

Chapter Four: Constitutional Design and Intra-Party Leadership Accountability

In Chapter Three we showed that careful selection of agents--the power to hire--can mitigate adverse selection problems. Yet perhaps the most important *ex ante* sanction that a principal can write into an implicit contract about an agent's *ex post* behavior is the power to *dismiss* that agent--the power to fire that agent if he or she does not perform up to certain standards. Principals who possess dismissal power can keep an agent in line and minimize the problem of moral hazard, which occurs when an agent violates the spirit of a contract after it has been signed. In contrast, principals who lack the ability to rid themselves of a wayward agent have good reason to fear the problem of moral hazard.

All democracies possess ways to remove and replace national leaders against their will. However, important differences exist across democratic regimes in terms of *parties'* ability to remove and replace their leaders against their will while those leaders are serving as incumbent heads of government. For example, once in office, parliamentary prime ministers remain subject to ongoing partisan as well as legislative confidence. This sets a relatively low bar for their removal. And indeed, as we detail below, parties in parliamentary systems regularly remove their own prime ministers between elections. Direct partisan control over the premiership minimizes the danger of moral hazard.

In semi-presidential systems, parties also regularly remove their own prime ministers between elections. However, semi-presidentialism complicates parties' ability to control prime ministers' fates, because hybrid constitutions typically afford presidents some influence over prime ministerial deselection—and presidents frequently take advantage of this authority. This means that under many conditions, prime ministers in semi-presidential systems are relatively

less accountable to their party than are prime ministers in parliamentary systems, precisely because they are instead accountable to the president.

The problem that parties in both pure and semi-presidential systems face is that they cannot fire their own sitting president. The separation of survival limits parties' ability to hold their agents accountable, thereby weakening parties' ability to act as citizens' agents in government. Indeed, the very notion of a powerful executive whom citizens directly elect for a fixed term is anathema to the notion of "responsible party government." Our approach points towards a tension in democratic theory: even though scholars equate modern democracy with party government, the separation of survival dramatically alters the quality of democracy because it weakens parties' control over their agents.

The contrast between presidents' separate survival and prime ministers' fused survival forms the basis of this chapter's focus on executive deselection. The implications of variation in parties' ability to fire their agents-in-government complement the findings in Chapter Three, which showed that adverse selection problems are minimized under parliamentarism. This chapter reveals that parliamentarism also minimizes the danger of moral hazard. Arguably, this chapter's findings are more substantively important than Chapter 3's, because control over deselection is more important for generating incentive compatibility between principals and agents, and is thus more important for explaining political outcomes of interest. We therefore first describe the relatively high degree of control parties exert over their agents in parliamentary systems. Then we discuss how semi-presidential systems complicate parties' ability to hold their prime ministerial agents to accounts. Finally, we expose parties' inability to control their directly-elected presidential agents.

FIRING PARTY AGENTS UNDER PARLIAMENTARISM

In parliamentary systems the composition of the executive branch can change for a number of reasons, including electoral loss or the collapse of a multi-party coalition. Yet what is distinct about parliamentarism is the degree to which *intra*-party politics determines control over the executive branch. Scholars of parliamentarism have certainly noted the relevance of *intra*-party politics for government turnover,¹ but party scholars have yet to consider the extent to which *intra*-party control over the executive branch varies across democratic regimes.

Using the same database employed in Chapter Three, we counted a total of 374 changes of prime minister in 39 pure parliamentary systems since 1945. This census does not include changes to or from caretaker or interim PMs and does not include incumbent PMs at the time the dataset was constructed (Summer 2007). By exploring published biographies, Lexis-Nexis, the *New York Times* on-line historical archives and a variety of other sources, we uncovered the specific reason each PM left office. Of these 374 changes, 16 followed upon an incumbent's death or physical incapacitation, leaving 358 cases. We were unable to find information on four cases, leaving 354. Of these, 113 PMs (31.9%) left office due to election losses, and 115 changes (32.4%) resulted from *inter*-party conflict such as coalition collapse.

We attributed 19 cases (5.4%) to "other" reasons, including dismissal by a monarch, governor-general, or unelected president; a military coup or threatened coup; or the incumbent's indirect election or appointment as president. This leaves 107 cases, 30.2% of the total, in which a change of PM resulted from *intra*-party politics. This percentage serves as a baseline for cross-regime comparison, and also illustrates parties' *organizational* hold on executive power in pure parliamentary regimes. In 89 of these cases the party of the PM did not change—but this means that in 18 cases the incumbent party sacrificed control over the premiership to fire its own leader!

¹ See e.g. Warwick (1994); Kenig (2006); Maravall (2007) and Tegos (2007).

Clearly, parties can and do revoke their agents' contracts frequently under pure parliamentarism, without serious internal or external repercussions.

When intra-party politics forces an incumbent PM from office, a key question is “was he pushed or did he jump?” It is sometimes difficult to tell, but one can usually distinguish a more-or-less voluntary resignation from an actual defenestration. In slightly more than half of the intra-party cases (58 of 107) the incumbent resigned voluntarily and his or her party simply replaced someone else. Most of these changes occurred due to an incumbent's age or exhaustion, as in the retirements of the UK's Winston Churchill in 1955, Sweden's Tage Erlander in 1969 or New Zealand's Keith Holyoake in 1972. In a few cases the incumbent PM resigned to take a different job—as was the case when the Greek parliament elected PM Konstantinos Karamanlis as the country's president in 1980. His New Democracy Party simply replaced him with George Rallis. Similarly, Norwegian PM Gro Harlem Brundtland resigned in 1996 to head the World Health Organization, and her Labor Party replaced her with Thorbjørn Jagland. Regardless of the reason, in all of these cases the PM's party handled the transfer of executive authority as an internal affair, without taking other parties' or voters' preferences into account.

Not all prime ministers resign willingly: intra-party pressure forced incumbent PMs from office in 49 of 107 cases. Sometimes prime ministers perceive rising internal opposition and resign prior to being ousted, thereby saving what little is left of their reputation and dignity. In such cases parties do not have to initiate a formal deselection procedure, but the incumbent nonetheless cannot independently determine the date of his or her departure from office. In other cases, incumbent PMs actually lose their colleagues' support and are pushed out. For example, British PM Anthony Eden famously resigned under pressure from his Conservative Party

colleagues in the humiliating aftermath of the Suez Crisis in 1957.² In other cases PMs depart because their performance disappoints their copartisans. For example, the New Zealand Labour Party forced incumbent PM David Lange to resign in 1989 because the party's popularity was sagging. Geoffrey Palmer took over, but intra-party pressure also forced him out for similar reasons, after less than a year. Parties have forced their own PMs from office at least once in 21 pure parliamentary systems.³

Sometimes parties even formally remove their own premier. In a few cases party discipline has collapsed and premiers find themselves out of a job because elements of their own party voted with the opposition. For example, defections on a confidence vote cost the Belgian Socialist Party's prime minister his job in 1946; likewise, in 1966 the Dutch premier quit after a copartisan introduced a motion to defeat a government proposal. Similar episodes have occurred in Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy and Japan. In other cases incumbent PMs are tossed from office via partisan no-confidence votes or leadership challenges. For example, leadership challenges in both major Australian parties can occur at any time via a motion in the party's legislative caucus (Davis 1998, 167). Such rules have made life difficult for several Australian PMs (Kenig 2006). In 1991, Paul Keating successfully challenged incumbent PM Bob Hawke for leadership of the Australian Labor Party, even though Hawke had just led Labor to its fourth consecutive election victory. Hawke immediately resigned. In 1971, the Australian Liberal Party deposed its sitting PM John Gorton in similar fashion (Davis 1998, 174).

