Chapter 8: Presidents, Prime Ministers and Mandate Representation

Thus far in this book we have focused on the impact of constitutional structure on such aspects of party presidentialization as agent selection and dismissal, campaign dynamics, the degree to which the electoral constituencies of different branches of a single party overlap, and on intra-party governance problems. In this chapter we turn our attention to the key policy decisions executives make--and the extent to which those decisions reflect what parties say they will do once in office, which is ostensibly the reason citizens voted that party and its candidate for the executive into office in the first place. In other words, in this chapter we ask, "What is the impact of fusion or separation of powers on policy-making and representation?"

We follow Pitkin (1967) generally in defining representation as a relationship between citizens' interests and political outcomes in which rulers act to meet the interests of the public. Since elections signal citizens' interests in modern democracy, we also follow Manin *et al.* (1999) in focusing on electoral responsiveness--what they call "mandate representation." Critically, conventional political science wisdom asserts that this sort of representation requires political parties. According to this view, representation requires prospective voting, in which governments "represent" citizens' interests when voters signal what they would like government to do, parties compete by proposing alternative policies, citizens use their vote to choose the best policies, and the party or parties that form the next government implement the proposed policies.

This view of the connection between parties, elections and representation permeates theoretical and empirical political science research.[1] It also reflects the way we have understood the process of democratic politics in this book, in which parties occupy a prominent position in a chain of delegated authority:

[1] See e.g. Klingeman, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994); Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999); Powell (2000); Stokes (2001); Cox and McCubbins (2005); Benoit and Laver (2006).

VOTERS → PARTY → EXECUTIVE → POLICY

If there were no slack in this idealized delegation chain, executives would be perfect agents of their party, and parties in turn would be perfect agents of the electorate. Under such conditions we would get "perfect" mandate-representation—that is, we would never see deviations from parties' electoral mandates, because parties would anticipate voter sanction for deviating. Thus in election campaigns the platform of the party and its executive candidate would be indistinguishable, and in governing, the executive's policy choices would embody the party's platform. In turn, voter preferences would determine the party's platform. If any of these conditions for perfect mandate-representation were violated, the principal would punish the agent, which could take the form of the party dumping its leader or, ultimately, the voters switching their votes to another party at the next election.

As Manin *et al*. note, no democracy literally enforces mandate representation--and with good reason: when circumstances change, voters might want parties to violate their mandates in order to respond adequately to the new conditions. Moreover, no chain of delegation—even one in which agents are reliable and honest and the contracts are perfectly designed—is ever so free of friction as our stylized account suggests. While consensus exists that parties do seek to promote mandate consistency, scholars also agree that perfect representation is a fantasy.

Nevertheless, for our purposes, understanding *why* representation tends to deviate from this theoretical ideal requires asking whether certain constitutional formats systematically shape this chain of delegation so that some parties can put the ideal into practice more easily than others. The study of political representation has a long history, yet although a majority of the world's democracies now have popularly elected presidencies, neither normative nor positive political theory has adequately explored the implications of the separation of powers for

democratic political representation.[2] An influential example illustrates this problem. G. Bingham Powell's (2000) wide-raging study of the relationship between elections and representation focuses on differences between "majoritarian" and "proportional" democracies, but ignores potential differences in representational outcomes between presidential and parliamentary systems.

From our perspective this approach is problematic, because neither pure nor semi-presidential systems can be shoehorned easily into either of Powell's ideal-types. For example, a two-party pure presidential system is not as majoritarian as a two-party parliamentary system, and a multiparty pure presidential system is not as proportional as a multiparty parliamentary system. Likewise, semi-presidential systems can be strongly majoritarian if the president's party has a majority in the assembly and thus controls the cabinet, but they can also be quite proportional if a coalition cabinet is in place or if the dual executive is divided between opposing parties, as under cohabitation. The wide range of possible configurations under pure and semi-presidentialism suggests that these systems do not fit neatly into the famous typologies of "majoritarian" vs. "proportional" (or "consensus") governance that comparativists have long employed (e.g. Lijphart 1984, 1999; Powell 2000).

In earlier work (Samuels and Shugart 2003) we addressed this conceptual gap, and considered the impact of the separation of powers on representation, using Manin *et al.*'s (1999) distinction between electoral responsiveness and electoral accountability. We argued that pure presidentialism tends simultaneously to maximize accountability--in which voters retrospectively

[2] One can also note the absence of attention to the presidency as a source of representational influence in the US in Miller and Stokes (1966), an absence repeated in Converse and Pierce's study of France (1986). Generally, in the US politics literature, "mandates" are typically explored from the president's point of view (e.g. Kelley 1983; Dahl 1990), or legislators' point of view (e.g. Weinbaum and Judd 1970), or parties' point of view (e.g. Edwards 1989; Jones 1999)--but the interplay of the party and the president in terms of representation has been largely ignored. Our approach most resembles Jones'.

assess politicians for their performance--and minimize responsiveness. Samuels (2004) and Samuels and Hellwig (2008) have empirically confirmed that the separation of powers does enhance retrospective accountability, at least on one measure of economic performance. Here, we turn our attention to electoral responsiveness.

Our argument in this chapter builds on existing research on the conditions that foster or impede mandate-representation. We suggest that all else equal, the separation of origin and survival creates relatively greater disincentives for consistent mandate representation. Following the theoretical arguments we have advanced in this book, we examine how different political institutions influence the chain of democratic delegation and thus impact the probability that parties are likely to fulfill their stated mandate. Parliamentary systems tend to more closely resemble the idealized chain of democratic delegation and accountability. Presidential and semi-presidential systems, in contrast, are far less likely to embody that ideal. This implies, quite simply, that *mandate representation should be less common as we move away from the ideal-typical parliamentary chain of delegation*.

Preceding chapters laid the theoretical foundation for this claim. We have demonstrated how the separate origin and survival of the executive breaks the chain of delegation by 1) encouraging parties to recruit candidates who may be less-than-faithful agents; 2) encouraging executive candidates to campaign independently of their parties; and 3) limiting parties' ability to sanction executives who enjoy separate survival. This chapter explores the empirical implications of these findings for democratic representation.

To test the impact of democratic regime-type on mandate consistency systematically, we explore the incidence of *violations* of mandate consistency. In doing so, we build on Susan Stokes' (2001) research on Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. Like Stokes, we call

violations of mandates "policy switches." Politicians may betray their stated campaign commitments in any policy area; we focus here only on economic policy, as did Stokes. As we explain in more detail below, campaigns can be oriented towards either "security" or "efficiency" in economic policy. A policy switch occurs when a candidate campaigns with one orientation but then pursues policies with the opposite orientation after assuming power.

We test our hypotheses on a much broader sample than Stokes, and our results support our claim: policy switches are about four times as common under pure presidentialism as under parliamentarism. Moreover, we find that the separation of powers overwhelms the causal impact of the factors Stokes identified. We find that two conditions enhance the likelihood of policy switches in pure and semi-presidential systems: (1) close presidential races, which increase the incentive of presidential candidates to tailor their campaign messages for their own electoral benefit; and (2) presidents who lack a legislative majority after an election, a situation that gives them greater discretion in forging governing and policy-making strategy.

As we explain below, close presidential elections and minority legislative support are the real-world political conditions under which we are most likely to see problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. In this way our findings in this chapter are consistent with the implications of our principal-agent theoretical framework. We have suggested that parliamentary systems minimize adverse selection and moral hazard—and in this chapter we find that close presidential elections and minority legislative support matter *only* in pure and semi-presidential systems, but not in parliamentary systems. In parliamentary systems neither the competitiveness of *legislative* elections nor whether a prime minister has a majority of seats make a switch more likely.

