

Chapter Six: The Impact of Constitutional Change on Party Organization and Behavior

As we argued in Chapter Two, all parties face collective action problems--and all parties confront the dilemmas raised by delegating power and resources to a single leader who will stand as the party's candidate for national office. The question we seek to answer is precisely how differences in the relationship between voters and the executive and legislative branches of government shape parties' ability to address these challenges.

Under parliamentarism's fusion of executive and legislative authority, parties organize to win legislative seats, and retain maximum accountability over their prime-ministerial agents. Yet under the separation of origin and/or survival, parties face different organizational and behavioral incentives. As shown in Chapters Three and Four, where voters have two agents--the legislative party and a president--parties face more complex intra-party delegation and accountability problems. Moreover, when winning the executive branch directly--rather than winning legislative seats--becomes parties' driving goal, parties must favor "vote-seeking" incentives in election campaigns. Chapter Five provided evidence that parties executive and legislative vote bases can diverge quite widely in separation of powers systems. In short, parties that concentrate on winning executive elections will develop different organizational forms, nominate different sorts of leaders, and adopt different electoral strategies than they would under parliamentarism.

To test the hypothesis that parties organize and behave differently under different democratic constitutional regimes, we would ideally compare parties in countries that shifted from purely fused powers to purely separated, or vice versa. A change from parliamentarism to presidentialism in a stable and competitive democracy would allow a "before" and "after" comparison. Unfortunately for political science research, changes of this nature are extremely

rare. In fact, since WWII we know of only one shift from a pure-type regime to another under democratic auspices: The Gambia in 1982. However, despite the case's theoretical potential, The Gambia changed its constitution under a single hegemonic party and subsequently experienced no change in party leadership. Moreover, a 1994 military coup suspended Gambian democracy.

We must therefore look for stable democracies that made less-extensive changes in the fusion or separation of executive authority that also had a relatively high degree of inter-party competition both before and after changing constitutional formats. Two cases fit this bill: France in 1958–65 and Israel in 1992 and again in 2001. In 1958, France amended its parliamentary constitution to enhance the powers of its indirectly-elected president, and a 1962 referendum adopted direct presidential elections starting in 1965. As for Israel, in 1992 the country changed its (unwritten) parliamentary constitution by adopting direct prime-ministerial elections starting in 1996, but—partly because the reform rapidly and dramatically changed the country's parties and party system—rescinded the change and returned to parliamentarism in 2001.

Both countries' reforms introduced separate origin of the executive, breaking the single chain of delegation that characterizes parliamentarism. However, in terms of executive survival, Israel retained a critical feature of parliamentarism: the entire government--including the elected prime minister--remained dependent on parliamentary confidence to survive in office.¹ In France, the president enjoys separation of survival, even though the French National Assembly retains the right to oust the premier and the cabinet. Thus while France adopted the premier-presidential variant of semi-presidentialism, Israel became a rare hybrid that combined separate origin with fused survival—an elected prime-ministerial regime.

¹ To be specific, a vote of no-confidence under the reformed system only removed the PM; if it passed, then the *Knesset* was also dissolved (Article 19A of the Basic Law, as amended in 1992).

In this chapter we leverage these two quasi-experimental cases to explore the impact of “imposing” separation of origin and/or survival on party organization and behavior. France and Israel are critical cases for this book’s argument because both shifted from pure parliamentarism to systems with direct executive election--and, in Israel’s case, shifted back--under fully democratic auspices. If we see predictable changes in party organization and behavior following these reforms, our theoretical argument gains credence--even if we must temper our generalizations because we draw upon only two cases. Thus in what follows we first discuss the theoretical importance of these two cases. We then examine the reforms parties undertook, and consider their impact on party presidentialization.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND EXPECTATIONS FOR PARTY ADAPTATION

How do parties adapt to change in the structure of executive-legislative relations? In this section we consider this question from the perspective of our neo-Madisonian framework. This approach emphasizes how the chain of delegation under different constitutional contexts confronts parties with different collective action and delegation problems. In particular, in Chapter Two we noted that democratic regimes structure the origin and survival of executive authority in different ways. Figure 5.1 thus revisits Figure 2.1, which showed how the pure-type regimes enact similar relationships on both dimensions of executive origin and survival: parliamentary systems are fused on both, while presidential systems are separated on both. In contrast, hybrid constitutions with single executives combine origin and survival differently. Thus in the lower-left cell we find assembly-independent regimes like Switzerland, while in the upper-right cell we have elected prime-ministerial regimes, which Israel’s brief experience

exemplified. In this latter system, the executive enjoys separation of origin but depends on the confidence of the assembly majority to survive in office.

Figure 5.1 Here

Of course, it is far more common to find hybrid regimes that have a dual executive. In semi-presidential systems the president enjoys separation of origin and survival, while the prime minister is dependent on the assembly majority for survival in office. The French and Israeli reforms thus created two distinct hybrids, which share the parliamentary feature of a prime minister accountable to the assembly majority and the presidential feature of an executive with separate origin. They differ on the question of the survival of the directly-elected executive.

How much did these reforms presidentialize the parties, relative to their experience under parliamentarism? The constitutional changes in France and Israel should have predictable effects on those countries' parties. Moreover, those effects should differ across the two cases as a function of their differences in executive survival. In this section we first consider the impact on parties of shifting from fused to separate executive origin, which occurred in both cases, and we then discuss the impact on parties of different combinations of executive origin and survival.

The Impact of Shifting from Fused to Separate Origin of Executive Authority

A shift from fused to separate executive origin should have predictable effects on political party organization and strategy. As suggested in Chapter Two, the possibility of winning a popular executive election focuses parties' strategy on their viability in executive elections rather than on winning parliamentary seats. Parties that survive and thrive in such systems are those that discover how to address the challenge of fielding a competitive candidate in the national executive race. In contrast, parties that fail to field viable candidates in direct

executive elections will remain “niche” parties in the legislature, relegated to a subordinate position in the political system relative to a viable coalition partner in a parliamentary system.

The opportunity to capture the executive branch directly provides parties with different organizational and behavioral imperatives than they encounter in parliamentary systems. Party presidentialization due to separation of origin is primarily a function of stronger “vote-seeking” incentives in direct-executive elections (Samuels 2002), relative to parties’ “office-seeking” or “policy-seeking” incentives in parliamentary elections (Strøm 1990). Vote-seeking incentives are stronger when there is separation of origin because no parliamentary system has a threshold of exclusion for *legislative* elections as high as all separation of powers systems do for *executive* elections, in which the winner takes “all the seats,” so to speak.

Given the stronger vote-seeking incentives, parties will sacrifice policy commitments in executive campaigns, and executive candidates will develop autonomous campaign organizations unaccountable to party organs.² Candidates for prime minister in parliamentary systems often develop personal organizations, but ultimately the candidate and the content of the campaign both remain accountable to the party.

The opportunity to compete in a direct executive election is also fraught with potential challenges for parties’ collective action problems because parties face the problem—also unknown in parliamentary systems--of having to coordinate electoral strategy across races for two institutions. Given the need to adopt a vote-seeking strategy in the executive race and the consequent incentive to nominate candidates with “outsider” appeal, the requirements for running successful campaigns in both races will not necessarily overlap. This challenge is complicated by the fact that the constituency of the median party legislator may differ

² In addition to the hybrid-system examples below in this chapter, we also demonstrate these phenomena under pure presidentialism in Chapter Seven.

substantially from the constituency that a viable presidential candidate might seek to target, as Chapter Five suggested.