Perhaps the most famous example of this sort is the ouster of the UK's Margaret Thatcher, as noted in Chapter One. An internal rule requires that the leader of the British

² Like Eden, several PMs claimed to resign for health reasons, but such explanations usually provide public cover for serious intra-party dissension.

³ A few parties in parliamentary systems have adopted "fixed terms" for their leaders, but a fixed term as *party leader* is irrelevant if the prime minister loses the support of the majority of his or her parliamentary copartisans, simply because *prime ministers* do not sit for fixed terms.

Conservative Party stand for reelection annually, regardless of whether the party is in opposition or in government (Davis 1998, 78). Thatcher used this procedure to pry open the door to power in 1975, when she defeated Edward Heath for the party's leadership. At that time the Conservatives were in opposition. Yet despite leading the party to three consecutive election victories, the same rule cost Thatcher her own job in 1990, after which John Major was selected as party leader. Party rules did not require Thatcher to resign as prime minister, but in losing the party leadership she lost the authority to lead the government, and she quickly resigned. Simply by winning the party's internal election, Major became prime minister.

Parliamentary parties' internal governance mechanisms clearly serve to keep prime ministers from growing too comfortable in their positions. PMs do not sit for fixed terms of office; parliamentary parties can swap leaders without input from voters or from other parties. The fact that this process is common has not gone unnoticed, but its frequency has not been placed in comparative perspective--nor have scholars considered its importance for understanding party politics across democratic regimes. For any political party, parliamentarism limits the danger of moral hazard because executives do not sit for fixed terms. Prime ministers are not only responsible to the assembly majority, but also to their party. This means that intra-party politics has a substantial impact over who runs the government as well as how those people run the government. As we begin to detail in the next section, other democratic regimes weaken parties' direct control over their agents and heighten the danger of moral hazard.

FIRING PRIME MINISTERS UNDER SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM

In parliamentary systems accountability follows a single chain of delegation from voters to parties to the party leader. In dual-executive hybrids, the chain of delegation is more complex.

The key source of variation is that party organizations do not have sole authority to deselect the prime minister--except, as we shall see, under situations of cohabitation. Instead, presidents enter the picture. Even in the premier-presidential subtype, presidents often deselect the PM, a fact that is puzzling given their lack of constitutional authority to do so. In this section we first compare the sources of prime ministerial turnover under semi-presidentialism with our findings for parliamentary systems. We then explain how presidents' formal and informal influence limits parties' hold over their prime ministerial agents in the assembly. Finally, we describe how cohabitation offers parties the opportunity to retain greater control over their prime ministers.

Sources of Prime Ministerial Turnover in Semi-Presidential Systems

As in parliamentary systems, control over the office of prime minister in semi-presidential systems can change because of an election loss or because of *inter*-party conflict, either within the governing coalition or between the government and the opposition. And just as in parliamentary systems, *intra*-party politics can also drive prime ministerial turnover in hybrid systems. However, semi-presidentialism also introduces a different intra-party dynamic to the question of prime ministerial turnover, because both presidents *and* the party's parliamentary caucus can influence prime ministerial turnover.

As discussed in Chapter Two, different configurations of constitutional authority should influence presidents' relative influence over prime ministerial deselection. In premier-presidential systems, the assembly majority possesses exclusive formal authority to dismiss the prime minister and cabinet. Yet in president-parliamentary systems the president also has the authority to dismiss the prime minister, regardless of the preferences of the party or parties that

comprise the assembly majority. This suggests that presidents should have relatively greater influence over prime ministerial deselection in president-parliamentary regimes.

In what follows, we distinguish “parliamentary” from “presidential” sources of prime ministerial turnover in semi-presidential systems. “Parliamentary” sources of turnover resemble the dynamics we observed above in pure parliamentary systems: that is, prime ministers can be forced from office due to elections, or due to inter- or intra-party conflict between elections. “Presidential” sources, however, are unique to semi-presidential systems: prime ministers can be forced from office as a function of *presidential* elections, and also as a function of inter- or intra-party *presidential* pressure between elections.

Presidential elections that cause a change in prime minister clearly indicate party presidentialization, because to the extent that a president can influence cabinet composition immediately after winning election (or reelection), the prime minister has become the president’s agent rather than the agent of the party’s assembly contingent. Given the formal distribution of power, we expect prime ministerial turnover following *assembly* elections to occur relatively more frequently in premier-presidential regimes, while turnovers following *presidential* elections should be relatively more frequent in president-parliamentary regimes.

Very few premier-presidential constitutions require the incumbent PM to submit his or her resignation upon the inauguration of a new president: only Armenia’s and Lithuania’s among our cases contains such a provision.⁴ Precisely because such provisions are so rare, if we observe prime ministerial turnover following a presidential election in premier-presidential systems, it must be a function of informal political norms and practices. As we describe below, the most important informal source of presidential authority in premier-presidential systems is *partisan*—

⁴ Although such a provision does not technically give a president “dismissal” power, if the resignation of the incumbent PM allows the newly inaugurated president to install a different premier, he or she clearly has exerted influence over the cabinet independently of the will of the assembly majority.

presidents' influence within their own party. That is, when the president's party (or a coalition of allied parties) forms the assembly majority, parties become informally presidentialized because the prime minister tends to be the president's political subordinate—even in premier-presidential systems, the subtype with “weaker” presidents.

Table 4.1 Here

Table 4.1 provides a breakdown of the reasons why prime ministers leave office, by subtype of semi-presidential regime.⁵ As expected, prime ministers are far more likely to depart because they have lost an assembly election in premier-presidential systems than in president-parliamentary regimes. The proportion of prime ministers who leave office because of the result of assembly elections echoes the proportion we found in pure parliamentary systems, supporting our point that this subtype “leans” towards parliamentarism. Also as expected, the impact of intra-or inter-party conflict within the assembly is relatively more important in premier-presidential systems, accounting for about 43% of all cases as opposed to about 33% of all cases in president-parliamentary systems. It is worth recalling that the proportion of prime ministers under pure parliamentarism who left office because of intra- or inter-party conflict was 63%.

