: in separate powers systems, legislative parties do not select or deselect the executive, and have far less influence over the national policy agenda. Moreover, national electoral competition focuses on the popular election of the executive, rather than on legislative elections. This may offer greater space for Madison's "local and particular" interests in legislative races (Shugart 1999; Samuels and Shugart 2003), but Madison's effort to counteract ambition with ambition as fully realized in the US Constitution also severs the connection between legislative electoral competition and the selection and deselection of the national executive—a connection that describes the very essence of parliamentarism. Although Madison did not intend it, this separation carries enormous implications for the political parties that have emerged in the system that evolved from his constitutional design.

In the remainder of this chapter, we develop a theoretical framework useful for

understanding and explaining how differences between democratic regime-types affect political parties. In the next section we describe differences in the chain of delegation from voters to elected officials across the world's democracies. We then describe how this focus on collective action problems and principal-agent relationships as key elements of democratic politics applies fruitfully to the study of political parties across these regimes. Put most simply, we argue that variation in institutional context shapes how--and even whether--party politicians resolve these delegation and collective action problems. Given this theoretical framework, we then describe these partisan dilemmas concretely, in three core activities all parties undertake: 1) leadership selection and deselection; 2) electoral competition; and 3) governing.

DEMOCRATIC REGIMES AND THE NEO-MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK

Our theoretical framework begins with Madison's insight that institutions channel political ambition. Modern theories of collective action and delegation are contemporary emendations of Madison's intuitions about how institutional context shapes politicians' behavior, and such theories provide the foundation for our argument. All organizations must coordinate collective action in order to prevent free-riding and to generate incentives for individual members to work on the group's behalf (Olson 1965). The tension between individual and collective interests can be addressed by delegating authority from principals ("rank and file") to agents ("leaders"). Delegation permeates all organizations, including political parties. Yet inherent in all relationships between principals and agents are potential conflicts of interest. Just as Madison feared politicians could use delegated power to oppress citizens, leaders or any organization can use the

resources or authority they have been delegated to further their own private interests, which may be at odds with their principal's collective, organizational interests.

The idea that institutional design is central to understanding accountability relationships between citizens and elected officials is central to the ideas Madison articulated in *Federalist #51* to support his theory of checks and balances. For this reason, Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) refer to the tension between the potential benefits and costs of delegation as "Madison's Dilemma." Our theoretical framework focuses on how differences in democratic regimes shape the ways parties attempt to resolve Madison's Dilemma—how they both delegate authority to a leader while simultaneously attempting to hold that leader accountable.

We employ a heuristic device to understand how institutional context shapes the ways party politicians address Madison's Dilemma. Think of representative democracy as a "chain of delegation" between principals and agents. Democracy requires that the first link in the chain connect voters to elected officials, and that those officials be accountable back to their principals, who can reelect them, or not.[1] Once in office, elected officials themselves become principals, because they delegate the responsibility to execute or implement policy to government bureaucrats—although this latter stage is beyond the scope of our analysis. We shall first describe the different chains of delegation that characterize democratic regimes. Once we have done this, we can explain why party organization and behavior will differ as a function of such variations in institutional context. In the remainder of this section we therefore compare and contrast

[1] Persson and Tabellini's (2002, 239-44) discussion of accountability ignores parties—and thus ignores the fact that parties act distinctly within particular institutional environments. This is an unreasonable assumption given the centrality of parties to democratic politics and to any theory of accountability. Even so their theoretical results implicitly require the executive and the median legislator to come from distinct parties.

the chains of democratic delegation in the two pure regime-types--presidentialism and parliamentarism--and then explore hybrid regimes such as semi-presidentialism.

The Chain of Delegation in "Pure" Types: Parliamentarism and Presidentialism

The key difference in the chain of delegation between "pure" types of democracy —parliamentarism and presidentialism—derives from the relationship between voters and the executive branch. In parliamentary democracy the voters elect a legislature. The members of the legislature, in turn, elect the executive.[2] Executive authority, vested in a cabinet headed by a prime minister, derives from the results of parliamentary elections, and not directly from the voice of the people. Moreover, the prime minister and the cabinet are agents of the parliamentary majority, to whom they are accountable: that is, the executive serves at the pleasure of the legislative majority.

The contrast with pure presidentialism is straightforward: In these latter systems the voters directly elect the executive, and the cabinet is an agent of the president, not the legislature. Moreover, the president is not an agent of the legislative majority; both the president and the legislature sit for fixed terms.

This distinction between the pure parliamentary and presidential types thus focuses our attention on two core dimensions of authority relations, as depicted in Figure 2.1: how executive authority *originates*, and how executive authority *survives*. Both origin and survival are defined with reference to the legislature, which means we can say that executive origin and survival are either *fused* or *separated*. As seen in the shaded cells of Figure 2.1, presidential and parliamentary systems are pure types because they have the same relationship to the legislature on both aspects of executive authority. That

[2] For present purposes it does not matter if the legislature is unicameral or bicameral.

is, origin and survival are both either fused (parliamentary) or separated (presidential).

Figure 2.1 Here

The Chain of Delegation in Hybrid Democracies with Single Executives

Executive authority can be constituted differently, in one of several “hybrid” constitutional formats. Two breeds of hybrid constitutional formats exist: those with a single executive, and those with a dual executive--and each breed has subtypes. Figure 2.1 includes the single-executive hybrid regimes in the clear cells; we shall focus on these relatively rare and poorly-understood regimes first, and then consider the better-known dual-executive hybrids, commonly known as “semi-presidential” systems.

As Figure 2.1 implies, both breeds of single-executive hybrids can be compared against the single-executive pure-type regimes. The differences between the pure and hybrid single-executive regimes derive from the way each system combines the dimensions of executive origin and survival. Thus in the lower-left cell we have *assembly-independent* regimes (Shugart and Carey 1992), the best-known example of which is Switzerland.[3] In such systems origin is fused but survival is separate. That is, the executive emerges from the legislature but is not *accountable* to the parliamentary majority for the duration of the term. Because there are so few real-world assembly-independent regimes apart from Switzerland (in which an informal “grand coalition” has

[3] Sporadically, there have been other examples. Bolivia is sometimes classified as an assembly-independent regime, because the Bolivian Congress frequently selects as president the head of one of the top two (formerly three) lists running in elections – unless one list obtains a majority of votes (as happened in 2005). Bolivia and Switzerland are frequently misclassified, and inconsistently so. For instance, both countries are “semi-presidential” to Gerring and Thacker (2004) but “presidential” to Cheibub (2002). Cheibub’s classification is particularly odd given the absence of any process in Switzerland for directly electing the executive. As for Bolivia, because parties select presidential candidates who run in a potentially decisive direct national election, we lose little by classifying the country as presidential. Bolivia is most definitely *not* semi-presidential, since it has no prime minister accountable to the assembly majority (as does Peru, for example).

governed for most of the last 60 years, neutralizing the potential effects that separate survival might have on the parties), they will not concern us further in this book.

The other single-executive hybrid, in the upper-right cell of Figure 2.1, combines the dimensions of executive origin and survival in the opposite way from an assembly-independent regime. In these systems, which we call *elected prime-ministerial* regimes, origin is separate but survival is fused. That is, the prime minister is popularly elected like a president, yet he or she (along with the cabinet) remains accountable to and can be dismissed by the assembly majority. This sort of regime existed briefly in Israel, and it has been proposed in several other countries (Maddens and Fiers 2004), in particular the Netherlands (Lijphart 1984, 77; Andeweg 1997). Although this hybrid is also uncommon, we shall pay it considerable attention in this book. This is both because separate origin is critical to shaping party organization and behavior and because the Israeli experiment with this format provides the basis for a "natural experiment" discussed in Chapter Six, where we explore the partisan consequences of changes in the origin and survival of executive authority in Israel and France--two of the rare historical cases of constitutional reform away from pure parliamentarism and towards either a single- or a dual-executive hybrid.

