

Chapter Three: Insiders and Outsiders: Madison's Dilemma and Leadership Selection

If we think of parties as teams of politicians who cooperate in elections and in government, then a critical question is, "How do parties select their leaders?" All organizations must cope with delegation problems, as principal-agent theory suggests. In this chapter, we consider how different democratic regimes shape the central issue parties face in terms of delegation: selection of those who seek the offices of president and prime minister.

As noted in Chapter Two, principals who hire agents face the inherent potential for agency losses, which occur when agents do not act faithfully in their principals' interest. In business or industry, disputes often emerge over the amount of effort the agents expend ("slacking"). In politics, by way of contrast, conflicts frequently emerge over the course of action agents pursue (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 24).¹ Parties have good reason to fear such agency losses due to two problems: adverse selection and moral hazard.

Adverse selection is a danger because prospective agents have incentives to misrepresent their preferences, downplay their character flaws, and hide their lack of experience or skills--particularly if their true plans clash with the organization's preferences. By engaging in misrepresentation, after selection to the leadership post agents can make Madison's worst nightmare come true and pursue their own interests, or pursue their own vision of what the party's goals *ought* to be--even if their personal interests or goals are *adverse* to the party's. In this chapter we focus on adverse selection problems; we turn to moral hazard problems in Chapter Four.

Like any organization, parties could reduce adverse selection problems that emerge once a contract has been signed if they could make optimal hiring decisions in the first place. Yet

¹ Agency losses almost always exist, no matter what the institutional context. As Lupia (2003, 35) notes, agency losses will equal zero only when an agent takes actions the principal would've taken given unlimited information and resources. Since such situations almost never arise, there is almost always some agency loss.

parties can never completely avoid adverse selection, simply because they lack perfect information about prospective agents' preferences, qualities and qualifications. Still, given the danger of selecting an agent whose actions might adversely influence their interests, parties have powerful incentives to expend considerable resources screening and selecting candidates, looking for agents who send reliable signals.

Unfortunately, parties have few tools to encourage applicants to reveal their "true" preferences and goals, and they have no way to judge *ex ante* the likelihood that a potential leader will live up to his or her promise. This is a worrisome problem given the potential damage that a leader could do to a party's fortunes. Parties do not screen for suitable agents by posting "help wanted" ads and then selecting a short-list of candidates to consider. Instead, they engage in an extended, implicit interview process that often lasts years, in which aspirants compete to send parties repeated signals about their usefulness and reliability. As in other professions, the most valuable signal a politician can send is previous experience. Parties therefore seek to minimize adverse selection problems by selecting candidates with certain kinds of experience.

The problem that all parties face is that the qualities that make a potential candidate useful for the party's collective goals may conflict with the qualities that suggest a candidate will reliably pursue those goals. Given our argument in Chapter Two, we expect parties will be less able to minimize adverse selection problems when at least part of the executive originates separately from the legislature. This is because the skills needed to win the prime minister's office in a parliamentary system are strongly correlated with the skills that make one a good party servant: an ability to embody the party's vision and to coordinate the party's bureaucracy and legislative contingent.

In contrast, the skills most useful for winning a presidential election include proven vote-

drawing ability and an appealing, supra-partisan public image. These skills may only weakly correlate with the skills that make one a faithful executor of the party's will. Consequently, for any party that must nominate a candidate for a separately-elected presidency—regardless of whether the group that decides that nomination is a party executive committee, a party convention, or the party's primary voters--the best potential agent from the party's organizational point of view may be incapable of satisfying the party from an electoral point of view, while the candidate most likely to win an election might be a less-faithful party agent.

Party organizations that confront this tradeoff—typically portrayed as a choice between nominating an “insider” or an “outsider”—tend to be presidentialized, because they must select their *de facto* leader to prioritize winning the presidency. To the extent that we see evidence of different career trajectories of presidents and prime ministers across different democratic regimes, we have evidence of this tradeoff in the real world. To be sure, leaders' different career trajectories are not the only source of evidence of contracting problems. In fact, candidate “type” represents an indirect form of evidence. Nevertheless, career trajectories do provide an important part of the picture, which we complete in later chapters.

The argument and evidence in this chapter extend beyond the longstanding conventional wisdom that suggests presidents and prime ministers tend to differ in background experience. This view is based only on differences between presidents and prime ministers in the “pure” democratic regimes, but unfortunately offers no guidance about what to expect in semi-presidential hybrid regimes. Thus, after defining the continuum of party agents ranging from “insider” to “outsider,” we leverage our principal-agent theoretical framework to derive hypotheses about expected career paths for presidents and prime ministers under all constitutional regimes. We subsequently explore executives' “types” through a global survey of

presidents' and prime ministers' career trajectories since 1945.

Our findings both confirm and build upon the conventional contrast between parliamentary insiders and presidential outsiders. We confirm that presidents are indeed more likely than prime ministers to be outsiders—and show that this holds for all democratic regimes, including premier-presidential systems. However, we also find that PMs in both semi-presidential subtypes do not closely resemble their “insider” parliamentary cousins. Indeed, many PMs in semi-presidential systems are “outsiders,” because—as we suggested in Chapter Two—prime ministers in semi-presidential systems are at least partly an agent of the president rather than the assembly majority.

Our findings also add nuance to the conventional distinction between insiders and outsiders. The key finding from our theoretical perspective is not so much that typical presidents arrive at the top position with little political experience per se, as the conventional view might suggest. Rather, the key point is that presidents *tend to reach the pinnacle of power with relatively weaker ties to their parties*. Presidents in all systems are relatively less likely to possess experience that signals reliability as a party agent. Our theoretical framework explains why this is so: in separate powers systems parties “pre-select” candidates who will be the voters’ direct agent, while in parliamentary systems parties select leaders who are direct agents of the party’s legislative contingent.

Both this chapter and the next provide insights into the implications of this key difference in intra-party politics. In what follows we provide evidence that the presidency’s separate origin matters considerably for the types of politicians nominated and ultimately elected. The next chapter focuses on the implications of separate survival, which restricts parties’ ability to discipline wayward agents once they are in office. Taken together, the separate origin and

survival of the presidency guarantee weaker principal-agent links between a party and its president. By contrast, parliamentary government guarantees that the incumbent executive remains an agent of the legislative majority, and hence also of his or her own party in parliament.

DEFINING INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS

Exploring whether executives are more or less likely to be “insiders” or “outsiders” across democratic systems--and thus confirming the extent to which adverse selection problems characterize intra-party politics across different democratic regimes--requires that we first define our terms. The notions of “insiders” and “outsiders” seem commonsensical, and in some ways this distinction echoes our continuum of presidentialized versus parliamentarized parties. In this light, US president Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1960) might represent the archetypical outsider, having held no prior political office whatsoever before winning the presidency. At the other end of the spectrum we might find UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1940-45, 1951-55) as the archetypical insider. Churchill entered the House of Commons in 1900 and spent 37 of the next 40 years as an MP before rising to the top spot--seven of those as cabinet minister and 11 of those as Tory leader.

