S. Nageeb Ali
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I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of California, San Diego. Email: snali[at]ucsd.edu Office: (858) 534-8250, ECON 214
Mailing Address: 9500 Gilman Drive, Dept 0508, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508 Fax: (858) 534-7040 |
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Publications |
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Why People Vote: Ethical Motives and Social Incentives,
with
Charles Lin,
forthcoming in American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics.
Integrating the ethical voter model with social signaling generates a simple framework that can be useful to understand turnout behavior and candidate competition. |
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Herding with Collective Preferences, with Navin Kartik, Economic Theory, November 2012.
Do individuals herd when there are payoff interdependencies, as in a sequential election?
A previous version was peer
reviewed by
NAJ Economics 12:4. |
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Learning
Self-Control,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May
2011.
Would a decisionmaker learn about
his temptations from his experience? |
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Information
Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees,
with
Jacob
Goeree,
Navin Kartik,
and
Thomas Palfrey, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, May 2008.
Do standing committees aggregate
information better than ad hoc committees? |
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Waiting to Settle: Multilateral Bargaining with
Subjective Biases,
Journal of Economic Theory, September 2006.
When does optimism about bargaining
power delay agreement? |
| Work in Progress |
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Enforcing Cooperation in
Networked Societies, with
David Miller, November
2012.
Which networks support the
greatest cooperation?
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Ostracism, with
David Miller.
Do individuals have an incentive
to reveal when others deviate?
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| Image Versus Information, with Roland Benabou. |
| Information Aggregation in Search Committees, with Aislinn Bohren. |
| Power and Predictability in Legislative Bargaining, with B. Douglas Bernheim and Xiaochen Fan. |
| Reputation in Tournaments, with Alex Wolitzky. |
| Current Teaching |
| ECON 281: Models in Behavioral Economics |