The Chain of Delegation in Dual-Executive Hybrids: Semi-Presidentialism

Thus far we have described the chain of delegation in all single-executive forms of democracy: presidentialism and parliamentarism, which are quite common, and the rare assembly-independent and elected prime-ministerial regimes. A more common hybrid form of democracy involves a dual executive: semi-presidentialism (Blondel

1984). According to Duverger's (1980) influential definition, these systems have the following features:

1) A popularly-elected president;
2) The president has considerable constitutional authority;
3) A prime minister and a cabinet, subject to the confidence of the assembly majority.

The key to semi-presidentialism is the juxtaposition of a president who enjoys separate origin with a prime minister accountable to the assembly majority. Yet as several scholars have pointed out (e.g. Elgie 1999, 13), Duverger's definition is vague. For example, what should we regard as "considerable" authority? More fundamentally, while the definition is clear about the origin of the president (through direct election, and thus separate from the assembly) and the survival of the prime minister and the cabinet (subject to parliamentary confidence), it is vague about 1) the *survival* of the president; 2) the *origin* of the prime minister and the cabinet; and 3) the sources of prime ministerial and cabinet *survival*.

In terms of the president's survival, Duverger and others assume that the president's term is fixed, and thus that presidents in semi-presidential regimes enjoy separation of survival as well as origin. This is relatively unproblematic.

However, Duverger's silence on prime ministerial and cabinet origin raises several issues, because presidents in many semi-presidential systems possess either formal, constitutional authority or (as we show in later chapters) informal, partisan authority to appoint both the prime minister and/or the cabinet. To the extent that this is the case, then prime ministers actually owe their *origin* to the results of the direct

presidential election, even if--following Duverger--they owe their *survival* in office to the confidence of the assembly majority. As we explain in greater detail below, presidents' appointment powers enhance the importance to parties of the direct presidential election relative to parliamentary elections, infusing semi-presidential regimes (and the parties in those regimes) with a substantial presidential tilt.

Finally, in terms of prime ministers' survival in office, Duverger's definition missed the fact that many semi-presidential regimes afford presidents not only appointment but also either formal or informal dismissal power--of the prime minister, the cabinet, and in some cases the entire assembly. If presidents' "considerable authority" includes dismissal, then--contra the third element in Duverger's definition--the survival of the PM does not depend exclusively on the confidence of the assembly majority. In some cases losing such confidence would be a *sufficient* condition for removing the PM and cabinet,[4] but it would not be a *necessary* condition--because the PM and/or cabinet could also be dismissed if it lost the confidence of *the president*.

Given the vagueness of the role of the presidency in early definitions of semi-presidentialism, Shugart and Carey (1992) introduced the concepts of *premier-presidential* and *president-parliamentary* subtypes of semi-presidentialism. A simple way to differentiate these two subtypes is that the former have relatively "weaker" presidents. The key distinction in the chain of democratic delegation between these two regime subtypes derives from the way that the constitution inserts the president into the survival

[4] To qualify as semi-presidential, the cabinet must be *collectively* accountable to the assembly *majority*. Scholars' typologies have not always respected this key condition. For example Argentina since 1995 has had the post of the Cabinet Coordinator, subject to removal by the congress. However, the rest of the cabinet is not subject to confidence, so this system is presidential. Similarly, a few countries have a prime minister and cabinet that may be removed by an extraordinary majority (e.g. two thirds), including Madagascar after 1997 and Taiwan before 1997. We do not classify these countries as semi-presidential during those time periods due to the supermajority requirement.

of the prime minister and cabinet:

- In premier-presidential regimes, the prime minister and cabinet are formally accountable *exclusively* to the assembly majority--and thus *not* to the president;
- In president-parliamentary regimes the prime minister and cabinet are *dually* accountable to the president and the assembly majority.

As we discuss in Chapter Four, presidents typically possess only informal, partisan authority to fire the prime minister in premier-presidential systems. In contrast, in president-parliamentary systems presidents typically possess formal, constitutional authority to dismiss the premier and/or the cabinet. Still, this means that both subtypes provide opportunities for presidentialization of the parties and the entire political system.

These subtypes clarify constitutional differences about prime ministers' *survival* in office. However, they retain Duverger's silence about PM's *origin*. Duverger's silence on this subject may stem from his assumption, which he shared with other "founding fathers" of semi-presidentialism, that separately-elected presidents would be "above" the assembly parties and remain distant from them. Likewise, Shugart and Carey were unconcerned about the relationship between presidents and parties in semi-presidential regimes. However, the extent to which presidents remain above or distant from *their own political parties* is an open empirical question--and is the main focus of this book. We return to this question in Chapter Three.

In this section we outlined the different chains of delegation between voters and elected officials in the world's democracies. The core institutional differences across democracies derive from whether there is a single or dual executive and whether executive origin and survival are fused or separate. Table 2.1 lists the democracies that

qualify under each regime-type. A country enters our sample when it scores five or greater on the POLITY IV scale of democracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2008) for five or more years during the period 1945–2004.[5] For each country we indicate the years the country was democratic and the years the country qualified as a having a given constitutional format. Some countries changed format during this time-period, and thus have more than one entry. For these cases a number follows the country-name, indicating the chronological order of the country's different regimes.[6]

Table 2.1 Here

Much research has explored the consequences of differences between presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, but few scholars have explored how political parties operate within these different systems. We now turn our attention to this question of how constitutional format shapes the key tasks that all parties undertake.

PARTIES IN THE NEO-MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK

In the previous section we described how different democratic constitutional formats structure the relationship between voters and elected officials. The main point of this book is to explain how and why these differences influence party politics. Yet before doing so, we must lay out our assumptions about what parties are and what they do. Scholars working in what we call the Neo-Madisonian theoretical framework assume that ambitious politicians have strong incentives to join forces in a political party, so as to solve the collective dilemmas they encounter in their quest to formulate public policies,

[5] A country leaves the database if its democracy rating falls below five, but it can reenter later if it again fulfills the basic conditions. For countries that qualified, we gathered data up through 2007 (we conducted this research in 2008), for reasons we discuss in Chapter 3 having to do with presidents' and prime ministers' post-executive careers.

[6] Given our interest in different *types* of democracy, we do not divide into separate cases countries where democracy of the same executive form has been interrupted by an authoritarian interlude.

win (re)election, and secure institutional posts.

Such collective dilemmas can emerge within the context of legislative politics, as in Cox and McCubbins (1993 or 2005) or Aldrich (1995), or they can emerge external to the legislature, as in Cox (1987). The first view draws attention to the social-choice problem of majority rule instability: a party-free legislature would be chaotic, meaning that individual legislators would be unable to get anything done. Legislators thus have strong incentives to band together into durable legislative coalitions. The second view suggests that politicians have strong electoral incentives to join forces to benefit from economies of scale, because as individuals they lack resources to adequately mobilize voters on their own behalf. Banding together thus not only helps induce policy stability on the floor of the legislature, but also helps individuals develop and maintain a collective public image in the electoral arena. In this view, politicians form parties because they come to regard a collective good, their party's public reputation or "brand name," as critical to their individual success.

Whether for internal or external reasons, political parties provide ambitious politicians with collective benefits that they would not obtain in the absence of party affiliation. Yet the provision of collective benefits confronts parties with a particular problem. Collective benefits--whether gains from trade within the legislature or the collective reputation that accrues from working as a group--are public goods. The value of a party's brand name is a function of its platform and its success or failure in government; voters form an impression of a party based on the policies it favors and opposes, and on its ability to effectively enact policies it favors or impede policies it opposes. Thus when the party wins or loses, all members win or lose to some varying

degree, whether or not they personally contributed to victory or defeat. Because the party's reputation is a public good, the party's effort to maintain and enhance that reputation confronts the problem of free-riding. That is, in every party, individual politicians face the dilemma of whether to pursue their individual interests or to devote resources to maintaining the party's collective reputation.

According to scholars who adopt this approach, the key to understanding party politics generally lies with understanding how parties address this tension between individual and collective incentives.[7] Political parties seek to solve this problem by creating institutional mechanisms that commit individual politicians to act in the party's collective interest. Scholars here turn to the literature on delegation and principal-agent theory, derived from the theory of the firm (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz 1972). In firms and parties, "principals" (party rank-and-file) delegate formal and informal power to central "agents" (party leaders), in order to solve collective action problems and reduce transaction costs.