Overall, nearly 76% of all cases prime ministerial turnover in premier-presidential regimes are due to factors specific to “parliamentary” politics—assembly elections or intra- or inter-party conflict in the assembly. In contrast, the same “parliamentary” factors account for only about 43% of all cases of prime ministerial turnover in president-parliamentary regimes. Rather obviously, the reason “parliamentary” factors are more important in premier-presidential regimes is because “presidential” factors are relatively more important in president-

⁵ As with the analysis in Chapter Three, we exclude Austria. And as with our analysis of pure parliamentary systems, these figures exclude PMs who died in office (three in president-parliamentary regimes) and those for whom we found no information (three in president-parliamentary regimes), and also excludes caretakers, interim PMs, and incumbents at the time the dataset was constructed.

parliamentary regimes. Even so, “presidential” influence accounts for a sizable proportion of prime ministerial turnover in both hybrid subtypes. First, we can see that in both regimes a number of prime ministers depart office because they decide to run for president.⁶ This sort of ambition is impossible under parliamentarism, and confronts parties in semi-presidential systems with the adverse selection problem highlighted in Chapter Three.

Table 4.1 also reveals that presidents have both intra- *and* inter-partisan influence over prime ministers’ fates, in both regime subtypes. As should be expected, such influence is far more important in president-parliamentary regimes (where constitutions give presidents formal authority to dismiss the premier) than it is in premier-presidential systems (40% of all cases vs. 17%). Yet even the relatively lower percentage for premier-presidential systems represents a puzzle, because the formal rules of that subtype imply that presidents should have no influence at all. Evidently, presidents in premier-presidential systems possess informal authority to deselect the premier--the result of party presidentialization rather than the formal rules.

As we argued in Chapter Two, when the presidency is an important political prize, parties will organize to win that office. Despite the potential benefits of winning the presidency, this imperative also entails potential agency losses. To the extent that presidents gain influence over prime ministerial selection and/or deselection, parties have relinquished the most important source of political power that exists in a premier-presidential system. The figures in Table 4.2 indicate that presidents do influence prime ministers’ fates in many premier-presidential systems. This means that despite the formal constitutional balance of power, parties have permitted a *de facto* reversal of the principal-agent relationship, as presidents use their partisan authority to

⁶ This number may be puzzling given the data in Chapter Three, which showed that a relatively large proportion of presidents had previously been prime minister. This is because there are many more prime ministers than presidents. Only a few PMs get to be president, but a fair number of presidents were PMs.

shape and reshape their party in their own image.⁷ Somewhat surprisingly, this authority even crosses party lines, as 6.6% of our cases represent instances of presidential influence in the dismissal of a premier from a *different* party.

Presidents' Informal Influence in Premier-Presidential Systems

The information in Table 4.1 reveals that presidents frequently drive prime ministers from office in both types of semi-presidential systems. In president-parliamentary regimes, presidents' partisan influence is well-understood. Yet in premier-presidential systems, presidents' influence represents something of a puzzle. Examples help us illustrate the sources of such authority.

Let us first consider how presidential elections sometimes result in the prime minister's dismissal, even if the incumbent PM and the president come from the same party--and even if the incumbent PM enjoys the confidence of the assembly majority. For example, newly-elected Finnish presidents have twice fired the incumbent premier. Similarly, of the six directly-elected presidents thus far in the French 5th Republic, five assumed office with a PM of their own party already leading the Assembly--but four of these presidents dismissed the incumbent premier.⁸ This happened after both the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections, even though assembly elections were just a month away: Rather than wait for the outcome of the legislative election, both presidents essentially asked the voters to ratify their personal choices.

These examples suggest that prime ministers in premier-presidential systems must have the *personal* confidence of the president as well as the *institutional* confidence of the assembly

⁷ Here we have in mind here a distinction between "constitutional" and "partisan" powers that is similar to that developed by Mainwaring and Shugart (1998) for Latin American presidential systems.

⁸ De Gaulle in 1965 is the only exception, but he had been serving as the appointed president prior to 1965 and had appointed the incumbent PM himself.

majority. Such cases reveal the nature of the implicit contract under which parties hire presidential candidates in premier-presidential systems: the candidate becomes the head of the party and is essentially delegated the right, upon winning the presidency, to change premiers. This alters the principal–agent relationship written into the constitution, which gives the assembly majority exclusive authority to deselect the premier. Parties are particularly unlikely to challenge this informal authority if the president had long coattails in a recent legislative race or is expected to help his or her party in an upcoming legislative election. Such informal partisan influence--above and beyond any formal constitutional powers, and without any formal presidential accountability to the party--marks the very essence of a presidentialized party.

Let us now explore examples of presidential influence between elections. To understand presidents' informal influence more fully, consider the key provisions in French constitution--the model for this hybrid subtype. The French constitution states that the president "terminates the appointment" of the prime minister "*when [the prime minister] tenders the resignation of the government,*"⁹ but it says nothing more about prime ministerial responsibility to the president. (However, it goes into considerable detail about the PM's responsibility to the *assembly*.) This phrasing implies that presenting a resignation letter to the president is merely a formality required after an election loss or a no-confidence vote, for example.

Nonetheless, under unified government French presidents have long had their way with their own parties' premiers. For example, Socialist President François Mitterrand dismissed three different premiers from his party between elections in efforts to improve his party's stature--and by extension, his own chances at reelection. President de Gaulle even dismissed one premier for "completing his mission"--leading their party to an election victory—which suggests that the

⁹ Article 8. Source: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#TITLE%20III>, August 9, 2008. Italics added for emphasis.

premier was an excellent party agent, but that for some reason he displeased his real boss, the president.¹⁰ Overall, of the 18 changes in prime minister since the advent of the 5th Republic, five followed assembly election losses and twelve resulted from presidential influence; only one has been a function of inter-party conflict in the assembly. This contrasts with the dominant dynamic in the pure parliamentary 4th Republic, in which each of the 21 prime ministers resigned due to inter-party conflict in the National Assembly.

French presidents are not alone in possessing informal authority to dismiss the prime minister, despite the lack of formal constitutional authority to do so. For example, in 1999 Romania's president Emil Constantinescu fired his party's premier, Radu Vasile. Given the formal constitutional chain of delegation, Vasile considered challenging the President's action in court, but he backed down and resigned (Dow Jones 1999). And in 1977, Finnish president Urho Kekkonen publicly "requested" that premier Martti Miettunen resign. Both Kekkonen and Miettunen were members of the Center Party. However, Kekkonen wanted to replace Miettunen's minority government with a broad coalition that would control over 75% of the parliamentary seats, but that would be headed by the Social Democratic Party instead of the Center Party (even though it would still include ministers from the Center Party).¹¹ We know of no functionally equivalent case like this under pure parliamentarism, in which a party heading a minority government fires its own premier, "voluntarily" relinquishes the premiership to another party, and re-enters the cabinet in a subordinate position.

Under unified government, presidents in premier-presidential systems have even been able to dismiss premiers who were not their co-partisans. As noted in Table 4.1, such influence accounts for 6.6% of all cases of PM turnover. One such case occurred in Lithuania in 1992,

¹⁰ *New York Times* 4/15/1962, "Pompidou Named French Premier."

¹¹ *New York Times* 5/12/1977, "Helsinki Cabinet Quits; Majority Coalition Due."

when independent president Valdas Adamkus forced out premier Gediminas Vagnorius. The president and PM had squabbled publicly for some time, and eventually Adamkus went on national TV to demand Vagnorius' resignation. In response, Vagnorius accused Adamkus of violating the separation of powers; the premier's party and an allied party then passed a resolution supporting the incumbent government. However, by "going public," the president leveraged his popularity against the PM's unpopularity--and Vagnorius was compelled to resign a week later (*East European Constitutional Review*, 1999).

