

Conclusion

Constitutional systems with directly-elected executives now comprise a majority of all democracies around the globe. However, the comparative study of political parties remains conceptually wedded to the European experience with parliamentary democracy. The notion that parties might be “presidentialized” is not, of course, new. In fact, the trend toward presidentialization identified in some of the literature (e.g. Poguntke and Webb eds. 2006) reflects a long-standing scholarly concern with parties’ deafness to popular demands. This particular concern has deep roots, even in the West European parliamentary context—it goes back at least to Michels (1911 [1962]) if not before, and in some ways is also an extension of Kirchheimer’s (1966) lament about the emergence of catch-all parties.

We do not deny that Parliamentary parties can become “presidentialized” in one sense, by becoming increasingly reliant on an individual leader. This too is not a new concern; Max Weber famously made this specific point in the early 20th century, pointing out that the problem had characterized 19th-century British parties (Weber 1946 [1918]: 103-07). Clearly, political parties have failed to live up to the high standards scholars set for them, ever since they have existed. Yet this reliance on an individual leader is more accurately identified as *personalization* than as presidentialization, and our notion of presidentialization differs fundamentally from the concept of personalization. In our view, parties in parliamentary systems can never become truly presidentialized because the fusion of electoral origin and survival gives parties tools to minimize both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Parliamentary parties can pick different kinds of candidates—candidates with different skills, interests and goals--than parties in presidential systems, and they can fire leaders who do not live up to expectations.

It is worth noting that the notion of personalization is well known in the literature on

legislative parties: it describes candidates who enjoy some personal reputation distinct from their party's collective reputation (Cain et al. 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Carey and Shugart 1995). By extension, as we noted in Chapter Five, the idea of personalization can be applied fruitfully to executives and their parties. However, the term presidentialization means something more than personalization. A president is not simply a strong personality with a reputation distinct from that of his or her party. He or she is an official who heads a constitutionally separate branch of political authority from the legislature. It is in this sense that we have employed the concept of presidentialization—to illuminate the transformations that parties undergo when they compete not only for legislative seats, but also for a separately-elected and separately-surviving executive.

At the core of this book is the question of how political parties organize and behave when they must bridge the gap between the legislature and the executive. When constitutional design pushes parties down a path to control of (or a share in) the executive branch that does not pass exclusively through the legislature, it also requires parties to place their faith in an individual candidate for a separate and powerful office. This institutional context means that collective, organizational control over that candidate, once elected, cannot be guaranteed. And it further implies that the party must downplay the importance of the collective representation that is the hallmark of parties' legislative organization and behavior. The key question is what difference does this sort of party presidentialization make?

We have argued that the internal collective action and delegation problems that political parties face vary as a function of differences in the executive-legislative structure of government. This argument has wide-ranging implications. Most broadly, this book suggests that many of the alleged differences in governance between democratic regimes--between presidentialism and

parliamentarism, e.g.--are not a function of regime-type per se, but are a function of the ways in which political parties function under different democratic regimes. The interactions to which we have called attention are not with the *number* of parties, as much previous research has claimed, but with their *nature*--the ways they organize and behave. This in turn suggests that the literature on “presidents and assemblies” in comparative politics has jumped the conceptual gun, because one cannot meaningfully consider the potential clash of incentives across separate branches of government without first considering the potential clash of incentives across branches of political parties.

These incentives come into conflict because of the ways democratic constitutions shape executive and legislative authority. Parliamentary constitutions offer parties comparatively simple and easy mechanisms of intra-party accountability, minimizing moral hazard. Because the executive emerges from the parliamentary majority, intra-party politics directly determines *who* runs the government as well as *how* those people run the government. Thus when parties select their agents from within their own top ranks and maintain effective control over those agents after they ascend to the top executive position, we can speak of parliamentarized parties. In contrast, to the extent that parties delegate discretion to agents who may have been selected for characteristics unrelated to their faithfulness to the party itself and who cannot be recalled, we can speak of presidentialized parties. To the extent that a separately-elected presidency matters for any of the things that parties seek--votes, office, or policy--then the separation of powers does not merely split one branch from the other; it splits parties *internally*, posing particular dilemmas for members of the same party who occupy or seek to occupy different branches of government.

