Russia is a huge country, and many of its regions (Russia's equivalent to U.S. states) are homelands to distinct ethnic groups. Chechnya, with its ongoing separatist war and jihadi connections, is only the most open of the many wounds that potentially threaten Russian unity.

The correct prescription for this challenge is a federal democracy because it gives regions limited control over their own affairs, a vital incentive for diverse and far-flung communities to remain within Russia. Indeed, Russia avoided a Soviet-style disintegration along ethnic lines largely because it forged a federal "bargain" that convinced regional elites to agree to Moscow's authority in exchange for varying degrees of regional autonomy.

The establishment in the mid-1990s of direct elections for regional executives provided local leaders their own power base outside of Moscow's grasp. Sharing power has worked. Chechnya is a stark exception to generally peaceful and stable federal relations. Putin's plan to cancel regional elections is a direct attack on the federalism that holds the Russian Federation together.

Putin's centralizing drive goes further, eliminating district elections for Russia's lower house of parliament. Currently, half of the deputies are elected from single-member districts, like the United States. In addition to providing all voters a personal representative, these elections permit very small ethnic groups with the opportunity to elect one of their own to the national legislature. The result is a remarkably diverse parliament reflecting the ethnic composition of society. The other half of Russia's deputies are currently elected nationwide, from lists submitted by political parties that win seats according to their share of the national votes (as long as it is over 5 percent).

When combined with the local districts, this creates a useful balance between local and national representation. However, when used alone, as Putin proposes, this party-list system will centralize political power because all of Russia's vast territory will be a single electoral district. Under such a system, leaders in Moscow will largely determine who represents voters throughout Russia.

This centralization would be dangerous even if Russia had a democracy that was otherwise healthy, with vibrant opposition parties. However, even before the Putin proposals Freedom House, an international organization that works to advance political and economic freedom, reported that Russia suffered the greatest decline of democratic processes among postcommunist states over the past year.

The Kremlin has finally established a "party of power" completely loyal to President Putin that now dominates the political landscape. Moreover, regional leaders were forced to give up their seats in the upper house of parliament. All national television stations have been brought under direct or indirect control of the central government in Moscow. Recalcitrant economic oligarchs have been forced into exile or arrested.

Unfortunately, the Russian political establishment and general public have gone along with these moves rather than punish Putin for failing to provide the stability and order promised in a system that has become popularly known as "managed" democracy. While opinion polls suggest there has been a serious erosion of support for the Chechen war, this has not translated into any meaningful opposition to the president. Rather, the recent wave of terrorist attacks has only reinforced a sense of vulnerability among the public that the government can easily manipulate into support for greater restrictions on the messy details of democracy.

Several critics within and outside of Russia have noted that Putin's proposals to cancel gubernatorial elections and end election of individual deputies to the national legislature have little direct connection to fighting terrorism and smack of an opportunistic use of the terrorist attack as cover for a plan long in the making. Regrettably, using terrorism as a cover for an authoritarian power play is only the beginning of the problems associated with this plan.

Ironically, the end of these electoral devices for regional autonomy and ethnic representation could increase rather than decrease threats to the security and stability of the Russian state over the long term. Regional leaders and publics, particularly ethnic minorities, will have fewer incentives to willingly accept the authority from distant Moscow. Putin may have little trouble establishing and even maintaining such a centralized system given his current unrivaled popularity and prestige. However, any successor may face some serious challenges from regions that felt repressed under Putin.

Warnings that democratic processes not be sacrificed for security may be unconvincing to a society newly introduced to democracy and reeling from such a horrifying terrorist attack as occurred in Beslan. For this reason it is vitally important to emphasize that the authoritarian measures undertaken by President Putin in the wake of this tragic event not only threaten the survival of democracy in Russia but may actually pose serious risks to the security and long-term survival of the country itself.