Presidents' ability to remove another party's premier is even more puzzling than any informal intra-party influence they might acquire. Any case of inter-party presidential influence is a clear violation of the notion of exclusive cabinet responsibility to the assembly under premier-presidentialism. Nevertheless, the non-trivial number of cases of inter-party presidential influence over prime ministerial deselection suggests that presidents' influence in premier-presidential systems is systemic, and not limited to their own party. Our findings suggest that presidents' authority to dismiss another party's agent can be a function of alliance-formation: In multiparty systems, parties sometimes form coalitions in which one party gets the presidency while another gets the premiership. When entering such alliances, parties apparently accept a deal in which the president determines how long the premier and the cabinet stay in office.

In sum, presidents' formal authority in president-parliamentary regimes gives them substantial influence over prime ministerial deselection. Yet we also find that presidents frequently possess considerable informal influence over prime ministerial deselection in premier-presidential regimes, even if they lack the requisite formal institutional authority. Such informal influence typically derives from presidents' position as *de facto* party leader, although sometimes this power even extends to the inter-party dimension of politics, leaving parties allied with

incumbent presidents also vulnerable to presidential influence. This is precisely what we mean by party presidentialization: given presidents' separation of survival, presidents' influence over prime ministers presents parties with potentially quite severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems.

Cohabitation: How to Avoid Party Presidentialization

The examples above reveal the extent to which presidents influence their own and allied parties, even in premier-presidential systems. However, all of these examples came from situations of unified government. Cohabitation, by contrast, places limits on presidents' partisan influence. Recall that we defined cohabitation as situations in semi-presidential systems when the prime minister is from a party opposed to the president, and the latter's party is not in the cabinet. These should be the most "parliamentarized" phases of semi-presidential systems. Recall also that in Chapter Three we noted that parties are relatively more likely to select their leaders as premier under cohabitation than under unified government. Here we ask how premiers lose their jobs in cohabitation situations. If cohabitation embodies a particularly "parliamentarized" phase of semi-presidential governance, then it should end through processes that typify parliamentarism. That is, cohabitation should end either due to election results or due to intra- or inter-partisan disputes in parliament, and not due to presidential influence.

Table 4.2 confirms this hypothesis, showing election results are the most common way to end a period of cohabitation. In about 40% of the cases cohabitation ended because the incumbent PM's party lost an assembly election, resulting in a new cabinet that included the sitting president's party. Another 30% of cohabitation periods end through inter-party conflict in parliament. In these cases an opposition-controlled coalition collapses and a new government

forms that includes the president's party. And in a few cases, intra-party conflict forces a PM from office, and the president's party enters the new government.

Table 4.2 Here

Thus in about 78% of our cases of cohabitation, "parliamentary" factors ended a prime minister's tenure. In contrast, "presidential" factors ended cohabitation in only 22% of the cases. And what is notable here is that in all of these cases, cohabitation ended because of the results of a presidential election. (For example, because the incumbent president's party lost to the incumbent PM's party, resulting in unified government for the former assembly opposition.)¹² In none of our cases did a president push a PM from office under cohabitation. (Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the incumbent president maneuvered behind the scenes.) This finding is striking: presidents in premier-presidential systems can clearly change the prime minister when their allies control the assembly majority, but they cannot do so when they face a majority opposition. This is exactly what we should expect theoretically, if cohabitation represents a "parliamentary" phase, as Duverger (1980) predicted, even before the first cohabitation had occurred in France, and as Lijphart (1999, 121–2) has argued.¹³

Cohabitation periods under premier-presidentialism are important inasmuch as they reveal the conditions under which presidents are politically sidelined in such systems. However, it would be a mistake to assume that cohabitation returns parties to a fully "parliamentarized" state. After all, under cohabitation, the party that holds the premiership but not the presidency

¹² In one case, cohabitation ended because the premier sought and lost the presidency: Lionel Jospin in France in 2002. Jospin resigned the premiership immediately upon Jacques Chirac's reelection as president, and his Socialist party also lost the assembly election a month later.

¹³ It is also notable how much less frequently intraparty conflict within parliament ends cohabitation relative to its importance overall for ending prime ministers' tenures, whether in premier-presidential or pure parliamentary systems. Intra-party conflict within the assembly represent more than a fifth of all PM terminations under premier-presidentialism and close to a third under parliamentarism. Yet only two of twenty-seven cohabitation premiers ended their terms this way. Parties logically--and quite sensibly--may be more careful to avoid internal conflict that might jeopardize their hold on the cabinet when they face an opposing president--whose influence would likely peak precisely when it came time to bargain over replacing the cabinet.

will understand the need to have a leader able to win the next presidential election. Indeed, the sitting premier is likely to be a future presidential candidate—as was the case in two periods of cohabitation in France, for example: Jacques Chirac, premier from 1986 to 1988, ran for the presidency and lost in 1988 but won in 1995; and Lionel Jospin, premier from 1997 to 2002, ran for the presidency and lost in 2002, when Chirac was reelected.

This section's analysis of the sources of prime-ministerial deselection in semi-presidential systems reveals that party presidentialization is greater in president-parliamentary systems than in premier-presidential systems, just as the constitutional structure of authority in these subtypes would lead one to suspect. However, prime ministerial de-selection—and thus intra-party politics generally considered—is presidentialized in both subtypes, except under periods of cohabitation. This is because presidents—agents who cannot be fired—employ both formal constitutional and informal partisan powers to shape cabinet composition. For this reason, moral hazard is a greater danger under hybrid constitutions than under pure parliamentarism. Regardless of the constitutional configuration of authority, political parties tend to be highly presidentialized under both subtypes of semi-presidentialism.

FIRING A DIRECTLY-ELECTED PRESIDENT

This chapter emphasizes the notion that the separation of survival enhances presidents' influence over their parties relative to prime ministers, and limits parties' ability to hold their leaders-as-presidents to accounts. As shown above, in both parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, parties can and frequently do replace prime ministers who have grown unpopular or who have strayed from the party line. However, parties cannot deselect presidents. Parties possess few tools besides legislative obstruction to use against directly-elected presidents who

decide to go their own way. To be sure, a party that obstructs its own president is sending a loud signal. Yet no matter how loud, such a signal is not, in the final analysis, equal to a party's power to cast its agent aside--nor, in semi-presidential regimes, is such a signal equivalent to a president's ability to fire his or her prime minister.