Readers may have in mind other examples of insiders or outsiders. Regardless, the question remains as to whether Eisenhower and Churchill are typical or exceptional. Despite the conventional wisdom, the extent to which presidents actually are outsiders remains an open empirical question, particularly when one considers *all* elected presidents, including those in hybrid systems. After all, as Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) noted in their evaluation of Linz’s critique of presidentialism, many presidents qualify as insiders. Thus while Mexico’s Vicente Fox (2000-2006) or Brazil’s Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-60) entered the presidency from the

governor's office and never served as national legislator or as national party leader, Mexico's Felipe Calderón (2007-2012) and Brazil's Lula da Silva (2003-2010) are both consummate insiders. Is the conventional wisdom true, or just an appealing and convenient exaggeration that seems to fit with what we think *ought* to be true?²

The same question applies to the conventional wisdom about prime ministers. Churchill's path might be archetypal--but it could also be atypical. After all, as with insider presidents, we also know of outsider prime ministers. A prominent example is Italy's Silvio Berlusconi (1994-95, 2001-06, 2008-), who founded *Forza Italia* only two months before first winning the premiership. Other PMs who never led their party and never served in parliament include the Czech Republic's Jirí Paroubek (2005-06) and Hungary's Péter Medgyessy (2002-04). Examples such as these cast doubt on the conventional wisdom because they at least partly conform to Linz's (1994, 26) definition of an outsider as someone who rises to the top position "not identified with or supported by any political party, sometimes without any governmental or even political experience, on the basis of a populist appeal, [and] often based on hostility to parties and 'politicians.'" It thus remains possible that outsider prime ministers under parliamentarism are more common than the conventional wisdom implies. And of course, the conventional association of prime ministers with insiders and presidents with outsiders is not especially helpful in sorting out expectations about the occupants of these roles in semi-presidential systems.

² Among US presidents since WWII, only Eisenhower was a complete political novice. Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton had no prior national *legislative* experience but were hardly novices, all having served (at least) as state governors. Richard Nixon served six years in the national legislature and eight as vice-president; Harry S. Truman served ten years as senator and then as vice-president; John F. Kennedy spent 14 years in the legislature before his election; Lyndon Johnson spent 23 years in the legislature and then served as vice-president until Kennedy's assassination; and Barack Obama served four years in the US Senate after serving seven years in the Illinois Senate. Still, it remains true that no American president has ever served in the cabinet or as *de facto* party leader prior to winning the White House. For discussions of selection of presidential "insiders" and "outsiders" in the US, see Ceaser (1979), Busch (1997), and Cohen *et al.* (2008).

Our definition of the distinction between an insider and an outsider differs slightly from Linz's in that we lean more heavily on quantities that observers can concretely identify and measure. We dispense entirely with the question of the nature of a politician's appeals (i.e. whether "populist" or not), and do not consider whether or not a politician is temperamentally hostile to parties and/or the political establishment. Instead, building on comparative research on political ambition,³ we suggest that one can learn a great deal about agents' true preferences, the strength of their ties to their principals, and thus about the nature of the contracting problems between principals and agents, through analysis of their career paths.⁴

What career path sends signals of agent reliability, and what suggests agent unreliability? The strongest indicator of "insiderness" is *the nature and extent of a prospective agent's links to a central party organization*--the organization that ultimately is responsible for nominating or "hiring" future national executives. Thus an ideal-type insider will not only be a member of a political party but will also have served as formal leader of the party, and for a relatively longer period of time than an outsider. Similarly, insiders are more likely to have served formally on the party's national executive committee, even if they did not rise to the position of party leader. Third, insider status is associated with service in the national legislature--and the longer one serves, the stronger the links between principal and potential agent. Fourth, principal-agent links will be stronger to the extent that a politician has served in the cabinet.

These four indicators define the core elements of the continuum distinguishing insiders

³ Examples include Mayhew (1974); Smith (1979); Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1991); Carey (1996); Samuels (2003); Shugart *et al.* (2005); Morgenstern and Siavelis (eds.) (2008).

⁴ Parties in different democratic regimes likely attract different types of applicants for leadership positions, due to different payoffs to holding office. If presidencies are truly elected kingships, then perhaps the office attracts individuals with monarchical pretensions. Likewise, if a prime ministers is merely first among equals, then perhaps prime ministers are far more likely to be party stalwarts. That is, it may be true that presidentialism selects for a certain "type" of person to compete for the highest office, and that those types of individuals are more likely to ignore organizational imperatives. However, we cannot directly measure personality type, nor can we measure how expected payoffs might influence such selection bias. Instead, we should look at behavior, rather than guess at the psychological predispositions of aspirants for higher office in different institutional contexts.

from outsiders, and thus between parliamentarization (where executives are most closely tied to copartisan legislators), and presidentialization (where the chief executive is the electorate's direct agent as well as—or even instead of—the party's). Three of these four positions (leader, executive committee, and cabinet) are themselves positions as a party's direct agent. The more “agency experience” a potential national executive has, the greater the buildup of trust, information, and relevant organizational experience, and thus the more that internal party dynamics will resemble the ideal-type parliamentarized party.⁵ By contrast, the less a potential national executive has built up these sorts of agency ties, the more the party is presidentialized.

Furthermore, following insights from comparative research on political ambition—and differing from Linz's definition to some degree—we suggest that evidence of insider or outsider status can be found throughout the entire arc of politicians' careers. That is, we can learn a great deal about politicians' relationships with their parties by considering what they do both *before* and *after* they have served as national executive. Parties do not merely confront *ex ante* problems of adverse selection. They also confront the problem of agents' *ex post* opportunism, known as moral hazard. To the extent that politicians continue working directly with their party after leaving national executive office, we can be fairly sure that they have not strayed *during* their term—that is, that moral hazard problems are relatively less important.

INSIDERS VS. OUTSIDERS: HYPOTHESES

⁵ Not surprisingly, scholars have found a match between parties' *internal procedures*, which range from “closed” to “open,” and the *types of candidates* selected, which range from “insiders” to “outsiders” (e.g. Kenig 2006; Freidenberg and Sánchez 2001; and Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). The more closed the selection procedure, the more likely the selection of an insider, and vice versa. We ignore party selection criteria because theoretically, we have little reason to believe that such institutions matter much across democratic regimes. For example, the US adopted primaries decades ago, but US presidential candidates were relative outsiders and remain relative outsiders in comparative perspective. Likewise, parties in presidential systems with “closed” candidate-selection mechanisms will still select relative outsiders compared to parties in parliamentary systems that employ relatively “open” candidate-selection mechanisms.

In this section we derive our theoretical expectations. The conventional wisdom sets up what we call a “positional” hypothesis: *the position of prime minister or president per se determines where occupants of those positions tend to fall on the insider–outsider continuum.* This view suggests that parties in parliamentary democracies face minimal adverse selection problems because their pool of potential prime ministers tends to consist of existing high-ranking party personnel. Parties select leaders for their skills at managing the party organization and its parliamentary contingent; prior partisan experience gives parties the opportunity to vet their prime ministerial candidates, and gives potential PMs the opportunity to signal over many years that they will uphold their party’s values and pursue its goals (Strøm 2003, 70). Although parties are certain to consider their leader’s popular appeal, the nature of parliamentarism does not *require* that they nominate prime ministerial candidates who can win direct popular elections. Thus, we expect prime ministers in pure parliamentary systems to most resemble insiders.