The impact of coattail effects and the electoral cycle (which by definition cannot exist in parliamentary systems) also exacerbate parties' organizational, financial, informational and strategic challenges. For example, to the extent that an elected presidency is politically valuable, direct executive elections--whether held concurrently or not--can influence legislative elections. Parties' electoral dependence on their presidential candidate can become problematic because—as shown in Chapter Four--after the election a president often becomes the *de facto* party leader, with separation of survival.

In sum, separation of origin forces parties to strategize differently about whom to nominate to lead the party, and how to campaign in both executive and legislative races. Given the political importance of the directly-elected executive, parties with viable presidential candidates face strong incentives to concentrate their energies and resources on the executive election, at the potential cost of under-investing in legislative races, and even considering the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard involved in the process. All parties in presidential or semi-presidential systems face these dilemmas, because all parties have strong incentives to present presidential candidates. The strength of such incentives varies as a function of parties' self-perceived viability in the presidential election: parties that believe they can compete for the presidency have relatively stronger incentives to adopt a broad, vote-seeking strategy, while parties that lack viable candidates for the direct executive election should concentrate on office- or policy-seeking through winning seats in the legislature.³

³ The degree of vote-seeking also depends on whether presidential elections involve one- or two-rounds. A one-round system distorts the votes-seats relationship somewhat less than a two-round system. In a one-round system, the candidate with the most votes wins. However, in a two-round system, the second-place finisher in the first round

The Impact of Fused versus Separate Survival

Institutional reforms transformed both the French and Israeli systems of fused origin into systems of separate executive origin. Yet these countries' constitutional reforms differed crucially in terms of the mechanism of executive survival. France created a directly-elected president with separation of survival for a fixed term, while Israel left the directly-elected prime minister subject to assembly confidence. This difference in executive survival should also have predictable effects on parties' behavioral and organizational imperatives. Specifically, in a dual-executive hybrid like France's, we expect all parties to become presidentialized. In contrast, where origin is separate but survival fused we expect a bifurcation of the party system in which only the larger parties enter the direct executive election and become presidentialized, while the smaller parties forgo the presidential race and remain parliamentarized.

As noted above, in systems with separation of origin, even small parties have strong incentives to compete in both the executive and legislative races. Small parties often enter direct executive elections despite no chance of winning, hoping to benefit from media exposure for their policy positions as part of a long-term political strategy. Coattail effects can also help parties win legislative seats in hybrid systems even if the party does not expect to *win* the executive election (Tavits 2009), thereby providing additional incentives to run a candidate in the direct election. A small party that is unlikely to win a direct executive election could also decide to enter the executive race to leverage whatever popularity its candidate possesses *after* the election to bargain for concessions from one of the leading candidates or the eventual winner.

can eventually win. Thus, in a two-round system presidential candidates are relatively freer to conduct ideological campaigns in the first round. Both cases in this chapter employ or employed two-round majority rules.

Given these incentives, parties that forgo running candidates in systems with separation of survival relegate themselves permanently to secondary positions in the political system. This is because under the separation of survival, to the extent that presidents can independently influence cabinet composition, switch policies (see Chapter Eight) or dissolve the legislature, smaller parties have no guarantee that the president will hold up his end of any bargain to divide the spoils. A party that decides not to nominate a candidate for direct executive elections might continue to win votes from committed supporters, but it cannot guarantee its supporters anything in return for their support. After all, presidents stay in office for the duration of their term no matter what smaller parties demand.

Parties that operate as strictly “parliamentary” parties in systems with separation of survival thus possess relatively less leverage over directly-elected executives who enjoy separation of survival, compared to parties’ leverage over prime ministers in parliamentary systems. Given this, parties in systems with separation of origin rarely choose this parliamentary path--most executive elections in pure and semi-presidential systems feature candidates from smaller parties. However, parties in systems that combine separation of origin with fusion of survival should see a bifurcation of party strategies: larger parties will become presidentialized and concentrate on the direct executive elections, while smaller parties will remain parliamentarized and concentrate on the assembly elections. This is precisely what happened in Israel: in each of three direct prime-ministerial elections there were exactly two candidates on election day; Israel’s myriad other parties all invested solely in the legislative contest.⁴

This bifurcation of party strategies is a function of the combination of separate origin and fused survival. As argued in previous chapters, systems that combine separate origin with

⁴ In 1999, the Centre’ Party’s candidate (Yitzhak Mordechai) dropped out the day before the election when it became clear that his entry in the race had been a strategic mistake.

separate survival tilt the balance of power towards the directly-elected executive and away from *all* the parties in the system, including the executive's own party. In contrast, the combination of separate origin and fused survival creates a peculiar situation in which smaller parties can gain considerable leverage over the prime minister—as in a parliamentary system--while the prime minister's own party becomes a secondary actor--as in a presidential system. In an elected prime-ministerial regime the winner of the popular election automatically becomes head of government, but a directly-elected prime minister whose party does not win a legislative majority needs coalition partners to form a cabinet with assembly confidence, just as in a semi-presidential regime. However, in contrast to a president in a semi-presidential system, the elected prime minister also needs these parties' support simply to remain in office. Indeed, the Israeli reform required new prime ministerial and assembly elections if the incumbent lost a confidence vote.⁵ This rule gave smaller parties relatively greater bargaining power in an elected-prime ministerial regime than in a semi-presidential regime, because a prime minister's coalition partners could bring down the executive itself and force new elections.

This combination of separate origin with fused survival created intra-party agency problems for the prime minister's party unlike those seen in parliamentary systems. In parliamentary systems the prime minister depends not only on the confidence of the legislative majority but also on majority support within his or her own party. Given this, as shown in Chapter Four, parties in parliamentary systems can and frequently do swap out their premiers between elections—without even a vote on the floor of parliament. In this way, pure parliamentary systems maximize intra-party accountability. However, somewhat ironically, parties in a system with separate origin but fused survival cannot fire their prime ministerial

⁵ This is true if the vote was a majority of at least 61 of the 120 *Knesset* members (Article 19A of the Basic Law as reformed in 1992). However, if more than 80 *Knesset* members voted in favor of a no-confidence motion, then the *Knesset* would remain and there would be elections only for the PM (Article 19B of the Basic Law).

agents and substitute in a co-partisan like parties in parliamentary systems can. Although prime ministers in hybrids like Israel's remain subject to parliamentary confidence--and thus in theory formally subject to intra-party dismissal--a party that seeks to discipline its agent in this way would have to immediately present a different candidate for another direct election—a highly risky prospect. This is because the system required new prime ministerial elections—but not new assembly elections--if the prime minister resigned or was forced from office through a procedure other than a confidence motion.

Thus in elected prime-ministerial regimes the prime minister's accountability to the assembly majority severely limits *intra*-party accountability, while retaining *inter*-party accountability. It is important to note that even if one party were to win a majority of seats, it would still have to call new prime ministerial elections if it wanted to remove its own leader as prime minister. All in all, elected prime-ministerial regimes severely weaken prime ministers' parties relative to coalition parties. This suggests that the combination of separate origin and fused survival presidentializes larger parties but leaves smaller parties parliamentarized. We thus expect only the larger parties to adopt a “vote-seeking” strategy by nominating outsiders who will campaign on broad platforms, while smaller parties--those that conclude they have no chance to win the direct prime ministerial election--should concentrate on the legislative race, consolidating their hold over an electoral “niche” and leveraging the hold they have over the prime minister to extract office and/or policy benefits.