In sum, patterns of mandate consistency and inconsistency across democracies derive from differences in the chain of democratic delegation. This finding has huge implications for the study of parties' ability to fulfill one of their primary purposes in modern democracy—to represent citizens' interests. As long suspected but never shown in comparative politics, "responsible party government" is in fact less likely under systems with directly-elected presidents. Before turning to our data and findings, we first offer a more thorough theoretical consideration of how the separation of powers affects mandate-representation.

PARTIES, PRESIDENTS AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Scholars have long criticized the separation of powers as an institutional structure that impedes "responsible party government." This essentially Anglophile view has a long pedigree in American political discourse. Woodrow Wilson (1908) decried the lack of "responsible" parties from his perch at Princeton's Department of Politics, before he had to deal with those parties as president of the United States. Critics such as E.E. Schattschneider (1942), who headed the American Political Science Association's "Committee for a Responsible Party System" (1950), blamed party irresponsibility on the separation of powers, and his argument still resonates (see e.g. Sundquist 1992).

It is true that scholars currently see US parties as having grown more cohesive (e.g. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006), a situation that some believe would "delight" critics such as Schattschneider (Bartels 2008, 290). Yet the fact that US parties are currently more ideologically cohesive does not suggest they have finally bridged the separation of powers; it only suggests to the historically-minded that US parties (or parties anywhere) can cycle in and out of relatively more or less "responsible" phases, not that Wilson's or Schattschneider's dream

of “parliamentarizing” US parties has been realized. Are “responsible” parties unlikely--in the US or in any other separate-powers system—or in any democracy, for that matter? Are “irresponsible” parties a function of the separation of powers itself, or are they simply the fruit of American exceptionalism?

The responsible parties thesis finds loud echo in the mandate-representation notion of how democracy *should* work: parties articulate distinctive platforms, voters make decisions based on those distinctions, and parties govern according to their platforms. Several scholars have applied the conception of mandate-representation in empirical research. For example, Klingeman and his colleagues (1994) noted a substantial degree of mandate *consistency* across eight established democracies, including the United States. In contrast, Stokes (2001) found substantial mandate *inconsistency* across pure presidential systems in Latin America.[3]

As noted, no research has considered the variable impact of the fusion or separation of powers on either responsible parties or mandate-consistency. In this section we discuss the obstacles that the separation of powers places in the way of mandate-representation. We consider politicians’ incentives to switch under any system, and then explore the particular incentives to stick with or abandon a mandate under each of our three main democratic constitutional designs. We argue that executives’ incentives to break the chain of democratic delegation and diverge from their party are stronger under systems with popular presidential elections. By implication, this means that the conditions Stokes (2001) identified as most likely associated with policy-switching—in particular, minority government—may actually only be important under the separation of powers.

First Principles: Executives’ Motivations to Stick or Switch

[3] Her cases include Peru, which, as we have noted, is technically a president-parliamentary regime.

Why might a politician promise one thing during a campaign and then repudiate that promise once in office? To understand why party agents in the executive confront different incentives in different institutional contexts, we must start with first principles about politicians' motivations. Politicians desire power and its trappings. If they reach to the pinnacle of their party organization and win the office of president or prime minister, they presumably want to retain that position as long as is feasible and ultimately to exit office with their reputation intact.

To accomplish this under democratic auspices, politicians must propose and enact policies that please voters. Yet in terms of mandate consistency, there is a more important question: to what extent must candidates for executive office propose and enact policies that also please the party members who put those politicians in position to win executive power to begin with? Stokes (2001) assumes that there is no fundamental incompatibility between what presidents want, what their parties want, and what voters want. Thus she assumes that some presidents switch policies because they believe doing so will simultaneously advance both their personal goals and advance their parties' interests. She states that presidents measure their success as "victory of one's own party at the next election" (Stokes 2001, 66) even when term limits prevent a president from running for reelection. This means that presidents switch policies believing they are acting as good party agents--*even if party members vehemently disagree*.

Stokes also argues that some presidents switch because they believe they are acting as a good agent of citizens' interests--again, regardless of whether citizens might vehemently disagree. To justify this assumption Stokes argues that neither international financial agencies (Stokes 2001, 74, 92) nor the prospect of personal financial gain (ibid, 85) motivate switches. Instead, she suggests that policy-switchers believe that voters underestimate the effectiveness of efficiency-oriented policies, and know that they must hide this belief and advocate populist

“security-oriented” policies on the campaign trail in order to win office. Presidents who switch are thus dissembling on the campaign trail when they later switch policies and enact what they believe to be citizens’ *true* interests, even though they are not responding to citizens’ *expressed* interests, and even though they are violating their *party’s* stated policies (ibid, see pp. 19, 56, 65).

Although Stokes hinted that presidentialism might be driving her findings (189), her hypotheses about why presidents sometimes violate their mandates are not derived from theoretical claims about how the separation of powers *per se* shapes presidents’ incentives. For instance, she argues that term limits--which are virtually unknown in parliamentary systems[4]--do not influence the likelihood of a policy-switch.[5] What then are the sources of executives’ incentives to stick with or violate their party’s mandate? We have no *a priori* reason to believe that Stokes’ motivational assumption--politicians switch because they believe doing so is in their personal interest, their party’s interest, and in voters’ interest--should differ across constitutional formats. Yet even if we assume politicians everywhere have similar motivations, the pertinent question remains whether different democratic institutions *channel* politicians’ motivations in different ways, constraining their options or providing new opportunities. If so, we should observe policy-switching at different frequencies under different constitutional formats. Thus in

[4] Botswana and South Africa are exceptions. The LDP in Japan has a term limit for its leaders who serve as PM.
[5] We accept Stokes’ assumption that presidents desire the victory of their own party at the next election. However, as we showed in Chapter Five, presidents and their parties sometimes have only partially overlapping electoral constituencies. Thus presidents eligible for reelection may judge their own success by whether they win reelection or not, even at the expense of their parties. Moreover, presidents limited to only one term may not always believe that election of another candidate from their party—one with a different electoral constituency—fulfills their legacy. Still, even given the potential that term limits affect the degree of incentive overlap between presidents and parties, term limits are not essential to explaining policy-switching across democratic regimes. As we saw in Chapter Four, prime ministers may have shorter time horizons than presidents because they are more likely to be deposed *by their own parties* before the end of the term. This suggests that the separation of origin and survival, and not the potential for reelection, fundamentally determines the incentives for executives to act as faithful party agents while in office.

the remainder of this section we explore both intra- and inter-party incentives to switch under parliamentarism, presidentialism, and semi-presidentialism.

Incentives under Parliamentarism

There is some baseline non-zero probability that a political leader will wake up one day and decide to switch policies. Such incentives are minimized under parliamentarism, both within and across parties. First, as discussed in Chapter Three, parties spend a great deal of time vetting their potential prime ministers. This leadership selection process implies a low probability that a prime ministerial candidate would harbor policy preferences at variance with his or her party—a necessary condition for a policy-switch. Once in office, certain intra-party conditions might marginally increase the propensity to switch: perhaps a crafty PM could feel so secure in office--either because of personal popularity or a lack of viable replacements--that party colleagues could not retaliate following a mandate violation.[6] Nevertheless, the core institutional fact of parliamentarism remains: even prime ministers who feel "secure" in office remain subject to both parliamentary and/or partisan no-confidence votes in the event that the party rejects the PM's policies or if things go badly. This generates powerful intra-party constraints on our hypothetical prime minister who wakes up one day intending to switch policies. The risks of getting fired are simply too high.