The same conventional wisdom suggests that parties in pure presidential systems face an often-irresolvable tension over candidate selection, and are more likely to select outsider candidates who lack relevant party and/or legislative experience and about whom parties know relatively less (Linz 1994, 26-28). In pure presidential systems, parties are not likely to select candidates for president for their skills at handling the party bureaucracy or managing the party’s legislative contingent. Instead, because they must win an electoral contest separate from legislative elections, parties will select presidential candidates based on their outsider appeal, partly because the traits that appeal to voters may be only loosely correlated with the traits that send signals of reliability to party insiders. In making such choices, parties accept the possibility of adverse selection in order to enhance their chances of victory in the popular election for president. The conventional wisdom thus assumes a tradeoff under pure presidentialism due to

the incompatibility between being a good agent and being a good candidate. Given this, we expect executives in pure presidential systems to most resemble outsiders.

It remains unclear, however, whether the positional hypothesis also holds for semi-presidential regimes. If the positional hypothesis is true, it should hold regardless of the pure or hybrid nature of a regime: prime ministers in dual executive systems should closely resemble prime ministers in pure parliamentary systems, and presidents in semi-presidential systems should closely resemble presidents in pure presidential systems. As discussed in Chapter Two, early advocates of semi-presidentialism such as Max Weber argued that presidents in such systems would be above *all* the parties, in a nonpartisan sense. In practice, this notion is typically a fantasy. Indeed, some presidents in hybrid systems--as in some pure presidential systems--are only “above” parties in that they are able to reverse the principal-agent relationship and *dominate* their own party, not ignore it. This *de facto* reversal of the principal-agent relationship is one of the hallmarks of party presidentialization. Constitutional structure in semi-presidential regimes affects the balance of power between the president, the party, and the prime minister. It thus remains an open question whether, on average, presidents in hybrid systems should resemble outsiders while prime ministers in those regimes should resemble insiders.

To explain patterns along the insider-outsider continuum in all democratic regimes, as an alternative to the positional hypothesis we posit a “configurational” hypothesis. Under this perspective the key does not lie with the position of prime minister or president *per se* in each regime. Instead, *the configuration of constitutional authority in premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes tends to shape the career path its occupants tend to follow*. We derive this hypothesis from theoretical arguments recently developed in research on mixed electoral systems (e.g. Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Cox and Schioppa 2002; Moser and

Scheiner 2004). That is, just as one element in a mixed electoral system is said to “contaminate” the other,⁶ constitutions that mix parliamentary and presidential elements may feature contamination across the components of the hybrid. In theory, contamination in hybrid constitutions could run either way--from the presidential element to the parliamentary, or vice-versa. Yet because the presidency in hybrid systems is so crucial to parties’ pursuit of their other goals, we have good theoretical reasons to expect most of the “contamination” to run from the presidential to the parliamentary component. This implies that career paths for *both* presidents and prime ministers in semi-presidential systems should tend towards the presidentialized end of the continuum, relative to prime ministers in pure parliamentary systems.

To understand the degree of presidential “contamination” of the parliamentary element of semi-presidential regimes, the configurational hypothesis focuses our attention on two key factors: the regime subtype (an institutional dimension) and cohabitation (a partisan dimension). As we discussed in the Chapter Two, premier-presidential systems emphasize the parliamentary component of the hybrid design in one key respect: the prime minister and cabinet are formally accountable solely to the assembly majority. By contrast, in president-parliamentary systems the prime minister and cabinet are responsible simultaneously to the president and the assembly majority. A configurational hypothesis thus leads us to expect that prime ministers in premier-presidential systems should resemble insiders more than their counterparts in president-parliamentary systems, though not as much as their counterparts in pure parliamentary regimes. In contrast, prime ministers in president-parliamentary systems should tend towards outsider status relative to their counterparts in pure parliamentary systems, because in this subtype the

⁶ That is, the number of parties contesting single-seat districts decided by plurality rule might have more parties than expected because of parties seeking proportional-representation (PR) seats and also presenting candidacies in the districts. Or the number of parties in the PR tier may be less than expected because of the focus of voters and other actors on the competition for seats via plurality.

president's authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister renders the latter an agent of the former, even though the PM remains dependent on parliamentary confidence as well.

Partisan compatibility between the president and prime minister provides the second source of “configurational” variation within semi-presidential systems. As we saw in Chapter Two, cohabitation occurs during just over one-fifth of the time in premier-presidential systems. As far as prime ministers' career paths are concerned, in cases of cohabitation the positional and configurational hypotheses converge: prime ministers under cohabitation should be insiders, insofar as the party that leads the assembly majority selects them to counterbalance the president. In other words, cohabitation is the “most parliamentarized” of situations under both semi-presidential subtypes. The infrequency of cohabitation under president-parliamentarism largely renders the point moot for that subtype. And under unified government, the configurational hypothesis leads us to expect PMs in president-parliamentary systems to be outsiders, to the extent that they are personal agents of the president rather than agents of the party. PMs in premier-presidential systems should again resemble insiders more than their counterparts in president-parliamentary systems, though not as much as their counterparts in pure parliamentary regimes.

Yet what about presidents in dual-executive hybrids? Does the fact of assembly confidence contaminate the presidential half of the dual executive to some degree, making presidents in semi-presidential systems somewhat more likely to resemble insiders than those in pure presidential systems? Perhaps presidents in premier-presidential systems tend towards insider status for the simple reason that their parties in such regimes must groom leaders to win a popular presidential election—which predicts presidentialization of leadership recruitment—while simultaneously attempting to ensure the robustness of their parliamentary “branch.”

Without a parliamentary party capable of winning (alone or with partners) control of the assembly, a party may win the presidency only to face cohabitation. That is, prime ministerial and cabinet responsibility to the assembly majority, coupled with the logic of popular presidential elections, implies that presidents should resemble insiders somewhat more so under premier-presidentialism than under pure presidentialism. However, this logic does not apply to president-parliamentary systems, due to their fundamental institutional logic that places the prime minister in a subordinate position to the president.

The positional and configurational hypotheses generate competing expectations regarding presidential and prime ministerial “types” in dual-executive hybrid regimes. The positional hypothesis assumes no contamination from the presidential to the prime ministerial branches of the dual executive, and implies simply that presidents and prime ministers in hybrid regimes should resemble their counterparts in the pure-type regimes. In contrast, the configurational hypothesis suggests that one side of the dual executive contaminates the other, partly as a function of the subtype’s *institutional* configuration and partly as a result of *party-system* configurations. Below we confront these hypotheses with data on executives’ career paths.

The strength of our argument depends on the breadth and consistency of the support we find for its empirical implications. At this point, it merits mention that we do not expect executives in pure presidential systems to have “zero” experience, nor do we expect every prime minister in pure parliamentary systems to have served as party leader for five years, for ten years in the cabinet and twenty years in the legislature. Still, we expect to career-path patterns to conform to our expectations: if parliamentarism minimizes parties’ adverse selection problems while the separation of powers complicates such problems, we ought to see evidence of differences in the “types” of candidates who ultimately make it to the top spot in each democratic

system.