We expect significant presidentialization of parties after the adoption of direct election of the president in France and the prime minister in Israel. In Israel we expect more extensive presidentialization for the parties that contest the separate executive election, while small parties should remain parliamentarized, emphasizing their legislative leverage rather than the remote

possibility of winning the executive election. We now turn to each case to test the strength of these propositions.

PRESIDENTIALIZED PARTIES IN FRANCE

Constitutional reforms shifted the French political regime from pure parliamentarism to semi-presidentialism. In this section we explain how these reforms presidentialized French political parties. Undisciplined parties, a fragmented party system, and intractable governability problems characterized the French Fourth Republic's (1946-58) pure parliamentary system. In the wake of the 1958 Algerian crisis--which almost resulted in a military coup in Paris--French leaders agreed to Charles de Gaulle's proposed constitutional reforms to anchor the political system with a strengthened executive (Cole and Campbell 1989, 176-7). The reforms initially retained the indirectly-elected presidency, but in 1962 de Gaulle demanded and won a plebiscite that adopted direct presidential elections, first held in 1965. The 5th Republic thus became the model for many subsequent semi-presidential constitutions, as we noted in Chapter Two.

French presidents enjoy separation of origin and survival for a five-year term (originally seven—see below). They also hold important formal constitutional powers, including authority to appoint the prime minister (Article 8), call referenda (Article 11), and dissolve parliament and call new elections (Article 12). Clift (2005, 223) suggests that de Gaulle's vision transformed the 4th Republic's largely ceremonial president from a "referee into a team captain." In reality, de Gaulle's reforms made the French president not just a team captain but an attention-grabbing star player his or her team anoints and depends upon entirely to lead them to victory.

This political transformation is important for our argument because experts on French politics concur that presidentialization of the parties and the party system occurred because of

these *institutional* changes, which were adopted well before the social-structural changes Poguntke and Webb (eds. 2005) suggest presidentialized parties in other European parliamentary systems. Writing in Poguntke and Webb's volume, Clift (2005, 241) confirms this point, adding only that "structural changes since the 1960s have induced further shifts, but the advanced starting point means subsequent presidentialization has seemed less dramatic than in many other cases."

France's reforms had immediate and obvious effects on both the internal character of France's parties, reshaping the relationship between party leaders as presumed presidential candidates and their parliamentary groups, and altering the dynamics of inter-party competition (Machin, 1989; Cole 1990a, 1993; Frears, 1991). The separation of executive origin has encouraged political personalization, a decline in the importance of ideology, and the marginalization of party organization from political campaigns. Let us examine these changes in some detail.

Presidentialization of Nomination and Campaigns

As the aggregate evidence in Chapter Three suggests, presidentialization has forced France's parties to focus their energies and resources on finding credible presidential candidates and on winning the presidential election, as opposed to winning parliamentary elections. Even given France's two-round majoritarian presidential electoral system, in which parties may use partisan and ideological appeals to stand out in a crowded first-round field, credibility in the presidential race requires finding a candidate with a broad electoral base (Knapp 1990, 140).

Across the political spectrum, the desire to win the presidential election has pushed parties to find supra-partisan candidates, adjust their campaign strategies by reducing the

importance of ideology, and limit the importance of the party organization. Cole (1990a, 13) notes that presidential candidates tend to “base [their] campaigns upon the notion of *rassemblement*, the ecumenical appeal beyond the political space represented by any one political tendency.” This dynamic appeared first on the right side of the political spectrum. De Gaulle himself claimed to disdain parties, and the first “Gaullist” party to emerge (in 1958), the *Union pour la Nouvelle Republique* (UNR)—which was a direct descendant of a similar party organized to support de Gaulle under the 4th Republic--was regarded as completely “‘at the service’ of de Gaulle’s ‘plebiscitary monarchy’” (Duhamel and Grunberg 2001, 533).

De Gaulle’s powerful personality united the UNR and obviated the need for a strong party organization (Knapp, 1990, p. 154). Moreover, de Gaulle’s popularity helped elect the party’s legislative candidates, confirming the party’s status as a mere tool of de Gaulle’s ambitions. After de Gaulle departed the political scene for good in 1969 the UNR re-formed and renamed itself the *Rassemblement pour la Republique* (Rally for the Republic, RPR), but it remained highly presidentialized. As with the UNR, the RPR’s main function was to elect its new leader Jacques Chirac president (Cole 1990a, 13).

Like the UNR/RPR, the Union for French Democracy (UDF), a non-Gaullist rightist party, was formed in 1978 as a “presidential-inspired confederation” (Cole 1990b, 126). In fact, the UDF was formed *exclusively* as a presidentialized party: when cobbling together the UDF, Valery Giscard d’Estaing deliberately devoted few resources to building a grassroots support base and focused instead on creating a party that would merely “articulate the president’s will” (ibid. 128). As a result, during campaigns the UDF’s presidential candidates tended to ignore the party organization.⁶

⁶ Many leading UDF politicians joined with the RPR in 2002 to form the Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP), renamed later the Union for a Popular Movement (also UMP). As of 2007 the UMP was France’s main conservative

On the left side of the political spectrum, the vote-seeking incentives of the semi-presidential constitution hit the Socialist Party (PS) particularly hard. Gaffney (1990, 64) notes that in the 3rd and 4th Republics, the relationship between party organization, ideology, and electoral strategy in the PS was “relatively non-contentious.” The party dealt with the trade-offs parties in pure parliamentary systems face fairly well, building its legislative delegation and augmenting its municipal bases of support. Yet facing the possibility of remaining permanently in the opposition, by the 1970s the PS was forced to confront the presidentialization of the regime. Led by Francois Mitterrand, who only joined the PS officially *after* he had announced his presidential candidacy in 1974 (Clift, 228), the PS began to direct resources and energy away from its parliamentary and municipal strategy and towards presenting a “nationally known, credible, and respected figure at its head” (Gaffney 1990, 64). This involved allowing Mitterrand to define himself as “larger” than the PS, in order to reach centrist voters.

The PS’ strategic reorientation diluted socialist ideology, personalized the presidential campaigns, and reduced the importance of the party organization and grassroots mobilization. Given the need to appear “above” his party, Mitterrand developed his own personal campaign organization that was free of the weighty democracy of the party’s internal structure. The personnel who staffed this organization were responsible to Mitterrand alone, not to the party (Gaffney 1990, 65). Mitterrand distanced himself from the PS to such an extent that in 1981 his campaign headquarters had virtually no contact with the party organization (Cole 1990a, 13). In 1988, Mitterrand again ignored the party’s platform and “stood on his own presidential platform” (Cole and Campbell 1989, 114), which was “pitched toward the center” (Northcutt 1989, 291) and swept the candidate’s attachment to his party under the carpet. Overall, Mitterrand’s rise to

political party. Most of the rump UDF was subsequently incorporated in 2007 into a new party, the *Mouvement Démocrate* (Democratic Movement).

power “transformed his party into an organized representative of the presidential will” (Cole 1993, 57).

Presidentialization of Assembly Elections

The adoption of semi-presidentialism presented parties across the spectrum with new and different strategic challenges in terms of nominating and electing presidential candidates. The same can be said about parties’ strategies in legislative elections, which after 1958 also increasingly responded to the ebb and flow of presidential politics. Clift (225) reports that the presidential electoral cycle rather than the rhythm of the parliamentary election calendar came to define the inner workings of all major French parties. This came about partly because presidential elections have greater “coattails” impact on legislative elections in France than they do in the USA (Pierce 1995, 189-99). An example of such influence comes from Mitterrand’s early dissolution immediately following his 1981 inauguration. At the legislative elections held only six weeks later, the PS captured an absolute majority of the seats (Cole and Campbell 1989, 130). This is a classic example of what Shugart (1995) calls a “honeymoon election”—an election held early in a new president’s tenure that generates even longer presidential coattails than a concurrent election.