In cases of coalition government, *inter*-party constraints also lower the likelihood of a switch in pure parliamentary systems. This is because the nature of parliamentary coalitions limits unilateral switching and makes such decisions a matter of *inter*-party transactions. Many coalitions (up to a third, depending on how they are counted) are formal, public agreements

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[6] The likelihood could also be shaped by the institutional context, for example if the parliament requires a "constructive" vote of no confidence, which requires that an alternative government to be ready to fill the expelled PM's shoes immediately. However, these sorts of factors are likely to have relatively minor importance.

sealed before the election campaign begins (Strøm and Müller 1999; Golder 2006; Carroll and Cox 2007). And even in the absence of a formal pre-election "contract," coalitions commit parties to sets of policies and to processes of inter-party coordination and consultation. Indeed, many parliamentary coalitions employ inter-party mechanisms that let parties "keep tabs" on their partners, such as the allocation of junior minister posts or legislative oversight committee chairs (Thies 2001; Clark and Jurgelevit 2008, Martin and Vanberg 2004).

Any premier heading a coalition cabinet in a parliamentary system is an agent of multiple parties and is thus accountable to multiple principals. Consequently, all parties to a coalition must consent to implement a proposed switch—and in the absence of such consensus, a switch will not happen. Thus just as PMs cannot unilaterally impose a switch on their own parties, PMs *or their parties* cannot impose a switch *on other parties* that could bring down the government were the switch successfully implemented. Coalitions in parliamentary systems place both intra- *and* inter-party obstacles in front of PMs who want to switch policies. And PMs heading minority governments—whether of a coalition or not—should confront even stronger constraints, given the fragility of minority governments. In short, switches should be highly unlikely in parliamentary systems, and still less likely under coalition or minority governments.

Incentives under Pure Presidentialism

In contrast to prime ministers, executives in pure presidential systems face far weaker intra-party constraints on their own actions. For one, presidents win their job through a popular election, which gives them a source of legitimacy distinct from their party's. Moreover, the separation of origin tends to generate incentive incompatibility between a party's executive and legislative branches, based on a party's need to recruit a presidential candidate who can win a

direct executive election (Chapter 3) and on the fact that the party's executive and legislative constituencies may not completely overlap (Chapters 5-7). Such incentive incompatibility only emerges when executives compete in popular elections. Moreover, when an election is expected to be close, incentive incompatibility may lead presidential candidates to be less-than-forthcoming about future policy choices, if they believe that being "too honest" might put their own election at risk.

In addition to incentive incompatibility derived from separate origin, parties' ability to control their agents once they have assumed office is more difficult under the separation of powers. As we showed in Chapter Four, the separation of survival means parties have extremely limited ability to hold their leaders accountable between elections. As such, presidents should have relatively greater liberty to switch policies than prime ministers under parliamentarism. Presidents can switch *despite* the preferences of their copartisans in the legislature, because their copartisans cannot credibly threaten them with removal.

What about inter-party constraints when a president's party does not control a legislative majority? We suggested above that coalition and minority situations make PMs in parliamentary systems *less* likely to switch. Yet for presidents, minority situations should have the opposite effect. This is because presidents can forge coalitions without the consent of their own party, a possibility that is unthinkable in parliamentary systems. Although coalition cabinets are common in presidential systems (Amorim Neto 2002, 2006; Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh 2004), formal *interparty* agreements are uncommon (Carroll 2007).[7] This is partly because the president is the *formateur* of the coalition, but also because the president cannot be fired. In pure presidential systems, presidents--not parties--lead and agree to coalition deals. Thus whereas

[7] To our knowledge Bolivia is the only case of pure presidentialism where there have been formal interparty agreements about the allocation of executive and legislative portfolios, due to congress' selection of the president when no candidate obtains a popular-vote majority.

prime ministers are at their *most* constrained when their parties are lacking a majority, presidents are at their *least* constrained under comparable conditions. Depending on their own personal preferences, they can force their own party to "agree" to a coalition—or reach across the aisle to pass a particular policy proposal--without fear of intra-partisan repercussion. As a result, policy switches should be most likely under presidentialism when there is no majority party.

Theoretically, we are agnostic as to whether presidents switch policies and then say, in effect, "My coalition partners made me do it,"[8] or abandon their party's mandate on their own accord and then find partners in the legislature to support their choice. Given the nature of agency relationships under presidentialism, either scenario is plausible. However, both scenarios are less plausible for prime ministers in parliamentary systems. If presidents switch policies because they need support in the legislature from parties favoring a switch, their own parties are in a weak position to stop them, for all the reasons we have given. If, on the other hand, they initiate the switch and then cobble together a supportive coalition afterwards, they still face minimal constraints from their own party compared to prime ministers in parliamentary systems. They are relatively unconstrained both to govern and to initiate consultations with other parties, and face even fewer constraints to do so when they face a legislature without their party in the majority—which is precisely the case in which presidents may feel they have a personal mandate above that of the party and hence the freedom to shuffle alliances and switch policies.

Incentives under Semi-Presidentialism

Now let us consider the case of semi-presidentialism. Three theoretical possibilities exist. First, it could be the case that semi-presidential systems generate both intra- and inter-party constraints on *both* elements of the dual executive—similar to the constraints on prime ministers

[8] This may be the case in Bolivia in 1989. See Stokes (1999), pp. 122–3.

in parliamentary systems--due to the need of the cabinet to have parliamentary confidence. Second, these systems could generate incentives similar to pure presidential systems, due to the separate origin and survival of one half of the dual executive, the presidency. Or third, semi-presidential systems could fall somewhere in the middle in their propensity to switch policies—a hypothesis that seems as safe as it is theoretically uninteresting.

We argue that semi-presidential systems are more like pure presidential systems in their tendency to give the executive-*whether a president or a prime minister*—considerable leeway to switch policies. This hypothesis might seem intuitive for presidents in “president-parliamentary” systems, because the president is clearly the strongest actor in the political system both within and across parties, due to unrestricted dismissal power.

However, there are good reasons to believe this hypothesis will hold even for prime ministers in such systems, as well as for both presidents and prime ministers in premier-presidential cases. Although the formal rules of premier-presidentialism imply a strong parliamentary logic and intra-party obstacles to policy-switching, we have already seen evidence of partisan presidentialization in these systems: a tendency for outsiders as both premiers and presidents (Chapter 3), a propensity for presidents to terminate the premier’s tenure (Chapter 4), and often considerable electoral separation of purpose (Chapter 5). Other scholars have also found presidential influence over cabinet composition, across all semi-presidential systems (e.g. Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). All of this suggests a strong presidentializing logic for party politics, even in relatively “parliamentarized” premier-presidential cases. Even though semi-presidential systems retain the link between the parliamentary majority and the cabinet, we expect these presidentializing intra-party dynamics to increase the likelihood of policy switching relative to parliamentary systems.