CAREER PATHS OF INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS

To compare insiders and outsiders across democratic regimes, we analyze the career paths of the universe of national executives--every president and prime minister in every democracy around the world between 1945 and 2007 (see Table 2.1). We gathered biographical information on all executives in these countries, provided the president was popularly elected and the prime minister was subject to the confidence of the assembly majority.⁷

As a first cut towards testing the implications of our argument, we examine the positions politicians held immediately prior to assuming national executive office, across democratic regimes. This penultimate job provides a window into the pool of talent into which parties have promoted their executive candidates just before promoting them to the very top job. Table 3.1 presents this information. (The proportions in may not add to 1.0 because politicians can hold multiple positions at once--for example, they can be party leader while also being a legislator.)

Table 3.1 Here

The first two rows include the two prior positions--national legislator and cabinet minister--that most typify the pool of party insiders. (We decided *not* to double-count these two positions, so a minister who was also a legislator--a very common combination in parliamentary systems--is counted only as the former.) These categories represent the jobs from which parliamentary parties would be expected to directly recruit their prime ministers, but from which presidents are less likely to emerge.

⁷ We excluded interim and caretaker administrations, and vice-presidents who took office following upon the death or resignation of a popularly elected president. For reasons we explain below, we also excluded presidents and prime ministers from Austria as an extreme outlier case. This resulted in a sample of 852 national executives. Please consult Appendix 3A for information on how we constructed this dataset.

The findings in this table lend initial support for the positional hypothesis, simply because most of the proportions are higher for all PMs than for all presidents. For example, nearly 85% of PMs in pure parliamentary systems enter office from either the assembly (55%) or the cabinet (29%), while fewer than 40% of presidents in pure systems do so. 51% of all prime ministers across regimes jumped straight from the national legislature, while only 28% of all presidents made a similar move. Such differences are even starker for cabinet ministers: no more than 13% of presidents came straight out of the cabinet, while 28% of prime ministers did.⁸ T-tests comparing all presidents against all PMs confirm a significant difference at $p < .01$ for both of these categories.

Although these findings suggest that the positional hypothesis may be on the right track, Table 3.1 also offers substantial support for the configurational hypothesis. Focusing on the first two rows, we see that presidents in premier-presidential systems are more likely than presidents in either pure presidential or president-parliamentary systems to come straight out of the legislature--and they are even more likely to do so than premiers in president-parliamentary regimes. This supports our expectation that presidents in premier-presidential systems should resemble insiders more than their presidential counterparts in other systems. Evidence in these two rows also supports the configurational hypothesis that we should see a stronger tendency towards outsider prime ministers in president-parliamentary systems, since those PMs are likely agents of the president rather than the party.

The proportion of executives coming from party leadership positions also does not support the positional hypothesis. For example, presidents in president-parliamentary systems are

⁸ The greater tendency of presidents to come from the legislature than from the cabinet perhaps is because the separation of legislative and executive institutions allows prominent opposition legislators to build the sort of independent reputation that is valued for a presidential campaign, whereas service in the cabinet may be antithetical to standing out and position-taking.

somewhat more likely than other presidents to be party leader as they jump to the presidency.

The proportion does not necessarily suggest that such presidents are always insiders (after all, .27 is not .77, for example) but it is notable that the highest proportion of the three groups of presidents emerges in this category, confounding the conventional distinction between “parliamentary insiders” and “presidential outsiders.”

The next three rows concern former holders of the vice-premiership or vice-presidency, former prime ministers, and ex-presidents or former presidential candidates. What is notable is the relatively large proportion of presidents under semi-presidentialism who jump directly from the premiership.⁹ We interpret this pattern as suggesting that for both dual-executive subtypes the premiership represents a position as “president-in-waiting.” Parties use the premiership both to groom and to vet potential presidential candidates, an option that is obviously not available in pure presidential systems. Of course, to the extent that parties choose prime ministers because they might make suitable future presidents, we have evidence of contamination from the presidential to the parliamentary components of the hybrid regime—and of parties’ acceptance of the tradeoffs inherent in such presidentialization.

The last two rows of Table 3.1 indicate that a relatively higher proportion of presidents come from true outsider positions in subnational government or non-elective (“other”) positions as diplomat, appointed bureaucrat, advisor to another politician, or as leader of a social movement. The configurational hypothesis gains additional support here: prime ministers in pure parliamentary systems are least likely to be outsiders, while prime ministers in hybrid systems are more likely to be plucked from outside the parliamentary party, most likely because presidents select them for their personal loyalty rather than their loyalty to the party.

⁹ The one ex-PM in pure presidential systems came from Gambia, which switched to pure presidentialism from pure parliamentarism. Several PMs in pure parliamentary systems were heads of provisional governments prior to their country’s independence, accounting for the relatively small proportion of “ex-PMs” in that regime type.

In sum, our first piece of evidence--derived from the penultimate job prime ministers and presidents hold before assuming the top spot--supports the configurational hypothesis over the positional hypothesis. Parties' adverse selection problems do vary across democratic regimes, but prime ministers *per se* are not insiders, while presidents are not always outsiders. Instead, the constitutional configuration of power affects the likelihood that parties will select agents from inside their central organization or not. True insiders are found only among prime ministers in pure parliamentary regimes, while presidents in all regimes and prime ministers in hybrid regimes tend to depart from this ideal-type.

Let us now see whether this finding holds up to scrutiny of a longer arc of politicians' careers. Table 3.2 provides details about whether national executives have served at any time prior to assuming the top spot in four key political positions: party leader, other high-ranking party leadership positions, legislator, and cabinet minister.

Table 3.2 Here

The evidence strongly supports the configurational hypothesis. Consider service as party leader first: Prime ministers in pure parliamentary systems should have the most party leadership experience of all, and they do. In contrast, prime ministers in both hybrid subtypes are far less likely to have led their parties.¹⁰ Indeed, there is no substantial difference between prime ministers in premier-presidential systems (51%) and presidents in any system. Moreover, PMs in president-parliamentary systems are the *least* likely to have served as party leader (19%) before leaping to the top spot. In short, there is no support for the "positional" hypothesis here. From a party's point of view the premiership in president-parliamentary systems is a secondary position

¹⁰ This may be partly because, whereas in pure presidential systems the only executive position available for party leaders to ascend to *is* the presidency, leaders in dual-executive systems can ascend to either position. As is clear in Table 3.1, there are on average about three prime ministers for every president in the semi-presidential systems, meaning that for many, being PM turns out to be the pinnacle of a career.

relative to presidency--just as we would expect it to be given the configuration of institutional power in this subtype.

Let us now consider the proportion of executives who have served as legislators. The findings here also favor the configurational hypothesis. Nearly all prime ministers in pure parliamentary systems have served in the legislature at some point in their careers – and for over nine years, on average. In contrast, only 58% of presidents in pure presidential systems have done so--and for a much shorter period, on average. Also note that although approximately the same proportion of presidents in premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems have served in the legislature (~70%), presidents in the latter subtype tend to serve for considerably less time – even though they are *more* likely to have served for any amount of time in the legislature than their prime ministers (68% vs. 62%)!

These patterns again support the idea that parties in premier-presidential systems tend to invest relatively more in bridging the legislative and executive branches of their party than parties in either president-parliamentary or pure presidential regimes. The combination of separate origin of the presidency with exclusive parliamentary responsibility of the cabinet to the assembly should encourage parties to recruit prime ministers more from both legislative and party-leadership ranks than parties in president-parliamentary systems--but less than in parliamentary systems--and also to recruit their presidents from “insider” positions relatively more than parties in pure presidential systems.