Our findings suggest that parties rarely reunite what constitutions divide. The separation of origin and survival shapes party strategy about whom to nominate for both executive and legislative office, whether or not to form electoral and/or governing coalitions, the content of electoral campaigns, and the content of and degree of support for executive policy proposals. Incentive incompatibility between branches of a political party can emerge in all types of parties, irrespective of ideological profile or social base, and regardless of the “type” of leader (insider or outsider). The breadth of the gap between party branches can also vary over time within a particular party, suggesting that parties’ efforts to bridge the separation of powers are only inconsistently effective.

Indeed, presidents’ insulation from intra-party deselection relative to prime ministers suggests that presidents may often engineer a *de facto* reversal of the party-executive principal-agent relationship. That is, presidents may come to control parties for their own purposes. We saw this most clearly in Chapter Eight. As party scholars from Woodrow Wilson (1908) to Susan Stokes (2001) have suggested and our research confirms (at least for one measure), the roots of “responsible parties” do not lie with the parties *per se*. It is not, for example, a matter of the strength or weakness of the party as an organization, but rather the way the separation of powers impacts parties, under particular party-system configurations. By implication, the nature and quality of interest representation differs across democratic regimes. Where there is little incentive incompatibility between branches of a political party, policy responsibility and mandate-consistency is likely. Yet where the separation of origin and survival generates incentive incompatibility and moral hazard problems, irresponsible parties are the likely result.

Responsible parties as conceived in the literature cannot exist under the separation of powers. This is an important point in light of recent developments in US party politics. The

dramatic decrease in what we termed “electoral separation of purpose” in the United States in the early years of the twenty-first century does not suggest that parliamentarized “responsible” parties have suddenly emerged. It is true that overlapping executive and legislative constituencies are a necessary feature of responsible parties, but low electoral separation of purpose is just one of the ways parties might bridge separately elected institutions. Quite apart from the fact that the relatively low levels of electoral separation of purpose in recent US elections (e.g. ESP for the Republicans =10.98 in 2004) remain short of the total fusion (ESP=0.00) of parliamentarism, these other indicators remind us that the increased discipline and polarization of US parties do not imply responsible or parliamentarized parties.

For example, both scholarly and popular critiques of George W. Bush’s presidency decried the increased use of unilateral executive powers (and not only in security and foreign affairs--see Cooper 2005) alongside the increased use of congressional “earmarks” in allocation of spending items.¹ *Neither* of these is a typical concern of parliamentary parties that resemble the responsible-parties ideal: prime ministers’ powers are necessarily shared with their cabinet colleagues (Lijphart 1994) and members of parliament typically enjoy few opportunities to “claim credit” for special favors outside of the party’s more general policies. However, if US presidents can use their “primary proposer power” to target spending to favored districts (Berry *et al.* 2009), they may be able to make their parties *responsible to the president* rather than the other way around, as parliamentarization would imply.

¹ The NGO Citizens Against Government Waste, for example, records a greater than 50% increase in what it defines as “pork-barrel spending” from 2001 to 2006, and then a sharp drop after the 2006 congressional elections resulted in divided government. See http://www.cagw.org/site/PageServer?pagename=reports_porkbarrelreport#trends (accessed March 29, 2009).

Consider also that had George W. Bush been a prime minister in a parliamentary system, he never would have survived in office as long as he did. The separation of survival cost the Republicans' presidential candidate and congressional candidates dearly at the 2008 elections.

Finally, consider the fact that it did not take long into Barack Obama's administration for journalists to note that the new president's priorities were overshadowing the preferences of his own party's legislative leaders (e.g. Nicholas 2009). Despite all the changes that US party politics has undergone towards more cohesive and ideological profiles and more consistent cross-branch electoral constituencies, both parties remain clearly dependent upon an unaccountable presidency to advance their goals. This remains the case despite the fact that US presidents possess notably weaker formal powers than their counterparts in other pure (and many semi-) presidential systems (Shugart and Carey 1992; Alemán and Schwartz 2006; Tsebelis and Rizova 2007).