The path to executive power in semi-presidential systems adds additional "breaks" in our idealized chain of delegation, enhancing incentives for policy-switching. Recall from Chapter Three that a large percentage of presidents in semi-presidential systems served as premier immediately before being elected president: 24% in premier-presidential systems and 19% of presidents in president-parliamentary systems. And of course, many more premiers *pursue* the presidency than manage to win it. This suggests that the goal of winning presidential elections shapes both PMs' *and* parties' incentives, across all semi-presidential systems. In the end, despite semi-presidentialism's "parliamentary" features, the existence of a popularly-elected president may overwhelm the parliamentary features. Thus to the extent that separate origin and survival of the president make switches more likely, we should observe more switches in semi-presidential systems than under parliamentarism.

Finally, pursuit of the presidency in semi-presidential systems implies that both new presidents as well as new premiers after a legislative election may be likely to switch. Most semi-presidential systems have nonconcurrent legislative elections. And as we saw in Chapter Two, cabinets are typically constitutionally required to resign after a new parliament is elected.[9] While a newly installed PM after a nonconcurrent election might seem to be the most shielded from presidential influence, a nonconcurrent assembly election typically means that the next *presidential* election will come sooner than the next *parliamentary* election, which in turns implies that the next test of parties' popularity will come in a presidential contest, *in which the newly installed premier may be a candidate*. Thus if premiers perceive that a switch may help them win the next presidential election, they may be able to initiate a switch notwithstanding

[9] Typically, especially in the premier-presidential subtype, the PM is not required to resign after a new president is inaugurated. However, as we saw in Chapter Four, they often do so anyway. This is a clear indication of presidentialization and an informal practice that opens up the potential for a policy switch led or instigated by a new president, who would then attempt to build a sympathetic cabinet.

their dependence on parliamentary confidence. Presidentialization of the entire political system means that parties must give freer rein to their leaders because of the need to build supra-party support in the electorate. As we have argued in other chapters, this electoral dynamic is present in semi-presidential systems nearly as much as under pure presidentialism. In sum, although the logic differs from pure presidentialism, the distinct presidentializing incentives of semi-presidential systems makes mandate-consistency less likely than under pure parliamentarism.

Theoretical Argument: Summary

This chapter's argument flows from the theoretical framework we have used throughout this book: the separation of origin and survival generates distinct imperatives that parties simply do not encounter in parliamentary systems. Both intra- and inter-party constraints on executive freedom of action are greater under pure parliamentarism than under either pure or semi-presidentialism. Likewise, the incentives to abandon a party's expressed mandate are stronger under systems with separate executive origin and survival. We are not saying that executives in pure or semi-presidential systems will *never* act as faithful agents of their parties. It is certainly possible for presidents to act as faithful partisan agents, just less likely than for prime ministers under pure parliamentarism.

Presidents and parties' greater incentive incompatibility is partly due to the fact that presidents must seek supra-partisan coalitions in the electorate. Moreover, the separation of survival makes policy-switching a much less risky option for presidents, compared to prime ministers. The separation of origin and survival thus encourages voters to see presidential candidates as distinct from their parties, even if they are long-time "party politicians." We expect the logic of this argument to hold even for prime ministers in semi-presidential systems. Parties

in semi-presidential systems must tolerate greater agency slack in the relationship with their prime minister because they know that they must field a viable presidential candidate--and their best choice may turn out to be the incumbent premier. Consequently, presidents or premiers in semi-presidential systems may propose policies that are not aligned with those of their party, and the party may either tolerate the switch (in the case of a premier) or be powerless to impede it (in the case of a president). In short, executives are less accountable to their party in pure and semi-presidential systems, and thus more likely to violate campaign promises.

POLICY-SWITCHING OR MANDATE REPRESENTATION: A GLOBAL EXPLORATION

To test our hypothesis about the impact of the separation of powers on mandate representation, we analyze campaigns and post-electoral policy choices around the world between 1978 and 2002. As in previous chapters, a country is included if it scored a "5" or better on the POLITY IV index of democracy for five consecutive years.[10] In presidential systems we analyzed the presidential candidates' campaign and governing strategy. In parliamentary systems we looked at the prime minister's party. In semi-presidential systems we looked at both presidential and parliamentary election campaigns, except in the few cases where elections were concurrent.[11] Our database contains entries for 401 election-observations, almost ten times as many as Stokes considered.

[10] The shorter time period than in other chapters allows us to focus on the "third wave" of democratization after the mid 1970s, after which there is a more diverse set of democracies of all types.

[11] There is no reason to consider both presidential and legislative campaigns when they are concurrent because it would not be feasible to separate the two (unless the election resulted in cohabitation, which has never been the outcome under concurrent elections). In pure presidential systems we ignore legislative campaigns, even when nonconcurrent, because in such systems legislative campaigns are by definition not about control of the government.

We employ Stokes' definition of a policy switch: During a campaign, "politicians will pronounce themselves in favor of job creation, growth, improvement in real wages, industrial policy, a gradualist approach to inflation stabilization, and limited repayment of the foreign debt, only to impose austerity and liberal reforms when elected" (Stokes 2001, 43). This is a switch from a "security-oriented" platform to an "efficiency-oriented" set of policies; the reverse sort of switch can also occur. Given these definitions, we coded winning candidates'[12] campaigns according to their stated future policy orientation: either a) "security-oriented;" b) "efficiency-oriented;" or c) too vague to classify. We then gathered information on the policies that the winning candidate subsequently pursued: again, either a) "security-oriented;" b) "efficiency-oriented;" or c) too vague to classify.[13] Comparing the two codings lets us determine which governments had followed through on campaign promises and which had switched policies.

Examples of Policy-Switches

Some policy-switches are well known, especially given Stokes' systematic exploration the Latin American cases. For example, Argentine president Carlos Menem (1989-99) campaigned on his Peronist party's historic platform, advocating a "nationalist and expansionist" economic policy (Stokes 2001, 45) that would avoid imposing hardships on the working and middle classes. Yet once in office, "Menem's economic team fashioned policies like the ones his opponents had advocated" (ibid, 47), including currency devaluation, spending cuts, privatization, and trade liberalization. Similarly, Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989-93) violated his party's longstanding left-of-center reputation by implementing austerity

[12] In the case of semi-presidential systems, this means the prime minister after a legislative election as well as the president after a presidential election (except that we consider only the president when elections are concurrent).
[13] Our research, as well as Stokes', relied heavily on news media accounts of campaigns and subsequent policies. We employed the "Lexis-Nexis Academic" on-line search engine, which consults hundreds of global news sources.

programs following his inauguration. Other cases of policy-switching in Latin America follow a similar pattern: leaders campaign on what Stokes calls “security-oriented” policies but govern with “efficiency-oriented” policies.

Our research yielded several examples of similar policy-switches from outside of Latin America. One such case comes from South Korea in 1997. Presidential candidate Kim Dae-Jung had gained wide respect as an advocate for democracy. His core constituency consisted of farmers, small business-owners, and union members. Big business distrusted him, particularly because he had called for slashing the power of Korea’s economic conglomerates, the *chaebols*. Kim had also opposed Korea’s entry into the OECD, saying that the country was “not ready” to open its markets (*Financial Times* 1997). Given his trajectory, one business executive said, “You know what his economic policy will be” (ibid.). Moreover, during his campaign Kim allied with the United Liberal Democrat party, with which he shared “the same economic policy based on nationalism and a strong state role in guiding business.”

Given this campaign, observers expected policies to favor “entrenched vested interests that would slow down controversial economic reforms” (ibid.). A week before election day, Kim even took out front-page newspaper ads promising to renegotiate an IMF austerity package if elected, which was “seen as a ploy to please an electorate worried that the IMF package would cause massive job layoffs” (Chandler 1997a). Academic experts did not expect Kim to tone down his anti-IMF rhetoric after the election. Overall, the campaign did little to dispel Kim’s image as a populist (Baker 1997; Mi-young 1997).