However, the presidentialization of legislative elections can be a two-edged sword. Given unequal term lengths, a honeymoon assembly election early in the president’s term (seven years long prior to 2002) would necessarily be followed by another later-than-midterm assembly election five years later (barring another parliamentary dissolution). If midterm losses are common in separate-powers systems, *late-term* election losses may even be greater (Shugart 1995). This was the case in the 1986 assembly elections, when the PS was unable to control its

own fate. At that time, Mitterrand was unpopular, but given the separation of survival the PS could not replace him. Thus Mitterrand's unpopularity—and not the party's or its PM's unpopularity--cost the PS its control of parliament (Gaffney 1990, 72). The result was the first case in France of cohabitation, with a conservative premier serving alongside Mitterrand.

The presidential election cycle would continue to dominate assembly politics after Mitterrand won reelection in 1988. Mitterrand immediately dissolved parliament again, and the resulting assembly elections gave the PS the largest share of parliamentary seats. This allowed Mitterrand to appoint a cabinet with the “opening to the center” he had promised in his own campaign. This cycle of elections reveals that the incumbent president's popularity powerfully shapes the results of French legislative elections. When presidents are popular, parties depend on them for their survival in office. Yet when parties cannot remove an unpopular president from office, they will suffer at the next legislative election.

In addition to reorienting party ideology and the content of electoral campaigns, the creation of a separately-elected president also reduced party organizations' influence in setting the government agenda. Cole (1990a, 10) goes so far as to state that Mitterrand's 1981 election transformed the Socialist Party's assembly caucus into “the prevalent model of the presidential party in the 5th Republic, the *parti de godillots* (party of bootlickers),” to illustrate parties' subservience to presidents and/or presidential candidates. After that election, the PS organization ceded influence over government policy and “rapidly gave up any pretence that it could lead government activity, rather than follow government's orders” (ibid.). This has become true of the other parties as well: presidents govern largely independently of parties, and make their own decisions as to whether to stand for reelection (Gaffney 1990, 74; Cole 1993). In short, soon after the adoption of the 5th Republic's constitution, French parties became “presidential machines,”

vehicles for politicians' presidential ambitions and an organizational resource for presidents to implement their programs.

Presidentialization of Inter-Party Politics

The adoption of direct presidential elections also changed the nature of *inter-party* competition. In particular, direct presidential elections severely damaged the fortunes of the French Communist Party (PCF). By supporting the Socialist candidate Mitterrand in 1974, the PCF all but admitted that a Communist could never be elected president. This move hurt the PCF because its supporters got used to splitting their tickets--voting for a Socialist for president but a Communist for assembly. The PCF's abstention from the presidential race also helped the PS in a different way, because it allowed the PS to reach out to centrist voters (Cole and Campbell 1989, 114).

That is, the PCF early on smacked up against the vote-seeking requirements of direct presidential elections. Because it could not compete for the political center and lacked viable presidential candidates, its influence rapidly waned. As a result, fearing for its own survival, in 1978 the PCF withdrew from its alliance with the PS. In 1981 the PCF ran its own presidential candidate, but Mitterrand won, and the party's electoral fortunes continued to decline. In 2007, the party won only 15 of 577 assembly seats (2.6%). Under pure parliamentarism, interparty competition would not have revolved around presidential elections and the PCF might have not endured such a dramatic decline. In fact, while it is impossible to say for sure, it is likely that under parliamentarism either the Socialists would not have won in 1981--because Mitterrand would not have had the autonomy to reshape his party towards the center--or they would have had to govern only with a coalition in which the PCF would have had much more leverage.

French Politicians React to Presidentialization

French scholars and politicians are perfectly aware that the hybrid constitution has presidentialized party politics (see e.g. Duhamel 1991). In order to reduce the likelihood of cohabitation, in 2000 French voters approved a referendum reducing the president's term from seven years to five. The National Assembly then passed a bill inverting the order of the 2002 elections so that the presidential election would precede the parliamentary election.

Representatives of every party hotly debated this "calendar inversion bill," and their position depended largely on whether their party's health depended on its ability to field a credible presidential candidate and benefit from coattail effects (Bell and Criddle 2002; Jérôme *et al.* 2003). The PS and the UDF, which both had credible presidential candidates, both favored calendar inversion,⁷ while the PCF and the Greens, which did not and which depended heavily on performing well in parliamentary elections, opposed it.⁸ Yves Cochet of the Green party stated that calendar inversion "would lead to the cannibalization of the parliamentary elections by the presidential elections".⁹ President Chirac's RPR viewed the calendar inversion as a plot by Socialist Premier Jospin to promote his presidential candidacy,¹⁰ but as we note below the RPR ultimately benefited from the move.

⁷ Courtois, Gerard & Cecille Chambraud, "L'avenir du quinquennat dépendra du calendrier électoral." *Le Monde* electronic edition, September 24, 2000. Saux, Jean Louis, "Charles Pasqua souhaite à son tour que la présidentielle précède les législatives." *Le Monde* electronic edition, September 27, 2000.

⁸ Gurrey, Beatrice & Jean Baptiste de Montvalon, "Le gouvernement ne paraît pas disposé à modifier le calendrier électoral de 2002." *Le Monde* electronic edition, October 6, 2000. Chambraud, Cecile & Beatrice Gurrey, "Lionel Jospin déclenche la polémique sur le calendrier électoral de 2002." *Le Monde* electronic edition, November 28, 2000.

⁹ Beuve Mery, Alain, "Le PCF refuse un changement 'dangereux pour la démocratie.'" *Le Monde* electronic edition, November 30, 2000. Beuve Mery, Alain, "Les Verts 'piégés' par leur base sur la question du mode de scrutin." *Le Monde* electronic edition, November 2, 2000.

¹⁰ Bacque, Raphaëlle, "L'Élysée estime que le calendrier actuel sert Jacques Chirac." *Le Monde* electronic edition, November 30, 2000.

In the wake of this reform, French parliamentary elections have become even *more* presidentialized than before.¹¹ In both 2002 and 2007, the party that won the presidential election regained (2002) or retained (2007) a majority in the National Assembly. The elections in both of those years illustrate several features of party presidentialization. In 2002, the left collectively suffered from its own fragmentation. The Socialists fielded Prime Minister Jospin in the presidential race, but four other leftist candidates each won at least 2% of the vote. Table 6.1 presents the results, with the leftist candidates' names placed in italics. Leftist fragmentation--combined with a stronger-than-expected showing by the far-right National Front candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen--meant that the left failed to place a candidate in the runoff round.

Table 6.1 Here

For our purposes, the 2002 presidential election and the subsequent parliamentary elections provide important lessons. First, it was clear that by 2002 nearly all parties had become presidentialized in one key respect: each saw advantage to presenting a presidential candidate. Presumably, leaders of parties such as Workers' Struggle or the Revolutionary Communist League did not believe they could actually win the presidency. Rather, they used the high profile of a presidential campaign to advertise their independence, which might serve them well in future parliamentary or regional contests, and perhaps also in the hope of extracting policy or office concessions from an expected Jospin runoff candidacy and potential presidency. However, this damaged the left's collective prospects.