When we turn to service in the cabinet, some support exists for the positional hypothesis. 73% of PMs in pure parliamentary regimes served in the cabinet at some point in their career before assuming the top spot; the proportions are lower for PMs in hybrid regimes. The proportions are lower still for all presidents than for any group of PMs – and are the lowest for

presidents in the president-parliamentary subtype. Finally, prime ministers in pure parliamentary regimes have served the longest on average in the cabinet, and presidents in pure presidential systems the least. However, differences also emerge “within” each position (PM or president), again casting doubt on the positional hypothesis.

Overall, the findings in Table 3.2 support the hypothesis that parties face different adverse selection problems in different democratic regimes. When parties control recruitment and select a single agent who is then responsible to the assembly majority, they tend to select insiders—leaders who have served as legislator, party leader, and cabinet minister. This is the ideal-type insider prime minister under parliamentarism. In contrast, when voters have a direct role in selecting national leaders, parties face a tradeoff, and are less likely to select insiders for either the presidency or the premiership. However, parties are somewhat more likely to select insiders in premier-presidential systems, the hybrid that leans most strongly towards parliamentarism.

This argument gains further support when we examine whether or not executives in different democratic systems had served in different *combinations* of positions prior to assuming office. We focus on combinations of the most important offices associated with insider status: legislator, cabinet minister, and party leader. If our argument holds water we should see stronger tendencies toward insider status for PMs in parliamentary systems and outsider status for presidents in pure presidential systems. In Table 3.3 we calculate the proportion of executives in our four regimes that held different combinations of political positions prior to assuming office.

Table 3.3 Here

The information in Table 3.3 strongly supports the configurational hypothesis. Prime ministers in pure parliamentary systems are far more likely to resemble insiders than those in

other systems prior to assuming the top office, and presidents in premier-presidential systems show a slightly stronger tendency towards insider profiles than presidents in other regimes. Yet somewhat surprisingly but following our configurational hypothesis, prime ministers in president-parliamentary systems are the most likely to resemble outsiders—in fact, they are more likely than any set of *presidents* to be outsiders!

As a final piece of evidence in support of our framework, consider what politicians do *after* they have served as national executive. As noted, principals do not merely confront *ex ante* problems of adverse selection--they also confront *ex post* problems of agents' opportunism, known as moral hazard. To the extent that politicians continue working with their party after leaving national office, we can be certain that they have not strayed *during* their term--that is, that moral hazard is less of a problem.

The conventional view of presidents as outsiders follows the stereotype of American presidents, who take their cue from George Washington. Washington was inspired by the story of the Roman general Cincinnatus, who defeated Rome's enemies only to retire immediately to his farm rather than grab the power that Roman elites handed to him on a platter. Indeed, American presidents have historically tended to abandon the hustle and bustle of party politics upon leaving the Oval Office. For example, at the end of his second presidential term former general Dwight Eisenhower followed in Washington's footsteps and retired immediately to his farm near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The only US president to return to the legislature after his term was John Quincy Adams, who served in the House from 1831 to 1848. In recent decades ex-presidents have concentrated on writing their memoirs, giving speeches, and raising funds to construct their presidential libraries. Only Bill Clinton has remained active in party politics, at least partly to support Hillary Clinton's ambitions.

How frequently do ex-PMs and ex-presidents remain as leaders of their party, return to the legislature, or to regain a spot in the cabinet, versus retiring completely from politics or being shunted into a less-important sinecure such as ambassador, diplomat, or representative to a regional parliament (e.g. the European Commission or the Central-American Parliament)? This question returns to our theme of the differences in principal-agent relationships between parties and leaders. Differences in post-executive career opportunities represent different “payoffs” parties can offer potential leaders as forms of *ex post* compensation.

In parliamentary systems, former prime ministers frequently return to the national legislature. The most extreme historical example is Italian premier Amintore Fanfani, who remained in parliament for over thirty years after his first appointment as PM. He also served nine years in the cabinet after he first reached the premiership--and was returned to the prime minister’s office four more times. Somewhat similarly, in pure presidential systems outside the US it is common for presidents to continue in politics after leaving office. For example, Venezuelan presidents Caldera and Herrera Campins both had long post-presidential legislative careers--28 and 20 years respectively. (Caldera also returned to the presidency a second time.)

Table 3.4 shows that we cannot generalize from US experience: many ex-presidents do continue their political careers upon leaving office (see also Corrales 2008). These results hold up if US presidents are removed from the analysis. Indeed, the proportion of ex-presidents who continue to lead their party in both pure and hybrid systems is not insignificant, again warning against exaggerating the degree to which presidents are “outsiders” throughout their careers. For example, ex-presidents in president-parliamentary hybrids are twice as likely to remain at the head of their party than prime ministers in those systems.

Table 3.4 Here

Nevertheless, Table 3.4 also indicates that prime ministers in pure parliamentary regimes are the most likely to continue on the inside track, trailed closely by PMs in premier-presidential regimes, and then by PMs in president-parliamentary regimes. In contrast, presidents in all systems are less likely to re-enter and remain in the legislature than PMs. Furthermore, although fully one in four ex-PMs in pure parliamentary system regained a spot in the cabinet, as did smaller proportions of ex-PMs in hybrid systems, the corresponding percentage for ex-presidents in both pure and hybrid systems is *zero*.

Both the positional and configurational hypotheses gain support from the results in Table 3.4. On the one hand, presidents are less likely to hold to the insider career trajectory after leaving office and more likely instead to sever their ties with their parties, suggesting that the danger of moral hazard is highest in hybrid or pure presidential systems. On the other hand, presidents and prime ministers exhibit considerable variation in their career trajectories in different democratic regimes. In particular, premiers in president-parliamentary systems actually resemble outsiders, most likely because they served at the pleasure of the presidents in those systems rather than the party.

Overall, the evidence from politicians' career paths clearly supports the hypothesis that the configuration of institutional authority affects the "types" of politicians that parties select for the top spots. Presidents are more typically outsiders, but the degree of "outsider-ness" varies as a function of constitutional structure. Likewise, only prime ministers in pure parliamentary regimes fully embody the stereotypical insider. The constitutional structure of premier-presidential and especially president-parliamentary regimes tends to presidentialize politics to such a degree that prime ministers are less likely to be faithful party agents in those systems, relative to those in pure parliamentary systems. Instead, prime ministers often become agents of

the president – especially in president-parliamentary regimes.

LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIALIZATION IN HYBRID REGIMES

Executives' career paths in semi-presidential regimes support the hypotheses that contamination occurs across the two components of the dual executive and that most of this contamination runs from presidential to parliamentary component, as our theoretical framework expects. When parties must nominate a candidate for direct executive elections, they tend to presidentialize their organization and behavior. As a result, executives tend to have outsider profiles in semi-presidential systems, compared against insider prime ministers under parliamentarism.