Nonetheless, almost immediately after the election--and even months before his inauguration--Kim “partly reversed himself” (*New York Times* 1997) and signaled a change of course (Agence France Presse 1997b). He used meetings with outgoing administration advisors

“as a pretext to commit his new government fully to the IMF’s harsh recovery program and to ditch an unrealistic election promise that he could stimulate the economy into full recovery within 18 months” (Chandler 1997b). Kim’s one-week conversion suggests considerable dissimulation on the campaign trail, given that immediately after the election he proposed a “sweeping package of monetary policy and financial market reforms” (ibid.), including labor-market flexibility in exchange for an IMF bailout. Not surprisingly, Kim’s supporters regarded this turnaround as traitorous (Agence France Presse 1997a; Alford 1997).

Prominent Examples That Are *Not* Switches

Two well-known cases might be thought of as switches but actually are not, at least by our definition: France after the 1981 election and New Zealand in 1984. In May 1981 French Socialist leader François Mitterrand won election as president. Less than six weeks later the Socialist party smashed its rivals in the parliamentary elections, winning 269 of 491 seats. Finally given the chance to put their ideas into practice, Mitterrand and his party initially made a hard left turn, nationalizing important industries and aggressively using fiscal policy to pump up France’s economy.

Unfortunately for the Socialists, this strategy backfired badly and by 1983 Mitterrand had abandoned them (Schmidt 1996). This “Great U-turn” is clearly a policy-reversal, but it is not an example of a policy-switch, because Mitterrand campaigned as a socialist, *and earnestly tried to govern as a socialist*. In our view as well as Stokes’, a policy-switch suggests that a president or prime minister makes no real attempt to follow through on his or her campaign promises. Mitterrand reversed course only in the face of evidence that his policies were not working; policy-switching requires no such evidence. Moreover, Mitterrand only switched after almost

two years in office; our definition (which follows Stokes') requires switching after six months or less.

A second "non-example" comes from New Zealand. In 1984, the Labour party defeated the incumbent National government and immediately embarked upon a radical program of economic liberalization that contradicted the party's longstanding programmatic reputation. In a very short time, New Zealand moved from having one of the most protected economies among the rich countries to having one of the world's most open economies. Much of the literature on New Zealand (e.g. Bollard 1994; Nagel 1998) refers to this move as a violation of Labour's manifesto commitments and points to public-opinion evidence that suggests voters believed that Labour had broken its promises.

However, our review of the campaign—as well as our ability to place this campaign in perspective of hundreds of other cases--suggests that Labour was *vague* about its commitments on the campaign trail, and on several occasions even suggested to voters that a difficult period of economic adjustment would lie ahead. For example, the then-shadow (and future) finance minister, Roger Douglas, had even authored a book entitled *There's Got to be a Better Way* (Douglas 1980) that sharply criticized the National Party's welfare-oriented policies and openly advocated "efficiency-oriented" economic reforms. Thus, while the government that came to power indeed implemented policies at variance with the longstanding reputation of the Labour party, it is not a case of a policy switch because the party's 1984 campaign gave voters no clear indication that it was committed to maintaining economic "security" policies.

Policy-Switches around the World

Let us now turn to the analysis of policy-switching. We were unable to classify 62 of the 401 campaigns (15.5% of the total) in our database as either "efficiency-oriented" or "security-oriented" because the campaign was vague (as in the New Zealand case sketched above) or because we lacked sufficient information.[14] This leaves us with 339 cases in which we could determine whether candidates had switched or not after winning office.[15] As noted, we consider a case to be a policy-switch only if the government reneged relatively quickly on its campaign position, consistent with Stokes' definition (43). We took this to mean "within six months of inauguration." If a government changes policy after six months, one could reasonably argue that conditions had shifted sufficiently such that the government was reacting to events (as in the case of Mitterrand) and perhaps acting in response to public opinion. Of our 339 cases, we found 27 policy switches (8% of the total),[16] listed in Table 8.1. We do not break semi-presidential systems into the two sub-types because of small sample sizes.[17] The total number of security-

[14] Stokes could not classify six of the 44 elections held between 1982 and 1995 in Latin America (13.6%), for similar reasons.

[15] Thus both our analysis and Stokes' preclude analysis of "strategic ambiguity" on the part of prospective presidents *or* prime ministers. This merits additional exploration.

[16] For the Latin American cases, our classifications agree with Stokes' in every case except one: Colombia 1982, which Stokes classified as a switch and we do not. President Betancur campaigned on a security-oriented platform and was elected in May 1982. We found no evidence that he switched policies within six months of taking office; media coverage indicates that Betancur continued the "security-oriented" policies after he took office. For example, in November 1982 the *Washington Post* called Betancur a "populist" (Diehl 1982). A December 2 *New York Times* article indicated no change in the president's policies (*New York Times* 1982). Echoing his "populist" appeal, In November Betancur warned that he might resort to nationalizations in an attempt to stabilize the economy (*Latin America Weekly Report*, November 19, 1982). It is true that a year later, Betancur was forced by changing circumstances to adopt heterodox policies to combat an economic downturn (*Latin America Regional Reports: Andean Group*, 9/2/83, 10/7/83, and 11/11/83). Nevertheless, he continued to resist orthodox shock therapy. Betancur does not qualify in Stokes' sense as a policy-switcher, because he did not switch from "security" to "efficiency" policies within the first six months of his administration and only partially switched due to changing circumstances. Of course, including Betancur in our analysis would only bolster support for our hypothesis.

[17] In semi-presidential subtypes we found only one switch in a president-parliamentary system: Peru 1990. Our data only include 26 elections under president-parliamentary systems, compared against 95 for premier-presidential systems. The percentages by regime type that we report below would hardly change if we reported on only premier-presidential systems.

oriented campaigns is 66, or 19.5% of the total; all of the switches except for one came following security-oriented campaigns (see below).[18]

Table 8.1 Here

Our findings reveal that policy-switching is rare, but by no means unique to Latin America or to pure presidential systems.[19] Six policy switches occurred in parliamentary systems, and seven in semi-presidential systems, in addition to the fourteen in presidential systems. For semi-presidential systems, because both presidential and parliamentary elections may be a path to government change, notes at the bottom of Table 8.1 indicate which type of election preceded a switch: four followed presidential elections (including two cases of concurrent elections) and three followed nonconcurrent parliamentary elections. Of the latter subset, two followed elections that resulted in cohabitation (Poland 1993 and France 1997).

Switches by Regime Type

Table 8.1 makes clear that even in the narrow yet important area of macroeconomic policy, parties do switch policies from time to time under each of the three main democratic institutional formats. Table 8.1 certainly suggests that *more* switches have occurred in presidential systems than in other democratic constitutional frameworks, but it says nothing about the *relative frequency* of policy-switches under different democratic regimes. Table 8.2 provides these relative frequencies by regime type.

Table 8.2 Here

The frequencies tend to conform to our predictions regarding the impact of regime type. Policy-switching is about four times as likely in presidential systems as in parliamentary

[18] The exception is Germany 1998.
[19] Another recognized difficulty with this kind of analysis is that we do not measure policy switches that were attempted but that failed or switches that were desired but were not attempted - but the same could be said of Stokes.

systems. Semi-presidential systems occupy a middle ground, seeing switches about twice as often as parliamentary systems, though less than half as often as in presidential systems.