Delegation tasks party leaders with protecting the party reputation and thus maintaining the value of the party label. To do so, leaders can impose discipline or other sanctions on individual politicians whose behavior threatens the party's collective image, and they can reward politicians whose behavior helps the group. Aldrich (1995) suggests that the most important tools party leaders possess include control over candidate selection and the distribution of resources such as campaign finance; Cox and McCubbins (1993) add to this list leaders' control over allocation of legislative resources and over the party's legislative activity.

Successful delegation generates incentives for leaders to concentrate on solving

[7] In addition to the references already cited, see e.g., Döring (2001), Rohde (1991), or Strøm (1990).

the party's collective dilemmas. Yet delegation creates potential problems. Everyone--both leaders and followers--gains from delegation, but principals must beware the danger of *agency losses* due to agents' opportunistic behavior (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). In any process of delegation, conflicts of interest between principal and agent inevitably arise unless both parties have perfectly aligned interests and are acting under perfect information--conditions unlikely ever to hold. Given this, rank-and-file party members in any political system have powerful incentives to balance empowering a leader with attempting to minimize that leader's opportunistic behavior.

Our Neo-Madisonian framework for studying political parties begins with the assumption that all parties face the challenge of engineering mechanisms that foster collective action. Parties pursue multiple and often conflicting goals--including votes, office, and policy—and the pursuit of those goals necessarily entails tradeoffs (Strøm 1990). To resolve internal tensions and address the challenges of collective action in the electoral and governing arenas, parties delegate authority to a single person *who will stand as the party's candidate for national executive office*. Whether or not a presidential or prime ministerial candidate is also *de jure* the head of the party organization, party organizations entrust prospective presidents and prime ministers with the parties' collective reputation--meaning that party members entrust leaders with their individual and collective political fates.[8] As Strøm suggested, a country's institutional context powerfully shapes how parties resolve such dilemmas. The next section follows up on this intuition, and connects variation in democratic regime-type to variation in the ways in which parties resolve their collective dilemmas.

[8] Not all elected officials are party members, but our theory concentrates on parties and their members. Countries in which independent candidates win substantial seat shares (e.g. Russia and Ukraine before the move to fully party-list systems) are relatively uncommon.

SITUATING PARTIES WITHIN THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

The notion that political parties serve primarily to solve politicians' problems of collective action and delegation has proven enormously influential in political science. Yet such theories have never considered how the separation of powers impacts the way politicians resolve these problems. This is especially puzzling given the intellectual tradition that fostered the development of these approaches in the first place. That is, the institutionalist literature in political science holds that political parties are endogenous creations of ambitious politicians, and suggests that institutional context shapes the way politicians resolve their collective dilemmas. To the extent that scholars take this approach seriously, then any comparative theory of political parties must account for the way in which government institutions shape how party politicians resolve collective action and delegation problems.

Stated most generally, our main theoretical claim is the following: *to the extent that the constitutional structure separates executive and legislative origin and/or survival, parties will tend to be presidentialized*. As we explained in Chapter One, presidentialization implies that parties delegate considerable discretion to their leaders-as-executives to shape their electoral and governing strategies, and that parties lose the ability to hold their agents to accounts. Parties can delegate more or less willingly; the question we consider is the extent to which a country's executive–legislative structure imposes higher or lower hurdles on parties' ability to hold their leaders to accounts.

Different democratic regimes enact different democratic chains of delegation. The simplest chain of delegation, which runs from voters to legislators to the executive, is a

shorthand description of a parliamentary regime--and it is also a shorthand description of the relationships between voters, parties, and party leaders in a parliamentary regime. Moreover, due to the fusion of survival, parliamentarism imposes a relationship of symbiotic mutual dependence between branches of government--which also means that a relationship of symbiotic mutual dependence exists within parliamentarized parties. Given this, obstacles to holding party leaders-as-executives to accounts are minimized in parliamentary systems. Similarly, parliamentarism means that for any political party, a single electoral goal drives the resolution of any and all collective action problems: winning legislative seats. All collective decisions regarding delegation to a leader focus on what the party needs to accomplish in the legislature and in legislative elections to maintain its brand name and its ability to access executive positions.[9]

If, however, a direct election fully or partly constitutes executive authority independently of the will of the assembly majority, then the chain of delegation grows more complex. Our approach emphasizes the fact—one that party scholars have largely overlooked--that *separating the executive and legislative elements of government into two independent branches also breaks parties into two separate branches*, one in the legislature and one in the executive.

When executives enjoy separate origin and survival, parties' collective action and delegation problems differ in fundamental ways. First, in contrast to parliamentarism, separation of origin means that party politicians no longer have a single goal in mind—winning legislative seats--when considering how to resolve their collective action problems. Instead, parties have two potentially incompatible goals: winning a direct

[9] Parties need not maximize seats; they may only seek to obtain enough seats to keep control of a particular ministry.

executive election *and* winning legislative seats. These goals are potentially incompatible because- (as we detail below and in subsequent chapters) the qualities of potential prime ministerial and presidential candidates do not necessarily overlap and because the separate executive electoral process means that presidential candidates can campaign on and win election for different reasons--or even be elected by a different set of voters--than their legislative parties. Such intra-partisan divergence of electoral incentives is impossible under parliamentarism.

The separation of survival also has powerful implications for intra-party politics. The separation of survival means that whether or not presidents and their parties were elected for similar reasons and by similar vote bases, once in office presidents can take policy stands that differ from their party's, without fear of dismissal. In such situations, branches of the same party confront each other from positions of mutual independence, and must therefore negotiate. However, relative to prime ministers under parliamentarism, presidents negotiate from a position of relative advantage because a party cannot fire its leader-as-president.

In short, the separation of powers makes resolving coordination and delegation problems more complicated, and confronts parties with particular organizational dilemmas. Separation of executive and legislative authority means that political parties cannot guarantee control over the things that they value--including access to cabinet and sub-cabinet executive-branch positions and influence over policy—by competing exclusively in legislative elections. Winning control of the executive branch directly offers the only guaranteed path to office and policy payoffs. Given this, to the extent that pursuit of a directly-elected national executive improves parties' chances to access and/or

control any of the things that they seek, then organizing to win executive elections rather than legislative elections will shape party organization and behavior.

PRESIDENT-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS UNDER SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM

The ideas presented in the previous section provide grounds to believe that parties in pure presidential systems will differ fundamentally from parties in pure parliamentary systems. Yet what about hybrid formats? Here we consider in greater depth the ways in which the dual executive of semi-presidentialism impacts political parties. Semi-presidential systems merit scrutiny because their complexity leaves room for ambiguity as to whether they should be classified as sitting midway on a hypothetical continuum between the two pure types or whether the separate presidency implies parties will tend towards presidentialization, even in premier-presidential systems with "weaker" presidents. In what follows we provide theoretical reasons to expect party presidentialization across *all* semi-presidential systems.

Semi-Presidentialism: Designed to Change the Parties

The idea that semi-presidentialism impacts political parties by altering their relationship to government formation is hardly new, even if party scholars have tended to overlook it. Semi-presidentialism originates with the 1919 Finnish and German constitutions. The hybrid nature of the Weimar constitution, for example, owes much to the advice of several eminent social scientists.[10] Max Weber ([1917] 1978) suggested that the German constitution should empower an agent of the entire electorate, in order to

[10] See e.g. Mommsen (1984), Myerson (1999), Stirk (2002), or Shugart (2005).

check and balance parties' legislative influence; influential jurist Hugo Preuss justified the hybrid regime by stating that such a constitution would provide the president and parliament with "autonomous sources of legitimacy" (Stirk 2002, 514).

These notions represent a 20th-century continental European echo of Madison's call for ambition to counteract ambition. Yet differently from the context of the *Federalist Papers*, these "founding fathers" of semi-presidentialism wrote in an era in which mass parties already existed. That is, unlike Madison, these scholars articulated and advocated their model of government *precisely under the assumption that an elected presidency would alter parties' role*, relative to their role under pure parliamentarism. Weber ([1917] 1978, 1452–3), for example, mistrusted parties' capacity to govern and assumed that a "plebiscitary" presidential election would force parties "to submit more or less unconditionally to leaders who held the confidence of the masses."