Yet institutions are not destiny--and we should not be surprised if parties in semi-presidential systems sometimes overcome the formal configuration of authority and act more like fully parliamentarized parties. Parliamentarization of leadership selection means that parties would fully control recruitment to the top positions of president and prime minister, and select leaders who would not undermine the parliamentarized nature of the parties. In this section we discuss two factors that might support parliamentarization under semi-presidentialism. The first condition concerns the impact of cohabitation, while the second identifies the sources of parliamentarization in our most obvious "outlier" case: Austria, which is formally a president-parliamentary system.

The Impact of Cohabitation on Party Presidentialization

Recall from Chapter Two that cohabitation occurs when the president and prime minister are from opposing parties and the president's party is not represented in the cabinet. These

situations arise when the president's party cannot control an assembly majority, either alone or in cooperation with other parties. Given that presidents in semi-presidential systems typically have a constitutional role in the appointment of a prime minister, it remains to be seen whether presidents who face an opposition-controlled assembly tend to submit to will of the assembly majority or negotiate over the selection of the PM and obtain an outcome more suited to their preferences.

We already saw in Chapter Two that cohabitation occurs about 20% of the time in premier-presidential systems, but less than 2% of the time in president-parliamentary systems. Here we look more closely at the selection of prime ministers in cohabitation situations, as a means of testing the relative influence of presidents versus parliamentary majorities in cohabitation situations. We then consider whether presidents in some situations may be able to avert cohabitation, by exercising leverage through their independent powers, despite facing an ostensibly unfavorable legislative situation.

To unpack this question, we examined the penultimate job of all prime ministers who were appointed to a cohabitation situation, to determine whether they were more often leaders of their party than prime ministers who served in situations of unified government. If so we have evidence that under cohabitation semi-presidential systems oscillate towards parliamentarization, as Duverger predicted (1980; see also Lijphart, 1999, 121-2). If cohabitation does produce parliamentarization, it should more frequently result in the appointment of a party leader as premier, because the opposition party will want to have its most powerful leader counterbalancing the president. The definition of "party leader" includes such roles as parliamentary leader of the party or leader of the (then) opposition, or the party's most recent presidential candidate.

Table 3.5 summarizes our findings, which should be compared against the proportions of party leaders appointed premier under all situations in semi-presidential systems reported in Table 3.1: 22% in premier-presidential systems and 18% in president-parliamentary systems. When we split the sample in Table 3.1 into cases of unified government and cohabitation, we see that prime ministers under cohabitation are about twice as likely to have most recently served as party leader, compared against prime ministers under unified government.¹¹ While the total number of prime ministers who are newly appointed under cohabitation is small (twenty six in premier-presidential systems and one in a president-parliamentary system), this difference is statistically significant. Moreover, the proportion--one third--is even higher than the 23% of premiers who had been serving as party leaders in pure parliamentary systems reported in Table 3.1.

Table 3.5 Here

The evidence in Table 3.5 confirms that under semi-presidentialism, an incumbent president whose party (or alliance) loses a legislative election must frequently accept the opposition leader as head of his or her cabinet. Still, 33% means that in two-thirds of all cohabitation situations the main opposition party does *not* install its leader as prime minister. This raises two possibilities: that the opposition *chooses* not to install its leader as PM, or that the president influences *which member* of the opposition takes over the cabinet. The latter possibility implies that presidents can meddle in the affairs of parties that hold the assembly majority even when the constitution would seem to prevent their doing so. To illustrate that this is not merely a theoretical possibility and to shed light on the limits of parliamentarization even under

¹¹ The percentage of party leaders becoming prime minister in non-cohabitation periods is slightly lowered by the fact that the president may be leading one of the parties. However, because our definition of “party leader” includes *assembly* leadership positions, nothing would preclude parties promoting their assembly leader to the premiership when another of their leaders (or perhaps one of our “outsiders”) has won the presidency. Such occurrences are evidently rare, and thus it is mainly in cohabitation situations—when neither the party itself nor an ally controls the presidency—that the leader is likely to become prime minister.

cohabitation, we briefly discuss three examples of presidential interference with opposition majorities, in both semi-presidential subtypes.

Our first example comes from Mongolia, a premier-presidential system. In 1997 the Democratic Union Coalition held an assembly majority, but the candidate of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party won the presidency. According to Severinghaus (2000) the remainder of the legislative term was volatile: There were three changes in prime minister, and during one contentious period in 1998-99, “the president vetoed one nominee for prime minister seven times in a row.” Thus, while the legislative majority did control each of these cabinets, the president’s insistence on determining which opposition leaders served in his cabinet severely limited parliamentarization.

A second example comes from Romania, another premier-presidential regime. As noted at the start of Chapter One, the results of Romania’s 2004 presidential runoff caused a realignment of the multiparty alliances that had just contested the assembly elections. In conceding defeat in the presidential runoff, incumbent prime minister and Social Democratic presidential candidate Adrian Năstase signaled that he expected a period of cohabitation with the winner of the presidential election, Traian Băsescu.¹² Năstase had good reason to expect to continue in the premier’s job, because his party and its coalition partner the Humanist Party had won a strong plurality of seats and was close to achieving an assembly majority before the presidential runoff took place. However, after winning the runoff Băsescu dismissed Năstase and nominated Calin Popescu Tariceanu of the National Liberal Party--an ally of Băsescu’s Democrats--as prime minister. Tariceanu then formed an assembly majority by enticing the Humanists to abandon their alliance with the Social Democrats.¹³ Băsescu thereby avoided

¹² “Romania presidential candidate seeks cooperation with victorious rival,” Radio Romania Actualitati, Bucharest, via *BBC Monitoring Europe*, December 13, 2004.

¹³ “Premier-delegate announces Romanian Humanist Party joins government,” Rompres news agency, Bucharest,

cohabitation simply by refusing to recommend as premier the leader of the alliance that had “won” the legislative election.¹⁴

Our final example is of presidential influence in a *potential* cohabitation situation in Taiwan, a president-parliamentary system. Given the constitutional configuration, in this case we expect even greater presidential influence than in Mongolia or Romania. In 2000, Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the presidency from the long-ruling Kuomintang Party (KMT). However, the DPP held a minority of seats in Taiwan’s assembly, and assembly elections were not scheduled for another year and a half. Taiwan’s constitution contains no provision requiring the PM to resign upon the inauguration of a new president, but newly-inaugurated president Chen Shui-bian dismissed the KMT premier and appointed another KMT official in his stead. However, he filled most of the rest of his cabinet with DPP officials. Note that this is *not* a cohabitation cabinet: even though the premier came from the opposition party, the KMT could not dictate the composition of the entire cabinet. In a situation that “should have” resulted in cohabitation, the president refused to accept the majority party’s choice for premier--and also refused a cohabitation cabinet.

This mildly accommodative cabinet lasted just over four months, at which point the president simply appointed a DPP cabinet, ushering in a period of “divided government” in which the executive and legislative branches were led by different parties (Rigger 2002). This situation is obviously not cohabitation, because the president and the premier came from the same party. Instead, this situation resembled minority government under parliamentarism—and

via *BBC Monitoring Europe*, December 23, 2004; and “Romania’s ruling coalition signs governance agreement,” Pro TV, Bucharest, via *BBC Monitoring Europe*, February 16, 2005.