¹¹ A similar reform occurred in Romania in 2004. Since 1990, Romania had been one of the few semi-presidential systems to hold concurrent executive and legislative elections. Not surprisingly, legislators bemoaned presidential influence in "their" elections, and thus made a move in the opposite direction as France--to de-couple the two elections by lengthening the president's term by a year (Radu 2003). This change was designed to reduce presidential influence, but its most important effect was to increase the likelihood of cohabitation--which predictably followed in 2007, after the collapse of the president's coalition (Condon and Wagstyl 2007).

Second, consider the performance of Le Pen. His party has established a national presence primarily due to its leader's perennial presidential candidacy. The National Front has never won more than one seat in a National Assembly election, except in 1986, the one election in which proportional representation was used. It has averaged just over 10% of National Assembly votes since 1986, but Le Pen himself frequently has won a higher vote share than his own party would in the next parliamentary election.¹² When Le Pen made the runoff in 2002, it was a national embarrassment, and voters--even those on the left--rallied to give the conservative Chirac over 80% of the votes in the 2nd round.

The parliamentary elections that followed one month after the 2nd round of the 2002 presidential election only confirmed the right's strength. The parties that backed Chirac united after the presidential runoff into the Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP), which signaled by its very name its call to end cohabitation. A race to control the presidency and the legislature that had appeared close before the first round of the presidential election eventually turned into a romp for the right: the UMP won 357 of the 577 seats.

After 2002, presidentialization became entrenched even further. The shortening of the presidential term to five years--the same as the assembly--substantially reduces the possibility for future episodes of cohabitation, given that previous episodes had begun at least two years into a president's term.¹³ With Chirac's retirement as his (shortened) second term drew to a close, his chosen successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, won the 2007 presidential election. The right subsequently again won a sizable majority of seats in the national assembly elections, held a month later.

Commenting on the outcome of those elections, Prime Minister Francois Fillon, whom Sarkozy

¹² For instance, in 1988, Le Pen won 14.5%, while his parliamentary party would win only 9.7% later that year. In 2002, Le Pen won 16.9% but the party won 11.3% the same year. In 2007, the figures were 10.4% and 4.3%. Only from 1993 to 1997 were the percentages similar in both presidential and parliamentary elections.

¹³ Thus far, cohabitation has occurred only after the late-term elections of 1986 and 1993, plus the early dissolution in 1997, two years into Chirac's seven-year first term.

had appointed even before the assembly election confirmed the majority, stated after the election that voters had made a “clear and coherent choice, which will allow the President of the Republic to implement his project” (CNN 2007).

France: Conclusion

Our theoretical predictions regarding the impact of the advent of separate executive and legislative origin and separate presidential survival hold up to scrutiny of the French case. Presidentialization of the French party system was fully evident by 1981 and, as we noted, has only deepened since then. In France, as Pierce (1995) and others have made clear, *national politics is presidential government*, not parliamentary “party government.” Across the political spectrum, French parties no longer conform to a parliamentary model: presidentialism has transformed parties into “rallies” around their presidential leaders, in which the executive branch of each party dominates its legislative branch. Presidential candidates set the tone of party platforms; pursuit of the presidency, not of legislative seats, dominates electoral campaigns; presidential elections heavily influence outcomes in the legislative race; presidents frequently remove and replace prime ministers despite lacking the constitutional authority to do so; and presidents have come to dominate the policy-making process. The adoption of a dual-executive hybrid constitutional format has reduced the importance of ideology, decreased the importance of party organization in campaigns and in policy formulation, and increased the level of personalization in both interparty competition and intraparty politics. The effects are clearly a function of France’s institutional reforms, and not of social-structural processes.

PRESIDENTIALIZED PARTIES IN ISRAEL

Presidentialization of the political parties also occurred in our second “quasi-experimental” case, Israel. Like France in 1962, in 1992 Israel adopted direct executive elections. Until that year, Israeli parties competed in a parliamentary system in which all 120 *Knesset* members were elected in one at-large national constituency. The combination of this huge district magnitude together with a low threshold of exclusion generated considerable party-system fragmentation, which in turn generated nettlesome governability problems. By the 1980s, scholars and politicians had begun debating a proposal to directly elect the prime minister, separately from *Knesset* elections. Many believed this reform would energize voters, enhance the prime minister’s legitimacy, and provide governments with stability and cohesion.

The resulting constitutional design was an elected prime-ministerial regime, which resembled presidentialism in adopting the separation of executive and legislative origin, but differed from presidentialism by retaining fused executive and legislative survival. That is, Israel kept the 120-seat national district for *Knesset* elections, but voters would cast two ballots--one for a prime ministerial candidate, and one for a party-generated list of parliamentary candidates.¹⁴ Yet the prime minister could lose office through a no-confidence vote, which would result in early elections. Under this system, direct prime ministerial elections were held in 1996 and 1999 concurrently with *Knesset* elections. A third prime ministerial election took place in 2001, without a new *Knesset* election, after the PM resigned due to inter-party coalition problems (Diskin and Hazan 2002).¹⁵

¹⁴ Technically only 119 Members of the *Knesset* (MKs) would be elected from the party-list ballot, because the directly elected PM was also an MK. However, the proportionality was calculated based on the full 120 seats, and the PM candidate was also the first-ranked candidate on the party list.

¹⁵ As noted, new elections of both *Knesset* and PM were required following either a *Knesset* dissolution or a successful no-confidence vote, but not if a PM resigned.

Reform proponents had assumed that few voters would split their tickets (Rahat 2004, 469),¹⁶ yet the aftermath of the reform proved its supporters dead wrong. Our neo-Madisonian framework helps explain why reformers' expectations were so off the mark. In each of three PM elections, only the two largest parties ultimately ran candidates for prime minister. Other parties focused on entering a post-election parliamentary coalition with whoever won the direct prime ministerial election, and thus concentrated all their resources on winning *Knesset* seats. The result was widespread ticket-splitting, which pushed party-system fragmentation to new highs. As a result, government stability suffered--as one expects in a system in which post-election allies in parliament hold the keys to the prime minister's survival but bear minimal electoral consequences because they do not contest PM elections themselves.

Given the disastrous consequences of the reform, after less than a decade Israeli politicians returned their country to pure parliamentarism. In what follows, we describe the ways in which the direct election of the prime minister radically and rapidly altered the nature of Israeli party politics. Both large and small parties strategically responded to the imposition of a new institutional context in ways our argument suggests. Even more radically and rapidly than in France, Israeli parties became "presidentialized" after the country moved away from parliamentarism and towards the separation of powers. Thus, as in France, the long-term structural factors that Poguntke and Webb (eds. 2005) point to also cannot explain party presidentialization in Israel--and such factors certainly cannot explain parties' similarly rapid *de*-presidentialization following the reform's repeal (Hazan, 2005).

Presidentialized Parties In the Electoral Arena

¹⁶ Israeli constitutional lawyers took the former position, while political scientists adopted the latter.

The combination of a national constituency for parliamentary elections with voters' ability to split their tickets generated the crucial "presidentializing" incentives in Israel and illustrate with a startling degree of clarity the imperatives that exist to greater or lesser degrees in all separate powers systems. This institutional combination divided Israel's parties into two camps: those that could credibly field a prime ministerial candidate and those that could not (Stellman 1996). Only Labor and Likud, Israel's two largest parties at the time, opted to nominate prime ministerial candidates in any of the three elections held under the hybrid system. Knowing that voters could split their tickets, smaller parties ignored the direct election completely and concentrated on winning *Knesset* seats, in the hope of entering the governing coalition as junior members.