Of course, many parties in separation of powers systems exhibit high electoral separation of purpose. They explicitly seek to work within the incentives the system offers, and take a path that is by definition unavailable in pure parliamentary systems by gaining votes in legislative and executive races from distinct pools of voters. We saw a striking example of high separation of purpose in Brazil's Worker's Party in 2006: where the party's president gained votes in his successful reelection bid, the party's congressional candidates performed poorly. A party with such limited electoral reach for its legislative candidates would be unlikely to win control over the executive branch in a parliamentary system, a point that only underscores another way that parties can be presidentialized: Rather than have a presidential candidate whose popularity and "coattails" generate low electoral separation of purpose, a party can instead have a presidential

candidate who builds an almost entirely separate electoral constituency that far transcends the electoral appeal of the party itself!

The point is that party “responsibility” is not a function of cohesiveness or low electoral separation of purpose. To the extent that a political party depends on its presidential leader’s electoral and governing success, it cannot be a “responsible” party as Woodrow Wilson or V.O. Key would have understood the term. It is instead a presidentialized party, because it must subordinate its collective pursuits to a single leader who remains unaccountable. The lack of intra-party leadership accountability is a critical implication of our theoretical framework: to the extent that presidents are unaccountable to their own co-partisans, Madison had it wrong in *Federalist 51*: constitutional checks and balances do not result in “ambition countering ambition,” but rather in an agent’s ambition running wild. The success of a system of checks and balances in preventing tyranny--whether of a majority or of a single powerful leader—thus depends crucially on factors Madison failed to consider: leaders’ personalities and intra-party norms and rules, rather than the inter-party balance of power, or what Madison termed the “factional” balance of power.²

We can forgive Madison this omission, because political parties did not exist in his time. However, contemporary scholars who offer twists on Madisonian theories of representation, accountability, and policy-making have failed to appreciate the implications of differences in intra-party politics across democratic regimes. In saying that scholars of political institutions may have jumped the conceptual gun we do not mean to engage in finger-pointing, simply because we might not like what we see in the mirror—see Shugart and Carey (1992), Samuels

² In any case, as Kernell (2003) notes and we discussed in Chapter Two, Madison originally formulated the theory of factional balance before he and his colleagues in the Constitutional Convention had invented separate origin and survival of the executive. The notion of factional balance thus applied to a proposed constitutional design that more resembled what today is understood as parliamentary government than presidentialism.

(2007) or Samuels and Shugart (2003), for example. This book is an effort to bridge the parties literature and the literature on constitutional design. Neither literature has fully come to grips with the impact of the separation of powers on parties.

By saying that the prevention of tyranny depends on factors Madison failed to consider we are also saying that in modern democracy, constitutional structure shapes the way and extent to which parties can fulfill the key tasks theorists of democracy assign to them—channeling citizens’ interests into government and giving citizens the possibility of holding government to accounts. Presidentialized parties suffer from an intra-party accountability deficit. Theorists of democracy in the pluralist tradition such as Schumpeter (1942), Dahl (1972), Bobbio (1987) and Sartori (1987) tend to downplay or simply ignore intra-party politics (Van Biezen 2004, 10). Instead, they conclude that the key to democracy lies with maintaining an *inter*-party balance of power. No matter how they organized themselves, as long as more than two “teams” of politicians compete regularly for power--and would relinquish power if voted out--the system was democratic. Everything else was superfluous detail (Schmitter and Karl 1991).

Yet even within the theory of democracy embodied by the line of argument traced from Schumpeter through Schmitter and Karl, our findings suggest that not all parties fulfill the “minimalist” criteria of democracy similarly. For one, it is not at all obvious that we should assume that parties act as unitary actors in presidential systems. And even if we can, to the extent that presidents *reverse* the principal-agent relationship, the dynamics of intra-party politics clearly differ across systems. A “responsible” party, after all, requires that the executive be responsible to the party and not the other way around, and certainly cannot allow executives and their parties to go their separate ways. In addition, voters have different opportunities to hold government to accounts in different systems. In parliamentary regimes citizens very often do not

have a chance to express their views about executive performance, precisely because the executive depends both on partisan and assembly confidence (Chapter Four). Parties can and do punish poorly-performing executives, in the hope that voters will *not* punish them at the next elections. In contrast, under the separation of powers parties cannot hold their own leader to accounts; only voters can reward or punish the party's candidates for national executive. Some evidence suggests that the possibility of intra-party accountability under parliamentarism weakens electoral accountability (Hellwig and Samuels 2008). However, it remains unclear whether voters in presidential elections are retrospectively punishing an individual, a party, or both.