In theory, legislative parties do possess one mechanism to “deselect” presidents: impeachment (Baumgartner and Kada (eds.) 2003; Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2006). Legislators threaten presidents with impeachment with some frequency, and sometimes these threats do force presidents to resign. The set of modern presidents who have resigned under pressure includes US President Richard Nixon in 1974, Ecuadoran Presidents Abdalá Bucaram in 1997 and Jamil Mahuad in 2000, Paraguayan President Raúl Cubas Grau in 1999, and Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1993. Successful impeachments carried to their (partial or full) conclusion include the cases of Brazilian President Fernando Collor in 1992, Malagasy President Albert Zafy in 1996, Philippines President Joseph Estrada in 2001, and Lithuanian President Rolandas Paksas in 2004. In addition, in 2005 Ecuador's Congress declared that President Lucio Gutiérrez had “abandoned his duties” and deposed him from office. Nineteen other presidents (one twice) have survived formal impeachment threats or trials.¹⁴

Intra-party prime ministerial deselection in parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes can expose an internal leadership crisis within the incumbent party, or—in semi-presidential

¹⁴ We counted 31 cases of formal impeachment threats against directly-elected presidents in our set of presidential and semi-presidential democracies (those listed in Chapter Two): the six completed plus the five threatened impeachments that forced presidents to resign listed in this paragraph, plus 20 other formal impeachment motions in Belarus (1996), Colombia (1996), Ecuador (1987), Malawi (2005), Paraguay (1997), Nicaragua (2002), Peru (1991 and 2005; different presidents), the Philippines (2005), Romania (1995 and 2007; different presidents), Russia (1998), South Korea (2004), Sri Lanka (1991 and 2002; different presidents), Taiwan (2000 and 2006; the same president, once in each of his terms), Ukraine (2004), the United States (1998), and Zambia (2001 and 2003; different presidents). This list only includes democracies after 1945; it therefore excludes cases in Panamá in 1955, Nigeria in 2002, Peru in 2000, and the US in 1868. It also does not include informal, extra-legislative “challenges” to presidents (Hochstetler 2006), even if such challenges result in a president's ouster (as, for example, in Argentina in 2001 or Bolivia in 2003), and it does not include impeachments of indirectly elected presidents such as Indonesia's Wahid in 2001 or Paraguay's González Macchi in 2002.

regimes--it can reveal presidents' efforts shape the cabinet independently of the assembly majority's preferences. Whatever the reason, such events are fairly common, and they proceed fairly rapidly. In contrast, impeachments are extraordinary constitutional procedures that involve a detailed and public legislative investigation, a media feeding frenzy, recourse to the judicial branch of government (depending on the constitutional procedure), and the mudslinging of a potentially lengthy public trial. As such, they are never purely intra-party political disputes, and they never represent a "normal" method for swapping out the national executive.

In addition, impeaching or forcing a president to resign suggests that the incumbent party nominated not merely an incompetent but a criminal to lead the party and the nation. This represents a shameful turn of events for that party as well as for the citizens who voted for that candidate. Given this, legislators in a president's party are rarely in a position to benefit from dragging their own leader through the mud, accusing him or her of criminal acts and/or treason, and deepening a political crisis of their own making. In contrast, legislators in parliamentary systems never confront such profound existential dilemmas because if their leader refuses to resign they can initiate no-confidence proceedings (either within the party or in the parliament) or force the PM to call new elections as a referendum on public confidence in the administration. Thus to put it bluntly, impeachment is not a viable intra-party accountability mechanism. There is a universe of difference between a party that dismisses its prime minister and a party that attempts to send its own leader to prison.

Given this, a party in a separation of powers system must be confronted with an imminent threat to its own survival before it will encourage its own president to resign. The case of Richard Nixon illustrates this point well. The break-in at Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate Hotel occurred in June 1972, seven months before Nixon's second inauguration. As a

result of the scandal following the cover-up of the break-in, Nixon resigned--over two years later, on August 8, 1974. Yet just two weeks prior to that date, despite mounting evidence of a criminal conspiracy at the highest levels of government, ten of the 17 Republicans on the House Judiciary committee voted *against* all three articles of impeachment that Democratic committee leaders had drawn up.¹⁵

Republican support for Nixon finally evaporated only after the Supreme Court ordered the President to release recordings of conversations that revealed he had lied about his knowledge of the break-in and that he had ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to end its investigation into the case. Only after witnessing the public outcry following in the wake of these revelations did Republican congressional leaders press Nixon to resign, because they feared the electoral consequences of a drawn-out Senate trial. Such fears were warranted, and Nixon had even addressed them in a press conference months earlier. When asked in February of 1974 if he would consider resigning if it became clear that his party would suffer a disastrous result in the November midterm legislative elections, Nixon said:

No, I want my party to succeed, but more importantly, I want the presidency to survive. And it is vitally important in this nation that the presidency of the United States not be hostage to what happens to the popularity of a president at one time or another (Nixon 1974).

Nixon could not have expressed our main point better: the separation of survival reverses the principal-agent relationship, by making the party hostage to the president. Nixon's resignation may have prevented things from getting even worse for the Republicans, but they still lost 49 House seats in 1974, and would not win a majority in the House for another two decades.

¹⁵ Source: www.watergate.info. N.d. "Analysis of the Impeachment Votes of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives." <http://www.watergate.info/impeachment/impeachment-articles-analysis.shtml>, accessed May 24, 2007.

The implications of this sequence of events are the following: in contrast to the relative frequency with which prime ministers are induced to resign when their parties view their continued presence in office as a political liability, a president, by virtue of the legitimacy a direct election confers and because of the separation of survival, is unlikely to step aside in a similar situation. Moreover, while a party can relatively easily dump its own prime minister, impeaching one's own president risks collective political suicide. Given this, parties almost never seek to use impeachment as an internal accountability mechanism.

Between 1946 and 2007, our 53 democracies directly elected 223 different individuals as president. (Several served more than one consecutive term, and a few served more than one non-consecutive term.) Ten of these presidents died in office, three were victims of military coups,¹⁶ and two engineered self-coups and remained in office in non-democratic settings.¹⁷ This leaves 208 presidents. Six of these were removed from office through impeachment or other constitutional procedures, and eleven others resigned under pressure. However, intra-party politics forced a president from office early in only *one* of these cases, or about 0.5% of the total.¹⁸ By way of comparison, recall that intra-party politics accounted for 30% of the cases of prime ministerial turnover in pure parliamentary systems.

This simple fact reveals that it is wrong to call the increased frequency of presidential challenges and resignations around the world a “de facto parliamentarization” of presidential

¹⁶ Several presidents deposed by militaries did not enter our dataset for technical reasons. For example, Juan Perón was not technically the candidate elected in 1973 in Argentina. He assumed office extra-constitutionally, and was deposed extra-constitutionally as well. Likewise, Brazilian president João Goulart assumed office from the vice-presidency after the incumbent resigned, and was deposed in 1964.

¹⁷ Alberto Fujimori of Peru in 1992 and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines in 1972.

¹⁸ This calculation includes administrations that were complete by 2007. One additional potential case exists, the impeachment of President Joseph Estrada of the Philippines in 2001. Estrada was elected in 1998 on the *Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino* (LAMMP) ticket. In 2000 he was accused of corruption, and in October of that year the Philippine House of Representatives voted to impeach him. Several of Estrada's copartisans voted with the prosecution, raising the question of whether LAMMP sought to remove its own leader. However, Kasuya (2003) notes that many LAMMP members who voted against Estrada had only joined the party immediately prior to the 1998 elections. Because parties in the Philippines are typically ephemeral and fluid, this case remains unclear.

regimes (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008), because true parliamentarization would necessarily let legislatures remove presidents via simple majority rule, and would also let president's parties swap out the nation's chief executive via a simple intra-party mechanism. Rather obviously, this is not the case. What we are seeing in separate-powers systems around the world is manipulation of constitutional rules for political purposes by both presidents and opposition majorities, not "parliamentarization."¹⁹

To illustrate the moral hazard problems that presidential parties confront, we searched for examples of parties that attempted to impeach their own president. We found only five cases in which elements of a president's party supported an impeachment effort. A majority in the president's party supported impeachment in only two of these cases, and only one effort succeeded. By examining these five cases we can learn a great deal about problems that presidentialized parties confront in terms of holding the de facto leaders to accounts.