These "two camps" are the result of the effect of combining separate origin with fused survival, as we suggested earlier. Labor and Likud had long been Israel's largest parties, yet neither had ever held a majority of seats in parliament, and the institutional environment had never forced them to seek a majority of votes. The adoption of direct prime-ministerial elections immediately transformed both parties' electoral and governing strategies, in similar ways. As in France, given the need to win a majority contest, Labor and Likud suddenly confronted a trade-off between sticking to their ideological roots and broadening their vote base. Both parties' leaders understood that in order to win the direct election, their prime ministerial candidate would have to attract voters from other parties. Thus the first way in which we can observe presidentialization of the two main parties is in terms of candidate selection.

As our framework suggests would happen, the reform encouraged the two main parties to select radically different types of candidates. Labor and Likud's strategies followed the logic we laid out in Chapter Three: to win a direct executive election, parties must recruit candidates who

can appeal to a broad constituency, rather than choose a candidate based on long intra-party service. In 1996 Likud thus selected Benjamin Netanyahu as leader in only his second *Knesset* term, because of his personal leadership characteristics. In the same year Labor chose Ehud Barak as its parliamentary leader, less than a year after his first election to the *Knesset*. Hazan concludes that the two main parties had “entered a new era in which they were forced to ‘accept’ leaders who were thrust upon them--similar to parties in the United States--by the exigencies of the new electoral and political system” (2005, 299).

Following the nomination of candidates with far weaker partisan connections, as in France the large parties sought to appeal to the center of the political spectrum and reduce the salience of ideology in their appeals. Labor and Likud candidates sought to appear to be “above” parties (Hazan and Rahat 2000), and focused their campaigns on attracting undecided centrist voters (Hazan 1999, 163)—strategies they had never adopted under the pure parliamentary system. Labor explicitly moved to the center of the spectrum prior to the 1996 contest, enacting new articles in its charter that “downgraded its more dovish [partisan] tendencies in exchange for a more centrist path” (Hazan 2001, 356). Likud followed suit, as Netanyahu moderated his party’s opposition to the peace process and distanced his party from far-right parties.

Believing that appealing to loyal voters was a waste of time and resources, both parties also held fewer public rallies, because only committed supporters tended to show up. Instead, in an attempt to attract undecided voters, they devoted more attention to television advertising. Hazan suggests that this shift to the center was even more pronounced in 1999, when “both sides decided to blur their differences in order to attract the undecided voters, with whom victory rested” (2001, 360). A move towards supra-partisan appeals is precisely what we expect given the introduction of separate executive origin, and is similar to what we saw in France.

Like France's major parties, Labor and Likud also diverted resources away from the Knesset race to concentrate on the prime ministerial race. Because the candidate elected PM would form the governing coalition and because one of the two main parties was bound to be in the opposition, for Labor and Likud winning the prime ministerial race became much more important than winning Knesset seats. Both parties initially struggled internally over the question of favoring the PM race over the Knesset campaign (Torgovnik, 2000), but in the end both devoted most of their resources to the prime ministerial race (Mendilow, 1999). Both large parties established separate election headquarters for the prime ministerial election and for the *Knesset* election, and devoted most resources on PM elections (Kenig, Rahat, and Hazan 2005).

One reason Labor and Likud downplayed the Knesset elections was both parties' need to attract *other* parties' supporters to win the prime ministerial race. Under the pure parliamentary system parties competed intensely against each other for votes in *Knesset* elections. Under the reformed system, prime ministerial candidates needed votes from their own party's supporters as well as from other parties' supporters to win the election. Given this, the large parties could not afford to compete intensely against their ideological rivals in the Knesset race because they feared that the smaller parties would urge their supporters to vote for the other party's prime ministerial candidate.

Given this dynamic, to appease the smaller parties Labor explicitly toned down its campaign rhetoric in 1996 and adopted a policy of not responding to rhetorical attacks from any of its partisan rivals in the *Knesset* race. Bick (1998, 126) quotes Haim Ramon, head of Shimon Peres' campaign, as saying that "it is only important that Peres wins. There is no point... if Labor ends up with fifty seats and Peres is not elected prime minister." This willingness to essentially dispense with the *Knesset* elections offers an important contrast with France. In France, as long

as the opposition does not control the National Assembly (in which case cohabitation results), separation of survival affords the French president relatively greater leverage over the cabinet compared to the influence of Israel's prime minister under the reformed system. This is because Israel's fusion of survival implied not only that the elected prime minister had to negotiate with other parties over the composition of a cabinet, but also that parties *other than the prime minister's* would hold the entire executive's survival in their hands. Of course, such power only accrued to parties *within* the governing coalition. It genuinely would be of little use to a party to have lost the PM election yet have won a substantial number of *Knesset* seats--because that party would be in the opposition, unable to bring down the government and force new elections. For any large party, winning the prime ministerial election was absolutely imperative.

The large parties appeared willing to sacrifice their legislative contingent to support their prime ministerial candidates' ambitions. In 1996 for example, Likud gave one-third of its spots on its own parliamentary list to two smaller parties in exchange for those parties' support in the prime ministerial race. Both major parties engaged in a similar practice in 1999 (Hazan and Rahat 2000). These sorts of intra- and inter-party dynamics are unknown in parliamentary systems, because under parliamentarism the personal success of the prime ministerial candidate, no matter how "presidentialized," remains connected to the collective electoral fate of his or her co-partisans.

In the theoretical section of this chapter we noted that the combination of separate origin and fused survival should produce a bifurcation of the party system, with the high presidentialization of the major parties accompanied by continued parliamentarization of the smaller parties. The willingness of Labor and Likud to sacrifice the legislative branch of their party to enhance the viability of the executive branch of their party is one element of this

dynamic. As for the small parties, they quickly perceived the strategic implications of voters' ability to split their tickets and their own ability to influence the survival of the directly-elected prime minister. They knew that the two larger parties would adopt a broad vote-seeking strategy in order to concentrate on the prime ministerial race, so they concentrated exclusively on the *Knesset* race and encouraged their supporters to split their tickets (Goldberg 1998, 71; Mahler, 1997; Stelman, 1996, 659). In 1996, nearly half of all voters split their votes between a smaller party for the *Knesset* race and a larger party for the prime ministerial race (Bick 1998, 126-28). The results of the reform grew crystal clear: As Table 6.2 reveals, after the reform Labor and Likud lost seats in the *Knesset* while smaller parties gained.

Table 6.2 Here

Several smaller parties had always sought out a niche in the Knesset's 120-seat single constituency, but the constitutional reform enhanced these parties' incentives to get voters to split their tickets. When voters can split their tickets, they can employ two distinct decision processes in each election—something they cannot do under parliamentarism. The separation of origin thus opens up new possibilities for party electoral strategies, particularly when (as in Israel but not in France) the system is bifurcated into parties that run presidential candidates and those that do not. Thus in Israel, Kenig, Rahat and Hazan (2005) note that candidates for prime minister competed primarily on foreign policy and domestic security, while “*Knesset*” parties competed on completely different issues. The smaller parties correctly concluded that they could do so while remaining neutral on the question of Israeli foreign policy, divorcing the executive and legislative campaigns from each other. Parties that benefited from voters' ability to split their tickets emphasized a narrowly-defined identity politics, such as the social cleavages between religious and secular Israelis, Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews, or new immigrants versus native

Israelis. The adoption of the direct prime ministerial election thus transformed Israel's two largest parties into vote-seeking parties and away from their ideologically-rooted policy-seeking origins, but gave smaller parties even more powerful incentives to seek out and hold onto a narrow niche in the hope of joining the winning candidate's cabinet coalition.