In short, the separation of powers creates presidentialized parties, not merely personalized parties. Variation in institutional context generates distinct intra-party dilemmas and dynamics across democratic regimes that have important political consequences for all the activities parties undertake: candidate selection, campaigning to represent citizens' interests, governing. Parliamentary parties can be personalized, but they can never become presidentialized.

SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IS MORE PRESIDENTIAL THAN PARLIAMENTARY

Another key implication of this book is that everything we have said above tends to hold true in both pure *and* semi-presidential systems. In this way, our theoretical framework helps explain why the distinction between prime ministerial “insiders” and presidential “outsiders,” as Linz (1994, 26-9) would have it, is untenable. Linz's distinction between insiders and outsiders does appear to hold between the two pure regime-types. However, the distinction is less helpful when applied to semi-presidential regimes, which suggests that the position of president and/or

prime minister is not the critical factor that determines the “type” of candidate selected for each office. Instead, the constitutional balance of authority between the two positions is important. Thus in nearly all semi-presidential systems, the existence of a directly-elected president tends to “contaminate” the parties, interfering in the principal-agent relationship between parties and their prime ministerial agents in the legislature.

Given this, prime ministers in semi-presidential democracy have distinctive career paths relative to their counterparts in pure parliamentary systems (Chapter Three). This suggests either that parties care relatively less about adverse selection problems under semi-presidentialism-- which seems unlikely--or that presidents play a powerful role in prime ministerial selection. And as we showed in Chapter Four, semi-presidential regimes also give presidents influence over prime ministerial deselection. Critically, these findings tend to apply even in premier-presidential systems, in which the premier is formally accountable only to the assembly majority, and not to the president.

Despite the absence of formal accountability of the premier to the president in premier-presidential regimes, our findings also illustrate the fact that premiers in such systems typically become the *de facto* agent of the president, as long as the president’s opposition does not control the assembly majority. Indeed, under unified government premiers frequently become personal representatives of the president within the assembly, rather than co-equals in a dual executive structure. In cases of cohabitation, control over the cabinet clearly shifts to the assembly majority. In the more common situation in which the president’s party has a strong legislative contingent--not necessarily a majority-- presidents’ place in the chain of delegation between parties and prime ministers complicates parties’ ability to hold *either* their prime ministers *or* their presidents to accounts. In a crucial way, presidents’ “contamination” of the party-prime

minister relationship thus attenuates parties' control over the composition and direction of government.

Our findings suggest that treating semi-presidential systems as largely parliamentary, and the parties within those systems as parliamentarized, is misguided. Politics in most semi-presidential systems is highly presidentialized, most of the time. Weber's and de Gaulle's desire for a president "above" and more powerful than the parties—a temporary elected monarch—has become the norm in hybrid systems. The Irish and Austrian cases of essentially parliamentarized politics are exceptional, and pretending that they are anything but exceptional is wishful thinking. Presidents' *formal* influence in president-parliamentary systems makes this conclusion rather obvious; their *informal* and *partisan* influence in premier-presidential regimes offers additional evidence that one cannot simply equate this subtype with parliamentarism. When presidents' parties and/or allies control the assembly majority, intra-party politics becomes highly presidentialized and we see a reversal of the party-leader principal-agent relationship: the prime minister becomes the *president's* agent, rather than the party's.

PURE TYPES AND HYBRIDS: IMPLICATIONS OF TRENDS IN CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

Our theoretical framework and the results it generates also help explain underappreciated aspects of trends in constitutional reforms around the world. Around the year 2000, semi-presidential hybrids came to represent a narrow plurality of all democracies. The spread of this regime-type suggests that politicians frequently seek a "best of both worlds." Hybrid constitutional designs and the ongoing tinkering (or debating about tinkering) within hybrid formats appear to offer politicians the opportunity to balance the advantages of a direct executive

agent of the electorate with the parliamentary accountability of the cabinet. However, the results in this book strongly suggest that this “best of both worlds” in terms of executive-legislative structure is a chimera. Premier-presidentialism may approximate this ideal balance, but as noted, it too tends to promote party presidentialization.