Members of the Sri Lankan UNP Fail to Fire their President

The effort to dismiss Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa (1989-93) reveals just how counterproductive impeachment can be as a mechanism of intra-party accountability. In 1991, 120 of the 225 members of the Sri Lankan parliament, including 47 of 125 MPs from Premadasa's United National Party (UNP), brought charges of "corruption, nepotism, and subverting the constitution" against the president. Although most who signed the impeachment motion came from the opposition, two dissident UNP faction leaders and several dozen of their followers also signed (Burger 1992, 744-5). Thus in this case a minority of legislators in the president's party initially supported impeachment.

¹⁹ To be sure, the line between "attempted abuse" and "normal politics" is unclear, but that does not change the point that such cases are not "parliamentarization."

However, nearly all of the UNP MPs who initially supported impeachment soon retracted their signatures and publicly pledged their loyalty to the president (Samath 1991a, 1991b), because they were threatened with expulsion from the UNP. In fact, the UNP did expel the few holdouts who refused to sign the loyalty oath. According to the Sri Lankan constitution, the seat of an MP who changes party affiliation--whether through defection or expulsion--is declared vacant (*Straits Times* 1991). The constitution also gives the president the power to nominate the MP's successor and to decide whether to simply seat the replacement or to hold a special by-election. The dissident UNP MPs challenged the constitutionality of their expulsion, but the country's Supreme Court found that the party was within its rights (Agence France-Presse 1991). Quite obviously, a country's impeachment provisions are irrelevant if the president has sufficient support within his own party to expel dissidents from the party and to even expel party-switchers from the legislature.²⁰ After nearly all of the original signatories of the impeachment motion recanted, the Speaker of the Sri Lankan Parliament declared that the motion lacked the required number of signatures to proceed. Thus by the end of this episode Premadasa had *gained* power within his own party.

Ethnic caste and economic class distinctions rather than policy differences were at issue in this case of intra-party conflict: Premadasa came from a middle caste, while the two dissident UNP factional leaders came from wealthy high-caste families that had long dominated Sri Lankan politics. These leaders believed the president had served the party well by winning the 1988 election, but that he had overstayed his welcome. They feared that his success would threaten long-established cultural and social norms (*The Economist*, 1991). Such a dynamic illustrates our point that presidentialized parties face tradeoffs between electoral and governing

²⁰ This constitutional context gives presidents extraordinary coercive power if they want it: Burger (744n) reports that immediately after assuming office, Sri Lankan president J. R. Jayewardene (1978-89) obtained a written, undated resignation letter from every UNP MP!

considerations. Premadasa's opponents failed to realize that in nominating a candidate who could win the election, they would have to stomach his domination of the party for the duration of his term. When these elites grew weary of Premadasa's influence, they sought to remove him from office by the only mechanism available: impeachment.

This strategy backfired badly, as the president used his constitutional authority to stop the impeachment process in its tracks and turn the UNP machinery on his tormentors. The separation of survival and Sri Lanka's constitutional rules allowed Premadasa to reverse the principal-agent relationship and "fire" rebellious members of his own party. (Had he lived to see the day, James Madison would have been horrified.) In the end, the UNP's factional leaders' unwillingness to accept the inherent tradeoffs of a separately-elected president seriously damaged the party's fortunes. The party's deep rift--as well as Premadasa's mysterious 1993 assassination--caused it to lose the next presidential race as well as 31 of its 125 seats in the following year's assembly elections.

South Korea's Millennium Democratic Party Tears Up the Contract and Pays the Price

A second example similarly illustrates how repudiating one's own president can be politically suicidal. In December of 2002 Roh Moo-hyun won South Korea's presidential election. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP) retained a majority in Korea's unicameral legislature, while Roh's Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) was split between his supporters and supporters of previous president Kim Dae-jung. After Roh's inauguration, the GNP presented a "different reason to impeach Roh every month" (Lee 2005, 9n). Roh's party failed to unite in his defense, and so in September 2003 Roh and his supporters split from the MDP and formed the Uri Party. The rump MDP members then joined the GNP in the opposition. Together

these two parties held over two-thirds of the seats, meaning they could override presidential vetoes, propose constitutional amendments to be put before voters in national referenda, and impeach the president.

In March 2004 the legislature voted 193-2 to impeach Roh on various charges, even though public opinion polls showed that 70% of South Koreans opposed the move. All 47 Uri party members boycotted the vote. Impeachment then became the driving issue of the April 2004 mid-term elections, at which the Uri party tripled its seats, gaining an assembly majority. The GNP lost 28 of its 149 seats, but the president's enemies in his former party paid the worst price: the MDP lost all but nine of its 63 seats (Lee 2005, 11). As in Sri Lanka, in South Korea the president's enemies badly misread public opinion, and paid a heavy price. (The Korean Supreme Court reinstated Roh in May 2004, and he served out his term.²¹)

Nicaragua's President Tears up the Contract, and His Party Cannot Respond

Nicaraguans elected Enrique Bolaños as president in 2002. The previous president, Arnoldo Alemán, had handpicked Bolaños to be his successor. In fact, Alemán believed he and his Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) could control Bolaños from the legislature and thus return Alemán to power five years later, as permitted by the Nicaraguan constitution (Muñoz 2002). (Nicaragua's constitution provided Alemán with a seat in the assembly automatically upon finishing his term.) However, immediately after assuming office Bolaños began investigating corruption in Alemán's administration. The former president was stripped of his parliamentary immunity, convicted of numerous crimes, and sent to prison for several years.

For assiduously prosecuting his mentor, the PLC expelled Bolaños. Bolaños then formed a new party, the Alliance for the Republic (APRE). In October 2004, the PLC, which the jailed

²¹ However, his popularity foundered, and he left the Uri party in early 2007 (New York Times, 2/23/07).

Alemán still dominated, joined with the opposition Sandinista Party (FSLN) to bring impeachment proceedings against Bolaños for alleged campaign finance violations during the 2001 campaign. Together the PLC and the FSLN controlled over two-thirds of the 91 seats in the Nicaraguan Assembly (LatinNews Daily, 2005). However, under intense pressure from the US State Department and the Organization of American States (OAS), the impeachment effort did not advance.²² For the PLC, the repercussions of this effort were grave: in the 2006 presidential elections the PLC candidate finished 3rd, behind the APRE candidate and the FSLN's winning candidate, former revolutionary and ex-president Daniel Ortega.