Presidentialized Parties In the Governing Arena

The adoption of direct prime ministerial elections clearly impacted parties' electoral strategies and affected election results. Moreover, contrary to proponents' predictions, the constitutional reform also proved disastrous for governability by complicating the relationships between prime ministers and their own party, and between prime ministers and other parties.

Not surprisingly given small parties' growth, the separation of prime ministerial and parliamentary elections had a clear "before and after" effect of weakening executive control of the legislature. Because of small parties' hold over the premier's fate, they could demand a higher price for their support (Rahat and Hazan 2005, 347). Thus after the reform PMs spent far greater time and effort on coalition management--on "maintaining, rather than on heading" the government (Hazan 2005, 304). The *Knesset* increasingly rejected or overturned government decisions, even as the distribution of budget resources tended to increasingly favor smaller coalition partners (Nachmias and Sened 1999). Hazan (1997) also shows a dramatic increase in "private members'" bills as a proportion of the total legislation passed immediately after the reform, evidence that the government had lost control of the agenda.

Direct elections also changed a system that had relied on the mutual dependence of leaders and followers into a system where prime ministers felt they should govern independently of their own party. This is a key indicator of presidentialization, because no matter how

personalized campaigns become in parliamentary systems, parties and prime ministers can never go their separate ways. While on the campaign trail, the candidates for prime minister ran “above” their parties, ignoring or even disparaging their parties in the process. Their personal constituencies also differed substantially from their parties—a phenomenon that is common under separate origin (as we saw in Chapter Five) but unheard of under parliamentarism. Prime Ministers who won direct election could legitimately believe that they did not owe their *personal* political success to their *party’s* political success, and they assumed that direct election had given them legitimacy and authority to run the government regardless of their party’s desires.

Direct elections thus weakened the influence of the prime minister’s party, virtually eliminating the notion of collective responsibility essential to parliamentarism. For example, after winning election, Benjamin Netanyahu (1996-99) “virtually ceased to function as a party leader” in terms of fostering unity of purpose and organizing collective decision-making by Likud ministers and MKs (Medding, 195). Netanyahu’s leadership style consequently “failed to establish the necessary *esprit de corps*...upon which the principle of collective cabinet responsibility rests” (ibid, 196). Similarly, Ehud Barak (1999-2001) ignored his party and personally chose his own ministers, acting as if the new system “specifically precluded” his party from having any say in cabinet appointments (ibid, 203). Not surprisingly, members of prime ministers’ parties grew disgruntled and expressed increasing reluctance to support their leaders. Medding concludes that the new system “retained the formal principle of collective responsibility, but deprived it of its party core” (ibid, 205). No scholar has argued that such dynamics characterized *pre-reform* Israel.

Israel’s reformed system severely presidentialized the prime minister’s own party in another key way. Although prime ministers remained accountable to the assembly majority, *they*

became unaccountable to their own party. Unlike in a pure parliamentary system, the prime minister's party in Israel could not "fire" its agent and swap in a new premier without taking the issue to the floor of the legislature. In a pure parliamentary system the prime minister's office "belongs" to a particular party until the next election or until that party can no longer sustain a government. In the Israeli hybrid *only a direct election could constitute the executive.* A party that sought to oust its PM from the party and force a resignation had no guarantee that it would retain the premiership in a new election. As a result, PMs enjoyed *de facto* separation of survival from their own (severely weakened) parties, but not from allied parties. As our framework predicts, prime ministers' parties grew increasingly presidentialized while the smaller parties remained parliamentarized. Given this, as one might expect in a pure presidential system but not in a parliamentary system, members of the PM's party abstained and withheld support with greater frequency following the reform (Hazan 2005; Rahat and Hazan 2005).

In sum, the Israeli hybrid left executive-legislative relations in an unstable political no-man's land—the prime minister expected legislative deference from his own party based on separation of origin, but allied parties expected prime ministerial deference based on the fusion of survival. The reform thus made coalition maintenance a "full-time, practically impossible, task," and even running day-to-day routine government affairs became a "chronic crisis of confidence" (Medding, 196). In the end Hazan concludes that "the directly-elected PM was unable to rein in the anarchy within both his coalition and his party" (2005, 304). As far as we know, scholars of parties in parliamentary systems have never claimed that "presidentialization" has generated decreased cohesion *within* a prime minister's party.

The Return to Parliamentarism and Parties' "De-Presidentialization"

The dramatic consequences of the Israeli constitutional reform seriously embarrassed the reform's original proponents. Rahat (N.d. 18) writes that those who had advocated reform "found it more and more difficult to market their original claims, as their promises collapsed one after the other: they promised stability, but governments collapsed prematurely; they promised an end to coalition politics, but the increase in the number of effective parties and in the power of the small sectarian parties made coalition maintenance at least as difficult as it was before; they thought that the popular mandate of the directly elected PM would supply him with political legitimacy that would improve governability, but legitimacy vanished quickly." As the negative repercussions continued to mount, reform proponents switched tacks and defensively argued that "society," rather than the reform itself, had caused the problems.

Initial efforts to overturn the reform stalled because of opposition from Labor and Likud party leaders—that is, from the only politicians who had gained under the new system (Rahat N.d. 5). However, mounting evidence that presidentialization exacted too high a cost added fuel to a movement to repeal the reform. Ironically, Rahat writes that "almost all the MKs who supported reform became its victims," while the only sizable party that had initially opposed the reform, the ultra-orthodox *Shas* party, emerged as the only winner (Rahat 2004, 469).

The impact of Israel's 1998 local elections proved critical to the repeal effort. Local elections followed the same formula as the national elections, meaning that mayors were elected directly, independently of city council members. As in the prime ministerial race, many mayoral candidates thus sought out the middle ground and downplayed party attachments. The 1998 election results revealed substantial losses for both Labor and Likud, strengthening the argument that ticket-splitting was a grave threat to those parties' survival (Rahat N.d., 7). The local election results finally convinced most Labor and Likud MKs that the reform had hurt their

interests. The only parties that continued to support the reformed system were the smaller sectarian parties.

The 1999 national elections reconfirmed the larger parties' decline, clarifying even to the most skeptical MKs that the new system was killing the larger parties and helping only the smaller parties. Thus the day in 2001 that Ariel Sharon's government was sworn in, the *Knesset* repealed the direct prime ministerial election and returned the country to pure parliamentarism starting with the 2003 elections. MKs from parties that had shrunk over the previous three elections supported the repeal, but 36 of the 41 votes opposing the repeal came from smaller parties (Rahat N.d., 19).