¹⁴ However, in March 2007 Tariceanu dismissed all the cabinet ministers from Bănescu’s Democratic Party. This followed a lengthy period of conflict between the president and the premier, including a failed attempt to impeach the president. Thus although the 2004 events showed how a president can obtain an outcome in his favor despite a situation seemingly ripe for cohabitation, the 2007 events show the limits of that power. In the latter case, the premier decisively won the dispute with the president, resulting in cohabitation--a “parliamentarized” outcome. See “Romanian premier declares ruling alliance ‘dead,’” *BBC Monitoring Europe*, March 27, 2007.

indeed, the premier always came from the DPP for the remainder of Chen's two four-year terms in office, even though his DPP and its ally, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, never managed to win a majority in the National Assembly. This period in Taiwan well-illustrates the high degree of presidentialization we expect in president-parliamentary systems.

This brief exploration of opposing-majority situations in semi-presidential systems supports our expectations about how institutional configuration of power impacts prime ministerial selection. When oppositions win an assembly majority in premier-presidential systems, the result is virtually always cohabitation. Still, in a few cases--as in Mongolia—the president can still influence the assembly majority's choice for premier. In contrast, opposition majorities in president-parliamentary systems are extremely rare to begin with—we found only the Taiwanese case mentioned above and the single case of cohabitation in Sri Lanka¹⁵—and even in those situations presidents can influence cabinet composition, as the Taiwanese case illustrates.

Parliamentarization in Austria

The president-parliamentary subtype grants the president so much formal authority over cabinet formation that parliamentarization of parties should be rare. However, rare does not mean never, as we illustrate by briefly exploring the case of Austria, which is the only obviously “parliamentarized” president-parliamentary regime in the world today. Our configurational hypothesis assumes that the presidency will be as important in reality as it is on constitutional parchment--which implies that prime ministers should always be subordinate to presidents in such systems. However, Austrian presidents have never played such a dominant role, despite the

¹⁵ Sri Lanka's cohabitation (2001-04) was “parliamentarized” in the sense that the leader of the assembly majority did become PM. Cohabitation ended when the president exercised his constitutional power to dissolve the assembly and call early elections, at which his party regained the majority.

president's clear constitutional authority to determine the prime minister, dismiss cabinets that enjoy parliamentary confidence, and dissolve parliament.

Müller (1999) notes that Austria's informal "constitutional convention" requires that the president always appoint the leader of the largest party as *formateur*. In fact, the leader of the largest party has always formed the government. In addition, no postwar Austrian president has dismissed a government or dissolved parliament. Parties also tend not to nominate their most important leaders for president, but rather "elder statesmen." Campaign laws further inhibit presidentialization, as there is almost no public finance available for presidential candidates to campaign independently of their parties, in contrast to the generous subsidies available for all other elected offices (Müller, 1999: 40). In short, unlike parties in other president-parliamentary regimes, Austria's parties have deliberately minimized the potential that they would become presidentialized.

Given these informal norms, Austrian politics does not follow the formal configuration of power its constitution outlines, and support for our configurational hypothesis in the analysis above declines when we include Austria. Austrian premiers are strong insiders, in contrast to PMs in all other president-parliamentary systems: eleven of twelve jumped to the premiership from the assembly or the cabinet, a far higher proportion than average for the regime subtype; all had also served at some point in parliament, seven of twelve had served as party leader, and half had served in the cabinet.

Austria is clearly an outlier for our argument. The presidency's limited political relevance is partly a historical accident, and partly a function of Austrian parties' conscious efforts. At the end of WWII, Austria re-declared its independence from Germany, which had annexed the country in 1938. To restore stability and the country's autonomy as rapidly as possible, Austrian

political leaders decided to sidestep the often lengthy and contentious process of writing a new constitution. Instead, they agreed to simply revert to the country's constitution as of 1920, which had been modeled on Weimar Germany's but which had been amended in 1929 to give the president considerably greater autonomous powers. After the war, the two main parties--the socialist SPÖ and center-right ÖVP--entered into a governing coalition that lasted for two decades. During this time, the parties established an informal norm that the presidency would be largely ceremonial. The constitution has never been amended to formally reduce the presidents' powers, but presidents have rarely if ever taken advantage of their considerable formal authority.

In no other semi-presidential system do we see this degree of *de facto* political deviation from the *de jure* constitutional form. However, the Austrian experience suggests ways that parties--and thus the regime itself--may be parliamentarized even under institutions that tend to promote presidentialization. We expect such cases to be rare, and they evidently are. We have seen that cohabitation also tends to "parliamentarize" party politics—but only in premier-presidential regimes. Finally, despite the Austrian case, parties tend to be highly presidentialized in president-parliamentary regimes, as our theoretical framework predicts.

CONCLUSION

The dual executive of semi-presidentialism has become increasingly common around the world. This chapter provided the first comprehensive empirical exploration of differences in career paths between parliamentary and presidential executives, across all democratic regime-types. Principal-agent theory suggests that delegation involves risk of agency losses, which occur when the agent does not act faithfully in the principal's interest. Political parties often have cause to worry that prospective agents will fail to pursue their promised course of action. To what

extent does institutional context affect parties' ability to gauge the relative reliability of prospective agents? As in other professions, the most valuable signal politicians can send about their reliability is previous experience. To determine whether institutional context affects parties' ability to deal with potential problems of adverse selection, we explored the types of experience that leaders bring to the table under different institutional contexts.

We have good theoretical reason to believe that parties under the separation of powers confront more difficult adverse selection contracting problems. This is because the qualities that make a potential candidate *useful* may or may not overlap with the qualities that make a candidate *reliable*. Parties always confront tradeoffs between seeking votes and pursuing their policy goals (Strøm 1990); presidentialism exacerbates this problem by pushing parties to favor vote-seeking over policy-seeking (see Chapter Six). This incentive even exists under dual-executive hybrids, because the political importance of the presidency often leads parties to organize around pursuit of that office. Parties under any separation of powers system may be relatively more willing to sacrifice candidate reliability in order to be competitive in the presidential race. They may be willing to accept the risks of adverse selection because the potential payoffs of winning a direct executive election may exceed those of winning legislative seats.

To the extent that such a tradeoff between partisan reliability and electoral utility exists, and to the extent that the separation of powers exacerbates this tradeoff, we expect parties to select different sorts of candidates. Scholars have long suggested that parties under pure presidential systems tend to select "outsider" candidates relative to parties in parliamentary systems. That is, scholars have long assumed being a good *party agent* is incompatible with being a good *candidate* under the separation of powers. This chapter qualified this conventional

wisdom by examining the career paths of all democratically-elected executives around the world. On the one hand, it is clear that the conventional wisdom should not be exaggerated. Presidents are rarely total outsiders, and prime ministers are not always consummate insiders. National leaders in all political systems tend to have substantial political experience.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the *nature* of politicians' experience tends to differ across systems. In both pure and semi-presidential systems, parties emphasize the recruitment of executive personnel who are capable of winning a separate electoral contest, which implies less cumulative experience as a political "insider." In addition, the institutional configuration of authority in dual-executive systems tends to "contaminate" the position of prime minister. Prime ministers in hybrid regimes do not closely resemble their "insider" parliamentary cousins. As one moves from the ideal-type parliamentary system to the ideal-type presidential system, politicians who make it to the top spot tend to have shorter legislative careers, are less likely to have served in the cabinet, and they are less likely to have exercised a position of authority within their political party. These are the three most important methods by which parties acquire information about candidates' qualities and qualifications.