Bolaños tore up the implicit contract he had signed with his party and his former boss and struck out on his own, with only minority support within his own party. In a parliamentary system, his party would thus have replaced him one way or another. Yet even supposing that the OAS and US government had *not* pressured the PLC and FSLN to back off, the PLC could not have treated its dispute with Bolaños as merely an internal party matter: given the requirement of a supermajority vote to impeach Bolaños, Alemán's and his followers needed the help of the PLC's main electoral and ideological rival, the FSLN.

As for Ortega, ending Bolaños' presidency quickly was actually not in his interest. He sought to divide PLC forces for as long as possible, because doing so was the only way he could win a free and fair presidential election under Nicaragua's qualified plurality rules.²³ Moreover, in an era of strengthened international democratic norms, impeachment required the blessing of the international community. This is intriguing not because the impeachment would have

²² See LAWR (2004); Joynes (2005); EFE News Service (2005); Global Insight Daily Archives (2005); BBC (2005); Briones (2002); and Sandoval (2004). This story has historical precedent in Nicaragua: in 1947 the country's legislature removed President Leonardo Argüello for daring to act independently of the country's *de facto* ruler, Anastacio Somoza García.

²³ The constitution had been changed, under FSLN urging, to permit the election of the presidential candidate with a plurality of only 35% of the vote as long as there was a five-percentage point margin over the runner up. (Ortega would go on to win, 38%–29%.)

succeeded if not for the intervention of the OAS and the US (surely it might have), but because one cannot imagine an internal party leadership dispute in a parliamentary system (no matter how cynically motivated) becoming a matter requiring international mediation. Under the separation of powers intra-party leadership disputes are not merely politicized but are constitutionalized, which in today's world means that international actors can legitimately pressure domestic actors to stick to the letter of their country's constitution--and which means that parties have far harder time holding their leaders to accounts.

How to Defenestrate Your Party's President: Paraguay 1999

Our fourth case is historically unique in that it is the only example of a majority within a governing party initiating a successful effort to remove its own president: the resignation of Paraguayan President Raúl Cubas Grau of the *Asociación Nacional Republicana* (ANR, or Colorado Party) in 1999. Cubas was politically weak from the get-go: he was able to obtain his party's nomination only because the Paraguayan Supreme Court disqualified the ANR's desired nominee, General Lino Oviedo for participating in a coup attempt in 1996. Prior to the 1998 election Oviedo was imprisoned. However, early in his presidency Cubas thumbed his nose at the Paraguayan Supreme Court and freed his pal Oviedo.

This act also defied the will of the majority faction within Cubas' own Colorado Party, led by Vice-President Luis Argaña. Argaña's supporters wanted Oviedo to remain in prison and out of politics. Thus, Argaña's allies in Paraguay's legislature declared that Cubas "did not represent the Colorado Party" and initiated impeachment proceedings. After all, as Vice-President, Argaña would assume the presidency if Cubas were forced from office (Pérez-Liñán 2006, 231). A period of political chaos followed, which culminated when pro-Oviedo thugs

assassinated Argaña on the streets of Asunción. This dénouement cost Cubas his remaining political support and forced him to resign and flee into exile.

To our knowledge, this is the only case in which a party *could* resolve its internal leadership disputes on its own, without needing to reach out to other parties. The Colorado Party had ruled Paraguay continuously for over six decades, in both authoritarian and democratic periods. Given this, the Argañistas--who controlled the Colorado organization after Oviedo's imprisonment--had good reason to believe that they could contain the negative political repercussions of an impeachment, and therefore that they could use impeachment as a method of leadership replacement.

Political conditions in Paraguay at the time thus reveal the conditions that enable a party to remove its own leader through impeachment: *a presumption that the incumbent party can control all the levers of power in the present and in the future*. The means that the incumbent party must single-handedly control all branches of government, from a supermajority position. Such conditions are extremely rare, even in single-party governments. And even though the ANR remained in power until 2008, it has paid a price for its internecine warfare. From democratization in 1989 through the 1998 elections, the party held the presidency as well as a single-party majority in both chambers of Paraguay's legislature. Yet in 2003 its presidential candidate won only a plurality of 37% of the votes, and the party lost its majority in both legislative chambers. By 2008, it had also lost control over the presidency.²⁴

Venezuela's Acción Democrática Fails to Support its President

Our final case illustrates what a party stands to lose if it does not defend its president from impeachment charges: the resignation of Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez of

²⁴ Political Database of the Americas, <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Para/para.html>, accessed 6/4/08.

Acción Democrática (AD) in 1993. In this case an opposition legislator initiated impeachment proceedings, but members of the president's party did not vigorously oppose the charges, partly because a majority of AD legislators opposed Pérez's key policy initiatives. AD's tepid defense severely discredited the president and contributed indirectly to his downfall. For our purposes, this case clearly exposes the sorts of accountability problems presidentialized parties confront that parliamentarized parties do not. Conventional wisdom holds that AD was one of the most highly parliamentarized parties in the history of modern Latin American democratic politics (Martz 1966; Coppedge 1994; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Given this, if any presidentialized party could hold its leader to accounts, it should have been AD--and to the extent that AD could not hold its leaders to accounts, no party in any pure presidential system truly can.

Pérez took office (for the second time) in 1989 as leader of a minority government. He had won AD's October 1987 internal primary by a three-to-one margin (Coppedge, 128), but his rivals retained control over the party machine, determining the agenda of the party executive committee meetings, publicly opposing Pérez's nomination, and proclaiming their opposition to Pérez's economic policy proposals.²⁵ (Pérez won the internal primary with support from the rank-and-file and state and municipal party bosses.) Given the animosity emanating from within his own party, after winning the election Pérez appointed non-partisan technocrats to economic ministries and engaged in what Corrales (2002) has called a "party-neglecting" governance strategy.

AD leaders *attempted* to hold Pérez to the party line. In particular, they tried to keep Pérez from implementing neoliberal economic reforms. To do so AD acted as a "virtual opposition force" by relaxing party discipline, which in this instance means allowing legislators to defy presidential initiatives, contrary to the party's usual practice of giving their party's

²⁵ Personal communication, Professor Michael Coppedge, University of Notre Dame, 5/28/07.

president nearly universal support (Pérez-Liñán 2006, 222). As a result, Pérez never imposed his will on AD leadership or legislators (Coppedge 103). For example, in October 1991 the party's president publicly demanded the resignation of economic ministers from the president's cabinet (Pérez-Liñán 2006, 29, 223). However, despite these efforts, Pérez ignored his party and undertook one of the "policy switches" that swept Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (Stokes 2001).

When Venezuela's economic and political situation began to deteriorate in the early 1990s, partly as a consequence of Pérez's reforms, anti-government protests erupted across the country. Police and military repression of those protests only engendered greater enmity against Pérez and his government. In February 1992, disgusted with corruption, impunity, and the downward spiral of political chaos, army colonel Hugo Chávez led an attempted coup; other military officers attempted a second coup later that year. Given the minority government situation, any parliamentary system would have forced Pérez from office via a no-confidence vote by this time. Yet given the separation of survival, AD was stuck with a president whom its leadership--and much of the Venezuelan population--had angrily repudiated.