As most Israelis expected and as our argument implies would happen, the return to the old system substantially and rapidly changed party and voter behavior yet again, reversing much of what had occurred during the hybrid experiment. In particular, PMs are "once again elected because of and together with their party, rather than individually and at times despite their party" (Hazan 2005, 307).¹⁷ Repeal of direct PM elections increased the parliamentarization of *all* parties, especially the larger ones, by linking the party leader--no matter how personally authoritative--to the collective fate of his or her party and giving the party, rather than the assembly majority, the possibility of holding the leader to accounts. Thus following the return to parliamentarism government coalitions became more stable, and "the parties, which were practically absent in the two previous elections, returned to the forefront" of election campaigns (Hazan 2005, 307). Repeal also altered the major parties' electoral strategies, weakening religious and ethnic sectarian parties (Kenig, Rahat and Hazan 2005). For example, several small immigrant parties, realizing they were facing extinction, quickly merged with Likud or other

¹⁸ The adoption of a constructive vote of no confidence after the repeal of direct PM elections also contributed to coalition stability.

right-wing parties. Abolishing the direct elections thus reversed the decline of the large parties and the gains of the sectarian parties.¹⁸

Israel's 1992 electoral reform rapidly and fundamentally altered the relationship between candidates and parties, changed the incentives of each party "branch," and made coordinating across party branches more difficult both on the campaign trail and in government. Like the French case, the Israeli experiment with moving away from pure parliamentarism by adopting separate executive and legislative origin supports our hypothesis that parties organize and behave differently when confronted with the greater vote-seeking incentives of a direct election. Indeed, the effects in Israel were so obvious, rapid, and ultimately disastrous—and exacerbated by the combination of intra-partisan separation of survival with prime ministers' dependence on allied parties for survival in office—that after less than a decade politicians moved to repeal the reform and return to pure parliamentarism.

CONCLUSION

Scholars and politicians both know that even relatively small institutional changes can have large effects on the balance of power both within political parties and within entire political systems. It stands to reason that larger institutional changes would have larger effects. In this chapter we examined two "quasi-experimental" case-studies of important changes in executive-legislative relations. Evidence from France and Israel confirms this book's main point that constitutional structure shapes parties' organizational and behavioral imperatives. A shift away from pure parliamentarism and towards the separation of powers in both countries altered parties' collective action and delegation problems, changed their electoral strategies, and damaged party organizational cohesion and strength—all evidence of presidentialization as we

defined it in Chapter One. Only these institutional reforms, and not other factors, can plausibly explain the rapidity and depth of party transformation in both countries.

In France, the adoption of separate presidential origin *and* survival presidentialized the parties dramatically. We saw evidence of this dynamic as parties nominated different types of candidates, shifted resources away from their legislative contingents and towards their presidential candidates, and reduced the extent of ideological and policy-based competition for assembly seats. Consistent with the broader patterns of intra-party accountability described in Chapter Four, the 5th Republic constitution shifted the balance of intra-partisan power to such an extent that presidents have effectively reversed the party-president principal-agent relationship. In the 4th Republic nearly all changes in prime minister resulted from inter-party conflict, yet in the 5th Republic nearly all cases of prime ministerial turnover have resulted from intra-party conflict—not from within parties’ assembly delegations, but from presidents’ influence over their parties. Breaking the single chain of parliamentary delegation has dramatically altered party politics in France.

In Israel, which adopted separate origin while retaining fused survival through executive dependence on parliamentary confidence, constitutional reform immediately transformed party and voter behavior. Moreover, consistent with our expectations for elected prime-ministerial regimes, we saw an immediate bifurcation of the party system. The two largest parties completely presidentialized their organizations and electoral behavior by nominating relative outsiders, downplaying ideology and organization in the executive election, and focusing on maximizing votes in the executive election at the expense of *Knesset* seats. In contrast, the smaller parties remained parliamentarized, and did not even present prime ministerial candidates.

Instead, they concentrated all their energies on the *Knesset* race and conducted “office-” or “policy-seeking” campaigns.

Critically, the Israeli reform also created a situation in which prime ministers enjoyed *de facto* separation of survival from their parties, but remained highly dependent on their coalition partners. This weakened prime ministers’ connections to their parties while making coalition management even more difficult than it had been under the pure parliamentary system.

Ultimately, presidentialization of Israel’s two largest parties was so rapid and profound that it threatened their organizational survival. As a result, it was repealed less than a decade after it had been enacted. And as our theory of the impact of executive structure on parties would lead us to expect, we saw an equally rapid “re-parliamentarization” of Israel’s large parties.

Several other countries have undertaken reforms from one variant of pure or semi-presidentialism to another (See Table 2.1), but few countries have undertaken reforms to their constitutional structure as extensive as those in France and Israel. The few other cases of change from parliamentarism towards any form of separated powers have been in new and/or unstable democracies, and thus the impact of these changes may have escaped scholarly notice. Moves in the opposite direction from the separation of powers towards parliamentarism are even less common: Israel excepted, if a country has ever had separate executive elections, it will not change to pure parliamentarism--a fact that helps explain the worldwide trend towards more presidential and semi-presidential systems. Indeed, we suspect that the rarity of within-country changes in the core elements of executive-legislative relations helps explain why scholars have paid relatively little attention to this book’s core claim, that constitutional structure has a critical impact on party organization and behavior.

Figure 5.1. Executive origin and survival in single-executive regimes: The Israeli hybrid compared to the pure types

		Executive Origin	
		Fused (From Assembly Majority)	Separate (Popularly Elected)
Executive Survival	Fused (Subject to Assembly Confidence)	Parliamentary	Elected Prime-Ministerial (Israel 1992-2001)
	Separate (Fixed Terms)	Assembly-Independent	Presidential

Table 6.1: Results of the 2002 French Presidential Election			
Candidate	Party	1st Round %	2nd Round %
Jacques Chirac	Rally for the Republic	19.88	82.21
Jean-Marie Le Pen	National Front	16.86	17.79
<i>Lionel Jospin</i>	Socialist Party	16.18	
François Bayrou	Union for French Democracy	6.84	
<i>Arlette Laguiller</i>	Workers' Struggle	5.72	
<i>Jean-Pierre Chevènement</i>	Citizens' Movement	5.33	
<i>Noël Mamère</i>	The Greens	5.25	
<i>Olivier Besancenot</i>	Revolutionary Communist League	4.25	
Jean Saint-Josse	Hunt, Fish, Nature, Traditions	4.23	
Alain Madelin	Liberal Democracy	3.91	
<i>Robert Hue</i>	French Communist Party	3.37	
Bruno Mégret	National Republican Movement	2.34	
<i>Christiane Taubira</i>	Left Radical Party	2.32	
Corinne Lepage	Citizenship, Action, Participation	1.88	
Christine Boutin	Forum of Social Republicans	1.19	
<i>Daniel Gluckstein</i>	Party of the Workers	0.47	

Candidates of leftist parties in italics

**Table 6.2: Number of seats won in Israeli Knesset:
Last election before direct election of prime minister (1992) and two
elections concurrent with prime ministerial election (1996 and 1999)**

Group	Party	1992	1996	1999
Large Parties	Likud	32	32*	19
	Labor	44	34	26
	<i>Large parties total</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>45</i>
Sectarian Parties	Shas	6	10	17
	National Religious Party	6	9	5
	Yahadut Hatorah	4	4	5
	Shinui	-	-	6
	Yisrael B'aliyah	-	7	6
	Yisrael Beitenu	-	-	4
	Ra'am	2	4	5
	<i>Sectarian parties total</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>48</i>
Non- Sectarian Parties	Meretz	12	9	10
	Tsomet	8	-*	-
	National Union	-	-	4
	Moledet	3	2	-
	Center	-	-	6
	Third Way	-	4	-
	Hadash	3	5	3
	Balad	-	-	2
	<i>Non-Sectarian Parties Total</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>25</i>
Others	One People	-	-	2
	Total seats	120	120	120
	Number of parties in parliament	10	11	15
	Effective #of parties in parliament	4.4	5.6	8.7

* In 1996, Likud, Gesher and Tsomet presented a joint list. The two smaller parties were each allocated the 3rd seat on the list, alternating. So 10 of the 32 seats went to these two parties—five each for Gesher and Tsomet.

Source: Rahat (2004)