We count fifteen cases of change of constitutional regime format--including changes from one semi-presidential subtype to the other--since 1946. Obviously the main conclusion one can draw from fifteen changes in 88 countries over more than sixty years is that such fundamental alterations of democratic constitutional format are very rare (see also Rahat 2008). Nonetheless, even such small numbers may tell us something about trends in democratic institutional design. Figure 9.1 indicates each reform according to the direction of change across the continuum of regime types from pure parliamentary through each of the various hybrids to pure presidentialism. Of these fifteen reforms, six represent shifts away from parliamentarism towards a regime with a directly elected executive; seven represent a move from one form of presidentialism to another; and only two represent shifts away from a system with a directly elected executive towards pure parliamentarism.

Figure 9.1 Here

First, consider the two shifts to pure parliamentarism: Israel, which we discussed at length in Chapter Six, and Moldova. Moldova’s reform came after the Communist Party regained electoral hegemony following a period of unstable legislative majorities and nonpartisan presidents. With the shift to pure parliamentarism, the Communists could ensure that their chairman would occupy the (unelected) presidency (Roper 2008), eliminating the risk that another party or independent might prevail in a direct popular election. These two countries combined had only about fifteen years of experience under direct elections before shifting (back)

to pure parliamentarism, but the other countries in our data have over 1,000 years of accumulated experience with direct executive elections, suggesting a striking empirical regularity: *once adopted, separate executive elections are almost never abandoned.*

Returning to Figure 9.1, we see that apart from Israel's two changes and Moldova's one, there are a total of twelve other structural constitutional reforms: five that *enter* one of the categories of separate executive authority and seven moves *within* the categories of separate powers. The five cases of moves towards separately elected presidents include The Gambia, which is the only case to span the entire space in Figure 9.1, and one case that moved to president-parliamentarism, Sri Lanka. The other three are cases of the adoption of premier-presidentialism: France, Slovakia, and Turkey.³

As for the cases of moves from one form of separation of powers to another, having only seven cases restricts our ability to generalize. With that caveat in mind it is striking that only two of these cases--both of which occurred in Madagascar--represent moves toward the "president-dominated" end of the spectrum in Figure 9.1. The other five cases all represent efforts to weaken presidents' formal powers while remaining within a separate-powers framework. These cases deserve further attention, as they represent a desire to limit the presidentializing tendencies we have argued are a fundamental feature of separate-powers systems. Three of these cases switched from president-parliamentarism to premier-presidentialism: Portugal, Ukraine and Armenia. The other two entered the semi-presidential category from pure presidentialism: Georgia and Taiwan. In these five cases, institutional reforms sought to strengthen the independence of prime ministers vis-à-vis presidents, at least in terms of the formal lines of authority.

³ The Turkish move refers to a constitutional amendment passed at the end of 2007, and thus the country did not enter as a semi-presidential system in our analysis of biographical data in Chapters Three and Four, which concluded with that year.

Thus Figure 9.1 shows that while we see almost no shifts to parliamentarism and some shifts away from parliamentarism, movement within non-parliamentary cases is almost entirely away from pure presidentialism, towards the “parliamentary” end of the continuum.⁴ In light of these patterns, and anticipating future interest in similar reforms in other presidential or president-parliamentary systems, it is worth asking whether such efforts really “parliamentarize” separate powers systems. Our research offers a qualified support for premier-presidentialism--the qualification being that parliamentarization is likely to be quite limited even where presidents have relatively weak constitutional authority. After all, we have shown repeatedly that even in premier-presidential systems, the existence of separate origin and survival tends to create fundamentally “presidentialized” parties. There are exceptions, of course, but one should be careful about designing constitutions, or recommending changes, under the assumption that the country in question would be one of the few exceptions.