The separation of powers forces parties to make different sorts of leadership-selection choices. When a direct executive election exists, parties are willing to forgo rigorous screening and selecting mechanisms in their effort to find credible candidates. This suggests that under the separation of powers parties have fewer tools at their disposal to encourage greater revelation of applicants' true incentives, and that there is relatively less that parties can do to judge *ex ante* the extent to which a potential leader will live up to their expectations. The potential losses for the organization are greater, but so are the potential gains.

Appendix 3A: Constructing the Database on Leaders' Career Paths

To create the database of national executives' career trajectories we first compiled a list of all leaders who qualified for analysis. We then generated a chronological biographical sketch of each PM/president, and then converted that information into quantitative indicators. We searched for the following information: the incumbent's party at time of election; date of birth (and death if applicable); starting and ending dates of service as national executive; the year of the person's first obvious formal engagement with politics; whether or not (and for how many years) the person led the national party organization; whether or not (and for how long) the person served in the executive organ of the national party organization; the person's first political job or activity; the person's job or activity immediately prior to assuming national office; and whether and for how long the person had served as national executive previously and whether if that experience had come in a non-democratic situation.

We also sought information as to whether or not the person had served in one of the following jobs both before *and* after assuming national executive office: vice-president or deputy prime minister, legislator (and for how many years), institutional leaders within the legislature, cabinet member (and for how many years), appointed (not elected) president, diplomat, party founder, provincial executive (e.g. governor) or provincial executive candidate, provincial or local legislator (and for how many years), mayor or mayoral candidate, and how many times he or she had ran and lost previously for national executive candidacies.

We obtained nearly all of our information from on-line sources. On average, each biography derived information from two to three sources. General on-line sources included Lexis-Nexis Academic, ProQuest Newsstand, Factiva, the Biography Reference Bank, the Hutchinson Encyclopedia of Biography, Chambers' Biographical Dictionary, Oxford University

Press' Dictionary of Political Biography and Dictionary of Contemporary World History, and the *New York Times* on-line archive. We also utilized the on-line collection of detailed political biographies provided by the Centro de Investigación de Relaciones Internacionales y Desarrollo (http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacion/biografias_lideres_politicos).

Numerous other resources proved helpful. Many contemporary politicians have their own websites--for example, Argentine President Carlos Menem's can be found at www.carlosmemen.com; Danish Premier Anders Fogh Rasmussen provides biographical information at www.andersfogh.dk; and Italian PM Romano Prodi provides a biography at www.romanoprodi.it. Likewise, many academic institutions and national historical organizations provide on-line biographies of important leaders. For example, we discovered extensive information about Italian premier Alcide de Gasperi at www.degasperi.net; the Philippine Presidency Project provides biographies of that country's presidents at <http://www.pangulo.ph/index.php>; the Balkan Political Club has extensive biographical information on many former leaders of countries in that region (<http://www.balkanpoliticalclub.net/en/fm.php>). Furthermore, any former PM who is or was ever a member of the European Parliament or the Council of Europe has an on-line biography (see www.europarl.europa.eu or <http://assembly.coe.int>).

Many countries' government websites also make available biographical information about past national leaders, in the native language as well as in English. For example, information about Albanian presidents can be found at <http://www.president.al/english/pub/presidentet.asp>; information about Australian PMs can be found at www.primeministers.naa.gov.au/meetpm.asp; information about British premiers can be found at www.number10.gov.uk. Some countries' parliaments' websites include information

about former PMs and/or current MPs. Thus information on Einars Repse, Latvian PM between 2002-04, can be found (in English) on the site of Latvia's parliament (www.saeima.lv), where he was serving at the time we constructed this database (summer 2007). Finally, political parties often provide biographical sketches about former leaders who served as national executive. For example, information about Armenian Premier Serzh Sargysyan can be found at the website of the Armenian Republican Party, http://www.hhk.am/eng/index.php?page=history_hhk.

Table 3.1: Immediate Pre-Executive Job (%)

	PMs, Parliamentary y (N=403)	Premier- Presidential, PM (N=149)	President- Parliamentary PM (N=76)	Premier- Presidential, Presidents (N=50)	President- Parliamentary, Presidents (N=23)	Presidents (N=151)
National Legislator	.55	.50	.32	.35	.18	.27
Cabinet Minister	.29	.24	.34	.12	.18	.12
Party Leadership Position	.23	.22	.18	.16	.27	.19
Vice PM/Vice-President	.06	.03	.06	.02	.05	.09
Ex-Prime Minister	.04	.01	.01	.20	.23	.01
Ex-President or Presidential Candidate	.00	.01	.01	.04	.00	.13
Municipal/Provincial Position	.02	.07	.06	.10	.09	.12
Other	.03	.02	.04	.02	.14	.14

Table 3.2: Positions Held at Any Point in a Career

	PMs	Premier- Presidential, PM	President- Parliamentary , PM	Premier- Presidential, President	President- Parliamentary , President	Presidents
Lead Party (%)	.76	.51	.19	.56	.56	.50
# Years Lead Party	4.09	2.61	1.20	3.71	4.91	3.21
Other Party Leadership (%)	.42	.42	.34	.30	.33	.32
National Legislator (%)	.94	.80	.62	.70	.68	.58
# Years Legislator	9.40	6.80	5.04	6.10	3.91	5.34
Cabinet Minister (%)	.73	.60	.54	.46	.39	.47
# Years Cabinet	4.19	2.84	2.24	2.53	2.78	1.92

Table 3.3: Combinations of Pre-Executive Positions (%)

	PMs	Premier- Presidential, PM	President- Parliamentary , PM	Premier- Presidential, President	President- Parliamentary , President	Presidents
Legislator + Minister	.69	.50	.29	.36	.27	.30
Legislator + Party Leader	.75	.50	.19	.44	.36	.33
Minister + Party Leader	.53	.31	.08	.30	.30	.27
Legislator + Minister + Party Leader	.52	.29	.07	.22	.23	.20

Table 3.4: Post-Executive Career Patterns

	PMs	Premier- Presidential, PM	President- Parliamentary , PM	Premier- Presidential, President	President- Parliamentary, President	Presidents
Lead Party (%)	.46	.49	.26	.26	.50	.30
# Years Lead Party	2.48	2.65	1.10	1.52	2.17	1.88
Legislator (%)	.82	.69	.40	.16	.23	.20
# Years Legislator	7.18	5.33	1.69	0.87	2.00	1.20
Cabinet (%)	.26	.13	.05	.00	.00	.00
# Years Cabinet	1.15	0.38	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table 3.5: Party Leaders Becoming Prime Minister in Semi-Presidential Systems, Cohabitation vs. Unified Government

	All Semi-presidential PMs		Premier-presidential PMs	
	Cohabitation (N=29)	Unified Government (N=197)	Cohabitation (N=28)	Unified Government (N=122)
Party leader	.33	.15	.31	.16
Significance	p=.01		p=.04	

Note: Includes only those prime ministers who were newly appointed after a parliamentary election or between elections; that is, excludes three PMs who were already in power and remained in power when an opposing president was elected.