The collapse of Weimar democracy with Hitler's rise to power could have completely discredited this model of government. Yet the appeal of a system that combines a popularly-elected, powerful president with a cabinet responsible to parliament continues to resonate powerfully. We owe the spread of semi-presidentialism around the world not to Weimar's disastrous experience, but to France's rather more successful reinvention of the regime-type a few decades later. In his Bayeux Manifesto of 1946, Charles de Gaulle called for a "chief of state, placed above the parties" (Lijphart 1992, 140–1). France's 1958 constitution elected the president indirectly, through an electoral college that included the legislature, and thus can be seen as a reform of the 4th Republic's pure parliamentary model (1946-58) rather than as an entirely new political system. Yet with his 1962 plebiscite de Gaulle gained approval for direct presidential

elections, thereby recreating a key element of the Weimar constitution and establishing what has become the most-emulated democratic regime-type in the world.

These two cases exemplify each semi-presidential subtype: Weimar Germany was president-parliamentary, while France V is premier-presidential. Of course, in contrast to Weimar's experience, 5th Republic France has grown stable—even though the irony that de Gaulle's system recreated a key element of the Weimar constitution has gone mostly unnoticed (but see Skach 2005). Party scholars have also largely failed to appreciate that advocates of semi-presidentialism offered fundamentally similar theoretical justifications for their proposed reforms in both countries: to create a system that would simultaneously change the parties and change the relationship between parties and government. In both countries, constitutional engineers understood that altering the chain of delegation between voters and their agents in government would change the organizational and behavioral natures of the parties that mediate between voters and government.

We now explore how both subtypes "presidentialize" political parties. Presidentialization is embedded in the very constitutional design of the president-parliamentary subtype. However, we also argue that parties are likely to be presidentialized under premier-presidentialism, due to the importance parties place on winning the presidency.

Presidentialized Parties in President-Parliamentary Regimes

In a typical president-parliamentary system the presidentialization of parties presents no puzzle. By definition, presidents in these systems have constitutional authority to both appoint and dismiss the premier—a power they do not possess in

premier-presidential systems.[11] Given this, presidents are both the dominant executive official as well as the dominant actor in the entire system. Even when the assembly majority is sharply opposed to the president, the constant threat that the president will dismiss the premier gives presidents' powerful political leverage (Shugart and Carey 1992, 121–6). This constitutional format makes this hybrid regime closely resemble pure presidentialism in terms of the president's authority over the cabinet. In some cases, presidents in president-parliamentary systems possess even *greater* authority than their counterparts in pure presidential systems, because under certain conditions they can dissolve the assembly.[12] Presidents' considerably formal authority in president-parliamentary systems suggests that the parties in such systems should tend to be highly presidentialized.

Presidentialized Parties in Premier-Presidential Regimes

In contrast to the situation in president-parliamentary regimes, the presidentialization of parties in premier-presidential systems poses a larger intellectual puzzle, because in such systems the cabinet is formally accountable only to the assembly majority. In theory this constitutional structure should weaken presidential influence in legislative politics, thereby limiting the presidentialization of the parties. Nonetheless, we argue that presidents' formal and informal influence works to presidentialize the parties in such systems.

[11] In all cases, the entire cabinet is required to resign if the PM resigns or is dismissed.

[12] While dissolution power also exists in some premier-presidential systems, the leverage it offers is tempered by the weaker leverage presidents in those systems enjoy over the cabinet—especially if, as happened in France in 1997, voters fail to give the president a legislative majority. That is, in president-parliamentary systems, dissolution is clearly augments presidential powers, whereas in premier-presidential systems, dissolution balances the president's more restrictive executive authority. See Shugart (2005) for further discussion.

In terms of formal institutional influence, Shugart (2005) noted that presidents in most premier-presidential systems do have the right to *propose* a PM, subject to an investiture vote, and some have the power to *appoint* the PM unilaterally. Only a few premier-presidential constitutions completely deny the president a formal role in initiating a premier's appointment.[13] To the extent that the president has formal authority to select the premier, then pursuit of the presidency will influence party organization. And as we show in Chapter Six, parties that focus on electoral pursuit of even relatively weak presidencies gain advantages over other parties. In this way, even relatively minimal formal presidential powers can induce party presidentialization.

We recognize that if presidents' formal authority to appoint the PM were their only source of political influence, party presidentialization would be quite limited. This is because after appointment, presidents have no formal authority to *dismiss* the PM or the cabinet in these regimes. Unless presidents possess some other source of political influence, parties might downplay the presidency and concentrate on capturing the assembly majority and, through it, control of the cabinet. However, presidents typically enjoy an additional source of political power beyond their formal constitutional authority: their informal partisan influence.

The importance of presidents' informal partisan authority in premier-presidential systems focuses our attention away from premiers' origin and towards their survival. As noted, in premier-presidential systems presidents have no *formal* authority to dismiss a PM or the cabinet. Thus, whether they like the incumbent PM or not, even a newly-elected president in a premier-presidential system has no formal authority to dismiss the

[13] These are Bulgaria, Croatia, Madagascar, (formerly), and Ukraine (Shugart 2006, Table 2).

sitting premier.[14] These rules should, in principle, limit presidents' power over parliamentary parties and should give premier-parliamentary systems—and the parties that operate within them--a strong parliamentary "lean."[15] Yet as we demonstrate in subsequent chapters, parties in premier-presidential systems are remarkably presidentialized. For example, observers of French politics understand that the president is the dominant political player both within his party and within the entire system, even though the presidency is comparatively weak in terms of formal, constitutional authority. A strictly institutional interpretation of France's constitution, compared to other hybrid formats, would render this fact puzzling.

Presidents acquire informal political influence in premier-presidential systems if (1) the president and the assembly majority come from the same side of an ideological divide and (2) the president is the *de facto* head of his or her party. The first condition holds about 80% of the time (see below). As for the second condition, presidents in premier-presidential systems are frequently the *de facto* leader of their party even if they are not their party's formal leader. When presidents are *de facto* party leaders, the importance of parliamentary confidence to the chain of delegation--the third element of Duverger's definition of semi-presidentialism—vanishes, because the premier becomes an agent of the president. If presidents possess this sort of intra-party authority, then

[14] After examining the constitutional provisions of all semi-presidential systems (see Table 2.2) regarding the conditions under which a government must resign, we determined that among premier-presidential systems only Armenia and Lithuania explicitly require a cabinet to resign upon the inauguration of a newly-elected president, giving the latter the power to form a new government. However, most premier-presidential constitutions do contain a clause requiring the PM and cabinet to resign upon the swearing-in of a newly-elected assembly. (Finland and France are prominent cases with no such provision.) This requirement is in any case implicit in the more fundamental requirement that the cabinet maintain parliamentary confidence. Notably, few president-parliamentary constitutions explicitly require cabinets to resign when a new president is inaugurated, yet presidents' unrestricted authority to dismiss a PM and the cabinet in such systems means that stipulating such authority is unnecessary.

[15] Except, perhaps, after an assembly election or the break-up of an assembly majority coalition, in which case the president has influence over the nomination of the next PM and cabinet.

parties will become presidentialized regardless of the president's constitutional powers. This means that premier-presidential constitutions do not provide necessary conditions for presidentialized parties, only sufficient conditions. In such regimes the extent of presidential influence is a function of the way parties resolve their own internal problems of delegation and coordination, and not simply of the constitutional rules.

Of course, in a premier-presidential system there is no guarantee that elections and intra-legislative bargaining will produce a legislative majority compatible with the president. When the president and the assembly majority come from opposing sides of an ideological divide the formal constitutional structure of authority should reign, and deprive the president of influence over the cabinet. This expectation derives from the fact that under premier-presidentialism the cabinet depends on the exclusive confidence of the (opposing) majority, which in turn eliminates the intra-partisan sources of presidential influence over legislative politics. Given this, the implications of cohabitation merit further exploration.