Still, we do see some potential advantages to premier-presidentialism, one of which is that no premier-presidential democracy has ever been replaced by an authoritarian regime--at least not after having met the criteria we use throughout this book to identify cases of democracy. Each of the other regime-types has experienced democratic collapse.⁵

However, the most important potential advantage is the prospect of cohabitation, which does not necessarily offer parties the “best of both worlds” but at least offers the possibility to oscillate between the presidential and parliamentary worlds (see the discussion in Linz 1994). Under cohabitation, the opposition party (or parties) gains control over the cabinet, the president

⁴ Still other cases that we know of have seen moves that do not amount to a change of type or subtype, but represented either actual moves (in Finland) or serious but failed proposals (in Sri Lanka, for example) to weaken the agency relationship of the presidency over the cabinet within semi-presidential systems.

⁵ We record breakdowns of parliamentary democracy in Malaysia and Somalia in 1969 and Pakistan in 1999; neither has returned to democracy for five or more years (although Pakistan could be in the process of doing so). Presidential democracy broke down in The Gambia in 1993, without a return thus far. Breakdowns in four other presidential democracies (Brazil 1964, Philippines 1969, Uruguay 1971, Chile 1973) and one president-parliamentary democracy (Peru 1992) have been followed by subsequent redemocratizations.

is relegated to a secondary political position, and the prime minister is no longer an agent of the president but rather of the parliamentary majority—as in pure parliamentarism. Still, any argument in favor of premier-presidentialism should not be based entirely on the possibility of “parliamentarization” as a counterweight to the presidency, because this phase of premier-presidentialism represents only about 20% of the total democratic experience under this format. Moreover, even under cohabitation considerable presidentialization of the parties remains: the party that holds the premiership has every incentive to seek the presidency at the next opportunity, and thus faces the electoral and governing dilemmas of presidentialization that we have detailed.

In short, this book suggests that none of the hybrid formats truly combines the “best of both worlds.” Parties in all systems with directly-elected executives face dilemmas of adverse selection, incentive incompatibility, and moral hazard. If reformers truly want parliamentarized parties, they should keep or adopt parliamentarism. However, if they want to combine popular election of the executive with parliamentary confidence, they should consider premier-presidentialism over the alternatives. Premier-presidentialism at least gives parties an incentive to bridge the two elected institutions more effectively than pure presidentialism or president-parliamentarism. Party presidentialization tends to occur even under premier-presidentialism, but at least parties in opposition to the president can regain control of the cabinet if an election result or a shift in the inter-party balance in parliament allows them to forge a cohabitation situation. Moreover, seeking to avert cohabitation, parties seeking the presidency under premier-presidentialism have relatively weaker incentives to downplay assembly elections as their counterparts do in many president-parliamentary and pure presidential systems.

Premier-presidentialism is also more promising than the elected prime-ministerial hybrid. The adoption of this format in Israel immediately revealed the extent to which separate election forces parties to become presidentialized, even though the elected prime minister remained dependent on parliamentary confidence to survive in office. If constitutional engineers want the perceived advantages of separate election, they are better off with a dual executive, rather than trying to combine features of both presidentialism and parliamentarism in a single executive. We thus concur with Sartori's view that Israel's single-executive hybrid may very well have represented the *worst* of both worlds.⁷

Moreover, despite periodic claims that parliamentarism offers superior government performance in this way or that—a claim scholars have made since at least Woodrow Wilson's day—we also warn against shifts that emulate Moldova's elimination of its elected presidency. Sartori (1994b: 112) has argued that the lack of parties with a “parliamentary fit” might make moves to parliamentarism difficult for parties to navigate. That is, although we have argued that parties take on characteristics derived from the executive-legislative structure in which they operate, presidentializing existing parliamentary parties may be much easier than parliamentarizing parties that have always operated in a system with a directly-elected presidency.

In any case, there is certainly no empirical support for the idea that parliamentarism represents a viable reform option in countries that lack a parliamentary tradition, however desirable scholars may think it would be. Besides, regionally diverse and economically divided societies may simply be more governable with presidentialism of some form (Shugart 1999). Whatever scholars have to say about these issues, the real world has spoken, and it has said that there is an increasing desire over the long sweep of democratization since the middle of the

⁷ Sartori (quoted in Hazan 2001, 351) called the Israeli system “the most incredibly stupid system ever designed.”

twentieth century for systems with separate presidencies. This real-world fact cannot be overlooked, and academic theories have simply not kept up. We have sought to address this gap in this book. If we have a normative case to advance for one pure or hybrid regime-type over another, it is cautiously in favor of premier-presidentialism. However, the case for that hybrid comes with the recognition that having a prime minister and cabinet accountable to the assembly, and even having the formal powers reduce the president's role within the executive, is in no way equivalent to adopting parliamentarism.