Switches by Campaign Type

Table 8.2 considered all campaigns. However, as noted above, all switches except one occurred after a "security-oriented" campaign. Thus in Table 8.3 we repeat the analysis in Table 8.2, but control for the type of campaign by including only security-oriented campaigns. In contrast to the pattern in Table 8.2, the patterns for both semi-presidential and presidential systems converge, with the propensity for switching now almost twice as great in pure and semi-presidentialism as under parliamentarism. Thus the semi-presidential systems occupy an "intermediate" position in Table 8.2 only because security-oriented campaigns occur somewhat less frequently under semi-presidentialism than under pure presidentialism. Once we control for the type of campaign, the propensity to switch turns out to be similar under semi- and pure presidentialism: over 40% of security campaigns under both variants of separated powers result in post-election switches.

Table 8.3 Here

Switches by Country Wealth

It is possible that policy switching is less likely in wealthier countries, perhaps because rich countries see less demand for security-oriented policy promises (because voters better understand that efficiency-oriented adjustments are sometimes necessary) or less need for adjustments (because of more diverse and better-managed economies). Thus Tables 8.4 and 8.5 consider the incidence of switches in only middle-income and poorer countries. This exercise also partly controls for the rich-country bias against pure presidentialism: Aside from the USA, all the world's richest democracies are parliamentary or semi-presidential. By the same token,

removing the richest countries also results in a much more balanced sample across democratic regime-types. However, as the two tables show, the patterns we saw in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 hold up when we remove wealthier countries from the sample. This suggests that country wealth does not help predict whether a country will undergo a switch.

Tables 8.4 and 8.5 Here

Switches by Region?

If we looked only at Table 8.1, we might conclude that switching was largely a Latin American phenomenon, given that all but one of our presidential policy switches occurred in Latin America. Yet although security-oriented campaigns *and* switches were common in Latin America,[20] the similar frequency in Table 8.5 of switches from security-oriented campaigns in semi-presidential and pure presidential systems means the economic, cultural or political factors found only in Latin America cannot explain the incidence of policy-switching in general. After all, we find semi-presidential systems on every continent on the planet except Australia. Given this, the propensity to switch--regardless of campaign type--cannot be a “Latin” phenomenon.

Predicting Switches from Security-Oriented Campaigns

Our theoretical discussion earlier in this chapter on the intra- and inter-party constraints parties impose on executives focused on switches without regard for the content of the campaign that preceded the switch. Table 8.2 confirms our primary hypothesis, that switches are most likely in pure presidential systems and least likely in parliamentary systems, with semi-presidential systems occupying an intermediate position. However, Table 8.3 revealed the importance of concentrating on security-oriented campaigns: although such campaigns are most

[20] Among Latin American presidential elections in our sample, 42.4% (28 of 66) featured security campaigns.

frequent under pure presidentialism, the propensity to switch from security to efficiency policies remains greater under both pure and semi-presidential systems compared to parliamentarism.

For whatever reason, switches from security-oriented campaigns to efficiency-oriented policies were more likely around the world during the time-period we explored. We can surely attribute some of this pattern to worldwide trends such as increased globalization and the decline of leftist parties. Under these conditions, advocating populist "security-oriented" policies could still reap votes for some candidates and their parties, but actually implementing such policies grew more difficult. Given a broad set of economic and political conditions, "security to efficiency" switches thus grew common. However, the fact remains that such switches were far more common under certain institutional contexts than others, controlling for country-wealth. Let us therefore consider in greater detail why governments in pure and semi-presidential systems are almost twice as likely to switch from a security-oriented campaign compared to governments in parliamentary systems.

To be clear, we are not seeking to explain why candidates adopt a particular campaign strategy. In fact, regression analyses (not shown) failed to predict security-oriented campaigns. At present we lack a way to predict what causes security campaigns, even in our global sample. We thus agree with Stokes, who argued that it is likely that some candidates who end up switching are dissimulating, while others truly believe they will implement security policies but then find that conditions make such policies unwise. Instead, what we want to do is predict, once a candidate has campaigned on security-oriented policies, whether that candidate will switch. Our large data set—almost 340 campaigns, about 20% of which were security-oriented—makes this investigation feasible in a way that has not been possible before, including for Stokes. As

suggested above, two variables are particularly important: the competiveness of the election for chief executive, and the post-election legislative status of the chief executive's party.

The Impact of Electoral Competitiveness

Stokes suggested that electoral competitiveness might predict switches. She argued that tighter races encourage dissimulation, while big leads encourage politicians to truthfully reveal their future proposals (Stokes 2001, 58). Her results on this variable were ambiguous, but our larger and more diverse sample makes it possible to test our own version of this hypotheses, which is that tighter races would be associated with a greater propensity to switch policies *only in presidential contests*. Because presidential candidates are delegated considerable discretion to shape their own campaigns—a key aspect of our definition of presidentialized parties—they may be less revealing of their future plans when they fear that doing so might jeopardize their chances of winning the election

Table 8.6 offers support for this hypothesis: policy switches indeed are more likely to follow close presidential elections in both pure and semi-presidential systems.[21] In contrast, switches are less likely in parliamentary systems following a close election, though the effect is not statistically significant. In Table 8.7 we repeat the analysis on the sub-sample of security campaigns. The results again support our hypothesis: closer presidential elections are more likely to result in switches, but no such relationship exists in parliamentary systems.

Tables 8.6 and 8.7 Here

Why does margin have no impact in parliamentary systems?[22] Part of the answer lies in the much greater range of margins in parliamentary systems, which derives directly from institutional variables. In presidential systems, negative margins are rare: They can happen only

[21] In the case of two-round systems we take the votes from the decisive round.
[22] Margin also does not matter in legislative elections in semi-presidential systems, a result we do not show here.

where electoral institutions permit a candidate to win who does not even obtain a plurality of the vote, as with the US electoral college in 2000 or in Bolivia, where the legislature may select as president a candidate other than the plurality winner of the popular vote. In parliamentary elections, on the other hand, it is common for parties other than the largest to obtain the premiership as a result of a coalition or via an informal support agreement under a minority cabinet.[23] This means that "competitiveness," measured as margin of victory, simply does not mean the same thing in parliamentarism as it does in systems with popular presidential elections, regardless of the nature of the legislative party system.[24] Because parties in parliamentary systems can and frequently do win the premiership even by "losing" the election, the incentives to either dissimulate or tell the truth on the campaign trail will differ. And in any case, the *prima facie* incentives to tell the truth are much stronger in parliamentary systems to begin with, due to the weaker adverse selection problems we highlighted in earlier chapters.[25]

Our findings suggest that the competitive context of popular presidential elections makes policy switches more likely. Although we were unable to predict when executive candidates or

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[23] The greater tendency of negative margins for the incoming executive is clear from summaries of the data distribution. The mean *margin* of victory in all our data is 11.2 (standard deviation 12.9, range –25.1 to 64.4). In presidential systems the mean is 11.0 (standard deviation 9.3, range –3.4 to 37.0), while in parliamentary systems the mean is 8.8 (standard deviation 12.9, range –25.1 to 56.8).

[24] Negative margins occur in some parliamentary elections under first-past-the-post or alternative-vote electoral systems when the party with the second most votes wins the most seats. Nonetheless, most negative margins in our data are cases of coalition governments led by parties other than the largest.