The Impact of Cohabitation

The definition of semi-presidentialism requires that the premier and cabinet be responsible to the assembly majority. However, the separate election of president and assembly makes possible an "executive divided against itself" (Pierce 2005) when an election results in an assembly majority that is opposed to the president, or vice-versa. Such situations are called "cohabitation," and are defined specifically as cases in which:

(1) The president and prime minister are from opposing parties; and

(2) The president's party is not represented in the cabinet.

Both conditions must hold for cohabitation to result. This restricts cases of cohabitation to those in which the president and PM come from *opposing* parties, not merely *different* parties. Thus the first condition rules out not only those cases in which the president and PM might be fierce rivals within the same party, but also cases in which the president and PM come from distinct yet allied parties—even if the alliance is an uneasy one. We also insist that the definition of cohabitation include the second criterion: there must be partisan opposition between the president and the entire cabinet, and not merely the head of the cabinet.

Consider the following two examples. First, given the dual executive, two parties might jointly pursue executive power, forming a coalition in which one of them would get the presidency and the other the premiership. In such cases it is likely that the two parties would also divide up cabinet positions. This is a *governing alliance*, not cohabitation. Second, two opposing parties (or blocs) might forge a "grand coalition" cabinet, again splitting the presidency and the premiership. This example is functionally equivalent to the first, because in both cases parties agree to divide up the top executive posts. Neither is a case of cohabitation because in both cases the presence of the president's party indicates a "division of the spoils." Our definition confines cohabitation to clear cases of partisan division between the presidency and the cabinet. Cohabitation cannot result merely from conflict between two officials; it must come from unresolved conflict between two officials from two opposing parties.

With this definition in mind, to the extent that our Neo-Madisonian framework is useful, then we should observe differences in the frequency of cohabitation across the two subtypes. Cohabitation should occur from time to time under premier-

presidentialism. In such systems, the success of all parties in legislative elections depends in part on the electoral calendar (concurrent or not) and on the incumbent president's popularity at the time of the legislative election. Because the president cannot dismiss the legislature, elections that result in an opposition majority should result in cohabitation. To be sure, parties will pursue the presidency in premier-presidential regimes, and party presidentialization will result. Still, cohabitation should occur on a regular, if relatively infrequent, basis. In contrast, we expect cohabitation to almost never occur under president-parliamentarism. In such systems, by definition presidents have the authority to dismiss the cabinet. This gives presidents far greater influence over legislative parties. Indeed, parties in president-parliamentary systems should be more highly presidentialized than in the other subtype, because they have such powerful incentives to focus on pursuit of the presidency.

The relative frequency of cohabitation across the two subtypes of semi-presidentialism offers a useful first test of our Neo-Madisonian framework. We determined which prime ministers in our database led cohabitation cabinets. The data set encompasses 25 countries with semi-presidential systems and includes 66 presidents and 209 prime ministers. (Our analysis included changes in cabinet composition.) Table 2.2 summarizes our findings, which strongly support our theoretical expectations. Across all semi-presidential systems cohabitation occurred about 15% of the time. However, sharp differences by subtype emerge: cohabitation occurred just over 20% of the time under premier-presidentialism, but less than 1.5% of the time under president-parliamentarism. Indeed, we found only one case of cohabitation in this latter subtype—a brief period in Sri Lanka. The appendix to this chapter contains a complete list of all cases of

cohabitation, by president and prime minister.

Table 2.2 Here

Our Neo-Madisonian framework suggests that cohabitation should limit party presidentialization in semi-presidential systems. We shall explore this hypothesis in more detail in later chapters. At this point, we simply note that cohabitation is relatively infrequent to begin with, and almost unknown in president-parliamentary systems. Consequently, given that presidents in both president-parliamentary and premier-presidential regimes enjoy substantial formal and informal political influence over the premier, the cabinet, and the assembly, party presidentialization should be substantial in all semi-presidential systems. After all, winning the presidency is critical for parties' pursuit of their policy and office goals, even where presidents are relatively weak.

In sum, parties face similar dilemmas of collective action and delegation under both pure *and* semi-presidential regimes. We now describe more precisely the sorts of dilemmas that presidentialized parties confront.

PARTY DILEMMAS UNDER SEPARATION OF POWERS

Our theoretical framework suggests that party structure should mimic constitutional structure, and that party behavior should follow from the incentives that constitutional structure generates. To the extent that a separately-elected presidency influences parties' ability to obtain what they want--votes, office, and/or policy influence--party behavior and organization will become "presidentialized." At this point we derive observable implications from this theoretical framework. We focus on three core activities parties undertake in all democracies: leadership selection and deselection,

campaigning, and governing.

Leadership Selection and Deselection

Variation in the structure of principal-agent relationships across democracies suggests that we should see differences in the process of party leadership selection and deselection across democratic regimes. In the Neo-Madisonian perspective, once politicians have resolved to join forces, the key problem they confront is one of delegation to a leader. Successful principal-agent contracts generate positive externalities for all party members, while unsuccessful delegation can damage the party's fortunes.

We know a good deal about principal-agent relationships within *legislative* parties (e.g. Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005), and about relationships between *legislatures and executives* (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992; Strøm 2003), but we know little about how different democratic regimes shape how parties structure the internal agency relationship with their leaders.[16] This is a critical question: after all, a party leader who also has won direct election as president or selection as PM will act in the party's collective interest only if he or she is truly an agent of the party. How does variation in the chain of delegation shape how parties structure their leadership selection processes as well as their ability to hold leaders to accounts through the possibility of *de*-selection?

Our framework suggests the following hypotheses: to the extent that parties regard the presidency as a valuable prize, the separation of powers exacerbates Madison's Dilemma by 1) enhancing agent opportunism and 2) complicating principals' ability to

[16] Comparative treatments include Davis (1992), Kenig (2006), Freidenberg and Sánchez (2001), and Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008). A special issue of the *European Journal of Political Research* in 1993 also explored this question. Several single-country studies exist; see e.g. Punnett (1992), Courtney (1995), or Stark (1996). However, none of these studies consider differences across democratic regimes.

rein in their agents. Agency losses are potentially greater in systems with separate executive origin and survival because both adverse selection and moral hazard problems are worse, and because the proposed organizational solutions party leaders could enact to hold their agents more accountable are more difficult, entail greater costs, or are simply impossible to achieve.

Adverse selection problems result from the likelihood that agents possess hidden information. In any institutional context, individuals who seek leadership positions have incentives to overstate their experience and qualifications or misrepresent their true preferences, particularly if their true preferences clash with the organization's. Upon appointment or election to the leadership post, agents who have engaged in misrepresentation can make Madison's worst nightmare come true by pursuing their own goals or their own vision of what the party's "true" goals ought to be.

Systems with direct presidential elections exacerbate the problem of adverse selection. A party seeking to place its candidate as a nation's chief executive must select a leader who will be competitive in a national election. However, the pool of candidates who can appeal to voters directly and the pool of candidates who can implement the collective "will" of the party organization might only weakly overlap. Parties may have to settle for suboptimal agents at the candidate-selection stage: the best potential agents from the party's point of view may be incapable of winning a presidential election, while candidates who can win such an election may not share the party's goals fully.

As for moral hazard, this problem arises from the possibility of hidden action. After a principal and agent sign a contract, the principal cannot observe every action the agent takes, and cannot know whether all those actions conform precisely to the

contract's terms. For political parties-as-principals, the danger is that leaders-as-agents might use their authority to advance their own personal goals rather than work toward their party's collective goals. This problem is minimized under parliamentarism because parties can "hire" a leader knowing that they can also "fire" that leader if he or she acts contrary to the organization's interests.

However, parties in pure presidential systems know that they cannot dismiss their agent if he or she exploits Madison's Dilemma. And in semi-presidential systems, the dual executive structure implies that parties have one agent they can freely fire and another that they cannot. Given this, to the extent that presidents influence prime ministerial and/or cabinet selection and deselection, moral hazard can pose a considerable danger to parties' interests. In fact, semi-presidential systems that function as "parliamentary systems with an elected head of state" appear to be the exception rather than the norm, and our theoretical framework explains why: national electoral competition for the presidency provides an alternative path to power for ambitious politicians aside from legislative elections, and competition in direct presidential elections tends to shape legislative electoral competition in ways not possible in parliamentary systems (Tavits 2008). Once parties organize to pursue a presidency, presidentialization has begun; parties then face the dilemma of potentially empowering an agent whose preferences may imperfectly align with their own, but whom they are unable to dismiss.