THE RESEARCH AGENDA

Our theoretical framework offers several avenues for future research. All else equal, parties that emerge under presidential institutions will face different dilemmas than parties in parliamentary systems. To our knowledge only Leon Epstein (1967) ever addressed this issue, and then only briefly in order to debate Duverger's hypothesis that the "mass" party was the modern norm. We suggest not only that Epstein's insight should hold regardless of the historical context, but also that presidentialized parties are the contemporary norm--for institutional, not sociological reasons. For example, scholars have argued that presidentialism affects the *number* of political parties. To the extent that this argument is true, it is likely that presidentialism also affects the *nature* of political parties--how and why they form and develop, and what their internal politics look like, under different constitutional regimes.

Scholarly explorations of party emergence have not addressed the question of the strategic, "psychological" incentives that presidential elections generate, either in terms of intra- or inter-party politics, and whether from the party's or the voter's strategic perspective. For example, given the dominance of presidentialism in many newly-emerging party systems and the

world-wide decline of the salience of socio-cultural cleavages, political scientists could certainly benefit by placing the separation or fusion of powers more centrally in their explanations for party-system emergence and consolidation (see Geddes 2004; Hicken 2007).

Similarly, if we accept that presidentialism affects party and party-system emergence, we should also accept the hypothesis that the incentives created by the separation of origin and survival affect parties' organizational evolution. Much of the party-development literature has an organizational sociology bent that pays little attention to the potential impact of electoral and other institutions. Even so, prominent sociologically-oriented scholars recognize that institutional environments can affect parties' evolutionary trajectory. Panebianco (1988), for example, held that the shape a party takes early on in its development largely explains its later developmental path. If parties take on a "presidential" character, they will retain these characteristics over time—an idea that may go a long way towards explaining why political reforms away from any form of presidentialism to parliamentarism are almost unknown.

Likewise, scholars have yet to consider many of the potential ways that the separation of powers shapes party behavior. To what extent do presidents and their parties go their separate ways? We have some research on the impact of presidents on cabinet composition (e.g. Amorim Neto 2002), but scholars should turn their attention to election campaigns, coalitional strategies, campaign organization, and the allocation of resources. Do presidents and their parties campaign on different issues or themes; receive votes from different groups of voters; or advocate different policies in the legislature? Scholars have recently confirmed that presidents and their parties often differ in terms of placement on the left-right spectrum, whether measured using published campaign manifestos (see Bruhn 2004 on Mexico, e.g.) or expert surveys (Wiesehomeier and Benoit, 2009). However, no comprehensive comparison of presidents' and parties' locations in

policy space using manifestos exists either across countries or over time, and thus far experts have been surveyed only once, meaning we lack a clear picture of the evolution of separation of purpose in any way beyond our aggregate electoral data. Scholars have also made little use of surveys to explore how voters think about presidents and parties differently.

Finally, our results in Chapter Eight suggest party responsibility is unlikely when president's parties lack a legislative majority. "Responsible" parties are likely under *all* political conditions in parliamentary regimes, but only under fairly uncommon situations in separate powers systems: single-party majority government. And even in that situation, responsible parties are unlikely because the separation of survival gives the executive autonomy to deviate from the party line, free of any threat of discipline. The findings suggest that scholars should explore presidential influence in representation in far greater detail. Powell (2004) concurs in noting that scholarly consideration of the interaction between parties and voter behavior in systems with both executive and legislative elections has not advanced very far. Do voters hold presidents *personally* accountable, or do they see presidents as agents of their parties? Only additional survey research, perhaps using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, can help answer these sorts of questions. We hope that our theoretical framework, derived from principal-agent theory, can help advance scholarly understanding of party politics in new and important ways across the world's democracies.

Figure 9.1. Reform to the executive-legislative structure of democratic regimes, 1946–2007