[25] It is theoretically plausible that under certain conditions in parliamentary systems, competitive races for an anticipated majority would have a similar effect as competitive races for a presidency--in particular, if the system were a two-party system. Indeed, at least three of the five switches in parliamentary systems following security campaigns took place under essentially two-party competition for a the premiership: Greece in 1981 and 1985 (elections won with a majority by PASOK against a single main competitor, New Democracy) and Australia 1983 (when a Labor majority replaced a previous majority by the Liberal–National Coalition). Another similar case is the Congress party's return to power in India (albeit with less than a majority) in 1991. The fifth case is Moldova in 2001, where the Communist Party was hegemonic, having won by a margin of 36.8 percentage points over its closest competitor. All of these cases support our hypothesis except Moldova, but small sample sizes prevent testing this argument statistically for parliamentary systems. Note that this suggestion does not indicate that switches should be a function of party-system "size" in all democratic regimes—only in parliamentary systems. In elections with direct presidential elections, it is not the number of significant legislative parties but the competitiveness of the *presidential* election that influences switches. This means that dissimulation is not necessarily more likely under separate powers systems—only when *presidential* races are competitive. Since this happens frequently, dissimulation should happen more frequently.

their parties would choose one type of campaign or the other, we would certainly expect competition to win a national plurality or majority to force parties to search for electorally appealing platforms even if they had no real intention of implementing them, simply to gain the necessary number of votes. And we would certainly expect such a result to be even *more* likely where the candidates campaigning to implement such policies were far less accountable to their principal, the party. This is, as noted in Chapter Two, part of our definition of "presidentialization." The logic of presidentialization suggests that close competition—as captured by electoral margins—makes campaigning on policies the executive (once elected) is unable or willing to implement more likely.[26]

The Impact of Legislative Status

Earlier we suggested that presidents who lack legislative majorities would be least constrained, whereas the incentives would be reversed for PMs, who would be most constrained when in a coalition or a minority-government situation. We thus predict policy switches would be more likely for minority presidents and less likely for minority prime ministers. In Table 8.8 we provide a breakdown of the frequency of policy switches by regime type, majority or minority situation, and by type of campaign.

Table 8.8 Here

When all campaigns are considered, the expectations follow our predictions. However, the only statistically significant difference in the frequency of switches appears between majority and minority situations in semi-presidential systems, where all of the switches occurred when the

[26] The data in Tables 8.6 and 8.7 also hint at a potential reason why security campaigns are less common in semi-presidential systems: the average margin of presidential elections is significantly higher in semi-presidential systems (20.0%) than in pure presidentialism (11.0%). This difference seems unlikely to be a product of the regime type, per se. Nonetheless, if we are on the right track to suggest that switches are more likely when a close presidential race has encouraged dissimulation, then observed differences in margins across these two regime types may explain at least part of the lower frequency of security campaigns (as shown in Table 8.3) in semi-presidential systems, compared to pure presidential. This notion could be tested only with data from future campaigns.

executive lacked an assembly majority. When we consider only security-oriented campaigns, the frequency of switches also follows our hypotheses, and the differences are statistically significant in each of the three regime types. In pure presidential systems, switches occurred in 63% of the cases of security-oriented campaigns that preceded a presidential minority government, while they only occurred 20% of the time when the president's party had a majority after a security-oriented campaign. For semi-presidential systems, switches occurred in seven of the thirteen cases of security-oriented campaigns that preceded a government in which the president's party lacked a majority.

Turning to parliamentary systems, we expect the relationship between legislative status of the executive and policy switching to be reversed: more switches should follow security campaigns when the prime minister's party controls a majority. This is what we find: just over one-third of majorities result in switches, against only one of ten cases of no majority after a security-oriented campaign.[27] Indeed, while the sample is small, the difference is significant at 91% confidence. With so few cases of either security campaigns or switches under parliamentarism, we must be cautious with these results, but they are at least consistent with our theoretical expectations.

Part of the problem with teasing out the sources of policy-switches in semi-presidential systems is because single-party majorities in such regimes are so rare. In any case, the more important "legislative status" consideration for semi-presidential systems may be whether there is cohabitation. As noted, two of our seven switches in semi-presidential systems occurred under cohabitation: Poland in 1993 and France in 1997. Our sample in this chapter includes fifteen

[27] In fact, the only case of a switch made by a coalition government in a parliamentary system is also the one case of a switch following an *efficiency* campaign. After Germany's 1998 election, the Social Democratic Party formed a coalition with the Green Party. Our reading of contemporary accounts suggests that the coalition may have been a key factor in producing the switch to security policies. All other switches in parliamentary systems were made by single-party governments, only one of which (India 1991) had less than a majority of seats.

cases of cohabitation, eleven of which, like these two switches, resulted from nonconcurrent legislative elections. In both switches under cohabitation, the next election in the cycle was a presidential election--a looming event that might make switching more likely, even when initiated by a newly-elected premier who is in opposition to the incumbent president. With only ten cases of cohabitation—and none of single-party majority—we are unable to test whether cohabitation or minority status of the president's party is relatively more important. Regardless, the results suggest that our theoretical reasoning about the differential impact of legislative status under fused or separated powers is on the right track: presidents are less likely to follow through on their promises when their party lacks a majority in the assembly.

The Impact of Economic Factors

It may seem commonsensical that economic factors should influence the frequency of policy-switches, but our analysis suggests that institutional and partisan factors we have considered swamp economic factors. Stokes hypothesized that we ought to see policy-switching in economic crises (Stokes 2001, 97). We thus estimated multivariate regression equations including both economic and political variables. We use the percentage real growth of GDP in the year of the election if the election was held in the 3rd or 4th quarters of the year, and GDP growth in the year prior to the election if the election was held in the 1st or 2nd quarters, and we also considered the impact of inflation in the current quarter as well as the four quarters prior to the election. In addition, building on the hypothesis we considered above, we also explored whether poorer countries (*Per Capita GDP*) and those more exposed to international markets (*Trade as a % of GDP* and *Foreign Direct Investment as a % of GDP*) are more likely to see

policy-switches.[28] If these factors were associated with policy-switching, they would predict a switch anywhere in the world.

However, we found that *none* of these variables predicted a switch in a global sample, strongly suggesting that institutional differences between parliamentary and pure- and semi-presidential systems are far more important.[29] We do not show the results because they come with a large caveat: we could not generate *any* significant statistical results for semi-presidential systems, on any variable. Unfortunately, it is impossible to estimate the impact of political and economic variables in semi-presidential systems because all switches in those regimes occurred under minority government. Given this "perfect prediction," the statistical program drops all semi-presidential cases from analysis. Additional statistical analysis must await accumulation of more campaigns—and more policy-switches--in semi-presidential systems, or explore a different manifestation of mandate representation across democratic regimes. Yet even given this caveat, our results clearly point to the impact of variation in democratic regime-type on the likelihood of policy-switching.

CONCLUSION

Traditional notions of "responsible party government" and of parties' ability to serve as citizens' agents in government include both the enactment of new policies and the preservation of established policies. Parties' promises to do both--through efforts to establish and maintain a collective reputation--are viewed as the key to their survival and as the main normative criterion by which we should judge whether party government is operating successfully.

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[28] Data for all of these variables came from the World Bank's "World Development Indicators."

[29] Following Stokes, we also tested for the impact of *Age* of the prime minister's or president's party, and *Years* since a country's transition to democracy, to explore the hypotheses that switches are associated with less-institutionalized parties or party systems. Neither of these variables had any impact.