Parties delegate to their leaders the tasks of promoting the group's collective benefit, protecting the party's reputation, and coordinating intra- and inter-party negotiations over policy, appointments, and election campaigns. Their very survival

depends on the ability to find and cultivate leaders who will internalize the party's collective dilemmas. Yet that task is fraught with potential agency problems, encapsulated in Madison's Dilemma. The trick is to induce those who seek to occupy leadership positions to work only towards the party's collective interests and to refrain from abusing delegated authority. As we show in detail in later chapters, this task is trickier for presidentialized parties.

Dilemmas of Electoral Competition

Principal-agent theory suggests that when Madison's Dilemma becomes too severe, delegation should not happen at all. Yet in a very real sense parties in presidential and semi-presidential systems do not have the option of not delegating, at least if they want to remain politically relevant over the long term. Choosing not to delegate would mean not participating in presidential elections. To the extent that presidents influence cabinet composition and/or the legislative agenda, or possess a veto, parties that decide to compete only in legislative elections are imposing limits on their ability to access "office" and "policy" benefits, compared to parties that stand a good chance of entering a government coalition in a parliamentary system. Such parties relegate themselves to secondary positions in the political system and adopt self-imposed limits on their ability to achieve collective goals. Quite simply, operating in a separation of powers system as a strictly "parliamentary" party that only runs candidates for legislative seats is not likely to be a politically profitable strategy. Given this, parties rarely choose this path. (See Chapter Six.)

The need to win a popular presidential election focuses attention on parties'

subjective evaluations of their viability in the presidential race, on which all their subsequent electoral strategy will be based, rather than on strategy for winning parliamentary seats. Parties become presidentialized where the elected presidency is valuable because the types of parties that are likely to form and prosper are precisely those that can field competitive candidates in national executive elections. To accomplish collective goals under parliamentarism, parties organize to capture a share of legislative seats sufficient to control the executive, or to bargain with other parties over shared control of the executive. Yet under the separation of powers winning the executive branch, not legislative seats, becomes parties' driving goal. Any party that seeks to be a major player on the national scene must organize to compete in a national executive electoral contest, or else be content to bargain with the winner of that contest from a subordinate position in the legislature.

The opportunity--and desire--to capture the executive branch directly provides parties with different organizational and behavioral imperatives, and confronts parties with situations they never encounter in a parliamentary system. As noted above, parties face the challenge--unknown in parliamentary systems—of *whom* to nominate as a presidential candidate. This choice is fraught with potential difficulties for parties' collective action and delegation problems, because the need to organize and compete effectively in both executive and legislative races means that parties face the problem—also unknown in parliamentary systems--of having to *coordinate* electoral strategy across races for two institutions. The requirements for running a successful campaign will not necessarily overlap in both races, meaning that parties in separation of powers systems confront potentially conflicting incentives from two kinds of elections. This challenge is

further complicated by the fact that the constituency of the median party legislator may differ substantially from the constituency necessary to win a direct presidential election.

The separation of powers thus forces parties to make hard choices in the electoral arena about candidate nomination, resource allocation (e.g. campaign finance and party personnel) and electoral coalitions that parliamentary parties do not face. The impact of coattail effects and the electoral cycle (the possibility of nonconcurrent executive and legislative elections)—both of which by definition do not exist in parliamentary systems--exacerbate these organizational, financial, informational and strategic challenges. To the extent that a presidency is electorally valuable, direct executive elections--whether held concurrently or not--can strongly influence legislative elections.

Our argument suggests that as they attempt to resolve problems of candidate choice and campaign content, parties operating under separate executive origin will adopt a vote-seeking strategy as opposed to an office- or policy-seeking electoral strategy, relative to parties operating under parliamentarism (Samuels 2002). The separation of powers thus affects how parties articulate the content of their platforms: policy concerns will be sacrificed, and party organizations will be marginalized in setting the party's agenda and establishing the party's public image. This also implies that party campaign organizations will evolve differently under the separation of powers: parties will develop separate nuclei devoted to electing the chief executive in presidential systems, but central party organizations are more likely to retain control over the campaign in parliamentary systems.

Within separate powers systems, the degree of a party's behavioral and organizational presidentialization depends on both relatively constant factors and on the

changing political context: the more-or-less objective value of the presidency for pursuing the party's broad goals, and the party's subjective evaluation of its chances of winning the presidency. These evaluations affect how parties organize to win both the executive and legislative elections. Parties that believe they can compete for the presidency have relatively stronger incentives to invest their resources heavily in that race and to adopt a broad, vote-seeking strategy.

Governing Dilemmas

Just as they do in the electoral arena, governing parties confront distinct dilemmas in different institutional contexts. For parties in government, the separation of origin and survival generates distinct organizational and behavior patterns unknown in parliamentary systems. In terms of the separation of origin, the potential electoral divergence between a party's executive and legislative branches can spill over into the policy-making process. Successful presidential candidates typically campaign on a platform that appeals to a wide swath of the electorate. Once in office, the president cannot simply revert to his party's potentially narrower core constituency, nor can he or she simply work to deliver policy that will help the party win legislative elections.

The separation of origin creates an agent of the citizenry specifically responsible for the "health of the nation," predisposed to care about the provision of public goods. Presidents know that history will judge them based on their ability to fulfill this role. However, legislators from a president's party may be judged on entirely different bases. For example, their electoral success may depend on the provision of goods to narrower constituencies, whether geographical or not. The degree to which one sees cooperation or

conflict between the executive and the legislative branches of a party in a presidential systems is partly a function of the degree to which the policies and goods of their respective constituencies overlap. Such overlap is maximized in pure parliamentary systems, but preference incompatibility varies considerably across presidential systems (Samuels and Shugart 2003).

The dynamics of intra-party negotiations over new policy directions will also differ across democratic regimes. In a parliamentary system, because survival is mutually dependent, the party and the prime minister have greater incentives to support each other. In presidential systems, the separation of survival makes intra-party negotiation over any policy differences more difficult. A party may choose to accept presidential proposals, or it may choose to ignore or even resist them. After all, there is no confidence vote to whip the party into line. Depending on the president's autonomous powers, the separation of survival may also let presidents achieve many of their policy goals *without* their party, a situation that never occurs in any parliamentary system. Moreover, presidential popularity and coattail effects mean that a party may find that its fate depends on what the president does independently of what the party wants him or her to do, another situation that is impossible under parliamentarism.

Another important difference for parties across political systems derives from the extent to which presidents autonomously control the policy and office benefits of holding power. Presidents' independent authority matters for intra-party politics no matter the number of parties in the system, but is particularly relevant in multiparty situations. This is due to the fact that if a president serves as cabinet *formateur*, party decisions to enter and leave a coalition will differ substantially across democratic regimes. Under

parliamentarism the PM may have to concede *de facto* control over certain ministries to his or her cabinet partners (Laver and Shepsle 1996). In contrast, the separation of survival means that parties considering joining a cabinet have greater cause to fear an inability to transform participation in the government into real policy influence (Carroll 2007), and implies that cabinet coalitions will be more costly for the chief executive to maintain (Altman 2001).

The impact of the separation of powers on cabinet dynamics, and consequently on party organization and behavior, ranges beyond entry and exit decisions. Amorim Neto (2006) notes that in pure parliamentarism, the *size* of the coalition (the number of legislative seats its controls) and the *number* of coalition partners are the critical variables in terms of governance outcomes such as cabinet stability and legislative success. Yet under pure presidentialism these two variables are relatively less important compared to the *proportion of partisan ministers* (versus the proportion of presidential cronies or of non-partisan technocrats) and the *extent to which portfolios are proportionally distributed* across coalition partners. That is, in parliamentary systems, cabinets are nearly always fully partisan and cabinet portfolios are almost always distributed proportionally to the proportion of the coalition's seats each party controls. Yet both partisanship and proportionality vary as the government system moves away from the pure parliamentary model.[17] Differences in cabinet politics illustrate another way in which the dynamics of "party government" diverge as one moves from a pure parliamentary to a pure presidential system of government. Autonomous *or* shared

[17] The clear importance of cabinet partisanship and proportionality under pure presidentialism calls into question cross-regime research that highlights the impact of the *number* and relative *size* of parties in legislative coalitions (e.g. Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Cheibub *et al.* 2004). The importance of cabinet partisanship and proportionality also suggest that a "veto players" framework (Tsebelis 2002) cannot explain governance in separation of power systems.

control over the cabinet, combined with presidents' separated survival, gives presidents a distinct advantage over prime ministers, and works against parties' interests.