In November 1992, an opposition politician accused Pérez of appropriating US\$17 million in public funds for personal gain. The case was filed with the country's Prosecutor General, who then requested that the Supreme Court weigh in. The Supreme Court decided to proceed with a trial. The Venezuelan Senate subsequently voted unanimously--including AD senators--to suspend Pérez's mandate, forcing him from office temporarily. According to Kada (2003, 126), Pérez claims that he urged AD senators to support the Supreme Court's decision, because he mistakenly believed he would be quickly absolved. Yet once a contrary decision came out, repudiating the Court was politically infeasible. The Venezuelan constitution permits

presidents to take a 90-day leave of absence. After that time, Congress must decide whether to declare the position permanently vacant, and if it does so, it must nominate a replacement. Because Pérez's trial was only getting started after 90 days, Congress was forced to vote on Pérez's status. The decision required only a majority vote--and because AD controlled only a minority of seats, it lost and Pérez was removed from office (Kada 2003, 127).

In failing to support its own president from the outset and by indirectly aiding the opposition's efforts to bring him down, AD committed political suicide, which contributed to the collapse of Venezuela's stable if elitist party system. Pérez had won the presidential election and AD won the largest bloc of legislative seats in 1988. Yet it finished a distant third in the 1993 elections and did not even run its own presidential candidate in 1998.²⁶ By 2000 Hugo Chávez had swept aside the remnants of Venezuela's party system and was consolidating his new "5th Republic."

If AD had existed in a parliamentary system, it would probably never have nominated Pérez in the first place. Yet because the party needed an "electable" candidate, Pérez won the nomination without support from a majority in the party's central organization. Then, despite AD's vaunted centralization, cohesiveness and organizational strength, the party organization could not hold its own president to the party platform, nor could it dismiss Pérez once his policies had proven enormously unpopular. AD was forced to swallow a bitter pill, and to deal with a situation a parliamentary party would never have confronted. Violent protests and two attempted coups certainly undermined Pérez's government--but the opposition's successful effort to unseat Pérez capitalized on the weak support Pérez received from his own party. AD's efforts to undermine its own president proved self-defeating, and illustrate why such actions are so rare:

²⁶ Election Results Archive, <http://www.binghamton.edu/cdp/era/>, accessed May 28 2007.

a party that turns on its own leader but that cannot remove that leader from office runs the risk of self-destruction.

CONCLUSION

At the start of this chapter we noted that while careful *ex ante* selection of agents can mitigate adverse selection problems, the ability to sanction an agent *ex post*--in particular to *dismiss* an agent--is far more consequential for principals' ability to realize their goals. All democracies possess mechanisms to remove and replace national leaders against their will. However, not all *parties* in all democracies have equal ability to fire their agents who hold executive office. Substantial variation in the internal balance of power between party principals and party agents exists under different democratic constitutions, suggesting that the danger of moral hazard—the likelihood that a party's agent will depart from the party's preferred position on any number of important issues--is highly correlated with regime type.

In pure parliamentary systems, about three in ten changes in PM result from purely *intra*-party politics. Parliamentary constitutions offer parties comparatively simple and easy mechanisms of intra-party accountability, including leadership review and deselection. Because the executive emerges from the parliamentary majority, intra-party politics directly determines *who* runs the government as well as *how* those people run the government. The frequency and relative ease with which parties swap out their agents under this regime type suggests that moral hazard is minimized in parliamentarized parties.

In semi-presidential regimes, parties possess a similar hold over their prime ministerial agents. However, such systems also give presidents--a less-faithful party agent--influence over prime ministerial selection and deselection. Presidents' place in the line of accountability

between parties and prime ministers complicates parties' ability to hold *either* their prime ministers *or* their presidents to accounts. That is, presidential "contamination" of the relationship between the party and the prime minister under semi-presidentialism attenuates parties' organizational control over the composition and direction of government.

It is worth remembering from Chapter Two that the founders of semi-presidentialism desired this result. And in fact, the president-parliamentary subtype almost completely eliminates parliamentary parties' influence over the composition and direction of government. As for premier-presidential systems, presidents also frequently swap out premiers, despite their lack of formal authority to do so. Presidents' influence derives from their informal, *de facto* position as party leader. In such regimes we therefore only see limits on presidents' influence under cohabitation. In contrast, when presidents' parties and/or allies control the assembly majority, intra-party politics becomes highly presidentialized and we see a reversal of the party-leader principal-agent relationship: the prime minister becomes the *president's* agent, rather than the party's.

In both pure and semi-presidential regimes, parties cannot credibly threaten presidents with removal--whether for ineffectiveness or something worse. Thus parties' direct influence over the occupant of the executive in systems with direct presidential elections typically ends at the nomination stage of the electoral process. After that, intra-party politics almost never determines between-election presidential leadership changes. Presidents are sometimes forced from office between elections, but parties almost never take the initiative to remove their own president. The rarity of such efforts suggests that politicians understand how damaging impeachments can be for the incumbent party—and the frequency of attempts to impeach *another* party's president tends to support this point. Politicians are usually loath to accuse their

own party's president of ineptitude or corruption--much less an offense against the constitution. Pursuing such a course of action is costly because impeachment proceedings focus the media spotlight on the incumbent party's shortcomings, not just the president's. In contrast, parliamentary parties can and frequently do remove an unpopular, incompetent, or even corrupt prime minister before the party must face the voters.

The evidence in this chapter clearly shows that parties lack mechanisms of *ex post* accountability to keep their presidential agents in line. They cannot deselect presidents who stray too far from the party line, underperform, are corrupt, or turn out to be incompetent or a fool. While the threat of deselection pervades party politics in parliamentary systems, deselection via impeachment cannot be considered part of a hypothetical contract between the party as principal and a candidate for president as its agent. Presidents' comparatively greater insulation from intra-party deselection relative to prime ministers means that there is greater danger of a *de facto* reversal of the principal-agent relationship in separate power systems, in which presidents come to control their parties for their own purposes.

Table 4.1: Reasons for PM Termination in Semi-Presidential Regimes

Reason for Termination		Premier- Presidential PMs (%)	President- Parliamentary PMs (%)
Parliamentary	Lost Election	33.1	9.5
	Interparty Conflict	22.8	7.9
	Intraparty Conflict	19.9	25.4
Presidential	Ran for/Elected President	6.6	9.5
	Interparty Conflict	6.6	12.7
	Intraparty Conflict	10.2	27.0
Other		0.7	7.9
(N)		136	63

Table 4.2: Reasons for Termination of Cohabitation in Semi-Presidential Regimes*

		Cohabitation PMs (%)
Parliamentary	Election resulted in unified government	40.7
	Interparty Conflict	29.6
	Intraparty Conflict	7.4
Presidential	Presidential election resulted in unified government	11.1
	Premier ran for/Elected President	11.1
	Interparty, Presidential Influence	0.0
	Intraparty, Presidential Influence	0.0
	(N)	27**

* Does not necessarily mean termination of the prime minister, but rather the reason the prime minister ceased to be in a cohabitation situation; this includes the one case of cohabitation under president-parliamentary system, which ended via an assembly election.

** Total number of completed cohabitation periods (this excludes five prime ministers still in office under cohabitation at the end of 2008).