To what extent can parties fulfill their promises under different constitutional regimes? For parliamentary systems, the conventional conceptualization of democratic representation assumes the executive and legislative branches of political parties always act in unison--on the campaign trail as well as in government. Yet following Shugart and Carey (1992) Manin *et al*. (1999), Stokes (2001), and Samuels and Shugart (2003), we argued that political parties in pure- and semi-presidential systems are unlikely, under most conditions, to act as voters' representational agents as they do in parliamentary systems. Indeed, voters can expect members of a party who occupy the executive and legislative branches of a presidential system to represent their interests in different ways. Among other things, this implies weaker mandate-consistency in systems in which executives enjoy separate origin and survival.

Stokes (2001) considered whether parties' organizational "strength"--their cohesiveness and ability to maintain their brand name--is associated with mandate representation. Her findings confounded conventional scholarly wisdom, because she found no connection at all between party strength and mandate representation: leaders of both weak *and* strong parties engaged in policy switches. We agree that parties would not grow more "responsible" if politicians were to suddenly heed scholarly exhortations to strengthen parties' organizations and roots in society. Mandate violations occur under both strong and weak parties, across all democratic systems. However, they occur far more frequently under certain conditions in pure and semi-presidential systems--the situations that maximize diverge between the members of the executive and legislative branches of a single party. The implications of this finding are important: *the roots of "responsible parties" do not lie with parties* per se*, but with the way the separation of powers impacts political parties under particular party-system configurations*.

Policy switches are thus not a function of a simple dichotomy between "parliamentary" and "not parliamentary" systems, but of the interaction between the regime-type, the party-system, and the way in which intra-party politics differs under different regimes. Political representation differs across democratic regimes because institutional context makes the parties different. Where incentives between branches of a single party overlap, policy consistency is likely--even under pure presidentialism. Yet incentive incompatibility is more likely under the separation of origin and survival, because parties cannot control their agents either on the campaign trail or in office. When parties cannot control their agents, they cannot hold them to the party's stated platform—and that's when you'll see switches.

Specifically, parties—or at least their leaders—do switch, under common situations in separate-powers systems: close presidential elections and minority government. In close presidential elections parties delegate the most discretion to their candidate to shape the campaign, to maximize the chances of winning. And under minority government, presidents are most free to choose coalition partners and push policy independently. These two conditions maximize the core feature of presidentialization that we have emphasized throughout this book: a political party in which the executive is an unreliable agent. Under parliamentarism, analogous situations are inconceivable. Indeed, we found no effect of competitiveness on policy-switching under parliamentarism--and as for legislative party size, we found that switches are more likely when prime ministers have a *majority* in parliament.

In this chapter we attempted to reconceptualize how we think of representation across different democratic regimes. Representation--the links between citizens and elected officials--involves different processes given different constitutional structures, so perhaps it should come as no surprise that the quality of representation also differs under presidential, semi-presidential,

or parliamentary government. What might be surprising is the relative lack of scholarly research confronting this issue. We hope this chapter provides useful direction for future research, since our analysis of policy-switches in macroeconomic policy has merely scratched the surface of the ways in which political representation differs across democratic regimes.

Table 8.1: Policy-Switches Worldwide, 1978-2002

Country	Year	System
Argentina	1989	PRES
Australia	1983	PARL
Bolivia	1989	PRES
Costa Rica	1990	PRES
Costa Rica	1994	PRES
Dominican Rep.	1982	PRES
Dominican Rep.	1990	PRES
Ecuador	1988	PRES
Ecuador	1992	PRES
Ecuador	1996	PRES
Ecuador	2002	PRES
France	1995	SEMI-PRES[a]
France	1997	SEMI-PRES[b]
Germany	1998	PARL
Greece	1981	PARL
Greece	1985	PARL
India	1991	PARL
Ireland	1987	SEMI-PRES[b]
Korea	1997	PRES
Panama	1994	PRES
Moldova	1996	SEMI-PRES[a]
Moldova	2001	PARL
Peru	1990	SEMI-PRES[c]
Poland	1993	SEMI-PRES[b]
Romania	1992	SEMI-PRES[c]
Venezuela	1988	PRES
Venezuela	1993	PRES

Notes regarding election type in semi-presidential systems:

a. Nonconcurrent presidential election.
b. Nonconcurrent legislative election.
c. Concurrent presidential and legislative elections.

Table 8.2: Frequency of Policy-Switching, 1978-2002, All Cases			
	Switches	Total Cases	%
Parliamentary	6	157	3.8
Semi-Presidential	7	99	7.1
Presidential	14	83	16.9

Table 8.3: Frequency of Policy-Switching, Security-Oriented Campaigns Only			
	Switches	Cases (% of total)	% of subtotal
Parliamentary	5	21 (13.4)	23.8
Semi-Presidential	7	16 (16.2)	43.8
Presidential	14	29 (34.9)	48.3

Table 8.4: Frequency of Policy-Switching, Excluding the Richest Countries (those with GDP per capita over US$15,000), All Campaigns			
	Switches	Cases	%
Parliamentary	4	75	5.3
Semi-Presidential	5	72	6.9
Presidential	14	76	18.4

Table 8.5: Frequency of Policy-Switching, Excluding the Richest Countries (those with GDP per capita over US$15,000) Security-Oriented Campaigns Only			
	Switches	Cases (% of total)	% of subtotal
Parliamentary	4	14 (18.7)	28.6
Semi-Presidential	5	11 (15.3)	45.5
Presidential	14	29 (38.2)	48.3

Table 8.6: Margin of Victory (%) and 95% Confidence Interval in Switch and Non-Switch Elections, by Election and Regime Type—All Campaigns			
Switch or no switch	Presidential Elections, Pure Presidential Systems	Presidential Elections, Including Semi-Presidential	Parliamentary Systems
No switch	11.9 (9.5 – 14.3)	15.1 (12.4 – 17.7)	8.7 (6.6 – 10.7)
Switch	6.8 (3.5 – 10.0)	8.6 (4.9 – 12.4)	13.7 (0.9 – 26.5)
Significance of Difference	.03	.03	.17

Table 8.7: Margin of Victory (%) and 95% Confidence Interval in Switch and Non-Switch Elections, by Election and Regime Type—Security-Oriented Campaigns			
	Presidential Elections in Pure Presidential Systems	Presidential Elections in Semi-Presidential Systems	Elections in Parliamentary Systems
No switch	15.4 (9.0 – 21.7)	14.8 (9.3 – 20.3)	9.4 (2.1 – 17.8)
Switch	6.8 (3.5 – 10.0)	8.6 (4.9 – 12.4)	15.3 (–0.8 – 31.4)
Significance of Difference	.01	.03	.17

Table 8.8: Switches by regime type, legislative status of executive, and campaign type

	Presidential		Semi-presidential		Parliamentary	
Executive status in assembly	All campaigns	Security campaigns	All campaigns	Security campaigns	All campaigns	Security campaigns
Majority Party	.11 (2 of 19)	.20 (2 of 10)	.00 (0 of 22)	.00 (0 of 3)	.06 (4 of 68)	.36 (4 of 11)
Minority Party	.19 (12 of 62)	.63 (12 of 19)	.10 (7 of 74)	.54 (7 of 13)	.02 (2 of 89)	.10 (1 of 10)
Significant difference?	No	Yes (at 98% confidence)	Yes (at 93% confidence)	Yes (at 95% confidence)	No	Yes (at 91% confidence)