Finally, because presidents' electoral incentives may diverge from their party's, and because of the separation of survival, presidents are more likely to betray their party's principles than prime ministers. Theories of political representation and traditional notions of "responsible party government" suggest parties' promises to enact new policies and preserve certain established policies are the main normative criteria by which we should judge whether party government is operating successfully. We have already suggested elsewhere (Samuels and Shugart 2003) that presidents are less likely than prime ministers to act as faithful agents of their party in terms of mandate representation. They are less likely to implement the party's platform, and are more likely to engage in "policy-switching" (Stokes 2001) than prime ministers. A president may choose to propose policies in the party's interest or not; the fact that the party nominated an individual and helped him or her win executive office does not automatically mean that the president is beholden to the party's wishes. In short, executives are less accountable *to their party* in presidential systems, even though they may be more accountable to *voters* (Hellwig and Samuels 2008). We explore this dynamic in depth in Chapter Eight.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional systems with directly-elected executives now comprise a majority of all democracies around the globe, yet the comparative study of political parties remains wedded to its roots in the European parliamentary experience. At the core of this

book is the question of how political parties organize and behave differently according to whether they are structuring electoral choice only for legislative offices, or for both legislative offices and a popularly-elected executive office. We have argued that the collective action and delegation problems that parties face vary as a function of differences in the executive-legislative structure of government.

Variation in parties' organization and behavior is a function of variation in the institutions of democratic government. In pure presidential systems, the direct election of the executive implies that parties have distinct challenges in selecting and controlling agents, conducting campaigns, and dealing with the challenges of governing compared to their counterparts in pure parliamentary systems. To the extent that parties maintain effective control over their agents who ascend to the top executive position, we can speak of parliamentarized parties. In contrast, to the extent that parties delegate discretion in the electoral and governing arenas to agents who may have been selected for characteristics unrelated to their faithfulness to the party itself and who cannot be recalled, we can speak of presidentialized parties.

We are certainly aware that many non-institutional factors figure into party organization and behavior, including social-structural dynamics and leaders' personalities. However the configuration of formal political institutions restricts parties' movement along the continuum from presidentialized to parliamentarized. Parliamentary parties can become presidentialized in certain important ways, as we noted in Chapter One. Nonetheless, parties in parliamentary systems can never become presidentialized in the most important way, because party agents in parliamentary systems never enjoy separation of origin or survival. For the same reason, although parties in presidential

systems can resemble parliamentarized parties, they can never organize or behave as if they were in a parliamentary *system*. To the extent that pursuit of the separately-elected president is important for the things that parties care about, then parties will become presidentialized, no matter whether the system is pure or semi-presidential.

We also recognize that parties everywhere resemble each other in numerous and obvious ways. However, even scholars of the presidentialization of politics in parliamentary systems acknowledge that such a dynamic will always be stronger in *actual* presidential systems (Poguntke and Webb (eds.), 6). Social-structural, historical, technological and other non-institutional factors work everywhere to shape parties' structures and behavior. Yet while parties can come to resemble each other structurally and behaviorally across all political systems, the possibilities for variation in structure and behavior increase as one moves away from fused powers systems and towards the separation of powers. This does not mean that all parties in separation of powers systems will always look and behave completely differently from all parties in parliamentary systems. In fact, parties may resemble each other to a considerable extent. However, scholars have missed critical variation across democratic regimes--variation that makes a difference for the key tasks political parties undertake, such as choosing leaders, campaigning, and selecting and implementing public policies. Far greater variance exists in party organization and behavior under separation of powers along these lines than under fused powers. Subsequent chapters explore these differences in greater depth.

Appendix 2A: Cohabitation in Semi-Presidential Systems--Cases and Data

Under semi-presidentialism, cohabitation occurs when two criteria are met: (1) the president and prime minister are from opposing parties and (2) the president's party is not represented in the cabinet. Here we discuss the operationalization of this concept in more detail and provide a list of cases.

It is important to the definition of cohabitation that the president and PM not merely be from *different* parties, but from *opposing* parties. In most cases, identifying opposing parties is straightforward. However, in fluid multiparty systems or systems with two major opposing blocs rather than two major parties, it is sometimes difficult to identify parties that politically oppose each other. We counted the president and PM as opposed if they or their parties were the major competitors in the *final* round of popular voting for president, in either the election immediately preceding or immediately following their presence in the dual executive.

For instance, in cases like France, it makes no sense to count the Rally for the Republic (Gaullists) and the Union for French Democracy as opposing parties, even though they sometimes presented separate candidates in the *first* round of presidential elections. They have never competed against each other in a runoff. Thus when one party holds the presidency and the other the premiership, we do not see cohabitation (even ignoring the second element of our operationalization). Similar examples are found elsewhere (see Chapter Four). In any case, where a minor party (defined as an also-ran in the presidential race) obtained the premiership it was almost always in coalition with a larger party that won the presidency, and thus both parties would be in the cabinet, ruling out cohabitation according to the second criterion.

Cases in which presidents are "non-partisan" also pose challenges in defining opposing parties. When a president has no party affiliation, he or she cannot literally come from a party that "opposes" the PM. Nonetheless, many "non-partisan" presidents are closely identified with specific parties or with ideological tendencies that place them closer to some parties than to others. In such cases we relied on secondary sources or contemporary news accounts to identify the president's *de facto* partisan affiliation. When we could not resolve the ambiguity of a president's partisan leanings, we ruled out the possibility of cohabitation during that president's tenure.

A related challenge emerges when presidents come from parties that are not major competitors in assembly elections or when one or both major opposing parliamentary parties do not contest presidential elections. In such cases, we do not count cohabitation as having occurred. (For these reasons, we count no cases of cohabitation in Ireland or Slovakia.)

Having identified cases of opposing parties within the dual executive, we turned our attention to the second criterion: determining whether the party of the president--or parties identified as clear allies of a "non-partisan" president--were represented in the cabinet. Only when the president's party had no such representation do we observe cohabitation. The resulting cases are shown in Table 2.A.1, which groups the examples of cohabitation by country and presidency, showing the name of the cohabiting prime minister(s) during each relevant presidency, and the parties of each executive. The table also indicates the years in which cohabitation occurred, and the percentage of the president's term that was taken up by cohabitation. The final column indicates how cohabitation came about, from one of the following three processes: through an assembly

election that resulted in the appointment of a cohabitation cabinet; through the election of a president opposed to the cabinet (but with no change towards including the president's party in the cabinet); or through an inter-electoral cabinet change.

Table 2.A.1 Here

In preparing this list of cases, we relied on various sources. For electoral data, we consulted Mackie and Rose (1991), Rose, Munro and Mackie (1998), the PARLINE database on national parliaments maintained by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp), *Psephos* - Adam Carr's Election Archive (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/), and Electionworld (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Electionworld/Electionworld). For cabinet composition, we referred to the PARLINE database. For post-communist cases we also relied on Blondel and Müller-Rommel (2001) and Sedelius (2006). Another useful on-line database for presidents and prime ministers is World Political Leaders, 1945–2008 (http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00index.htm). We also relied extensively on contemporary news accounts, tracked through Lexis-Nexis on-line and Keesing's Record of World Events. For some individual countries, especially when there were ambiguities from the sources mentioned thus far, we relied on the following country-specific references, as follows.

- Finland: Nousiainen (2000), Strom (1990).
- Lithuania: Krupavicius (2007), and personal communication with Erik Herron.
- Mongolia: Fish (1998), Ginsburg (1998), Severinghaus (1996, 2000).
- Portugal: Amorim Neto and Costa Lobo (2009), Strom (1990).
- Romania: Müller (2006).

Figure 2.1. Two dimensions of executive relationship to the legislative assembly

		Executive origin	
		Fused (from assembly majority)	Separate (popularly elected)
Executive Survival	Fused (subject to assembly confidence)	Parliamentary	Elected prime-ministerial
	Separate (fixed term)	Assembly-independent	Presidential

Pure types are shaded; single-executive hybrids are not.

Table 2.1: Countries Included, by Democratic Regime Type

Parliamentary	Premier-Presidential	President-Parliamentary	Presidential
Albania (1997-2007)	Armenia 2 (2005-2007)	Armenia 1 (1998-2005)	Argentina (1983-2007)
Australia (1946-2007)	Bulgaria (1990-2007)	Austria (1946-2007)	Benin (1991-2007)
Bangladesh (1991-2007)	Croatia (2000-2007)	Georgia 2 (2004-07)	Bolivia (1982-2007)
Belgium (1946-2007)	Finland (1945-2007)	Madagascar 2 (1993-97)	Brazil (1946-64, 1985-2007)
Botswana (1966-2007)	France 2 (1962-2007)	Mozambique (1994-2007)	Chile (1955-73, 1989-2007)
Canada (1946-2007)	Ireland (1952-2007)	Namibia (1990-2007)	Colombia (1957-2007)
Czech Republic (1993-2007)	Lithuania (1991-2007)	Peru (1980-92, 2000-07)	Costa Rica (1949-2007)
Denmark (1946-2007)	Macedonia (1991-2007)	Portugal 1 (1978-80)	Cyprus (1975-2007)
Estonia (1991-2007)	Madagascar 1 (1991-93)	Russia (1992-2007)	Dominican Republic (1978-2007)
France 1 (1946-62)	Mali (1992-2007)	Senegal (2000-2007)	Ecuador (1979-2007)
Gambia 1 (1966-82)	Moldova 1 (1991-2001)	Sri Lanka 2 (1978-2007)	El Salvador (1984-2007)
Germany (1949-2007)	Mongolia (1992-2007)	Taiwan 2 (1997-2007)	Gambia 2 (1982-93)
Greece (1975-2007)	Poland (1989-2007)	Ukraine 1 (1992-2005)	Georgia 1 (1995-2004)
Hungary (1990-2007)	Portugal 2 (1980-2007)		Ghana (2001-2007)
India (1950-2007)	Romania (1990-2007)		Guatemala (1996-2007)
Israel 1(1948-96) & 3 (2001-07)*	Slovak Republic 2 (1998-2007)		Honduras (1982-2007)
Italy (1948-2007)	Slovenia (1991-2007)		Indonesia (2002-2007)
Jamaica (1959-2007)	Ukraine 2 (2005-07)		Korea (1988-2007)
Japan (1952-2007)			Madagascar 3 (1997-2007)
Latvia (1991-2007)			Malawi (1994-2007)
Malaysia (1957-69)			Mexico (1997-2007)
Mauritius (1968-2007)			Nicaragua (1990-2007)
Moldova 2 (2001-07)			Panama (1989-2007)
Nepal (1990-2002)			Paraguay (1992-2007)
Netherlands (1945-2007)			Philippines (1950-69, 1987-2007)

New Zealand (1945-2007)	Taiwan 1 (1992-97)
Norway (1945-2007)	Uruguay (1952-71, 1985-2007)
Pakistan (1988-99)	USA (1946-2007)
Papua New Guinea (1975-2007)	Venezuela (1958-2007)
Slovak Republic 1 (1993-98)	Zambia (1991-2007)
Solomon Islands (1978-2000)	
Somalia (1960-69)	
South Africa (1990-2007)	
Spain (1978-2007)	
Sri Lanka 1 (1948-78)	
Sweden (1945-2007)	
Thailand (1992-2006)	
Trinidad & Tobago (1962-2007)	
Turkey (1983-2007)	
UK (1946-2007)	

* Israel 2 (1996–2001) was an Elected Prime-Ministerial system.

The table lists the years for which we gathered political career data, as used in Chapters Three and Four. Please see Chapter Three for a discussion of the Austrian case.

Table 2.2. Rate of cohabitation by semi-presidential subtypes

	Duration of cohabitation	Total presidential tenure	Percent of cohabitation
Premier-presidential	69 years, 9.7 months	315 years, 7.3 months	22.1
President-parliamentary	2 years, 4 months	163 years, 6.2 months	1.4
Semi-presidential total	72 years, 1.6 months	479 years, 1.7 months	15.1

Note: See Table 2.A.1 for a complete list of cases of cohabitation.

Table 2.A.1: Cases of Cohabitation

Country and President(s)	Party	Cohabiting Prime Minister(s)	Party	Years	% of presid term*
Bulgaria					
Zhelyu Zhelev	UDF	Zhan Videnov	BSP	1995-97	31
Petar Stoyanov	UDF	Simeon Sakskoburggotski	NDSV	2001-02	11
Georgi Parvanov	BSP	Simeon Sakskoburggotski	NDSV	2002-05	51
Croatia					
Stipie Mesic	HNS	Ivo Sanader	HDZ	2003-08	57***
Finland					
Juho Paasikivi	KOK	Urho Kekkonen	ZE	1950–53, 1954-56	50
Martti Ahtisaari	SDP	Esko Aho	ZE	1994-95	12
Tarja Halonen	SDP	Maati Vanhanen	ZE	2003-08	19***
France					
François Mitterrand	PS	Jacques Chirac	RPR	1986-88	30
		Edouard Balladur	RPR	1993-95	
Jacques Chirac	UMP	Lionel Jospin	PS	1997-02	41
Lithuania					
Algirdas Brazauskas	LDDP	Gediminas Vagnorius	Homeland Union	1996-98	25
Rolandas Paksas	LDP	Algirdas Brazauskas	Social Democratic	2003-04	100
Valdas Adamkus	non-partisan conservative	Algirdas Brazauskas	Social Democratic	2004-06	42
Macedonia					
Kiro Gligorov	SDSM	Ljubcho Georgievski	VMRO–DPMNE	1998-99	12
Boris Trajkovski	VMRO–DPMNE	Branko Crvenkovski	SDSM	2002-04	31
Branko Crvenkovski	SDSM	Nikola Gruevski	VMRO–DPMNE	2006-08	51***
Mongolia					
Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat	Democratic Union	Puntsagiyn Jasray	MPRP	1993-96	77
Natsagiyn Bagabandi	MPRP	Mendsayhany Enkhsaikhan	Democratic Union	1997-98	38
		Tsakhiagiyn Elbegdorj	Democratic Union	1998	
		Janlaviyn Narantsatsralt	Democratic Union	1998-1999	
		Rinchinnyamiyn Amarjargal	Democratic Union	1999-2000	
Poland					
Lech Walesa	Solidarity	Jan Olszewski	PC	1991-92	55
		Waldemar Pawlak I	PSL	1992	
		Waldemar Pawlak II	PSL	1993-95	
		Józef Oleksy	SdRP/SLD	1995	
Aleksander Kwasniewski	SDRP/SLD	Jerzy Karol Buzek	AWS	1997-2001	40
Portugal					
Mario Soares	PS	Anibal Cavaco Silva	PSD	1986-1995	96
Jorge Sampaio	PS	José Durão Barroso	PSD	2002-04	
		Pedro Lopes	PSD	2004-05	29
Cavaco Silva	PSD	José Sócrates	PS	2006-08	100***
Romania					
Traian Basescu	PD	Calin Popescu-Tariceanu	PNL	2007-08	43
Slovenia					
Janez Drnovsek	LDS	Janez Jansa	SDS	2004-07	62

Sri Lanka					
Chandrika Kumaratunga	SLFP	Ranil Wickremasinghe	UNP	2001-04	21

Notes:
* Combined across all cohabiting PMs for any given president
** Whether cohabitation resulted from an election or not, and if so, which type
*** President still in office as of December 31, 2008